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Abstract 
This Ph.D. thesis delivers a human rights-based analysis of post 9/11 anti-
terrorism policies in a European context, looking at the cases of the UK, 
Germany, and the EU. It enters the debate of whether these European states 
and the EU sufficiently uphold human rights standards while trying to tackle 
terrorism. The major claim of this thesis is that the mentioned entities do 
curtail essential human rights in the course of anti-terrorism since 9/11. Such 
curtailments threaten the free and full unfolding and development of human 
beings, the full enjoyment of human capabilities, and additionally change the 
power-relation between the individual and the state (to the benefit of the 
latter). Human rights curtailments could be detected via using a double-edged 
analytical framework, resting on a more narrow approach to human rights 
connecting to legally binding rights documents (such as the ICCPR or the 
ECHR) and court rulings, and a broader understanding of human rights, 
connecting with the wider idea and aims of rights, such as the guarantee of 
dignity, freedom, and justice (the ‘spirit of rights’). Terrorism policies that are 
under scrutiny in this thesis are e.g. indefinite detention, dragnet 
investigations, data retention, intelligence mass surveillance, facial 
recognition systems, and various prevention measures. Pertained rights are 
e.g. the right to life, liberty and security, the right to privacy, the freedoms of 
expression, association, assembly, and movement and the right to be free from 
discrimination. Since this thesis does combine a long-term comparative 
approach with a double-edged human rights angle, including the EU and 
Germany, covers a range of rights issues, and adds to the understanding of 
newest developments, it does answer on a research gap. In terms of rights 
problems in the course of recent anti-terrorism, the UK owns the worst record. 
Germany has continuously run into rights problems as well in its attempts to 
tackle terrorism. The EU has become a major player in European anti-
terrorism making in the last two decades and is, therefore, a proactive force 
behind some rights-curtailing policymaking as well. The three entities are 
additionally interrelated in their policymaking. Two major approaches are 
currently followed in such policymaking, one, the construction of an all-
encompassing system of surveillance and two, a focus on Islamist terrorism 
triggering discriminatory tendencies towards Muslim minorities. It is the 
courts (and rights NGOs) that have been the major opposing forces to rights 
infringing European anti-terrorism, declaring policies for ineligible in several 
instances. Curtailing rights norms does not only interfere with legal norms and 
the spirit of rights but is also potentially counter-productive. By stirring 
resentment among those most affected by rights-intrusive policies, the 
groundwork for more and not less violence is established. Therein, I develop 
the argument that the protection of rights levels does bear potential as a 
cornerstone for more effective anti-terrorism. Lastly, I offer proposals for 
short and long-term strategies, aiming at a more inclusive and non-rights-
 
 
infringing anti-terrorism framework which might be viable as an alternative 
to the policies currently applied by European states.  
 
Dansk Resume 
Denne ph.d.-afhandling fremfører en menneskerettighedsbaseret analyse af 
post 9/11 antiterrorpolitik i en europæisk kontekst med Storbritannien, 
Tyskland og EU som cases. Afhandlingen introducerer en debat af, hvorvidt 
disse europæiske lande og EU tilstrækkeligt opretholder 
menneskerettighederne, mens de søger at bekæmpe terrorisme. 
Hovedpåstanden i denne afhandling er, at disse enheder rent faktisk 
indskrænker essentielle menneskerettigheder i forbindelse med antiterror 
siden 9/11. Sådanne indskrænkelser truer den frie og fulde udfoldelse og 
udvikling af mennesker, den fulde udnyttelse af menneskelige evner og 
yderligere ændrer de magtbalancen mellem individet og staten (i sidstnævntes 
favør). Indskrænkelser af menneskerettigheder kan afdækkes ved at anvende 
en tofoldig analytisk model baseret til dels på en mere snæver tilgang til 
menneskerettigheder koblet til bindende menneskerettighedsdokumenter 
(såsom ICCPR og Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention) og 
domsfældelser og til dels en bredere forståelse af menneskerettigheder koblet 
til den bredere ide og mål af rettigheder såsom garantien af værdighed, frihed 
og retfærdig (’spirit of rights’). De antiterrorpolitikker, der bliver gransket i 
denne afhandling, inkluderer bl.a. forvaring på ubestemt tid, elektronisk 
profilering som efterforskningsmetode, datalagring, efterretnings-
overvågning, ansigtsgenkendelsessystemer og forskellige forebyggende 
foranstaltninger. Vedrørte rettigheder er fx retten til liv, frihed og sikkerhed, 
retten til privatliv, ytrings-, forenings-, forsamlings- og bevægelsesfrihed og 
retten til ikke at blive diskrimineret. Eftersom denne afhandling kombinerer 
en langsigtet komparativ tilgang med en tofoldig menneskerettighedsvinkel, 
inkluderer EU og Tyskland, behandler en række forskellige rettigheder og 
bidrager til en forståelse for den nyeste udvikling, dækker den et hul i 
forskningen. I forbindelse med rettighedsproblemer i relation til antiterror 
holder Storbritannien den værste rekord. Ligeledes er Tyskland løbet ind i 
rettighedsproblemer adskillige gange i forsøget på at tackle terrorisme. I de 
sidste to årtier har EU spillet en stor rolle i den europæiske antiterrorisme og 
er derfor også en proaktiv kraft bag nogle rettighedsindskrænkende politiske 
beslutninger. De tre entiteter er yderligere forbundne i deres politiske 
beslutningsprocesser vedrørende antiterrorisme. I øjeblikket bliver to 
hovedtilgange fulgt i antiterrorpolitik; et: konstruktionen af et altomfattende 
overvågningssystem, to: et fokus på islamisk terrorisme medførende 
diskriminerende tendenser mod muslimske minoriteter. Det er domstolene (og 
menneskerettigheds-NGO’er), som har været de instanser, der i størst grad har 
modsat sig rettighedskrænkende europæisk antiterrorisme, idet de flere gange 
har erklæret politikker for uberettigede. Indskrænkelser af rettighedsnormer 
står ikke blot i vejen for lovmæssige normer og ’the spirit of rights’, men kan 
 
 
også være kontraproduktive. Ved at vække foragt blandt de, der er mest 
påvirket af rettighedsforstyrrende politikker, etableres en grobund for flere og 
ikke færre voldshandlinger. Deri udvikler jeg argumentet for, at det at værne 
om rettighedsniveauet potentielt kan være en hjørnesten i en mere effektiv 
antiterrorpolitik. Endeligt præsenterer jeg forslag til kort- og langsigtede 
strategier med sigte mod en mere inkluderende og ikke-rettighedskrænkede 
antitterrormodel, som kan være et levedygtigt alternativ til de politikker, 
europæiske stater aktuelt benytter.  
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Terrorism wins only if you respond to it in the way that the terrorists want 
you to; which means that its fate is in your hands and not in theirs. 
-David Fromkin (1975) 
 
The best — the only — strategy to isolate and defeat terrorism is by 
respecting human rights, fostering social justice, enhancing democracy and 
upholding the primacy of the rule of law. 
- Sergio Vieira de Mello (2002) 
 
 
Introduction: Thinking Anti-Terrorism and Human Rights 
 
Entering the Realm of Terrorism (-Policy) and Rights 
The day the world public witnessed the collapse of the World Trade Center 
and an attack on the Pentagon created a new awareness for terrorism within 
many Western societies. The events of 9/11 were globally visible, reached 
extraordinary attention and gained an “iconic significance.”1 9/11, by its sheer 
magnitude alone, triggered the impression of a new era of terrorist threats 
among public and politicians. Terrorism and states’ reactions to terrorism have 
since 9/11 become familiar issues and they undoubtedly shaped both public 
consciousness and political agendas in many Western states.2 Consequently, 
in the perception of many, the world has become a somewhat darker place 
since these attacks. We have witnessed many appalling terror attacks on 
civilians, wars meant to eradicate the threat of terrorism, as well as the 
implementation of a range of anti-terrorism measures ‘at home’, sometimes 
connected to challenges for rights and freedoms.3 Thus, not only acts of 
                                                          
1 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 95. 
2 A range of scholars evaluated the event as defining an epoch; as changing the world for good. 
For example, Martin Amis wrote that “September 11 has given to us a planet we barely 
recognize”; and Fred Halliday held that “the crisis unleashed by the events of September 11 is 
one that is global and all-encompassing.” Amis and Halliday cited in English, Terrorism: How 
to Respond, 94. Obviously, the effect of the event can be discussed. The attacks of 9/11 were 
not the first international terror attacks against US targets; not even the first attack of bin-
Laden’s network against the World Trade Center, however, they indeed were unique in 
magnitude and impact on public consciousness. 
3 Awareness of terrorism after 9/11 was maintained by other prominent attacks. Every reader 
will be very aware of a range of terror attacks taking place in Western countries in the last years. 
Many of the examples that spring to our mind have been carried out by Islamists. Allow me to 
address a few iconic examples, without being exhaustive. Spain witnessed a bomb attack on the 
Metro in Madrid on March 11, 2004, killing 191 people. Bombings of underground trains and 
a bus in London on July 7, 2005 cost the lives of fifty-two travelers. After a few more ‘calm’ 
years in terms of Islamist terrorism in Europe, Western societies were stunned by a new and 
intensified wave of Islamist terrorism. January 2015 saw the attack on the staff of Charlie 
Hebdo and a Jewish supermarket in Paris. Later in 2015, on the night of November 13, a new, 
larger series of attacks played out in Paris, killing more than 130. Both Paris attacks were 
committed by individuals connected to IS. In July 2016, France experienced another grave 
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terrorism but also states’, international organizations’ (IOs) and federations’ 
(such as the EU) attempts to tackle terrorism have featured high on the social 
and political agenda in the last seventeen years and have likewise become a 
part of public consciousness. Most Western states tried to find quick and 
effective new responses to terrorism after 9/11. A range of new anti-terrorism 
and counter-terrorism measures were launched. The most aggressive reaction 
to the events of 9/11 was delivered by the US government with its 
proclamation of its ‘War on Terror’, which led the country (together with other 
states) to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq, while the infamous Patriot Act 
(2001) was supposed to tackle the problem of terrorism on the inside.4 
Additionally, far-reaching surveillance measures were initiated by 
intelligence services such as the NSA (in cooperation with other Western 
services such as the British Government Communications Headquarters 
[GCHQ] or the German Bundesnachrichtendienst [BND]). European states 
contributed to the American War on Terror on several occasions and likewise 
increased anti-terrorism policies at home. After 9/11 and the bombings in 
Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, respectively, many European countries 
                                                          
terror attack, when an Islamist steered a truck into a crowd in Nice, killing eighty-four people. 
In December 2016, Germany was hit, when a truck drove into the crowd at a Christmas market 
in Berlin, killing twelve. In spring 2017, Islamist attackers stroke three times in the UK. In 
March a car drove into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge in London (killing five and injuring 
around fifty), in May a bombing of a concert in Manchester killed twenty-two people, and in 
June a group of attackers killed seven people on London Bridge via driving into pedestrians 
and subsequently stabbing passersby. Although Western societies focused mostly on Islamist 
terrorism in the years after 9/11, it is, for the sake of integrity, to be noted that significant non-
Islamist terrorism played out as well. Especially the terror attack committed by Anders Breivik 
in Norway in 2011, killing seventy-nine people, most of them adolescents, raised attention (I 
provide references for these attacks in the course of this thesis). 
4 Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 458. The militarized approach of the US received tremendous 
criticism, from all imaginable sources and levels. Critics aimed at the negative effects of this 
military approach on rights regimes, the rule of law and the American foreign policy 
architecture at large, as well as doubting the effectiveness of the approach in terms of curtailing 
the terrorist threat. A few examples of scholarly criticism will emphasize this point. For 
instance, Paul Hoffman argued, “a war on terror waged without respect for the rule of law 
undermines the very values that it presumes to protect“. Paul Hoffman, “Human Rights and 
Terrorism,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26 (2004): 932. Jack Donnelly evaluated that the 
war on terror “facilitated dangerous trends in American foreign policy, particularly the 
demonization of enemies and a tendency to act unilaterally.” Jack Donnelly, International 
Human Rights, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013), 241. Andreas Bock observed that “the 
fight against terrorism with military or violent means does neither have a deterrent effect nor 
can it increase security in societies threatened by terrorism.” Andreas Bock, Terrorismus 
(Paderborn: UTB, 2009, 59). Fittingly, Alison Brysk argued that there exists “no credible 
evidence that post-9/11 policies have improved the security of American citizens or prevented 
further attacks”, thus she concludes, “the cure has been worse than the disease.” Alison Brysk, 
“Human Rights and National Insecurity,” In National Insecurity and Human Rights: 
Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007), 3. 
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adopted new laws, procedures, and actions to tackle the threat of terrorism as 
it was felt they were under a similar threat as the US and engaged in a shared 
conflict.5 Additional policies were adopted since the onset of the most recent 
wave of IS-inspired terrorism. In general, anti-terrorism policies and actors 
have in a pan-European context experienced an increase in budgets, mandates, 
and functions.6 
The violation of human rights norms is a risk not only for military 
counter-terrorist actions on foreign soil (such as the US-led invasions in 
Afghanistan) but also within states, including democratic states, in the course 
of anti-terrorism policies (seen here as non-military). To that extent, a 
question, in face of increased anti-terrorism policies by many Western states, 
is whether such measures by European states and the EU itself, endanger or 
violate existing human rights norms and if so, if curtailments of recognized 
international human rights, would be justified (e.g., by way of concepts of 
rights ‘derogation’ and ‘limitation’). This issue has been heavily discussed in 
recent years, both among scholars and in the political arena.7 Already in the 
first years after 9/11 and the subsequent push for enhanced anti-terrorism 
measures in many countries, public concern rose regarding a potential erosion 
of civil liberties in many Western states (e.g. Germany and the UK).8 
                                                          
5 This was often perceived as a ‘Clash of Civilizations.’ 
6 Claudia Hillebrand, Counter-Terrorism Networks in the European Union: Maintaining 
Democratic Legitimacy after 9/11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1-2. 
7 Fabio Fabbrini, “Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in 
the Data Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United States,” 
Havard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 28 (2015): 66. Leaders of European nation-states have 
often declared that human rights are to be upheld while tackling terrorism, e.g., French President 
Francois Hollande declared in a speech on the crisis in Mali in 2014 that “the terrorists should 
be hunted, but human rights must be respected.” Tages-Anzeiger, ”Terroristen unter 
Respektierung der Menschenrechte jagen,“ February 2, 2013. 
http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/ausland/naher-osten-und-afrika/Terroristen-unter-Respektierung-
der-Menschenrechte-jagen/story/13259474?dossier_id=815  
On the international institutional level, examples for the growing attention towards rights 
questions in terrorism policies can be easily delivered as well. For instance, the UN appointed 
a special rapporteur on the ‘promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism,’ and at the EU level all anti-terrorism moves such as 
directives, action plans, strategy papers and the like emphasize that terrorism is supposed to be 
dealt with by upholding human rights standards, not undermining them. 
The formulation ‘in recent years’ shall not produce the perception that the issue of rights in 
terrorism policies was never discussed before 9/11. For instance, Grant Wardlaw and Paul 
Wilkinson, pioneers of terrorism studies, already delved into that topic in the 1980s. Grant 
Wardlaw, ”Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and the Democratic Society,” In Government 
Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research, ed. by Michael Stohl and George Lopez 
(Westport: Greenwood, 1986). Paul Wilkinson, “Maintaining the Democratic Process and 
Public Support,” In The Future of Political Violence: Destabilization, Disorder and Terrorism, 
ed. by Richard Clutterbuck (London: Macmillan, 1986). 
8 Adrian Hyde-Price, ”Germany: Redefining its security role,“ In Global Responses to 
Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond, ed. by Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn (London and 
4 
 
In entering these discussions, some scholars argued that the effects of 
European anti-terrorism on human rights have been limited. For instance, 
focusing on the case of post 9/11 Germany, Wolfgang Heinz argued that the 
country “has thus far maintained one of the most liberal and democratic 
counterterror policies, demonstrating that another way is possible”.9 Steven 
Greer argued that a tendency of (rights-) discrimination cannot be found in 
recent British anti-terrorism.10 Additionally, David Omand (a former director 
of the GCHQ), held in 2015 that mass surveillance, and therein a reduction of 
privacy rights, would not take place in the UK.11 Other scholars made the 
general point that rights problems would be a seldom phenomenon in 
(democratic) states in the course of anti-terrorism. For example, James Piazza 
and James Walsh argued in a cross-cultural study (based on a set of cases not 
limited to Europe) that the rights to free speech, freedom of movement and 
freedom of association, would generally not be curtailed by government 
policies after terror incidents. They conclude that “governments do not 
respond to terrorist attacks by systematically restricting human rights across 
the board.”12 Michael Freeman suggested that a free press and the separation 
of powers (which is arguably given in many European states) would make it 
unlikely for governments to seriously restrict freedoms and human rights.13 
Others, scholars as well as NGOs, however, have argued that 
European states and institutions have indeed sacrificed or endangered rights 
in the course of anti-terrorism efforts and that such policies cannot be justified 
by legal claims concerning rights derogation and limitation. A range of 
measures introduced by European countries and institutions to tackle terrorism 
has been criticized for being inconsistent with international human rights 
norms. For instance, Todd Landman, Mary Volcansek or Conor Gearty point 
out that the UK breached the European Convention on Human rights (ECHR) 
by implementing a regime of indefinite detention for foreign terror suspects 
in 2001 under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) (under 
derogation from article 5 of the ECHR which protects the right to life and 
                                                          
New York: Routledge, 2003). 
9 Wolfgang Heinz, “Germany: State Responses to Terrorist Challenges and Human Rights,” in 
National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison 
Brysk and Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 157. 
10 Steven Greer, "Anti-Terrorist Laws and the United Kingsom's 'Suspect Muslim 
Community'," British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 50 (2010). 
11 David Omand, “What Should be the Limits of Western Counter-Terrorism Policy?” In 
Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 70.  
12 James Piazza and James Walsh, “Transnational Terror and Human Rights,” International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, (2009): 126, 144-145. 
13 Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies using 
Emergency Powers to Fight Terrorism (Westport: Praeger, 2003). 
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liberty).14 Research by Martin Scheinin, Javaid Rehman as well as Christina 
Pantazis and Simon Pemberton, and Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick 
has pointed to discriminatory tendencies by UK authorities when carrying out 
terrorism policies in stop-and-search practices of the police. Pantazis and 
Pemberton hold that Muslims specifically have become the new ‘suspect 
community’ in Britain.15 Quirine Eijkman and Baart Schuurman argue that 
preventive measures (such as attempts to prevent radicalization) have led to 
the stigmatization of Muslim communities in some European countries, 
including the UK.16 Gearty argues in the same direction by pointing out that 
especially rights of minorities have been limited in the course of British anti-
terrorism.17 Thus, stigmatization of religious or ethnic groups has raised 
concern in terms of the right to be protected from discrimination. Furthermore, 
since the summer of 2013, the UK has faced criticism for its involvement in 
wide-ranging Internet surveillance, e.g. by scanning massive amounts of data 
by wiretapping transatlantic fiber-optic cables. Critics, such as Quentin 
Skinner, pointed here to a breach of privacy rights, as well as the right to 
liberty.18 Moreover, Timothy Garton Ash holds that states (such as the UK) 
are heading in the wrong direction by prosecuting speakers and banning 
websites and organizations for non-violent extremism, causing a problem in 
terms of freedom of expression. He additionally bemoans decreasing 
protection of privacy rights.19 
                                                          
14 Todd Landman, “The United Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and Counterterror,” In 
National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison 
Brysk and Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 84. Conor Gearty, 
Liberty and Security (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 90. Mary Volcansek, “The British 
Experience with Terrorism: From the IRA to Al Qaeda,” In Courts and Terrorism: Nine Nations 
Balance Rights and Security, ed. by Mary Volcansek and John Stack (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
15 Martin Scheinin, “Terrorism,” In International Human Rights Law, ed. by Daniel Moeckli, 
Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 560-561. 
Javaid Rehman, “Islam, "War on Terror" and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United 
Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings,” Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2007). Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton, “From the 
Old to the New Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist 
Legislation,” British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 49, No. 5 (2009). Tuyfal Choudhury and 
Helen Fenwick, ”The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities,” 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, Vol. 25 No. 3 (2011). 
16 Qurine Eijkman and Baart Schuurman, Preventive Counter-Terrorism and Non-
Discrimination in the European Union: A Call for Systematic Evaluation (The Hague: ICCT, 
2011). 
17 Gearty, Liberty and Security, 99-102. 
18 Quentin Skinner, “Liberty, Liberalism and Surveillance: a historic overview,” 
openDemocracy, July 26, 2013. https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/quentin-skinner-
richard-marshall/liberty-liberalism-and-surveillance-historic-overview  
19 Timothy Garton Ash, Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2016), 283, 324, 331-332. 
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Scholars have voiced criticism towards Germany as well. For 
instance, Oliver Lepsius pointed out that the German Air Security Law from 
2004, which in last consequence would have given the Defense Minister the 
competence to order shooting down civilian airplanes in order to prevent a 
9/11 scenario, would have violated the right to life, as well as human dignity 
(the German Constitutional Court decided likewise).20 Another example of 
German anti-terrorism receiving criticism is the German data retention law, a 
law going back on an EU directive, which allows for the saving of 
telecommunication metadata for six months.21 Furthermore, Martin Scheinin 
criticized the German policy of dragnet investigation, carried out in the years 
after 9/11 as potentially infringing the protection from discrimination, since it 
was linked to variables such as religious denomination and nationality.22  
The EU faced criticism for its post-9/11 anti-terrorism policies as 
well. Critical voices, such as Claudia Hillebrand, Gustav Lindstrom, Javier 
Argomaniz or Lilian Mitrou, pointed at the EU’s initiatives regarding data 
retention, biometric passports, the centralization of databases or the planned 
Passenger Name Record, based on allegations of breaching privacy rights (e.g. 
article 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and article 8 
ECHR).23 Ian Brown and Douwe Korff pointed out that the EU data retention 
laws not only are at odds with privacy rights but touch “on fundamental values 
of a democratic society.” They additionally claim that such large-scale 
collections of data can lead to problematic processes of profiling and that the 
EU is actively involved in facilitating the necessary conditions for states’ 
                                                          
20 Oliver Lepsius, “Human Dignity and the Downing of Aircraft: The German Federal 
Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Prominent Anti-Terrorism Provision in the New Air-
Transport Security Act,” German Law Journal, Vol. 7, 2006. 
21 Katja de Vries et al., “The German Constitutional Court Judgment on Data Retention: 
Proportionality Overrides Unlimited Surveillance (Doesn’t It?),” In Computers, Privacy and 
Data Protection: an Element of Choice, ed. by S. Gutwirth et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011). 
Christian DeSimone, “Pitting Karlsruhe Against Luxembourg? German Data Protection and the 
Contested Implementation of the EU Data Retention Directive,” German Law Journal, Vol. 11, 
No. 3 (2010). Fabbrini, “Human Rights in the Digital Age.” Patrick Breyer, 
“Telecommunications Data Retention and Human Rights: The Compatibility of Blanket Traffic 
Data Retention with the ECHR,” European Law Journal, Vol. 11 No. 3 (2005). 
22 Scheinin, “Terrorism,” 560. 
23 Hillebrand, Counter-Terrorism Networks in the European Union, 169-170. Gustav 
Lindstrom, “The EU’s approach to Homeland Security: Balancing Safety and European Ideals,” 
In Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches, ed. by Esther Brimmer 
(Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006). Javier Argomaniz, ”When the EU is 
the ‘Norm-taker’: The Passenger Name Records Agreement and the EU’s Internalization of US 
Border Security Norms,” European Integration, Vol. 31 No. 1 (2009). Javier Argomaniz, The 
EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, polity and policies after 9/11 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 151. Lilian Mitrou further pointed to problems in connection with freedom 
of expression. Lilian Mitrou, “The impact of communications data retention on fundamental 
rights and democracy – the case of the EU Data Retention Directive,” In Surveillance and 
Democracy, ed.by Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas (London: Routledge, 2010). 
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intelligence agencies to carry out such profiling.24 Similarly, Martin Scheinin 
claimed that the EU’s recommendation to its member states to conduct 
terrorist profiling in the course of anti-terrorism, including physical, 
psychological and behavioral variables contributed to alarming trends of such 
policies from a human rights perspective.25  
In general, especially the surveillance measures of the mentioned 
three entities, but also others (e.g. the US) have come under scrutiny by 
activists and academics. Micheline Ishay is one example of a human rights 
scholar voicing criticism against all-embracing surveillance. In a 2004 
publication, she remarked, “measures protecting privacy have been removed, 
[…] paving the way to an ever more pervasive surveillance society.” She 
furthermore claimed, “the expansion of counterterrorist activities […] 
accelerated the rise of a more bureaucratized, cyber-controlled society.”26 She 
drew parallels – as others have done in the last years – between increasing 
surveillance in the name of anti-terrorism, and Jeremy Bentham’s concept of 
the Panopticon prison.27 
Looking at all this material, it seems clear that there is a clash of 
perspectives regarding the question of whether European states and the EU 
sufficiently uphold human rights standards while trying to tackle terrorism. 
My thesis intends to be part of this debate. My purpose here will be to carry 
out an analysis of current European anti-terrorism policies from a human 
rights perspective. The cases in focus will be Germany and the UK as well as 
the EU as an intergovernmental/-supranational actor. I seek to scrutinize the 
justifiability of recent and current anti-terrorism policy on the part of these 
actors vis-à-vis human rights. My intention is to analyze anti-terrorism from a 
legal perspective, yes, invoking the ‘letter of the law’, yet, doing that while 
analyzing anti-terrorism from a broader perspective grounded in the general 
aims and ideals of human rights, the ‘spirit’ of human rights.28 Both 
perspectives are in this thesis seen as interrelated and mutually indispensable. 
                                                          
24 Ian Brown and Douwe Korff, “Terrorism and the Proportionality of Internet Surveillance,” 
European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 6 No. 2 (2009). 
25 Scheinin, “Terrorism,” 560. 
26 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization 
Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 351-352. 
27 The Panopticon is the model of a prison in which the inmates would live in constant 
uncertainty about being surveyed or not, and would, therefore, eradicate all unwished behavior. 
Ishay, The History of Human Rights, 352. Michel Foucault built on Bentham’s concept when 
he explained state control in his book Discipline and Punish. Foucault evaluated the Panopticon 
as a method by the state to assert effective and less visible forms of control, inducing a 
permanent consciousness of state power in the inmates, triggering an automatic functioning of 
power. Jeffrey Rosen, “A Cautionary Tale for A New Age of Surveillance,” In Terrorism in 
Perspective, ed. by Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 
2003). 
28 Ben Dorfman, 13 Acts of Academic Journalism and Historical Commentary on Human 
Rights: Opinions, Interventions and the Torsions of Politics (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2017), 176, 
193-195. 
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Still, the spirit of rights perspective is seen as the basis for the legal framework 
in which rights exist. International legal rights norms, in this sense act as the 
‘tool’ of the spirit of rights. I hope to show that human rights troubles have 
evolved in the course of European anti-terrorism policies and those temporary 
rights problems, in fact, turn permanent so that the extraordinary is 
normalized.29 I will contest the argument that domestic terrorism policies on 
the part of European states as well as the EU itself have not curtailed human 
rights or claims that, if they have, that these curtailments have been 
insignificant. Thus, in this thesis I will defend the following statement: 
Current policies regarding anti-terrorism on behalf of European 
societies curtail essential human rights.30 An analysis of the post 9/11 
terrorism policies of the UK, Germany and the EU helps demonstrate 
this. The primary curtailed rights are the right to privacy, freedom of 
expression, the right to non-discrimination, the right to life, liberty and 
security of person, and the freedoms of association and movement. 
Such rights curtailments threaten the free and full unfolding and 
development of human beings, the full enjoyment of human capabilities, and 
additionally change the power-relation between the individual and state (to the 
benefit of the latter). Therein, the restriction of civil and political rights 
furthermore endangers essential components for the functioning of the idea of 
(Western liberal) democracy. Additionally, such rights curtailments are 
potentially aggravating the problem of terrorism, as the infringement of rights 
can very well lead to a growth of the number of individuals in a society willing 
to use violence in order to advance their political convictions instead of 
reducing this group (whereas upholding rights might reduce the amount of 
individuals taking up terrorist means). These points show the general 
relevance of the issue of human rights curtailments in anti-terrorism, as well 
as the relevance of this study. 
The relevance of the research is mirrored in another point. Currently, 
the concept of human rights, both in legal terms and in terms of its basic idea 
is challenged in global (and European) contexts. The concept is pressed by 
e.g., a surge of success of right-wing parties and movements, the election of 
Donald Trump as president of the US, a rise of powers in the international 
arena that show a disregard of a wide range of human rights (Saudi Arabia or 
China), and the establishment of a set of anti- and counter-terrorism policies 
                                                          
29 This is based on a tendency by states and organizations to make policies permanent, which 
once were adopted based on the argument of a context specific necessity. Policies are often kept 
in place by using the argument that they would have been effective (and this is the case even if 
a certain threat has declined again). Mikkel Thorup and Morten Brænder, ”Staten og dens 
Udfordrere – Vold som Terror eller Krig,” In Antiterrorismens idehistorie – stater og vold i 500 
år, ed. by Thorup and Brænder (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2007), 49. 
30 As current policies, I define policies implemented after the 9/11 attacks. 
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and campaigns that have derogated from rights norms.31 This pressure on 
human rights is, however, not a new phenomenon, but has been a constant for 
(most of) human history. Therefore, a sufficient or high level of human rights 
in human societies, cannot be taken as a given. The adherence of rights norms 
cannot be taken for granted in terms of my specific field of inquiry as well, as 
this has very often not been the case, not currently and not in the past. This, to 
a certain degree, puts the curtailment of rights in the course of anti-terrorism 
into perspective. However, this does not excuse such curtailments, or diminish 
their importance. Such infringements are wrong, especially morally and 
politically. They do, however, feed into a larger trend of developments that 
press the concept of human rights. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
In order to defend the above thesis statement, I will take the steps offered 
below. 
A first major step is to gain an overview and understanding of the key 
concepts at play, which are human rights, anti-terrorism, and terrorism. These 
conceptual chapters will provide the groundwork for the following empirical 
analysis and evaluation of terrorism policies in the three mentioned cases. The 
first concept I will focus on will be human rights. Here, I will shortly cover 
the history of the concept and will, especially, focus on the question of where 
in the historical timeline the starting point of the evolution of human rights 
can be traced. I will also cover some of the general theoretical basics regarding 
the concept of human rights, which are relevant for this thesis, meaning I will 
delve into different understandings of what human rights actually are and shed 
light on both a legal and a wider, “spirit of the law” understanding of rights. 
In a third section in this human rights theory part, I will delve into the specific 
rights that are at the focus of this thesis. 
The second conceptual chapter of my thesis covers the concepts of 
terrorism, anti-terrorism, and counter-terrorism. Therein, I will elucidate the 
historical context of the term terrorism and provide an overview of the 
definitional quarrels regarding the term, before offering a definition of my 
own. Subsequently, I will deliver a differentiation and definition of the terms 
anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. Without delivering a clarification of 
these terms, it would be rather confusing to go through some of the relevant 
empirical literature on terrorism policies. I would like to point out, that while 
I deliver the core of the conceptual and theoretical input for this thesis in those 
first chapters, I offer further theoretical input along the way in other chapters. 
After addressing the major concepts at play, I will provide the 
empirical analysis of my thesis. Here, I will go through the three cases in 
focus. In each case, I will first provide a section focusing on the actor’s 
                                                          
31 On the rise of regimes showing a disregard of human rights, see e.g., David Rieff, “The End 
of Human Rights,” Foreign Policy, April 9, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/09/the-
end-of-human-rights-genocide-united-nations-r2p-terrorism/ 
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relation to the phenomena of terrorism. In this context, I will provide 
information on crucial terror attacks in the UK and Germany, as well as the 
reaction of the public and the political elite to the same. In terms of the EU, 
this part will talk less about specific attacks (since there is so far no – or only 
one – attack aimed at the EU as such).32 Here, I will talk more about the change 
of context regarding terrorism policymaking at the EU level over the last 
decades, which is an important point to cover in order to understand the 
relevance of the EU for European terrorism policymaking. These context 
sections gain their relevance from anti-terrorism policies reflecting the history 
of threat in a country.33 These sections will additionally provide some of the 
necessary background information, for evaluating conditions of rights 
derogation and limitation such as emergency and proportionality. After each 
context section, I will conduct a human rights-based analysis of the cases’ 
recent anti-terrorism policies. I will for this purpose use my double-edged 
human rights framework, consisting of a legal approach and a wider (spirit of 
rights) understanding of rights based on the wider aims and ideals of human 
rights. I will therein present the relevant material on a policy, subsequently 
conduct the analysis on this policy, and then move to the next policy, thereby 
creating a repeating sequence of empiric information and analysis. Terrorism 
policies that will be scrutinized are e.g., surveillance regimes, data retention 
laws, stop-and-search practices, policies on preventing extremism, detention 
regimes or dragnet investigations. The last analysis chapter will develop a 
comparison between the three cases, elucidating similarities and differences 
in anti-terrorism policies and the status of human rights in the course of such 
policies. 
Subsequently, I would like to offer a normative discussion. I.e., in the 
face of the results of my analysis, one might ask, how a more sound 
relationship between rights and anti-terrorism should look like. I will thus 
discuss if and to which degree rights should be compromised in order to 
establish alleged security against terrorism in society. I will cover the 
questions whether we need to balance rights against security, whether an 
increase in security measures always equals increased protection against 
terrorism, and whether the upholding of human rights possibly can be 
understood as an anti-terrorism measure in itself. I will here take inspiration 
from the academic discussion on these matters and develop my own 
standpoint. 
I will conclude this thesis by summarizing my arguments and findings 
and will additionally emphasize approaches that potentially can contribute to 
reducing the danger posed by terrorism, without endangering rights and 
democracy.  
 
                                                          
32 Of course, in a way, an attack on any EU state is an attack on the EU itself. However, what I 
point to here are direct attacks on physical EU institutions. 
33 Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” 1. 
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Methodological Issues 
In this section, I would like to elaborate on some of the methodological issues 
of this study and account for some of the choices this thesis takes in that area. 
 
 Methodological Basics and a Double-Edged Database 
This study employs an interpretivist epistemology. Such an epistemology is 
primarily concerned with the understanding of social and human action. 
Interpretivism asserts that human beings act based on the meaning which they 
continuously assign to their environment, including the own actions, as well 
as the actions of others, such as in case of this study terrorism and anti-
terrorism.34 Hence, this study will interpret the qualitative data at hand, which 
oftentimes is already an interpretation by others (e.g. in case of the scholarly, 
NGO or journalist publications used). Thus, this study conducts an 
interpretive analysis of human rights relevant actions (the terrorism policies 
of Germany, the UK, and the EU) which have been undertaken by interpreting 
the social environment (e.g. the meaning or importance of human rights norms 
in face of a terrorist threat). 
This thesis is based on a social constructionist ontological paradigm.35 
Hence, in the context of social constructionism, the major concepts of this 
study, such as terrorism, anti-terrorism, and human rights are understood as 
constantly revised social constructs. Social actors (governments, citizens, 
society at large) constantly assert new or different meaning to said 
phenomena, and consequently change their ideas about how e.g., states should 
react on terrorism and how important the protection of human rights should 
be in such a process. The same would be true for all research on this issue 
since research is operating inside of the boundaries of described social action. 
In line with interpretivist and constructionist thinking, this thesis aims 
to underline (especially in the parts elucidating the empirical contexts) that 
anti-terrorism policies are dependent on the ideas and interpretations of actors 
                                                          
34 On the concept of interpretivism see e.g. Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15-17 or Norman Blaikie, Designing Social Research, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 99. 
35 This paradigm asserts that all social phenomena are social constructs. Human beings 
construct knowledge by making sense of their environment (see above), taking contexts, 
concepts, and experiences into regard. This means that social phenomena do not possess a 
meaning per se, social actors (humans) are instead continuously producing said meaning by 
social interaction. Our social world is in this view not existing externally to us but build on our 
social interaction with each other. Consequently, social phenomena and their meaning are 
constantly revised by new interactions, for instance, all components of what we usually describe 
as a culture. As all researchers are a part of this process of constantly constructing and 
reconstructing meaning, all academic concepts and all research results have to be understood 
as part of this process. Scientific knowledge simply constitutes the interpretation of social 
phenomena by researchers. This means that knowledge is not indefinitely determinate, but 
rather the opposite, under constant change. Bryman, Social Research Methods, 19-21. Blaikie, 
Designing Social Research, 95. John Brewer and Albert Hunter, Foundations of Multimethod 
Research: Synthesizing Styles (Thousand Oakes: SAGE, 2006), 158. 
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of the political elite and populations, as to what terrorism is and how it can be 
or should be tackled. It is thus the underlying ideas and perceptions that shape 
reactions to terrorism, rather than materialist categories (e.g., technology, 
resources or military power).36 For example, policy outcomes will greatly be 
affected by perceptions as to which kind of terrorism is the most dangerous, 
as well as by ideas on which strategies are the potentially most successful. The 
same holds good for the relations between human rights and anti-terrorism 
policy. The perception of the relation between the two shape policies that will 
either benefit rights over anti-terrorism policy or vice versa. For example, if 
(certain) human rights are interpreted as being too valuable to be sacrificed 
for anti-terrorism, we can expect a less rigid terrorism policy as a policy 
outcome. International Relations scholar Alexander Wendt famously claimed, 
“anarchy is what states make of it.”37 Following Wendt, it can be argued that 
the concepts of terrorism, anti-terrorism, and human rights are what states 
make of them. 
As is typical for many studies with an interpretivist and constructionist 
approach, this thesis constitutes a qualitative study. It will use mainly 
qualitative methods, conducting an analysis of qualitative data. The major 
method employed in this study is content analysis, a specific form of ‘non-
reactive’ research (as defined by Brewer and Hunter). Non-reactive research 
consists of research that works with “various unobstrusive observational 
techniques or artifacts, archives, official statistics, and other natural by-
products of past social life.”38 Thus, the thesis works foremost with academic 
literature, policy papers, international documents, court rulings, NGO reports, 
and investigative journalist reports. Although the study clearly puts its 
emphasis on the interpretation of qualitative data, it occasionally integrates 
the interpretation of quantitative data (items like public surveys). Therefore, 
on these occasions, it inhibits traits of a mixed-methods investigation (the 
same is valid when this study takes up the results of fieldwork research).39 
When addressing the nature of my data, it is worth mentioning what I 
see as my data’s ‘double-edged’ nature. A range of the empirical data of my 
research, I would argue, is easily accessible. Accessibility is high especially 
concerning stories about terror attacks themselves, as well as the most 
notorious or debated state reactions on such attacks. For instance, states’ 
                                                          
36 Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. By 
John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 258-264. 
37 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46 No. 2 (1992). 
38 Brewer and Hunter, Foundations of Multimethod Research, 2. Norman Blaikie calls this kind 
of research, based on the traces that individuals leave behind in natural settings, e.g., documents, 
for research of ‘social artefacts.’ Blaikie, Designing Social Research, 22. 
39 Such an approach allows for compensating the “particular faults and limitations” of the 
different ‘research styles.’ The term ‘research styles’, points to non-reactive research, survey 
research, fieldwork and experiments. Brewer and Hunter, Foundations of Multimethod 
Research, 1-4. 
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surveillance programs or de-radicalization efforts (e.g., the British Channel 
program), have been extensively explained and discussed in the public sphere. 
Stories about terrorism and states’ and the EU’s reactions do fill newspapers 
and magazines on a regular basis.40 This has, especially, been the case in the 
first years after 9/11 and has increased again with the new ‘wave’ of IS-
inspired terrorism in Western countries in recent years. The revelations of 
Edward Snowden moreover shed light on the practices of intelligence services 
in regard to anti-terrorism. It has therefore not been necessary to ‘dig’ for data 
in archives or the like. Furthermore, a range of public surveys on terrorism 
and anti-terrorism are publicly available. The amount of empirical data 
potentially relevant to my thesis is thus growing on a daily basis. However, 
this at the same time represents a challenge. It is a tricky task to order the 
wide-ranging information on the topic regarding its individual importance, 
while simultaneously making sure not to ‘drown’ in information. I have thus 
tried to find the right balance between integrating a detailed and extensive 
amount of empirical data, without drowning in the ocean of empirical sources 
available on some of the issues discussed in the study. 
Still, it is quite clear that some potentially very relevant information 
on states’ terrorism policies and practices is not publicly accessible, but rather 
confidential. This is especially valid for the practices of security organs such 
as intelligence activities. Edward Snowden’s disclosures about surveillance 
did also cause so much sensation because he shed light on confidential 
practices. The fact that not even many researchers active in the field of anti-
terrorism had anticipated the magnitude of surveillance taking place shows 
that potentially important information about anti-terrorism is not known to the 
public, as well as researchers in the field. It might thus be the case, that certain 
information which would have an influence on the empirical analysis of this 
thesis and hence on its overall evaluation of the terrorism policies of the three 
cases at focus, is inaccessible until further. This, therefore, provides a certain 
limitation of my research; however, a limitation that is not uncommon in both 
social science and historical writing and that simply has to be taken into 
regard. 
 
 An Interdisciplinary Study 
Since this thesis draws (mainly) from two different research fields, human 
rights research and terrorism studies, and tries to bridge these fields, it 
constitutes a piece of interdisciplinary research.41 In order to position this 
                                                          
40 As indicated, this is valid for many state reactions on terrorism, however, not all. Some 
terrorism policies are less discussed in the public sphere. 
41 Moti Nissani defined interdisciplinarity as “bringing together distinctive components of two 
or more disciplines.” Moti Nissani, “Ten Cheers for Interdisciplinarity: The Case for 
Interdisciplinary Knowledge and Research,” The Social Science Journal, Vol. 34 (1997): 203. 
On interdisciplinarity see e.g., Tanya Augsburg, Becoming Interdisciplinary: An Introduction 
to Interdisciplinary Studies, 3rd ed. (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 2016). 
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thesis in the broad array of current academic fields, I will now shortly reflect 
on the fields that this study connects with and will point to benefits of 
interdisciplinary research. 
The field of human rights research encompasses a large range of 
subfields or topics, e.g., the content of rights, the history of rights, 
effectiveness of international conventions or rights in foreign policy, to name 
a few. My study connects to another topic in human rights research, which is 
the evaluation of the degree of rights compliance of rights-bearers (in this case 
states’ and a federation’s compliance with rights obligations under terrorism 
policies).42 Human rights research can moreover be divided by looking at the 
general research approach. Malcolm Langford here differentiates between 
normative, empirical, and evaluative approaches. My research reflects the 
latter, as the evaluative approach combines normative and empirical traits in 
its attempt to determine compliance by actors with human rights norms. This 
compliance can be understood in both legal and non-legal terms.43 My study 
will do precisely this and will carry out an evaluation of terrorism policies 
based on legal and non-legal perspectives in an interrelated fashion. 
Human rights research is in this thesis combined with terrorism 
studies. Here, my study connects with both the traditional terrorism 
scholarship and the sub-field of critical terrorism studies (CTS). It connects 
with the first by relying on input and ideas of some major figures in the field, 
e.g. regarding elucidations of the definitional struggles surrounding the term 
terrorism, regarding the mapping and definition of anti-terrorism, or regarding 
a historical model of terrorism development (David Rapoport’s four-wave 
model). However, my human rights-based analysis of terrorism policies 
connects well with the overall orientation of CTS. CTS has been intensely 
engaged with producing critiques of recent Western terrorism policies, 
covering everything from the US War on Terror to European counter-
                                                          
In employing an interdisciplinary approach, my thesis follows suggestions from the literature 
on human rights methodology. See e.g., Langford who argues that the field of human rights 
constitutes “a natural field for interdisciplinary endeavor.” Malcolm Langford, 
“Interdisciplinarity and Multimethod Research,” In Human Rights Research Methods, ed. by 
B.A. Andreassen, H.O. Sano and S. McIernet-Lankford (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017), 1. 
Coomans, Grünfeld and Kamminga, claim that the participation from researchers of multiple 
fields “is an indispensable element of human rights research.” Fons Coomans, Fred Grünfeld 
and Menno Kamminga, “Methods of Human Rights Research: A Primer,” Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 32 (2010): 186. Jack Donnelly advocates for an interdisciplinary approach in 
human rights-related research as well, when he warns against distressing tendencies “toward 
disciplinary exclusivity and interdisciplinary blindness.” Jack Donnelly, Universal Human 
Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 
180. 
42 Coomans, Grünfeld and Kamminga, “Methods of Human Rights Research,” 181. 
43 Langford, “Interdisciplinarity and Multimethod Research,” 12. 
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radicalization.44 CTS approaches, similar to this study, e.g. deal with the 
influence of terrorism policies on the extension of state power, the influence 
on minority communities, the reciprocal effects between terrorism and anti-
terrorism and aim at evaluating terrorism policies via the categories of 
proportionality, effectiveness, and legitimacy.45 Moreover, CTS shares this 
study’s emphasis on disciplinary plurality and normative outlook.46 CTS 
additionally connects itself to the broader aims of human freedom and the 
realization of human potentials and social well-being, social justice, equality 
and eradication of discrimination, notions that reflect, or at least come close 
to the aims of the human rights concept used in my thesis.47 Now, a debate has 
been going on in the overall field in recent years concerning a gap between 
traditional terrorism studies and CTS. CTS scholars have accused traditional 
terrorism research of being too state centristic, too focused on policy 
prescription, too occupied with the analysis of anti-Western terrorist groups, 
lacking interdisciplinary input and historicity and maintaining institutional or 
intellectual links with state institutions.48 Some traditional scholars rebutted 
by pointing out weaknesses of CTS scholarship (e.g. not living up to their 
research promises).49 However, I would tend to agree with Richard English in 
his evaluation, that the portrayed gap between the two subfields is not 
necessarily as big as perceived by some. For instance, scholars who do not 
assign themselves to CTS have delivered research that is critical of state 
reactions to terrorism as well; especially military responses have been 
regarded rather critical by a wide range of scholars.50 And one of the most 
iconic scholars of traditional terrorism studies, Paul Wilkinson, not only 
conducted research on state violence and state terrorism but often enough 
                                                          
44 Sondre Lindahl, “A CTS model of counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 10 
No. 3 (2017): 523. Richard Jackson, “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies,” 
European Political Science, Vol. 6 No. 3 (2007): 6. 
45 Richard Jackson et al., Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011). Richard Jackson, Marie Breen-Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, “Critical Terrorism Studies: 
Framing a new research agenda,” In Critical Terrorism Studies: A new research agenda, ed. by 
Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 228. 
46 Furthermore, CTS is sharing some of my epistemological and ontological basics, as e.g., 
awareness regarding the constructed nature of concepts. Jackson, “The Core Commitments of 
Critical Terrorism Studies,” 1-6. 
47 Jackson, “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies,” 7. In this sense my study 
connects – besides the interpretivist paradigm - with the critical methodological research 
paradigm, a paradigm, which has an “emancipatory interest in human autonomy.” Blaikie, 
Designing Social Research, 100. On the topic of critical theory see e.g., Jürgen Habermas, 
Knowledge and Human Interests (London: Heinemann, 1972). 
48 Jackson, “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies,” 1-2. 
49 David Martin Jones and M. L. R. Smith, “We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical – or Hypocritical 
– Studies on Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2009). Mind that 
the authors dub CTS for hypocritical studies. 
50 See e.g. the evaluation of this point by Adam Roberts, ”Terrorism Research: Past, Present, 
and Future,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2015): 67-71. 
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emphasized the importance of human rights and civil liberties, thus following 
some of the ideals of CTS.51 In the face of such tendencies, one may conclude, 
that the range of approaches and scholarly opinions in terrorism studies is 
much more complex than the idea of a clear-cut dichotomy in the field would 
suggest.52 My research reflects a study that does not align itself with this idea 
of a necessary dichotomy between traditional and critical terrorism studies and 
will connect with parts of both.53 
In its characteristic of evaluating and analyzing policies, this study 
additionally connects with the field of policy analysis. In its analysis of 
terrorism policies, my study follows (some) suggestions from policy analysis 
scholarship. For instance, several of the usual steps of the policy analysis 
process are employed in my thesis (e.g., the definition of a problem, the 
collection of evidence, the selection of evaluation criteria or the construction 
of potential alternatives).54 However, this study does not reflect a 
‘conventional’, objectivist, empiricist and technocratic version of policy 
analysis. Rather, it turns to a newer, more critical, argumentative and 
interpretative (qualitative) branch of policy analysis, as e.g., suggested by 
Frank Fischer.55  
Since it is not always necessarily clear where the one field ends and 
the next starts, a clear demarcation of a discipline or field is not always easily 
delivered.56 Thus, a definition of which fields or disciplines my study exactly 
touches upon is not absolute, especially since my core research fields see 
activity by a great variety of scholars with different backgrounds. This is 
specifically valid for the field of human rights research, which collects 
scholars from law, history, philosophy and social science (including sub-
                                                          
51 See e.g., Alison Watson, Introduction to State Terrorism and Human Rights: International 
Responses Since the End of the Cold War, ed.  Gillian Duncan et al. (London: Routledge, 2013), 
1-2. 
52 Richard English, Introduction to “The Enduring Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism,” In Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by English (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 11. 
53 Furthermore, drawing back on Andrew Heywood, it can be claimed that this thesis is 
engaging with a traditionally liberal perspective since “liberal thinking about terrorism has 
tended to be dominated by the ethical dilemmas that are posed by the task of counter-terrorism.” 
Andrew Heywood, Global Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). 
54 See e.g. Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More 
Effective Problem Solving. 2nd ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 2005). 
55 Frank Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1-23. 
Several other smaller and larger fields or disciplines are touched upon in this thesis, e.g. human 
rights law, history, political theory or political philosophy. 
56 Moti Nissani defined an academic discipline as an entity that owns a “self-contained and 
isolated domain of human experience which possess its own community of experts”. Nissani, 
“Ten Cheers for Interdisciplinarity.” 
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fields). In light of such developments, Langford fittingly pointed to an 
“erosion of disciplinary barriers” taken place in the last decades.57 
Interdisciplinary research, however, provides some benefits. For 
instance, one might point to the benefit of an advancement of research 
frontiers triggered by interdisciplinary research. Overcoming such frontiers is 
beneficial since many of the currently pressing issues regarding human rights 
cannot “be answered within the confines of a single tradition,” crossing 
disciplinary boundaries heightens the probability of arriving at more plausible 
answers in human rights research.58 The same has been argued for research on 
terrorism and anti-terrorism.59 Therein, one furthermore finds an argument 
supporting my choice of drawing on both legal and philosophic evaluations of 
terrorism policies (I explain how I employ these modes of evaluation below). 
 
 A Comparative Study with an Unusual Case Selection 
As my study will focus on several cases (Germany, the UK, and the EU), and 
will try to provide a comparison of the human rights problems of anti-
terrorism efforts of these cases, my research constitutes a variety of a 
comparative case study design. 
In general, comparative case studies constitute in-depth explorations 
or examinations with a high detail level and an emphasis on the specific 
context of the instances at hand.60 Such studies strive for a “thick description” 
including both facts and context, which is also common for single case studies. 
Other than single case studies, comparative case studies provide the 
opportunity to discover differences, commonalities, and patterns across the 
cases. Specific characteristics of a case simply become more visible in 
comparison with other cases.61 Additionally, studies based on multiple cases 
                                                          
57 Langford, “Interdisciplinarity and Multimethod Research,” 1. 
58 Ibid., 4. For further advantages of interdisciplinary research see Moti Nissani, who points to 
not less than ten advantages of interdisciplinary research. Some of them resemble Langford’s 
points, e.g., when Nissani speaks about a potential increase of communication between research 
fields or heightened possibilities for solving various intellectual, social or practical problems. 
An additional point of his take on the benefits of interdisciplinary research is, e.g., a general 
boost of creativity of research. Nissani, “Ten Cheers for Interdisciplinarity.” 
59 Magnus Ranstorp, “Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11: An academic field of old problems 
and new prospects,” In Critical Terrorism Studies: A new research agenda, ed. by Richard 
Jackson, Marie Breen-Smyth and Jeroen Gunning (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 
13. 
60 Martyn Hammersley, What’s wrong with Ethnography (London: Routledge, 1992), 185. 
Linda Chmiliar, “Multiple-Case Designs,” in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, ed. Albert 
J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe (Thousand Oakes: SAGE Publications, 2010). 
61 See e.g. Todd Landman, Studying Human Rights (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 
66. Shelagh Campbell, “Comparative Case Study,” In Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, 
ed. by Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe (Thousand Oakes: SAGE 
Publications, 2010) or Chmiliar, “Multiple-Case Designs.” Comparative case studies might 
further be understood as a replication of the issue or phenomenon, not dissimilar to experiments 
in quantitative research. 
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produce clues on how different contextual environments can influence 
individual cases. The generalizability (external validity) of such studies is 
naturally higher than of single cases studies.62 Studies involving multiple cases 
are more powerful than single case studies; they deliver “more extensive 
descriptions and explanations of the issues” and demonstrate “the issues 
across a more varied range of circumstances.”63 In other words, comparative 
designs allow for a broader picture, which aligns this design with the broader 
aims of this study, since gaining at least a sense of the broader European 
context of terrorism policymaking is indeed an objective of this study. To have 
an insight into the policies and context of more than one case will allow for 
better and more considerate judgments in connection with the policies of each 
specific country. These advantages are the major reasons for choosing this 
design. A single country case would - put simply - not provide this 
opportunity. If the study would only look at one country it would e.g., be hard 
to evaluate how far-reaching that country’s policy is concerning terrorism 
policies. In other words, the policies of a country can be put into perspective, 
and it will thus be possible to “establish what is unique in a particular 
context.”64 And indeed, both the similarities and the differences of anti-
terrorism policies (and their human rights consequences), which this study 
aims to reveal are deemed important. Furthermore, a comparative design will 
not only provide the opportunity to deliver a more powerful take on the overall 
argument of this study (my thesis statement) but will additionally benefit the 
development of ideas (or hypotheses) on how to move forward in terms of 
European terrorism policies (in the Conclusion).65 
However, a case study design, even a comparative case study design, 
means that my results will not be directly transferable to every other European 
country, resulting in limited generalizability (or external validity) of the 
findings for the whole ‘population’ of European states.66 Still, the external 
validity does not equal zero. For cases that are similar to those in focus, my 
results should deliver indications and clues in regard to what human rights 
                                                          
62 Chmiliar, “Multiple-Case Designs.” Landman, Studying Human Rights, 66. 
63 Chmiliar, “Multiple-Case Designs.” 
64 English, Terrorism: How to Respond, 53. English makes his point in relation to research on 
terrorism, but it is valid for many areas of research. 
65 Bryman, Social Research Methods, 60. Campbell, “Comparative Case Study.” Chmiliar, 
“Multiple-Case Designs.” 
Comparative approaches (especially of smaller selections of countries) are advocated for in 
human rights research. Landman, Studying Human Rights, 66. Fittingly, Jack Donnelly 
advocates for comparative approaches in the field of human rights when he holds that “the study 
of human rights must […] rest most heavily on the study of comparative politics.” Donnelly, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 180.  
66 Of course, as Blaikie pointed out, all social science research results are limited in time and 
space and therefore limited in the scope of their generalizability, which makes generalizability 
beyond time and place always a matter of judgement, in qualitative but also quantitative 
research. Blaikie, Designing Social Research, 11. 
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might come under pressure should certain similar anti-terrorism strategies be 
implemented. Such clues can be expected to be strongest for other EU member 
states due to the existing interrelations between member states’ and EU anti-
terrorism policies.67 
The cases at center stage in my research are again, Germany, the UK, 
and the EU. My case selection can be regarded as unusual since it is a 
combination of two nation-states and an intergovernmental/supranational 
organization. This might at first appear odd. It is thus appropriate and 
necessary to discuss the reasons for integrating the EU into the case selection.  
Before coming to this issue, I will, however, shortly explain why the 
cases of Germany and the UK have been chosen. Both of my country cases 
are big Western European states, therefore, my case selection, in terms of the 
country cases, reflects rather a selection of typical cases than outlier cases. 
Therein, my study rather constitutes a most-similar design instead of a least-
similar design. Both states are leading actors in global politics (e.g., at the G7 
or G20 level), and they are two of the biggest players in the EU framework 
(although the UK is on its way out of the EU as we know). This pertains to 
the EU’s policymaking in general, as well as its anti-terrorism policymaking. 
Both, Germany and the UK have implemented a range of terrorism policies in 
earlier decades and have intensified their policymaking regarding terrorism in 
the years after 9/11. Both countries have witnessed terror attacks on their soil 
in recent years, and have reacted to them by ever-intensified terrorism 
policies.68 Therein, both countries have received criticism for several of their 
recent anti-terrorism policies. Consequentially, both cases promise to provide 
valid insight into the potential dangers for human rights in the course of 
terrorism policies. So, a range of similarities can be detected in terms of these 
two particular cases. Due to these commonalities, the two country cases make 
a fit for a comparative design.69 
I have chosen not to include more country cases in my study. This is 
despite the fact that the inclusion of additional states would increase the 
possibilities for comparison and would thereby increase the strength of the 
overall arguments of my study and the transferability of my results. Several 
other relevant country cases can be found, for instance, France or Spain. 
Especially the former has implemented a range of questionable terrorism 
policies in the last years, reacting to several attacks by members or supporters 
                                                          
67 I am following the idea of transferability by Lincoln and Guba, who claimed that 
transferability of research results from qualitative case studies is possible, given that the 
contexts are similar. Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba, Naturalistic inquiry (Beverly Hills: Sage, 
1985), 124-125. 
68 Of course, the UK and Germany have witnessed terror attacks in the more distant past as well 
(e.g. from the 1960s to the 1990s). 
69 On this see e.g., Campbell, “Comparative Case Study.” Although a range of similarities 
between the UK and Germany exist, they do not constitute perfect matches. However, perfect 
matches are hardly existent in comparative case studies of countries or, in fact, social science 
in general, as Campbell points out herself. 
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of IS. However, the inclusion of additional countries would be too extensive. 
There would be too much empirical ground to cover in relation to the 
resources available for this study. Still, by including two countries and an 
intergovernmental/supranational organization, this thesis provides for a sound 
diversity of cases, establishing clues about the overall status quo of terrorism 
policies in the European context.  
Now, I will come back to the point why the integration of the EU into 
the case selection of this thesis is not only justifiable but actually to the benefit 
of the study. As seen, the EU has been criticized by scholars for endangering 
human rights in the course of its anti-terrorism policies. This clarifies the 
general relevance of integrating the EU into this study. However, the 
overriding argument for integrating the EU into my case selection is the 
existing and growing interrelation between the EU’s member states and the 
EU in terms of understandings and definitions of terrorism and anti-terrorism, 
as well as the adoption of anti-terrorism policies and strategies. Since 9/11, 
the focus of anti-terrorism has gradually shifted from the national to the 
international or transnational level. Therefore, the EU has become a more 
important player in anti-terrorism policymaking in the European arena.70 
Member states like the UK and Germany are shaping the anti-terrorism 
policies of the EU; however, their own policies are likewise shaped by the EU. 
European anti-terrorism is not only developed and coordinated at the state 
level anymore but increasingly at the EU level. Such interrelations can be 
exemplified by the common EU definition of terrorism from 2002. Before the 
events of 9/11, no common definition of terrorism existed at the EU level, 
however, after 9/11 the then fifteen EU member states quickly agreed on a 
common definition of terrorism. This common definition is ever more 
important in relation to member states that do not have their own definition. 
This is relevant for one of the country cases chosen for this research, Germany. 
Instead of deploying their own definition, German authorities lean on the 
official EU definition of terrorism. This example clearly shows the relation of 
EU bodies and member states in terms of understanding the phenomena of 
terrorism. Without taking the EU into regard one might conclude that 
Germany does simply not have any terrorism definition at disposal as a basis 
for its terrorism policies, this would, however, be a faulty assumption. 
Furthermore, EU member states are connected via the EU in terms of policy 
strategies, as well as common institutions that are supposed to tackle the threat 
of terrorism. In terms of policy strategies, both ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ 
processes take place, or in other words processes of Europeanization 
(uploading refers to the EU adopting national strategies into its own strategy 
                                                          
70 Monica den Boer, “The EU Counter-Terrorism Wave: Window of Opportunity or Profound 
Policy Transformation,” In Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions 
and Policies, ed. by Marianne van Leeuwen (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 
185. 
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framework, downloading refers to the opposite process).71 For example, the 
EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy from 2005 oriented itself towards the 
British CONTEST strategy, which was first drafted in the UK in 2003. 
Tellingly, both strategy papers named four areas of anti-terrorism action, in 
the British strategy these four areas were called ‘Prevent’, ‘Protect’ ‘Pursue’ 
and ‘Prepare’ and in the EU strategy they were labeled ‘Prevent’, ‘Protect’, 
‘Pursue’, and ‘Respond’.72 Furthermore, interrelations between the EU and its 
member states, as well as Europeanization processes are demonstrated by the 
circumstance that the EU is able to spread security politics from core countries 
of the EU to countries at the periphery of the institution (a ‘downloading’ 
process of Europeanization).73 In other words, due to the mentioned 
interrelation between the EU and its member states, EU institutions or some 
of the core states do have an effect on the terrorism policies of less threatened 
countries (this way anti-terrorism policies can ‘travel’ from one country to 
another).74 Moreover, at times, member states might use the EU level to 
implement policies that would be unpopular to adopt on a national basis (as 
was arguably the case with the EU data retention directive).75 Such examples 
emphasize that European anti-terrorism connections are essential for the 
terrorism policies inside of the individual member states. By now, almost no 
policymaking initiative in EU member states does not include a European 
component, including anti-terrorism policymaking.76 Since EU processes 
have become essential for understandings of terrorism, as well as efforts to 
                                                          
71 On the concept of Europeanization see e.g. Tanja Börzel and Diana Panke, 
“Europeanization,” In European Union Politics, 5th ed., ed. by Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-
Solorzano Borragan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 110-121. A widely used 
definition is the following one by Radaelli, who suggests that Europeanization is: Processes of 
(a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the 
logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies.” 
Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy,” in The Politics of 
Europeanization, ed. by Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 30. 
72 Andrew Staniforth, The Routledge Companion to UK Counter-Terrorism (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 347. 
73 Börzel and Panke, “Europeanization.”  
74 Zygmunt Bauman supports this claim when he reasons that a rise of security measures in 
countries hit by terrorism does not only affect “the directly assaulted places but far away spots 
in the countries of  “second speed” Europe – which the terrorists […] have no intention of 
attacking.” Zygmunt Bauman, “A Few Comments on the Mis-Imagined War on Terrorism,” 
socialeurope.eu, March 29, 2016. 
75 Such strategies of avoiding the implementation of policies ‘at home’ and rather adopting it at 
international level is also called for policy laundering in the literature. See for instance Barry 
Steinhardt, “Problem of Policy Laundering,” American Civil Liberties Union, August 13, 2004.  
http://26konferencja.giodo.gov.pl/data/resources/SteinhardtB_paper.pdf 
76 Markus Beckedahl and Falk Lüke, Die digitale Gesellschaft: Netzpolitik, Bürgerrechte und 
die Machtfrage (München: dtv, 2012), 73. 
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tackle terrorism within a European context in the latest (two) decades, one 
cannot discuss anti-terrorism policy at national levels in a European context 
without taking the larger, EU context into account.77 Ignoring the EU would 
not allow for any insights into the multi-layered nature of European anti-
terrorism policymaking and might set the preconditions for misunderstandings 
on European anti-terrorism (e.g., it might appear, that it is exclusively states 
that are responsible for certain terrorism policies, whereas, in reality, the 
initiative for a specific policy might have come from EU institutions). 
However, by including the EU in my case selection, I gain a more diverse and 
multi-layered insight into European anti-terrorism.78 Moreover, I claimed 
above that the results of my research would deliver some clues for other 
European country cases as well. By having an in-depth look at the EU in terms 
of terrorism policymaking and by elucidating the interrelation between 
member states and the EU, I strengthen my argument that my results deliver 
such indications for similar cases. 
Furthermore, the EU is a relevant case to be included in this study, not 
only due to its relevance in terms of European anti-terrorism but also due to 
its relevance as an international rights player. The EU emphasizes the 
promotion of human rights and democracy as (part of) its raison d’ être, while 
at the same time trying to oversee the human rights situation in its member 
states (and candidate countries).79 Over the years, the EU’s human rights 
                                                          
77 Certainly, when looking at anti-terrorism policymaking in a European context one could look 
at other European institutions as well, since also other institutions are active in that policy field, 
for instance the Council of Europe (CoE). However, although other institutions are not without 
relevance, the EU is by far the most relevant and important actor in terms of European anti-
terrorism. It owns more concrete policies than other institutions (e.g., in terms of data retention 
or biometrics) and it provides its members with a common definition of terrorism, as well as a 
common strategy to fight terrorism. Thus, the EU is not only the most important European 
player in terms of regional integration in general, but also in terms of anti-terrorism. Since I 
have to delimitate my focus I have chosen the EU over other European institutions. 
78 Such inclusion of diverse cases in comparative design is suggested in the literature. For 
instance, Jack Donnelly advocated for such a research design when he postulated, “we must 
pay greater attention to the interaction of national and international factors […].” Donnelly, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 181. My research is aiming precisely at the 
results of this interaction for the European human rights regime concerning European terrorism 
policies. 
79 For instance, the EU has adopted its own rights declaration, the CFREU. This charter was 
promulgated already in 2000 and gained the legal status of an EU treaty with the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2009. Additionally, the EU decided in the course of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty 
to become a party to the ECHR. Furthermore, human rights are integrated into various 
documents of different importance in the EU framework. For example, human rights clauses 
are included in the Treaty of the European Union from 1992 (the Maastricht Treaty); which 
states that the “Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity […] and respect 
for human rights” (article 2). It further states that the EU in its “relations with the wider world,” 
is supposed to contribute to “the protection of human rights” (article 3). Newer treaties, such as 
the Lisbon Treaty, contain references to human rights as well. Rights clauses are also included 
in so-called Association Agreements with states surrounding the EU. However, although EU 
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agenda has evolved to become ever more ambitious. Therein, not living up to 
its own promises in terms of human rights, would harm the EU’s credibility 
as an international rights player, and would constitute a negative example for 
its member states.80 
Although the inclusion of the EU, as mentioned, provides my study 
with another important and beneficial layer of analysis, it is clear that the three 
cases I have collected are not completely comparable entities. The EU is not 
capable of carrying out the same kind and amount of terrorism policies as 
sovereign states. The EU, other than the two countries selected, does not 
maintain independent police, commando or military units. It does additionally 
not possess the same amount of legislative power in terms of security policy 
(still a wide range of security policy is kept to national levels). Thus, the EU 
does not possess the whole range of tools to fight terrorism, as states do.81 
Therefore, it has somewhat of a special status in my study. Still, I will provide 
an evaluation of human rights in the context of EU terrorism policy, based on 
the very reasons I lined out above: the general relevance of the EU as an anti-
terrorism policy player (and rights player), the interrelation of EU-member-
state policymaking, and the insufficiency that an ignorance of the EU in the 
European anti-terrorism policymaking would constitute.  
 
 Brexit 
I have before emphasized the interrelation between my two country 
cases and the EU in terms of anti-terrorism (the major reason for including the 
EU as one of my focal points in this study). In this regard, the current political 
process of Brexit is to a certain degree a challenge for my study. Clearly, the 
mentioned interrelation will likely become less strong in the course of Brexit. 
How the exact cooperation on anti-terrorism will look like, once Brexit 
becomes a reality is currently very uncertain; the possibility that current 
relations between the countries will be upheld is, however, present. This is 
based on potential incentives for such a continuation on both sides. Theresa 
May held at the Munich Security Conference in 2018 that she wishes to 
continue intense security cooperation with the EU (e.g. in terms of the 
European Arrest Warrant or with Europol) and expressed hopes for a security 
agreement that would provide for such cooperation.82 Furthermore, since the 
                                                          
institutions have developed a human rights agenda, human rights ideals often have to take the 
backseat when coming in conflict with other political interests, e.g., security interests. 
80 Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer Mac Naughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave macmillan, 2008), 223-228. 
81 This limitation of the EU’s capabilities is recognized by the EU itself, e.g., by EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries. “The European Union's Role in the Fight Against 
Terrorism: The Role of the EU in the Fight Against Terrorism,” Irish Studies in International 
Affairs, Vol. 16 (2005). 
82 Theresa May, Speech at the Munich Security Conference, February 17, 2018. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-
february-2018 
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UK has been evaluated as rather important for European anti-terrorism (e.g., 
the UK is evaluated as quite effective in terms of intelligence gathering) the 
perception that the UK’s contribution is simply necessary for a successful 
European anti-terrorism might lead to incentives for continued cooperation on 
the EU’s side.83 This could still be valid despite member states’ motivation to 
drive a harsh course on the UK in the Brexit process (based on the strategy of 
deterring other member states from going the same way as the UK).84 
However, at the very least, the overarching function of the EU in the field of 
anti-terrorism will not be valid anymore in regard to the UK. Sir Malcolm 
Rifkind, i.a. former Foreign Secretary and former Chairman of the British 
Intelligence and Security Committee hypothesized in April 2016 that anti-
terrorism cooperation will continue despite Brexit, but that this cooperation 
will not be as effective anymore.85 The anti-terrorism policy of the EU as a 
whole might also be looking different, as the EU’s policies have significantly 
been shaped by influence from the UK (amongst other players). After the 
Brexit, the EU will find a different political context for security 
policymaking.86  
Clearly, the Brexit will affect the relationship between the UK and the 
EU on anti-terrorism. It will, furthermore, influence the EU’s overall anti-
terrorism policy, given the previous strong role of the UK. However, the 
findings on the human rights troubles of the UK and the EU in the course of 
anti-terrorism produced in this thesis are not affected by the Brexit process. 
Only those observations that build on the concrete relation between the EU 
and the UK will possibly lose relevance once the UK formally exits the EU. 
And of course, as I write, the UK is still a member of the EU. 
 
 Delimitation of Focus 
When trying to analyze the terrorism policies of the three cases some 
delimitations are necessary concerning the focus of the study since one would 
not be able to analyze all terrorism policies of the three entities (anti-terrorism 
and counter-terrorism). I will employ the following points for delimitation of 
policy focus. 
                                                          
83 Claudia Hillebrand, “With or without you? The UK and information sharing in the EU,” 
Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 16 No.2 (2017): 91-94. 
84 Bernhard Blumenau, “International Cooperation & Intelligence Sharing” (presentation, The 
Future of Terrorism: Georgetown & St. Andrews University Conference, Washington, April 
28-29, 2016). 
85 Malcolm Rifkind, “How Far is it Possible for the UK and its Security Services to Protect the 
Country from Terror?,” World Counter Terror Congress, London, April 19-20, 2016. 
86 This position is e.g., shared by Rob Wainwright, Director of Europol, who claimed in the 
spring of 2016 that the Brexit equals the exit of one of the leading European forces in anti-
terrorism. Rob Wainwright, “Protect: Cooperation and International Responses to Security and 
Counter-Terror Strategy in Europe,” World Counter Terror Congress, London, April 19-20, 
2016. 
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First, I will restrict myself to those policies that are playing out inside 
of the boundaries of my cases. Including both domestic and foreign terrorism 
policies, spanning over two decades, would be a far too extensive and 
potentially endless endeavor. To scan all domestic terrorism policies is already 
a challenging task, to include non-domestic policies as well, would let the 
range of this research grow beyond feasible boundaries. An inclusion of non-
domestic terrorism policies would necessitate an analysis of e.g., the UK’s and 
Germany’s involvement in the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan, or the UK’s 
involvement in the Iraq War regarding potential human rights infringements. 
This would additionally open up for a foreign policy dimension, which is not 
at the heart of the discussion in this thesis (although a change of foreign policy 
might be a valuable tool for diminishing radicalization of certain groups ‘at 
home’). My research will thus have its focus on domestic and inner European 
processes and will only cover measures that are aiming at individuals inside 
of the EU, Germany and the UK. This said it is not intended here to give the 
impression that human rights violations abroad would be less important or 
appalling. However, the focus of this thesis is simply not on potential human 
rights problems abroad (due to the above-mentioned reasons). 
In addition, I will restrict myself to those policies and measures that 
are endangering the maintenance of a generally high human rights level. This 
means that I will not take up unique individual human rights violations (outlier 
events or exceptional cases), which have no further relevance regarding the 
importance of rights in a state’s (or federation’s) overall terrorism policy. 
Rather, I will focus on policies or measures that at least potentially affect a 
large range of individuals, that are of a severe character, or that resemble the 
general treatment of the idea of human rights while trying to tackle terrorism.87 
Thus, I will point to typical or systematic (one might also say widespread) 
human rights problems instead of individual instances of the same.88 Hence, I 
will rather talk about systematic surveillance or discriminatory stop-and-
search practices towards large or certain shares of populations, rather than 
                                                          
87 Individuals are here understood universalistically, that means rights problems of all 
individuals inside the three entities will be at focus, not only the infringements of the rights of 
citizens or residents. This means that I am appealing to an idealistic and fully universal concept 
of human rights. 
88 For this reason I will, e.g., not go into the individual cases of Murat Kurnaz and Khaled El-
Masri in the chapter on Germany. Kurnaz was abducted in the course of the US’ rendition 
program and interned at Guantanamo Bay, and El-Masri was abducted by Macedonian police, 
handed over to the CIA, and interned in Afghanistan. Both were tortured during detention. In 
both cases, the German state did not provide much support to its resident and citizen 
respectively. Der Spiegel, “Lebenslänglich,“ May 13, 2013. Constanze Kurz, Die Datenfresser 
(Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 2011), 250-251. The cases have thus been chosen off for this thesis, not 
because the German state was here not involved in processes that are criticizable from a human 
rights perspective, but since they rather constitute special (or exceptional) cases (and 
furthermore played outside of the boundaries of Germany). 
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single or unique and non-systematic events of rights violation (e.g. violations 
spontaneously committed by single state representatives).89  
My evaluation as to which terrorism policies might trigger such rights 
problems, and consequently which policies to focus on, is based on my 
research of the empirical data regarding the cases, consisting foremost of 
secondary sources, such as scholarly publications, as well as reports by NGO’s 
and investigative journalism, but also primary sources such as court rulings. 
With the help of such documents, I have thus ‘sampled’ the most relevant 
issues in the course of conducting an extensive (semi-) systematic research. 
Therein, I went through all major policy packages and legislative acts for both 
country-cases as well as the EU and additionally, lean on evaluations from the 
scholarly literature and NGOs in the field as to which policies potentially 
trigger rights issues. Of course, for newest developments, such scholarly 
guidance is not always given (though potentially by NGOs or journalist 
publications).90 Relevance is here evaluated as rights issues that are 
widespread or rather severe and that appear often in the literature and the 
mentioned documents. I will thus scrutinize anti-terrorism policies such as 
data retention policies, surveillance measures of various kinds, policies on 
(indefinite) detention, stop-and-search measures of police forces, anti-
radicalization programs or the construction of biometric databases. 
Another relevant delimitation in regard to this study pertains to the 
analyzed rights issues. In theory, the range of rights that can be affected by 
terrorism policies spans over the whole spectrum of rights outlined in the most 
important human rights documents (the UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and 
the ECHR).91 In other words, not only infringements of civil and political 
rights but also of economic, social and cultural rights are possible. For 
instance, the security measure of the barrier wall between Israel and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory has not only effects on civil and political rights 
but also ESCRs, such as the right to health, education, and water.92 To give 
another example, the freezing of assets of terror suspects might affect the 
economic rights of many more individuals than only the suspect’s).93 Still, 
                                                          
89 However, unique cases might under very severe circumstances still be relevant and will 
therefore not be ultimately excluded; an example will be my analysis of the German Air 
Security Law. 
90 States and the EU provide overviews of their anti-terrorism activity as well, and whereas 
some of this data is usable, e.g. the original text of anti-terrorism acts, or original strategy 
papers, one has to consider states’ interpretations of their own policy line to be necessarily 
biased. 
91 UDHR stands for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ICCPR stands for International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and ICESCR stands for the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
92 Since many Palestinians are cut off from access to hospitals, schools or wells. Scheinin, 
“Terrorism,” 561-562. 
93 On this see e.g., Joe Stevens, “UN Targeted Terrorist Sanctions and the Rule of Law: The 
UKs Response”, Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. No. 2 (2012). Christina Eckes, “EU 
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most anti-terrorism policies that include the potential for rights problems do 
affect civil and political. Economic, social, and cultural rights (ESC rights) are 
affected to a much lesser degree by anti-terrorism policies. Yes, there may be 
infringements of ESC rights in the context of terrorism policies as well as 
knock-on effects from civil rights violations. However, not only has the 
discourse regarding terrorism policies rights ‘performance’ largely been 
spinning around civil and political rights issues, e.g. at UN level but also in 
the literature.94 It is additionally, as mentioned, the case that the most frequent 
negative effects of rights infringing terrorism policies are not to be found in 
the area of ESC rights, but civil and political rights.95 An individual’s senses 
of personhood and its recognition as a social actor with relatively liberal 
possibilities for thought, expression, association, assembly, movement, and 
prospects within a political system is really what’s at issue – the recognized 
terrain of civil and political rights. My thesis will thus operate in this sphere: 
rights that have to do with one’s relation to civic polities, people’s relation to 
the state, their possibility of realizing and unfolding themselves as humans 
and political actors versus that state. ESC rights will not be addressed in my 
thesis. My decision to focus on civil and political rights is furthermore 
supported by the practical necessity to delimitate the focus of my research. 
Since the range of human rights potentially affected by terrorism policies is, 
as mentioned, very broad, it would not be possible to cover all rights norms 
that are potentially infringed (and again, the large majority of affected rights - 
at a widespread or severe level - are civil and political rights).  
Therein, and based on my selection of terrorism policies explained 
above, the civil and political rights that will be at center stage in my human 
rights analysis of the mentioned cases are freedom from discrimination (art. 2 
UDHR), the right to privacy (art. 12 UDHR), freedom of expression (art. 19 
UDHR), freedom of assembly and association (art. 20 UDHR), freedom of 
movement (art. 13 UDHR), and the right to life, liberty and security (art. 3 
                                                          
Counter-Terrorist Sanctions against Individuals: Problems and Perils,” European Foreign 
Affairs Review, Vol. 17 No. 1 (2012). 
94 Unsurprisingly, different scholars have different perceptions as to which rights are the most 
relevant ones in regard to terrorism policies. However, a general tendency to focus on civil and 
political rights is prevalent. For instance, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, reflecting post 9/11 
policies in the US and UK, point to the right to a fair trial, the right to privacy, freedom from 
discrimination or freedom of expression. Alison Brysk implies that a vast range of rights can 
be relevant concerning terrorism policies, e.g. the right to life, liberty and security, freedom 
from torture, the right to privacy, freedom from arbitrary detention and the freedom from 
discrimination, as well as the freedoms of movement, association, and expression. Other 
authors focus on a narrower set of rights in their writings on the subject, e.g., Michael Ignatieff 
talks mostly about detention without trial and torture in his almost infamous book The Lesser 
Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Eric 
Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 39-41. Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” 
1. 
95 Scheinin, “Terrorism,” 561. 
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UDHR). Other rights, such as the right to equal protection of the law or the 
freedom from arbitrary detention (art. 9 UDHR), the right to a fair trial (art. 
10 UDHR) and the right to be treated with presumed innocence (art. 11 
UDHR) will appear occasionally, but the rights mentioned above will be at 
the center of my investigation. 
Another delimitation of focus is the result of my fixed timeframe, 
which I have set from 9/11 to current years. Naturally, this timeframe 
constitutes a certain limitation in regard to the policy focus of the study. It 
could have benefitted the understanding of the results of my post 9/11 analysis 
to be able to compare those results to a full-fledged analysis of the terrorism 
policies of the exact same cases from, say, the end of WWII to 2001. However, 
such a vast timeframe is utopic for a study of this size. Therefore, I have 
chosen to ‘only’ provide some historical detours when relevant in my analysis, 
which will provide a sense of terrorism policies in the UK and Germany in 
earlier decades (foremost the 1970s). Thus, the historical legacy of current 
terrorism policies does not feature as a major issue in my study; it is, however, 
not fully omitted. 
 
 Identifying Rights Problems 
After having delimitated the rights focus, the question arises as how to identify 
potential cases of rights curtailments and violations, in other words, how this 
study will go about operationalizing such restrictions of rights.96 In this thesis, 
a human rights violation in the course of an anti-terrorism policy is 
operationalized via a double-edged human rights framework.   
First, I operationalize a violation by referring to the legal human rights 
framework to which the EU, the UK, and Germany institutionally connect, 
which is legally binding human rights documents. The ECHR and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) in a European 
context and the ICCPR in a wider, global context will, due to their importance 
and international regard, be the benchmark in this regard (for the country 
cases).97 The legal benchmark for the EU is, however, the CFREU, since the 
EU is not itself a party to the ICCPR or the ECHR (although the objective to 
join the ECHR as a party has existed since the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty). A violation of human rights in the legal framework is operationalized 
                                                          
96 ‘Operationalization’ concerns the transformation of theoretical concepts or processes into 
variables, which can measure such concepts, or processes. See e.g., Blaikie, Designing Social 
Research, 115-119. Bryman, Social Research Methods, 696. The term operationalization 
pertains mostly to quantitative research; however, by interpreting the term ‘measurement’ as 
the interpretation of data in qualitative research, it becomes usable for my purposes as well. 
97 Clearly, the UN documents have been the foundations of the European documents. Whereas 
the UDHR is not a legal document, it is internationally recognized as maybe the most important 
human rights document and it has been the stepping-stone for the legally binding human rights 
documents. 
The term ’benchmark’ connects to the more orthodox policy analysis literature, see e.g., Peter 
Knoepfel et al., Public Policy Analysis (Bristol: Policy Press, 2007). 
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as a breach of legally binding human rights obligations emanating from the 
mentioned documents (taking legally eligible options for rights limitations and 
derogation into regard).98 I foremost operationalize this legal benchmark by 
referring to court rulings (by a relevant human rights court or high court) 
which have declared a policy as being in violation (or not) of human rights. If 
no ruling has been issued on a concrete policy or if a ruling is still forthcoming, 
I will, if possible, utilize other rulings, which might be seen as precedents and 
can thus provide indications concerning the question whether a policy might 
be legally challengeable. In such instances, one will, again, have to take legal 
possibilities for rights derogations and limitations into account. If 
discrepancies between rights norms in the legal documents or between the 
demands for eligible rights derogations or limitations are detectable, I will rest 
on the most demanding set of norms.99 If several rulings on a terrorism policy 
are to be found, I will rest on the most actual one. 
However, human rights are not only legal terms enshrined in certain 
documents. Human rights reflect a certain understanding of the human being; 
general personhood, a potential maximal realization of human development 
and capabilities, and the relation between individual and state. In this sense, 
they not only represent ‘letters of the law’, but also certain intentions and aims 
(e.g., human dignity, freedom, and justice), constituting the spirit of rights.100 
My thesis will thus employ a quasi-idealistic approach and will evaluate a 
violation of rights not only in legal terms but in essence, in terms of a breach 
of the overall aims and intentions of rights, the spirit of rights. This perspective 
of human rights is necessary, as it is, from my perspective, insufficient to 
conduct a rights analysis of terrorism policies exclusively from a legal 
perspective. A narrow legal perspective does not always reflect the wider aims 
and the basic idea (or ideals) of human rights (although, one might, as 
mentioned, understand human rights law as an expression or legal translation 
of the wider intentions of human rights, or as the embodiment of human rights 
ideals). Whereas such a perspective is necessary for the analysis of all 
terrorism policies, its importance shines through the clearest under certain 
circumstances. For instance, not all policies that appear critical from a rights 
perspective have been evaluated by a human rights court (or constitutional 
court) or a ruling is still pending, or two courts have different opinions on the 
same policy. And, of course, legal frameworks can change over time, and 
might thus change their relation to certain rights. Furthermore, and this is a 
major point here, it is sometimes possible that a certain policy has been 
                                                          
98 The mentioned rights documents leave space for a legal derogation of rights under certain 
circumstances.  
99 Logically, if a policy is eligible according to the most demanding human rights document, it 
is eligible in regard to the others as well. 
100 Dorfman, 13 Acts of Academic Journalism and Historical Commentary on Human Rights. 
An understanding of human rights existing in a wider context and entailing a certain spirit 
springs also from a document such as the UDHR. 
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declared legal and justified by a court, however, the policy might despite its 
legal status still undermine the wider aims, spirit, and culture of human rights. 
In these cases, one can only rely on argumentation that connects to the wider 
meaning and aims of rights, and the consequences of their potential 
curtailment. Thus, I will evaluate the terrorism policies in focus against their 
compatibility with the overall aims of human rights norms (freedom, justice, 
and peace in the world, the protection of human dignity and the unfolding of 
individual capabilities). 
 
 Validity 
A few points are due regarding the validity of this study. The idea of validity 
is interested in the integrity of the results and processes of research.101 In the 
traditional social science understanding, there are several categories for 
evaluating validity, measurement validity, internal validity, ecological 
validity, and external validity.102 The latter category will not be taken up here 
since I have provided an account of the external validity of this study in my 
points on generalizability further above. Now, ecological validity – the 
question whether a research really reflects everyday life and natural settings, 
instead of producing artificial results possibly influenced by unnatural 
research conditions such as a laboratory - is given for this study, since my data 
on potential human rights violations are drawn directly from people’s life 
world, or from legislation or policies that exist in the real world.  
Whereas the categories of external and ecological validity fit with my 
qualitative study, this is not the case with the categories of internal and 
measurement validity. Internal validity concerns the relation between the 
major variables in a study, in other words, the issue of whether the 
independent variables really cause the dependent variables. In the case of this 
study, the dependent variable would be the existence of violations of human 
rights in my three cases in the course of terrorism policies. The independent 
variables could then in the context of my study be understood as the rights 
standards, which allow us to interpret human rights as being violated. 
However, the last rather reflects my operationalization of rights violations, 
rather than a check on causality. Normally the category of internal validity 
points towards more explanatory causation, e.g. rise of terror incidents 
(dependent variable) based on an increase of right-wing extremism 
(independent variable), and thus the category of internal validity does not 
                                                          
101 The concept of reliability is concerned with the question of whether the results of a study 
are repeatable. Bryman, Social Research Methods, 32. However, the concept of reliability is 
foremost in focus in quantitative studies and since there is by definition no possibility that a 
study which owns a sufficient level of validity does not fulfill the requirements of reliability as 
well, I will concentrate on an explanation of validity. Lincoln and Guba claimed in their 
influential scholarly writing on reliability and validity in qualitative studies that “since there 
can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the former [validity] is sufficient to 
establish the latter [reliability]." Lincoln and Guba, Naturalistic inquiry, 316. 
102 The term ‘traditional’ is here referring to a research approach based on quantitative methods. 
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seem to fit fully to my kind of study. The same is valid for the category of 
measurement validity.103 The emphasis on measurement shows that the idea 
of measurement validity foremost points to quantitative studies. In the context 
of my thesis, it would be concerned with the question of whether concepts 
such as terrorism, human rights, or human rights violation are really reflected 
by the data I use. However, since my study does not conduct any real 
measurements, but rather interprets social actions (see my point on 
interpretivism above) a certain misfit between the orthodox categories of 
validity and the nature of my qualitative study becomes apparent. A range of 
scholars (e.g., Lincoln and Gupta or Leung) has recognized this problem of a 
misfit. Therein, Lawrence Leung suggests that in qualitative studies one 
should rather check for the “appropriateness” of a study in order to establish 
if it reflects validity. This standard of appropriateness pertains to the research 
question or hypothesis in face of the aim of the study, the tools and the data of 
the research, the choice of research design and sample for reaching results, as 
well as the mode of data analysis.104 Applying this standard of 
appropriateness, I would argue that the validity of my study is given according 
to these standards. First, the thesis statement (the hypothesis) presented above 
points directly to the analysis conducted in the study and drives towards a 
comparative analysis as carried out in this thesis. Second, the data and tools 
of the study (non-reactive research) fit the nature of the research, as argued 
above.105 Third, the research design of a comparative study is, as argued, 
appropriate, a single case study design would give less telling results, and a 
broad scale quantitative research would not be able to produce a detailed 
analysis and grasp the important contexts and rights-based considerations. The 
choice of the sample was explained and defended as appropriate earlier. Last, 
the mode of analysis, a critical and interpretive analysis of terrorism policies 
based on a double-edged and interrelated framework, was explained as well 
and is likewise regarded as appropriate. Thus, my research does not only fulfill 
the classic validity categories (as far as possible), but also the alternative take 
on validity based on the specifics of qualitative work. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103 This concept is concerned with the question whether measurements in a study really reflect 
the concepts that they are supposed to measure. Bryman, Social Research Methods, 32-33. 
104 Lawrence Leung,” Validity, reliability, and generalizability in qualitative research,” 
Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care, Vol. 4 (2015): 324-327. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4535087/ 
105 Maybe, one could have added interviews with members of the security apparatus or victims 
of rights infringements; however, such a design would have exceeded the resources of this 
study, without necessarily adding it essential value. 
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Literature Review 
Of course, in the face of the ambitions of my thesis, there is a question as to 
what the major existing works are on the topic, and where this thesis might 
differentiate from the same. In the following, I will present such similar 
academic accounts. This will entail a reflection on the research gap that this 
thesis tries to reduce. I will additionally highlight some works that provided 
valuable inspiration for this thesis. 
Before presenting those studies that are most directly related to my 
research, it is worthwhile to note the striking recent development in the overall 
field of terrorism studies. Until 9/11, terrorism was not considered a first-order 
security problem and terrorism studies consequentially “occupied a marginal 
position within mainstream academic circles.”106 Tellingly, Walter Laqueur 
pointed out, “books on terrorism published before September 2001 did not 
become bestsellers.”107 However, since 9/11, the literature on terrorism and 
anti-terrorism has without a doubt seen exceptional growth.108 Accordingly, 
Michael Boyle even spoke of an “explosion of literature on terrorism since the 
September 11th attacks.”109 A statistic by CSA Worldwide Political Science 
Abstracts illustrates this point. Between 1960 and 2000, one could find 3.802 
publications with the keyword ‘terrorism’, however, for the much shorter 
period from 2001 to 2006, one could find 6.564 publications.110 Thus, it is 
evident that the attention terrorism as a social and political phenomenon 
attracted among scholars rose rapidly after 9/11.111 Therein, 9/11 not only 
provided a ‘high moment’ for international relations, politics, and history, but 
                                                          
106 Ranstorp, “Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11,” 13. Additionally, Peter Katzenstein 
explains that “international terrorism had not been considered part of conventional scholarship 
on national or international security before September 11.” Peter Katzenstein, “Same War—
Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism,” International Organization, Vol. 57 
No. 4 (2003): 734. 
107 Walter Laqueur, “What to Read (and not to Read) about Terrorism,” Partisan Review, 
Summer 2002. 
108 9/11 clearly triggered an increase of terrorism research especially in the US, thus 9/11 in a 
way “Americanized the study of terrorism,” as Richard English holds. Richard English, “Why 
does terrorism occur?” Lecture at the Olympia Summer Academy, Nafplio, July 17, 2016. 
https://www.blod.gr/lectures/why-does-terrorism-occur/ 
109 Michael J. Boyle, “Progress and Pitfalls in the Study of Political Violence,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol. 24 No. 4 (2012): 529. 
110 Jennifer S. Holmes, “Terrorism,” in The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. by 
Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (London: Sage, 2009), 463. Ranstorp points out that in the 
twelve months after 9/11 one could count just as many articles on terrorism as in the previous 
thirty years. Ranstorp, “Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11,” 22. 
111 Richard English, “21st-Century Terrorism: How Should we Respond?” Political Insight, 
Vol. 1 No. 3 (2010): 76-78. Several other authors have made the same argument. For example, 
Martha Crenshaw explained, “that what was once a marginal subject for social science has 
developed into a full-fledged program of ‘terrorism studies’.” Martha Crenshaw, “Terrorism 
Research: The Record,” International Interactions, Vol. 40 No. 4 (2014): 556. Alex Schmid 
notes the publication of “thousands of articles, especially since 9/11.” Alex Schmid, The 
Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2013), 460. 
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also for the field of terrorism studies.112 Still, one will find that there is less 
research on state reactions to terrorism than on terrorism itself. For example, 
Campbell found in a 2005 study that only around twenty percent of research 
focused on responses to terrorism.113 Still, this means that one will find 
hundreds of publications on state responses to terrorism. Especially after 9/11 
(and Bush’s proclamation of the ‘War on Terror’) a vast amount of literature 
has been published on anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. 
Many takes in the literature on terrorism policies (including 
comparative ones) do, however, not include human rights effects of such 
policies as a major focal point. For instance, Yonah Alexander’s anthology 
Combating Terrorism, looks at the strategy ten countries employ towards 
terrorism, or Peter Katzenstein compared the German and Japanese terrorism 
policies before and after 9/11, however, without including a human rights 
scrutiny of terrorism measures.114 Other studies do include human rights 
                                                          
112 However, the surge of research in terrorism has isolated it from the overall research in 
political violence. Boyle, “Progress and Pitfalls in the Study of Political Violence,” 528. This 
can pose a problem, given the natural overlaps between the overall research field and the more 
specialized terrorism studies. 
113 Campbell as cited in Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 461. 
114 Yonah Alexander, Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2002). Katzenstein, “Same War—Different Views.” Other 
examples of valuable or regarded publications on terrorism policies – without applying a central 
focus on human rights effects – are: Dorle Hellmuth, Counterterrorism and the State: Western 
Responses to 9/11 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). Frank Foley, 
Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn, Global 
Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond (London: Routledge, 2003). Javier 
Argomaniz, Oldrich Bures and Christian Kaunert, “A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and 
Intelligence: A Critical Assessment,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 30 No. 2-3 
(2015). Argomaniz, The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, polity and policies after 9/11. 
Oldrich Bures, EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 
Marianne van Leeuwen, Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions 
and Policies (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003). Raphael Bossong, The Evolution 
of EU Counter-Terrorism: European security policy after 9/11 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2013). Karin von Hippel, Europe Confronts Terrorism (Houndsmill: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005). Dieter Mahncke and Jörg Mornar, International Terrorism: A European 
Response to a Global Threat? (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2006). Elies van Sliedregt, ”European 
Approaches to Fighting Terrorism,” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, Vol. 
20 (2010). Michael Bauer and Cornelia Beyer, Effectively Countering Terrorism (Brighton: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2009). David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Uniting against terror: 
cooperative nonmilitary responses to the global terrorist threat (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2007). Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, Critical Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2015). Staniforth, The Routledge Companion to UK 
Counter-Terrorism. Scott Poynting and David White, Counter-Terrorism and State Political 
Violence: The ‘war on terror’ as terror (London and New York: Routledge, 2013). Samuel 
Peleg and Wilhelm Kempf, Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 
2006). Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2005). 
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effects in their empirical research on terrorism policies, however, they restrict 
themselves to single case study designs. For instance, Jeanne Bonnici’s article 
on the effects of EU legislation on data protection and privacy rights, or 
Christina Pantazis’ and Simon Pemberton’s study on the implicit effects of 
UK anti-terrorism on non-discrimination.115 Yet other studies employ rather a 
                                                          
And of course, a plethora of academic works foremost covering terrorism do contain some 
chapters or contributions on state reactions to terrorism. A few examples are the following: 
English, Terrorism: How to Respond. Richard English, Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2015). Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism: Understanding threats and Responses in the Post-9/11 World, 3rd ed., 
(Boston: Longman, 2010). Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways 
Forward (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). Richard Jackson et al., Terrorism: A 
Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Andrew Silke, The Psychology 
of Counter-Terrorism (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism 
versus Democracy: The liberal state response. 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 
2011). David Whittaker, Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat (London: Longman 
Pearson, 2002). Gus Martin, Essentials of Terrorism (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2008). 
Gus Martin, The New Era of Terrorism (Thousand Oakes: Sage Publications, 2004). Cindy 
Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Pearson Longman, 2009). Walter 
Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). Stuart Gottlieb, Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: 
Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 
2010). Bock, Terrorismus. Mikkel Thorup and Morten Brænder, Antiterrorismens idehistorie 
– stater og vold i 500 år (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2007). 
115 Jeanne Pia Mifsud Bonnici, “Recent European Union developments on data protection … 
in the name of Islam or ‘Combating Terrorism’” Information & Communication Technology 
Law, Vol. 16 No. 2 (2007). Pantazis and Pemberton, “From the Old to the New Suspect 
Community.” Other examples in terms of the UK are: Conor Gearty, "11 September 2001, 
Counter-terrorism, and the Human Rights Act," Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 32 No. 1 
(2005). Rehman, “Islam, "War on Terror" and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United 
Kingdom. Emmanouela Mylonaki and Tim Burton, “An Assessment of UK Anti-Terrorism 
Strategy and the Human Rights Implications Associated with its Implementation,” Journal on 
Terrorism and Security Analysis, Vol. 6 (2011). Benedetta Berti, “Escaping the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: Securing a Role for Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism,” In Effectively Countering 
Terrorism, ed. by Cornelia Beyer and Michael Bauer (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009). 
David Bonner, "Checking the Executive? Detention Without Trial, Control Orders, Due Process 
and Human Right," European Public Law, Vol. 12 No. 1 (2006). Studies that implicitly cover 
the right to non-discrimination in the UK case are: Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick. ”The 
impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities,” International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology, Vol. 25 No. 3 (2011). Marie Breen-Smyth, "Theorising the “suspect 
community”: counterterrorism, security practices and the public imagination," Critical Studies 
on Terrorism, Vol. 7 No. 2 (2014). Paul Thomas “Failed and Friendless: The UK’s ‘Preventing 
Violent Extremism’ Programme,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 
12 No. 3 (2010). Greer, "Anti-Terrorist Laws and the United Kingdom's 'Suspect Muslim 
Community'.” 
In regard to the German case, not too many publications can be detected in the English 
language. Examples are: Berthold Meyer, “Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws,” In 
Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State. Verena Zöller, "Liberty Dies by Inches: German 
Counter-Terrorism Measures and Human Rights," German Law Journal, Vol. 5 No. 5 (2004). 
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theoretical approach on the relationship between terrorism policies and rights. 
For instance, Jeremy Waldron dealt with the implications of the idea of a 
balance between security and freedoms in the course of terrorism policies in a 
2003 article. Another example is Sondre Lindahl’s proposal for a different 
approach to terrorism policies.116  
Therefore, the studies that come closest to my own are the ones that 
apply a comparative approach and include a human-rights-based analysis of 
terrorism policies. I will elucidate some examples. A piece of research that 
appears similar to mine was delivered by David Whittaker with his monograph 
Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights in 2009. Whittaker approaches the 
anti-terrorism policies of the US, the UK, and the EU from a human rights 
angle. The monograph constitutes a rare example of a comparative study that 
includes the EU in the case selection (although Whittaker’s coverage of the 
EU is slightly thin). Whittaker elucidates some of the issues that have shaped 
the discussion around terrorism policies in the first years after 9/11 (focusing 
foremost on the US and the UK). The study, however, differs from my own in 
the lacking extended human rights framework (Whittaker stays close to legal 
evaluations), a lacking critical approach and a lacking genuine European focus 
(due to the prominent role of the US).117  
                                                          
Heinz, “Germany: State Responses to Terrorist Challenges and Human Rights.” Lepsius, 
“Human Dignity and the Downing of Aircraft.  
For the EU case one might e.g., mention: Hillebrand, Counter-Terrorism Networks in the 
European Union. Lindstrom, “The EU’s approach to Homeland Security: Balancing Safety and 
European Ideals.” Frank Gregory, “The EU’s Response to 9/11: A Case Study of Institutional 
Roles and Policy Processes with Special Reference to Issues of Accountability and Human 
Rights,” In Terrorism and Human Rights, ed. by Magnus Ranstorp and Paul Wilkinson, 
Terrorism and Human Rights (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). Brown and Korff, 
“Terrorism and the Proportionality of Internet Surveillance” Christina Eckes, EU Counter-
Terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: The Case of Individual (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). Vassilios Grammatikas, "EU Counter‐terrorist Policies: Security vs. Human 
Rights?" Conference Paper, First Annual Conference on Human Security, Terrorism and 
Organized Crime in the Western Balkan Region, Ljubljana, Slovenia, November 2006. 
116 Jeremy Waldron, “Security and Liberty: The image of balance” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol. 11 No. 2 (2003). Lindahl, “A CTS model of counterterrorism.” Other 
examples are: Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and 
the Courts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). George Clifford, ”Just 
counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 10 No. 1 (2017). Mahmood 
Monshipouri, Terrorism, Security, and Human Rights (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2012). Richard Ashby Wilson, Human Rights in the 'War on Terror' (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd ed. 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).  Stuart Taylor Jr., “Rights, Liberties and Security: 
Recalibrating the Balance after September 11,” In The New Era of Terrorism, ed. By Gus 
Martin (Thousand Oakes: Sage Publications, 2004). Eric Stoddart, “Challenging ‘Just 
Surveillance Theory’,” Surveillance&Society, Vol. 12 No. 1 (2014). Scott MacDonald, "The 
Lawful Use of Targeted Killing in Contemporary International Humanitarian Law," St Andrews 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2 No. 3 (2011). 
117 David Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights (Harlow: Longman, 2009). 
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Kent Roach’s book The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism 
from 2011 is another example of a study that has similar traits to my thesis. 
Roach compares the cases of foremost four countries; the US, the UK, 
Australia, and Canada, (Egypt, Syria, Israel, Singapore, and Indonesia are 
added as additional examples in one chapter) and the UN. He scrutinizes the 
terrorism policies of all cases from a human rights perspective. Especially his 
analysis of the UK is relevant from the perspective of this study. Here he e.g. 
points out that the policy of indefinite detention violated valid rights norms. 
He further emphasizes the historical legacies of current UK anti-terrorism. 
Roach’s detailed study differentiates from mine in the circumstance that it 
restricts itself to a legal analysis of rights eligibility. His research does 
additionally not deliver insights on the EU, and the case selection does not 
reflect a European focus.118 
Alex Conte’s extensive study Human Rights in the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism from 2010, covers the terrorism policies of four 
countries (the US, the UK, Australia, and Canada) from a legal angle. Conte 
e.g. scrutinizes pre-charge detention legislation, covers the rights problems 
triggered by the UK’s indefinite detention regime established in 2001, the 
detrimental effects of British control order measures on the rights to liberty 
and emphasizes imprecisions in legal definitions of the criminal offense of 
inciting terrorism as established in the UK’s 2006 Terrorism Act. Therein, 
Conte’s study elucidates some of the same policies and rights issues as my 
thesis. Although Conte’s study has some overlaps with my own, it restricts 
itself firmly to a purely legal take on rights issues, it does only include states 
in its case selection, and the cases do not reflect a European focus.119 
Todd Landman conducted comparative research on the effects of anti-
terrorism for the cases of the UK and the US in his 2007 article "Imminence 
and Proportionality: The U.S. and U.K. Responses to Global Terrorism." He 
covered anti-terrorism policies such as stop-and-search practices and 
indefinite detention and control orders (for the UK case) and concluded that 
in both cases civil liberties indeed have been curbed in the course of efforts to 
tackle terrorism.120 Landman’s study shows similarities to my research, 
however, it does not include the EU, it does not cover developments of the last 
decade and its case selection does not reflect a European approach. 
James Piazza and James Walsh conducted a comparative study on the 
human rights consequences of governments’ responses to terrorism as well. 
However, their study evaluating rights violations after a series of terror attacks 
                                                          
118 Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
119 Alex Conte, Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism: Commonwealth 
Approaches: The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Heidelberg: Springer, 
2010). 
120 Todd Landman, "Imminence and Proportionality: The U.S. and U.K. Responses to Global 
Terrorism,” California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38 No. 1 (2007). 
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in a range of countries (often non-Western), in the timeframe 1981-2003, used 
a quantitative approach. They reached, as mentioned earlier, the conclusion, 
that the rights to free speech and freedom of assembly and freedom of 
movement would generally not be curtailed by such policies, only 
extrajudicial killings and disappearances would see an increase in times of 
heightened terrorism.121 My study, which does focus on a different timeframe 
and a narrower case selection and which goes in more depth with the specific 
cases, as well as the meaning of the idea of human rights, will contest this 
claim. 
A pre-9/11 example of a study that resembles the research undertaken 
in this thesis is provided by Michael Freeman, who covered the relation 
between security and freedom and human rights for the cases of Canada, 
Northern Ireland, Uruguay and Peru from the 1960s to the 1990s, in his 2003 
book Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies using 
Emergency Powers to Fight Terrorism. He concluded that the usage of 
emergency powers of these countries in answering terrorist threats 
(respectively by the FLQ, the IRA, the Tupamaros, and the Shining Path) did 
produce mixed results. In Peru and Uruguay, emergency powers were abused 
by the state, but not in the UK and Canada. He additionally emphasized that 
the existence of a free press and a separation of powers would make a serious 
restriction of human rights unlikely.122 Freeman’s study does deviate from 
mine not only in its conclusion but also in terms of its case selection and 
timeframe. 
Some researchers do likewise utilize a comparative approach and 
include several cases; however, they restrict themselves to research on only 
one rights issue instead of a multitude (as this thesis does). An example is a 
publication by Quirine Eijkman and Bart Schuurman from 2011 (Preventive 
Counter‐terrorism and Non‐Discrimination in the European Union). Eijkman 
and Schuurman scrutinize the effects of current preventive anti-terrorism 
policies on the right to non-discrimination in three cases (the Netherlands, the 
UK, and the EU). They come to the conclusion that problems are detectable 
for all cases regarding non-discrimination, pointing to e.g., stop-and-search 
practices in the UK or the construction of databases at the EU level.123 
Although the study ‘only’ covers one rights issue, it comes rather close to my 
own research in its general approach. 
                                                          
121 Piazza and Walsh argue that only ‘rights to physical integrity’ are affected by terrorism 
policies, claiming that governments which “experience many terrorist attacks subsequently 
engage in more extrajudicial killings and disappearances.” Piazza and Walsh, “Transnational 
Terror and Human Rights.” 
122 Freeman, Freedom or Security. Based on the cases of Canada and Uruguay, he additionally 
pointed out that emergency powers can bring effective results in fighting terrorism. 
123 Eijkman and Schuurman, Preventive Counter-Terrorism and Non-Discrimination in the 
European Union. 
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Another example of research in my topic frame restricting itself to one 
rights issue, is a study conducted by Konrad Lachmayer and Normann 
Witzleb, which scrutinizes the effects of (some) recent surveillance measures 
on the rights to privacy and data protection in the EU, the US and Australia 
(in their 2014 article “The Challenge to Privacy from Ever Increasing State 
Surveillance”). They, e.g., analyze the EU’s data retention scheme or the 
American Patriot Act, and concluded that surveillance measures have reached 
“unprecedented intensity and intrude deeply into the personal sphere of 
millions.” They additionally point to the permanent character of newly 
implemented surveillance, a point I will return to later.124 Although the study 
is restricting itself to only one anti-terrorism and rights issue, its focus 
resembles one of the major points of inquiry in this thesis, surveillance.125 
In the literature, one additionally finds anthologies that comprise 
contributions on the human rights effects of terrorism policies of a range of 
countries (or entities), thus opening up for an indirect comparative approach. 
An anthology with the title Terrorism and Human Rights from 2008, edited 
by Paul Wilkinson and Magnus Ranstorp constitutes a valuable example.  It 
includes contributions on several countries (e.g. the UK, Australia, India, 
Spain or Israel), as well as the UN and the EU. It additionally contains a 
general discussion on the relationship between rights and terrorism policies. 
For instance, Laura Donohue provides a convincing argumentation against the 
often-used analogy of a balance that is to be struck between security and 
freedom.126 The publication shows its value as a major reference point in the 
field. It differentiates from my thesis, as it does not reflect a systematic or 
genuine comparison of several cases in one piece of research (due to being an 
anthology). 
Another anthology taking up the relationship between terrorism 
policies and human rights is edited by Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, 
National Insecurity and Human Rights from 2007, inter alia containing 
chapters on human rights consequences of terrorism policies in the US, the 
UK, Spain, Israel, Germany, and Canada. The anthology presents useful 
insights into human rights problems in the different cases, and the chapters 
provided by the editors deliver strong points for omitting or restricting 
measures that endanger rights in scenarios of terror threats. They end by 
                                                          
124 Konrad Lachmayer and Normann Witzleb, “The Challenge to Privacy from Ever Increasing 
State Surveillance: A Comparative Perspective,” University of New South Wales Law Journal, 
Vol. 37 No. 2 (2014). 
125 Another example of such a ‘single issue’ comparative approach is Fiona de Londras, 
Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), a study that scrutinized the detention schemes in face of the right to be 
free from arbitrary detention for the cases of the US and the UK. 
126 Magnus Ranstorp and Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and Human Rights (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2008). 
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suggesting that upholding rights standards might be a way of curtailing 
terrorism in the first place, a point I will return to in this thesis.127 
Mary Volcansek and John Stack edited the anthology, Courts and 
Terrorism: Nine Nations Balance Rights and Security from 2011. The 
contributions include both pre- and post-9/11 cases. The volume does apply a 
judicial perspective on the case studies and extends its focus on the concept of 
democracy, as well as the more broad relation between security and liberty.128 
The editors emphasize that courts play a decisive role (potentially the most 
important role) in trying to establish or at least protect a balance between 
rights and security. 
A pre-9/11 anthology in the topic framework is European 
democracies against terrorism: governmental policies and intergovernmental 
cooperation, from 2000, edited by Fernando Reinares. The anthology 
provides case studies on four countries (the UK, France, Spain, and Italy), as 
well as the EU. However, other than my study, Reinares’ publication does not 
restrict itself to a specific focus on human rights effects of anti-terrorism, but 
rather employs the broader framework of democracy and rights (although the 
chapter on the UK does utilize a narrower legal rights framework and points 
to legal rights problems in the UK’s efforts to tackle terrorism in Northern 
Ireland).129 And of course, the publication does not reflect a comparative effort 
by a single author.130 
Based on this overview, I would like to claim that my thesis does 
indeed answer on a research gap. The gap that my thesis addresses is a 
consequence of the following seven points. First, a comparative approach, 
                                                          
127 Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir, National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies 
Debate Counterterrorism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). 
128 Mary Volcansek and John Stack, Courts and Terrorism: Nine Nations Balance Rights and 
Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
129 Fernando Reinares, European democracies against terrorism: governmental policies and 
intergovernmental cooperation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). 
130 As further examples one can mention: Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the 
Past, ed. by Art and Richardson. The contributors analyze the reaction of thirteen states on 
terror threats, spanning over a wide geographical distribution, albeit foremost focusing on the 
pre-9/11 timeframe. Most contributors do furthermore not focus on rights issues, but rather the 
relation of democracy and state reaction. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and 
Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007). 
Already in 1994, David Charters edited the anthology The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect 
on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries. It evaluates the effects of pre-9/11 terrorism 
policies on democracies and civil liberties in the UK, Germany, Israel, Italy, France, and the 
US. The volume (in most parts) delivers the conclusion that fears of democracy being eroded 
by terrorism policies have been exaggerated. David Charters, The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its 
Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994). 
The anthology Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008) 
by Andrea Bianchi and Alexis Keller can be seen as another example of a publication fitting in 
this topic frame, however, it deals foremost with effects of terrorism policies on democracy 
instead of rights and it does not reflect a comparison of specific cases. 
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combining research on multiple cases from a human rights angle is not a 
common phenomenon in the literature; many scholars restrict themselves to 
single case studies. Furthermore, many comparative works are a selection of 
single case studies in anthologies. Second, although a vast amount of literature 
exists on anti-terrorism, this is not the case for the academic coverage of 
German anti-terrorism (at least in the English language), even less so in terms 
of coverage of the German case from a human rights angle. Third, a 
comparative approach spanning over (almost) the complete timeframe since 
9/11 is not the rule in the literature. Fourth, comparative approaches including 
the EU are rather rare in the field. Fifth, some comparative studies do restrict 
themselves to a narrow set of rights issues, sometimes only a single affected 
right (e.g., the study by Eijkman and Schuurman). This is not the case with 
my study since I try to elucidate the effects on a range of civil and political 
rights. Sixth and this is perhaps the decisive category, a comparative approach 
of anti-terrorism analysis from a human rights angle, operating with a wider 
human rights framework (that is including the analytical category of wider 
human rights aims, or ‘spirit of rights’) is rare. Seventh, my thesis does close 
some gaps on the most recent developments in the three cases that have not 
yet (or almost not) been accounted for in the academic literature (e.g. 
developments towards facial recognition or biometric databases have 
foremost been covered at the NGO level). Combining these points my research 
does indeed constitute a unique piece, given the combination of a long-term 
comparative approach with a double-edged human rights angle, including the 
EU and Germany, covering a range of rights issues and adding to the 
understanding of the newest developments in the specific cases. 
In my efforts to reduce this research gap and in conducting my 
research I have taken important inspiration from a wide range of works. It is 
worthwhile to mention a few. Works which provided this thesis with 
inspiration regarding the theoretical framework are e.g., Martha Nussbaum’s 
Creating Capabilities, providing the concept of human capabilities, which 
plays an important role in understanding the aims of the human rights idea and 
which is reflected prominently in my conceptualization of the spirit of rights 
idea. Likewise, Francis Fukuyama’s recent book Identity presented insights 
into the importance of the recognition of equal worth. Ben Dorfman’s 13 Acts 
of Academic Journalism and Historical Commentary on Human Rights 
provided invaluable inspiration for my double-edged rights framework (the 
letter of the law and the spirit of rights). Jeremy Waldron’s article “Security 
and Liberty: The image of balance” presented valuable points on the 
mentioned balance analogy and its policy implications. Additionally, Conor 
Gearty’s book Liberty and Security delivered important theoretical points on 
the relation between terrorism policies and human rights, and additionally 
insights on the British case, e.g. in regard to the effects of anti-terrorism on 
minorities as well as the majority in the country. Another scholar who 
presented valuable input for this thesis is Laura Donohue (e.g. via her 
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contribution “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum”), for instance by 
providing a theoretical take on different understandings of the relation 
between terrorism policies and rights, by heightening the understanding of the 
importance of privacy, by delivering empirical input on surveillance matters, 
as well as evaluations on long-term consequences of rights curtailments and 
rights support. Moreover, Richard English takes a prominent role in the 
literature base of this thesis. Several of his publications (but especially his 
books Terrorism: How to Respond and Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism) provided inspiration, e.g., on the definitional fault-lines of the term 
terrorism, or how to evaluate responses to the phenomenon.131  
 
                                                          
131 A range of additional examples of works that inspired my thesis could be mentioned, I will 
restrict myself to these: Timothy Garton Ash’s  Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected 
World, Lilian Mitrou’s “The impact of communications data retention on fundamental rights 
and democracy,” and Andreas Bock’s Terrorismus have delivered valuable input; for instance 
for the understanding of freedom of expression, data retention surveillance and its rights 
implications, and long term strategies to tackle terrorism, respectively. 
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Chapter I 
Human Rights: History, Concepts, and Issues 
In order to conduct a human rights-based analysis, an elaboration of the 
concept of human rights is a necessity. In this chapter, I will first deliver a 
short introduction to the history of the concept in order to deliver the relevant 
conceptual context. Some historical understanding of the concept is needed 
in order to grasp (some of) the theoretical discussions around human rights 
that will follow subsequently. I will thus provide an explanation of the 
double-edged understanding of human rights that this thesis will utilize. It 
begins by delivering an account of a legal understanding of what human 
rights are, how they are justified and how rights can be derogated. Thereafter, 
I will elucidate a wider perspective on human rights. I will go in-depth with 
the wider aims of human rights (what I call the ‘spirit of right’) and explain 
the ideas behind such a concept-based understanding of rights. In the last 
section of the chapter, I will introduce those specific rights that are 
overwhelmingly in focus in this thesis one by one in more detail. This is a 
necessity since I will in the analysis delve into the specific rights implications 
of specific anti-terrorism policies. In order to be able to conduct such an 
analysis, the affected rights need to be elucidated. I will, thus, introduce the 
relevant rights, locate their legal source, clarify potential legal limitations of 
such rights and explain both their general importance, as well as their 
relevance in the context of this thesis. 
 
A Brief History of Human Rights 
Human rights are reflected as a concept that does not exist in a historical 
vacuum but is dependent on the context of its central ideas. The historical 
roots of the concept of human rights will be relevant for locating the source 
of my double-edged human rights framework. In other words, the legal and 
the spirit understanding rest on slightly different understandings of the roots 
of human rights.1 
One of the most fiercely debated issues in the historical writing on 
human rights is the question when the concept of human rights first appeared, 
in other words where to start in the timeline of the history of humankind with 
tracing human rights.2 The one extreme of the explanations on the issue is to 
trace human rights back to the roots of civilized mankind itself, e.g., the Code 
of Hammurabi (ancient Babylon); whereas the other extreme is to trace them 
back no longer than the 1970s. Micheline Ishay is a proponent of the former, 
                                                          
1 Furthermore, some theoretical justifications of rights lean more on certain historical 
explanations regarding the sources of rights than others. 
2 Ed Bates, “History,” In International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed., ed. by Daniel Moeckli, 
Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 16. 
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whereas Samuel Moyn tried to renew the historical picture of the concept of 
human rights by claiming the latter.3 
Ishay claims that many ancient religions and values had an influence 
on the development of modern rights. Most religions would contain a claim 
of universality (a claim to be valid for all human beings) and would provide 
altruistic guidelines. For instance, Ishay speaks of portrayals of ‘brotherly 
love’ to be found in some of these religious texts. She finds these roots of 
human rights in all three big monotheist religions, as well as ancient 
Buddhism and writings of Confucius. She moreover points to the fact that 
some drafters of the UDHR claimed that some of the ancient roots are 
connected to modern human rights; e.g., Rene Cassin claimed that “human 
rights comes from the Bible, from the Old Testament, from the Ten 
Commandments.”4 Ishay herself holds that the Jewish precepts can be traced 
back to the code of Hammurabi, which in her opinion narrates “the moral 
principles of a people, sanctioning punishments for those who transgress the 
law.”5 Ishay additionally traces human rights back to ancient philosophers, 
e.g., Socrates and Plato (in regard to their view of universal human 
goodness).6 
Critics (e.g. Lynn Hunt) remarked that Ishay’s history of human 
rights, due to its broad approach, would simply become the history of human 
civilization - in other words, a history of everything.7 I would agree with this 
criticism since the differences between current human rights ideas and the 
postulated ancient roots simply appear too vast. Surely, ideas of universality 
and empathy for all human beings are reflected in some of the ancient roots 
Ishay refers to, however, they differ considerably from modern ideas about 
human dignity, the unfolding of the potential of individuals versus the state, 
the importance of rights for the establishment of democratic states and 
societies and the picture of humans being endowed with reason (e.g. as 
spelled out in the UDHR).8 
In contrast to Ishay, Moyn holds that human rights are a very recent 
idea. He holds that human rights ideas only became widespread in the 1970s. 
First during this decade would we have seen a movement spreading the 
concept of human rights. Moyn opposes the claim that ancient religions or 
philosophies should be regarded as precursors of modern human rights. For 
example in case of Christianity, “the cultural and political implications of 
                                                          
3 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization 
Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human 
Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard Bellknap, 2010). 
4 Cassin as cited in Ishay, The History of Human Rights, 19. 
5 Ishay, The History of Human Rights, 19. 
6 Ibid., 23. 
7 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
2007), 20. 
8 I will come back to these points in the next section of this thesis. 
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Christianity from age to age and place to place were simply too different, in 
need of too much drastic transformation, to approach modern conceptions on 
their own.”9 The same could then be claimed for all other ancient religions 
and philosophies that Ishay presents as roots of human rights. Furthermore, 
according to Moyn, the rights declared during the Enlightenment would not 
resemble modern human rights either. The rights evolving during that period 
would have aimed at the construction of nation and state through revolution, 
the scope of these rights would not have included humankind as a whole. I.e., 
the “rights of man” (from The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen, from 1789), Moyn argues, were about “a whole people 
incorporating itself in a state,” revolutionary rights were about the creation 
or renovation of citizenship space, not the protection of humanity. According 
to Moyn, these rights were subordinate features of the creation of state and 
nation. Moreover, the creation of the UDHR after the end of World War II 
could not be evaluated as the moment human rights gained importance in 
international politics and policymaking either, Moyn claims. In the 1940s, 
when the UDHR was under composition, wartime hopes of a world shaped 
by human rights were soon disappointed. “The world looked up,” Moyn 
holds, and then went on with Cold War politics. Human rights policy would 
quickly not have been in focus anymore and even the horrors of the 
Holocaust soon came out of focus. Human rights would have been marginal 
until the 1970s.10 
According to Moyn, human rights evolved in the 1970s as a new 
utopia. They evolved as the image of another and better world. This was only 
possible because other utopias had died before. What Moyn has in mind here 
is foremost the utopia of the ‘new left’ as it was called at the time, including 
student revolts in many Western countries during the end of the 1960s. The 
idea of reaching a better world by way of a political revolution had lost its 
momentum, Moyn argues, it made space for a less politicized rights 
movement that also tried to achieve a better world. In consequence, human 
rights saw their social breakthrough and were taken up by a variety of social 
movements and governments alike (e.g., the US administration under 
Carter).11 
                                                          
9 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 16. 
10 Moyn, The Last Utopia. Kenneth Cmiel – one of the big names in human rights scholarship 
– in a certain sense seems to agree with Moyn when he explained that several rights were not 
understood as human rights before the 1970s, but are now a central part of human rights 
discourse, e.g., children’s rights or rights of indigenous people. Kenneth Cmiel, “The Recent 
History of Human Rights,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 109 No. 1 (2004): 118. 
11 An example for the unpolitical drive of the human rights movement would be the fact that 
Amnesty International denied naming the structural reasons for human rights violations, while 
still blaming the responsible authorities for the emergence of such violations. Moyn, The Last 
Utopia. 
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The two other major approaches regarding the starting point of 
human rights history, which one finds in scholarly literature surfaced already 
in the paragraph on Moyn’s ideas on the topic. These approaches point to the 
Enlightenment and the creation of the UDHR after the Second World War 
respectively. These strands are the most popular in the literature and the 
common understanding of the origin of human rights. In comparison to 
tracing the roots of human rights in the texts of ancient religions or 
philosophies, it appears easy to detect roots of modern human rights in 
Enlightenment texts. For instance, one can trace human rights in the English 
Bill of Rights (1689) or in the writings of philosophers such as John Locke 
when reflecting his demands for rights to life, liberty, and property, or in 
Immanuel Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism.12 A prime example of an 
Enlightenment text reflecting human rights ideas, according to this strand of 
the literature, is the mentioned French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen.13 Various rights detectable in the French Declaration surface 
in the 1948 UDHR as well, e.g., freedom of expression and the rights to 
property or security (articles 2 and 10 of the French Declaration). 
Furthermore, one is bound to notice the similar wording of the first article of 
these two documents. Both speak of humans (“men” in the French 
Declaration) being born “free and equal” in rights. Some drafters of the 
UDHR fittingly declared the French Declaration to have been a source of 
inspiration (e.g., Eleanore Roosevelt).14 Lynn Hunt is a writer in the camp of 
those academics identifying the ‘human rights moment’ during the 
Enlightenment. She established an innovative hypothesis when she argued 
that the reason for human rights evolving during the Enlightenment was the 
advancement of a sense of empathy during the period. The ability of ordinary 
people to assign importance to individuals and their wellbeing would have 
received a boost. The Enlightenment would have been based on a change of 
the notion of selfhood and the individual in general. People started (with the 
help of accounts of torture, novels, plays, music, etc.) to identify with other 
individuals more than earlier. Hunt uses the term “imagined empathy” to 
underline this process.15 However, critics (e.g. Ishay) hold that given the 
inequality of rights distribution during Enlightenment (e.g., non-nationals, 
women, and citizens without property were discriminated), the 
“Enlightenment human rights legacy represents little more than an 
                                                          
12 One could add a vast array of names of Enlightenment thinkers, e.g., Voltaire, Rousseau, 
or Mill, to mention but a few. 
13 Together with the American Delcaration of Independence and the American Bill of Rights, 
which came into being only a few years earlier, 1776 and 1787 respectively. 
14 In her address to the UN at the ratification of the UDHR on December 9, 1948. 
15 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 26-34. Hunt’s term of imagined empathy is a development 
of Benedict Anderson’s famous ‘imagined communities’. 
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imperialist masquerade aimed at subdoing the rest of the world under the 
pretense of promoting universality.”16 
As the fourth strand, other researchers rather see the creation of the 
UDHR as the decisive moment in human rights history (mostly with 
acknowledging the Enlightenment roots of the UDHR). Elisabeth Reichert is 
representative of this group. She describes the UDHR as “nothing short of a 
revolution in thought” and additionally points to the fact that no prior 
document could match the UDHR in scope and participation, which would 
make it to ‘’one of the most esteemed accomplishments in political, social, 
economic and cultural history.”17 The UDHR would for the first time have 
implemented “minimum standards of conduct for governments all over the 
world”. For the first time, universal rules had appeared.18 The UDHR 
manifested universally applicable rights and aims of rights (freedom, justice, 
and peace in the world). The declaration developed out of contemporary 
precursors such as Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms from 1941 (freedom of 
speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from [economic] want 
and freedom from fear) or Roosevelt’s proposal for an American economic 
bill of rights (or ‘Second Bill of Rights’) from 1944 guaranteeing social 
rights, as well as the pledge of the UN Charter to “reaffirm faith in human 
rights.”19 A Commission on human rights was thus founded which, produced 
the draft of the UDHR under the influence of delegates from various 
countries, reflecting what Reichert called a revolution in thought.20 In an 
extension of the push for human rights norms at the UN level, human rights 
                                                          
16 Ishay, The History of Human Rights, 8. Of course, one might point out, that many of those 
societies that Ishay herself pointed to in her attempt to trace ancient roots of human rights, 
were existing in similar or worse structures of inequality. Another point of criticism towards 
Hunt’s explanation is, as mentioned, the argument by Moyn, claiming that the rights 
documents created during Enlightenment would rather have aimed at the construction of 
nation and state, rather than a rights framework accessible to all mankind. 
17 Elisabeth Reichert, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Only a Foundation,” The 
Journal of Intergroup Relations, Vol. 39 No. 1 (2002): 34. 
18 Reichert, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 34. Still and this is an interesting 
feature of Reichert’s account, she extents the contextual basis of her UDHR-based human 
rights account to more than just the immediate post-war years and initiatives, holds that the 
UDHR was built on earlier ideas as well. Here she includes not only Enlightenment roots but 
also earlier ancient roots. She mentions, e.g. Greek philosophers such as Socrates and 
Aristotle, Roman legislation, but also ancient religions such as Judaism, Christianity, 
Confucianism and Buddhism. Reichert thereby connects with Ishay’s approach. Reichert, 
“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 36 
19 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). Reichert, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 40. 
UN Charter from 1945. 
20 Influential delegates were not exclusively from Western countries, but also Latin American 
States, China (the Republic), Lebanon or the Soviet Union. 
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received a legally binding basis in the European context with the adoption of 
the ECHR in 1950.21 
Now, although the processes towards the production of global rights 
ideas and regimes were “revolutionary” after the Second World War, as 
Reichert claims, the realities of the Cold War would soon catch up with the 
idealism enshrined by the UDHR. Moyn rightly holds that human rights were 
moved to “the edge of the stage,” and the big powers were much rather 
caught up in Cold War power struggles, than a struggle to advance the idea 
of human rights.22 Still, human rights did evolve during the Cold War period. 
For instance, via the adoption and implementation of legally binding human 
rights covenants at the UN level (the ICCPR and the ICESCR). Still, the Cold 
War led to a “bifurcation” of the concept of human rights. As Conor Gearty 
explains, the concept split into “two apparently separate and conflicting 
zones, the civil and political (the US version) and the social and economic 
(the Soviet version).” He moreover argues that the US succeeded in making 
the world believe that the concept of human rights was “well exclusively 
concerned with the civil and political” [rights].23 
With the end of the Cold War, the concept of human rights gained 
ever more ground. Fittingly, Gearty argued, “with the fall of the Berlin Wall 
the idea of human rights has achieved a near-total dominance as the ethical 
idea of the contemporary global age.”24 Tim Dunne agreed to this evaluation 
by claiming that the end of communist regimes triggered a “re-empowerment 
of the human rights regime.”25 Indeed, events such as the 1993 World 
Conference on Human rights, China’s signing of the ICCPR in 1998 and the 
usage of human rights vocabulary in numerous UNSC resolutions were 
                                                          
21 The ECHR, in contrast to the UDHR, does contain almost exclusively civil and political 
rights. This restriction to one of the two main categories of rights was a conscious move of 
differentiation aimed at pointing out contrasts to the Soviet Union. The ECHR was 
additionally supposed to provide a statement of common values and identity of the signatory 
states. Steven Greer, “Europe,” In  International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed., ed. by Daniel 
Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
418. 
22 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 46. 
23 Conor Gearty, “Terrorism and Human Rights,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 42 No. 3 
(2007): 345. 
Michael Freeman is another scholar critically remarking the “common view” that “only civil 
and political rights are genuine human rights”, which would be without basis since neglecting 
basic economic and social rights would “render civil and political rights worthless.” Michael 
Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2011), 76. Although my study stays in the realm of civil and political rights as well, it 
acknowledges the importance of both parts of the human rights framework. However, as 
argued in the methodology section, an analysis of civil and political rights is most relevant in 
the nexus of European anti-terrorism. 
24 Gearty, “Terrorism and Human Rights,” 345. 
25 Tim Dunne, “The Rules of the Game are Changing: Fundamental Human Rights in Crisis 
After 9/11,” International Politics, Vol. 44 (2007): 272. 
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landmarks in that regard. The idea that human rights are “a means to realize 
human dignity” found supporters around the globe.26 Writers such as 
Kenneth Cmiel and Michael Ignatieff even argued that human rights after the 
end of the Cold War had become one of the most important - if not the 
dominant – moral vocabulary in foreign affairs and that human rights were 
shaping security measures as well.27 Christian Reus-Smit concluded that 
human rights had become a standard for the conduct of the sovereign, not 
only inside their own borders but even in regard to external affairs.28 
Fittingly, Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
remarked in 2002 that, “human rights are now firmly on the agenda of the 
international community. […] There is now much greater recognition of the 
centrality of human rights and of the immense benefits a rights-based 
approach brings.”29  
However, with the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent policies 
established by many Western states, the concept of human rights again lost 
ground. Fittingly, Michael Ignatieff claimed that the dominance of the 
human rights vocabulary in international politics – which he evaluated to 
have been status quo during the 1990s – came under pressure after 9/11.30 
Accordingly, Jack Donnelly evaluated that “since September 11 we have 
indeed seen democracy and human rights partly eclipsed.”31  
However, although the period after 2001 saw the idea of human 
rights generally to come under pressure, the EU still moved forward with 
adopting the CFREU at treaty level in 2009. It is thus this tension between 
an increased importance of human rights norms since the end of the Cold 
War – one might speak of a ‘breakthrough’ of human rights – and the 
tendency of security interests to override this human rights trend since 9/11 
that reflects the context of my study.  
This thesis, generally, follows the two traditional explanations of the 
roots of human rights, the Enlightenment roots and the push for the human 
rights idea around the construction of the UDHR. This circumstance is based 
on the argument that disregarding the importance of the Enlightenment roots, 
as well as the UDHR for modern human rights regimes and responsibilities 
                                                          
26 Dunne, “The Rules of the Game are Changing,” 272. 
27 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004). Cmiel, “The Recent History of Human Rights.” 
28 Reus-Smit, as quoted in Dunne, “The Rules of the Game are Changing,” 273. 
29 Robinson, as cited in David Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights (Harlow: 
Longman, 2009), 33. 
30 Michael Ignatieff, “Is the Human Rights Era Ending?” The New York Times, February 5, 
2002. https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/05/opinion/is-the-human-rights-era-ending.html 
David Rieff argued in a similar fashion when he claimed, “the global balance of power has 
tilted away from governments committed to human rights norms and toward those indifferent 
or actively hostile to them.” David Rieff, “The End of Human Rights,” Foreign Policy, April 
9, 2018. 
31 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013), 237. 
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(as Moyn does) would be a considerable mistake. Both have clearly shaped 
the current understanding, context, and form of rights regimes and the wider 
aims of rights. Still, I acknowledge Moyn’s point concerning the importance 
of a bottom-up process of human rights since the 1970s. It would, likewise, 
be a mistake to reduce human rights to an elitist top-down process. The 
‘breakthrough’ of rights in the latest decades would not have been possible 
without broader civil society support for human rights ideas. Therefore, 
instead of determining one of the presented approaches as the absolute 
answer, this study argues that two of them should be regarded as the major 
roots of human rights, without disregarding the relevance of the push human 
rights on the empirical level experienced since the 1970s. Thus, (some of) 
these alleged exclusive sources of human rights rater build on each other, 
granting more than one of them importance for the understanding of modern 
rights concepts. 
 
A Double-Edged Concept of Human Rights 
 Letter of the Law 
In terms of what human rights actually are, one might, as mentioned, point 
to both a legal understanding of human rights, as well as a more broad 
understanding of rights, connecting to the overall ‘spirit’ of the idea 
integrated into a specific political culture. Let me start with elucidating the 
legal understanding first.  
Here, many point to the most relevant recognized human rights 
documents that have been established over the last seven decades as a 
reference point. The first major document and arguably still the most known 
and most important one is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). The UN General Assembly adopted the UDHR on December 10, 
1948. The declaration was the result of a two-year-long drafting process 
involving numerous consultations, as well as controversies between 
delegates of the Commission of Human Rights. This committee consisted of 
representatives from various countries, in an attempt to broadly represent the 
UN as a whole. The UDHR contains a long list of rights guaranteeing all 
individuals the enjoyment of these rights, based on their common dignity and 
the principle of equality. Individual rights that the UDHR outlines are for 
example the right to life, equal protection by the law, property, work, social 
security, marriage, nationality, presumption of innocence, asylum, social 
security, privacy, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of 
assembly and association, freedom of movement or protections from slavery, 
torture, arbitrary arrest or discrimination. The document consists of thirty 
articles and just as many rights stem from these articles. Although the list of 
rights in the UDHR seems extensive, not all ‘good’ or even necessary 
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features of human life are part of human rights documents, e.g., to be loved 
is not a human right.32  
It is an important detail that the UDHR has no legal status, but is 
‘only’ a non-binding declaration. However, almost all rights outlined in the 
UDHR gained legal status by the 1966 adoption of two international 
covenants, the ICCPR and the ICESCR (plus adding additional rights, such 
as the protection of minority cultures). The ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the 
UDHR together constitute the so-called International Bill of Human Rights.33 
A majority of the world’s states are a party to all these documents. The 
UDHR delivered important inspiration for the drafting of the most important 
European human rights document, the 1950 ECHR by the Council of Europe. 
In fact, the ECHR is explicitly supposed to further the goals of the UDHR. 
Several decades later, the EU’s drafting of the CFREU was oriented towards 
the goals of the UDHR as well (the CFREU gained legal status at the EU 
level in 2009).  
Whereas the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ECHR define a range of 
specific human rights, they also provide some general provisions on rights 
(especially the UDHR and the ICCPR). The concept of human rights as 
manifested in the mentioned documents emphasizes that all humans equally 
hold the same rights and that all human rights are inalienable. In other words, 
all humans possess human rights (citizens and non-nationals alike), human 
rights are consequently universal. This claim regarding the universality of 
human rights aims at the circumstance that they should by definition be valid 
for everyone and everywhere. Human rights are held by all humans to an 
equal amount; no one enjoys a larger or smaller degree of rights. 
Furthermore, the inalienability of human rights aims at the idea that humans 
cannot lose their rights, even if they commit crimes or act morally wrong.34 
Additionally, the UN’s 1993 Vienna Declaration on human rights, a 
declaration adopted by 177 states, determined that “human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”35 Therefore, 
states or other authorities cannot choose to only follow a few rights, they are 
one indivisible, interdependent and interrelated concept.36  
                                                          
32 Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 73. 
33 Christine Chinkin, ”Sources,” In International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed., ed. by Daniel 
Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
78. 
34 Sarah Joseph and Adam Fletcher, ”Scope of Application,” In International Human Rights 
Law, 2nd ed., ed. by Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 120. “Even the cruelest torturer and the most debased victim 
are still human beings,” Jack Donnelly writes. Donnelly, International Human Rights, 19. 
35 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx 
36 Donnelly, International Human Rights, 19-24. 
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However, the rights framework established by the UDHR, 
understood as indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, did – somewhat 
ironically - witness the establishment of a split between these rights into two 
different categories of rights governed by two different legal documents with 
the adoption of the ICCPR (civil and political rights, CPRs) and the ICESCR 
(economic, social and cultural rights, ESCRs). This differentiation occurred 
during the Cold War and was driven by the logic of this global conflict. 
During the ideological struggle of the two superpowers, either side put 
emphasis on a different kind of rights, the Western powers on CPRs and the 
Communist bloc on ESCRs.37 CPRs are, for instance, the right to life and 
liberty, freedom of expression, the right to privacy, the right to vote or the 
right to be free from discrimination. CPRs are often referred to as ‘first-
generation-rights,’ and are supposed to protect one’s freedom from state 
interference (which is why they are also called negative rights).38 They are, 
moreover closely linked to the democratic nature of a state.39 The ICCPR is 
the major UN rights document encompassing specifically CPRs. ESCRs, are, 
e.g., covering rights such the right to health care, housing, education, work 
or food. They are often considered ‘second-generation-rights,’ and are 
supposed to support social and economic development and individual 
flourishing.40 ESCRs are covered in the UN’s ICESCR and are at times 
omitted in other rights documents, e.g., the ECHR does not contain many 
ECSRs, but mostly CPRs (the UDHR includes both ‘generations’ of rights).41 
A distinction between CPRs and ESCRs may be based on the fact that most 
CPRs, other than ESCRs, do not require the provision of resources to 
individuals, which might be a reason why governments (especially of 
economically liberal states) are more reluctant to guarantee for ESCRs.42 
Still, distinctions between CPRs and ESCRs are not always clear-cut, e.g. the 
right to property is often considered a civil right, whereas it might just as 
well be regarded as an economic right.43 As mentioned, this thesis will carry 
                                                          
37 Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 7. 
38 Todd Landman, Studying Human Rights (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 9. 
Many civil rights, thus, connect to Isaiah Berlin’s notion of negative liberty. Isaiah Berlin, 
Liberty, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002). 
39 Laura Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” In Terrorism and Human Rights, 
ed. by Magnus Ranstorp and Paul Wilkinson (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 69. 
40 Landman, Studying Human Rights, 9. 
41 Besides these two generations of rights, scholars often refer to a third generation of rights, 
which entails collective rights or group rights such as the right to self-determination or the 
right to economic and social development. However, few third generation rights are 
manifested in the world’s most important rights documents, with some exceptions (e.g. the 
right to self-determination is guaranteed in article 12 of the ICESCR). Costigan and Stone, 
Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 7-8. 
42 Costigan and Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 7. 
43 Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 76. 
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out an analysis of terrorism policies with a focus on CPRs. This might trigger 
the impression that this thesis contributes to the often mentioned tendency to 
regard CPRs as more important than ESCRs.44 However, this is not the case. 
In the context of terrorism policies, CPRs are a justified and somewhat 
logical first choice, however, ESCR-based research in terrorism policies does 
have its relevancy (see methodology) and this thesis indeed regards all 
human rights as indivisible. 
As mentioned, human rights are determined in several legally 
binding treaties, all largely or directly based on the UDHR. The most 
important of these treaties are, from a European perspective anyway, the 
ICCPR or the ICESCR at UN level, the ECHR at Council of Europe (CoE) 
level and the CFREU at the EU level. These treaties clearly define specific 
rights, spell out what these rights include and provide standards for when 
certain rights obligations might be derogated or limited. They manifest the 
most tangible basis for evaluating policies regarding their rights 
compatibility. In case of the ECHR the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and in case of the CFREU the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
dispense justice and act as judicial watchdogs of the affected treaties. 
Member states of the Council of Europe and the EU are legally bound to 
convert decision of these courts in national legislation (if demanded by the 
courts). Together with the treaties, the rulings of these courts constitute the 
legal basis of human rights evaluation. This level of evaluation might also be 
referred to as the ‘letter of the law’. A legal evaluation of anti-terrorism 
policies is indispensable, given the well-established legal framework 
surrounding human rights in the European context (especially at treaty level), 
as well as the notable recognition legal evaluations of rights issues enjoy.45 
Legal evaluations will thus be one part of my double-edged mode of human 
rights evaluation (see my ‘operationalization’ of this in the methodology). 
The evaluation of rights based on ‘the letter of the law’ connects with 
a plain legal justification of the concept of human rights. Here it is claimed 
that rights are justified simply since states have commonly agreed on them; 
often based on a consensus of international law. The argument is simply, that 
since conventions such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR were commonly 
agreed on, it is justified to demand all parties to uphold the commonly 
agreed-upon standards. 
Of course, this position does not answer to why this consensus is 
right, good or just in itself.46 However, the human rights documents 
presented above claim to deliver this answer. The documents emphasize that 
human rights norms derive from an inherent dignity that humans simply 
possess (thereby connecting to a naturalist understanding of rights). This 
                                                          
44 Costigan and Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 7. 
45 Chinkin, ”Sources,” 79. 
46 Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 68. 
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argumentation tries to justify for the existence of human rights, and arguably 
for the documents itself. Human rights norms would, at the same time, 
constitute the basis for the protection of human dignity. For instance, the 
UDHR refers to the inherent dignity […] of all members of the human 
family,” and  “the dignity and worth of the human person” in the preamble 
and states in article 1 that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights.”47 The ICCPR and the ICESCR point to the inherent dignity of 
humans as well. Newer human rights documents, such as the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and the EU’s CFREU, likewise refer to human dignity as 
justification for human rights. The Vienna Declaration holds that “all human 
rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person.”48 
The CFREU speaks in its preamble of the indivisible, universal value of 
human dignity and its first article reads, ”human dignity is inviolable. It must 
be respected and protected.“49 Again, the notion of human rights is here 
based on the idea that every human being does possess dignity. Therefore, 
every human being is entitled to be treated in a way that mirrors this dignity. 
In this understanding, “human rights rest on an account of a life of dignity to 
which human beings are by nature suited.”50 Although my thesis regards the 
idea of human dignity as the cornerstone of the modern concept of human 
rights, it will not follow the idea that humans possess an inherent dignity 
from which human rights naturally emit. Such a conception would not be 
congruent with the overall constructionist perspective of this thesis. Rather, 
I will, in the next section, covering the idea of a spirit and wider aims of 
rights offer a constructivist take on the justification of rights. 
I have already introduced the notion of an eligible derogation from 
legally binding human rights norms. I will now shed more light on the 
intricacies of such legal options for restricting rights. Derogation options 
underline the legal character of rights as opposed to the spirit of rights and 
they will, furthermore, become essential in the analysis of this thesis. The 
option of derogation of rights emanates from two general paradoxes of the 
concept of human rights. First, human rights allegedly can prevent for 
measures that can mitigate public emergencies and establish national security 
or might come in the way of other beneficial developments for society as a 
whole, e.g. public order, public health or economic well-being (see ICCPR 
and ECHR). Therefore, rights can in such situations, under certain 
conditions, be derogated. This circumstance constitutes a paradox since the 
                                                          
47 Such claims are often deriving from the ideas of naturalist thinkers of rights, such as Locke 
or Kant. 
48 See, Vienna Declaration from 1993. States and state leaders have picked up on the idea of 
dignity as a cornerstone for the concept of human rights as well. 
49 This first article of the CFREU reflects not only the UDHR and the ICCPR, but is in tone 
and formulation very close to the first article of the German Grundgesetz (“Die Würde des 
Menschen ist unantastbar”). 
50 Donnelly, International Human Rights, 21. 
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aim of collective security might clash with the human right to individual 
security, which is guaranteed in all mentioned legally binding rights 
documents. Second, rights can be derogated if certain rights come in conflict 
with each other (constituting the second paradox). This is a paradox since the 
different rights springing from the different articles in the UDHR are 
declared inalienable and equal. However, certain rights are at times (or in a 
certain sense by definition) conflicting. The UDHR, for instance, 
acknowledges this problem in article 29. An example in the context of this 
thesis is the potential clash between those rights that are violated by terror 
acts and those rights that are curtailed by policies supposed to tackle terror 
threats. Terror acts violate, e.g. individuals’ right to life and security of 
person (art. 3 UDHR, art. 6 and 9 ICCPR, art. 2 and 5 ECHR). A state in its 
attempts to secure this right might, however, undermine a range of other 
rights and thus trigger a clash of rights interests. For instance, the UK 
government officially derogated from the right to liberty of person as 
enshrined in the ECHR (art. 5) when it implemented a legislation on 
indefinite detention for foreign terror suspects in 2001 (thereby implicitly 
derogating from the right to non-discrimination as well), in order to preserve 
the rights to life and security of person. 
In general, two different strategies are thinkable when having to deal with 
conflicting rights. The first would be to resolve the issue by assigning certain 
rights more importance than others. This would, however, clash with a 
central trait of the concept of human rights itself since all rights were defined 
as equal. Furthermore, any such hierarchy of rights would face legitimate 
criticism of being arbitrary. The second idea is that rights can only be 
curtailed when absolutely necessary, which would demand a context-specific 
evaluation of necessity.51 This idea has been implemented in the mentioned 
rights treaties. Thus, the general idea of derogation is to downscale the extent 
of rights, away from a maximalist approach, in order to preserve or restore a 
situation of stability, in which the preservation of a smaller amount of rights 
is much more likely.52 In other words, some human rights can be restricted 
(for a certain timeframe) in order to secure the enjoyment of other rights, 
which are evaluated as more important at that specific point in time.  
Three of the human rights documents used in this thesis contain 
general provisions for such human rights derogations. These are the ECHR, 
the ICCPR, and the CFREU (the UDHR does not include such a derogation 
                                                          
51 This evaluation should involve all affected parties into the debate as Freeman argues. 
Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 82-84. 
52 A maximalist understanding of human rights reflects the aim to establish, consolidate and 
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clause since it is not a legally binding document). I will shortly present the 
main points of the similar but not identical derogation schemes in the three 
documents. 
In terms of the ECHR, the option to deviate from rights norms under 
certain circumstances is (mainly) established by article 15.  Here, the ECHR 
points out that the rights in the document can be derogated in situations that 
threaten “the life of the nation”, such as war or public emergencies.53 A 
specific definition as to what constitutes such a situation of emergency 
threatening the life of the nation is missing in the text, however, relevant 
legal interpretations have subsequently been delivered by the ECtHR. The 
court held that the formulation ”time of emergency” is to be understood as 
reflecting an “exceptional situation or crisis […] which afflicts the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community 
[…].” Later, the ECtHR added that an emergency situation must reflect an 
actual or imminent situation. The term exceptional crisis was further refined 
by declaring that such a situation is given when the normal measures are not 
sufficient anymore in order to uphold public safety, order or health.54 Besides 
the condition of an emergency situation, the ECHR additionally points out 
that a derogation is only allowed “to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent 
with […] other obligations under international law.”55 The formulation “to 
the extent strictly required” means that measures must be strictly 
proportional. Proportionality is here connected to the categories of severity, 
duration, and scope. According to the ECtHR’s case law, measures 
derogating from the ECHR’s rights obligations must be necessary, in order 
to be proportional (in the sense that ‘ordinary measures’ are not sufficient to 
alleviate the crisis). Furthermore, measures must at least potentially be able 
to reduce the threat, measures must only be used as long as necessary, the 
severity of the measures must be in proportion to the threat, and safeguards 
against the abuse of emergency measures must be implemented. In applying 
                                                          
53 Indeed, the derogation from certain rights is at times executed in the course of the 
implementation of an official ‘state of emergency’. This is also valid for Western countries, 
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this principle of proportionality the ECtHR is providing the state authorities 
with a certain ‘margin of error,’ which means that not every small extension 
of proportionality might be the basis for the abolishment of a measure.56 
Moreover, countries executing rights derogations are supposed to define the 
territorial reach of such measures and they are required to inform the 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe on the concrete derogation and 
its reasons. However, following the principle of jus cogens, not all human 
rights articles in the ECHR are derogatable, articles 2, 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 
7 cannot be restricted.57 These articles guarantee the right to life, the 
prohibition of torture, the prohibition of slavery and servitude, as well as the 
prohibition of punishment outside of the law.58 Such non-derogatable rights 
reflect Jeremy Waldron’s suggestion that certain rights might not be 
supposed to be sensitive to changes on the scale of social costs.59 It can be 
argued that defining a core of rights that are not to be derogated while 
allowing other rights to be restricted, conflicts with one of the core principle 
of the human rights concept: the indivisibility of rights.60 Ironically, human 
rights treaties themselves would, therefore, provide for the subversion of a 
central cornerstone of the concept of human rights.  
Besides the general provision on derogation in article 15, the ECHR 
does contain specific limitation clauses in several individual rights articles, 
arguably setting less demanding provisions for limiting the maximal 
enjoyment of rights (articles 8, 9, 10 and 11, as well as article 2 of protocol 
4). I will come back to those special provisions when covering these specific 
articles in more depth later. 
The ICCPR provides general conditions for a potential derogation 
from human rights obligations as well. Similar but not identical conditions 
(to the ECHR) have to be met in order to be allowed to derogate from rights 
obligations. According to the ICCPR, derogation can only be executed in 
situations “of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation,” (the 
ICCPR does not mention a state of war scenario as the basis for derogation). 
Although the advanced interpretation of the term ‘emergency’, provided 
above has been delivered by the ECtHR in a European context and is 
therefore in theory not applicable to the ICCPR, it can be argued that the 
ECtHR’s specifications are anyhow applicable to the ICCPR’s provisions, 
since the provisions on derogation in ECHR and ICCPR are, as mentioned, 
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very similar.61 Thus, one can use the same specifications of an emergency 
situation when dealing with the ICCPR as when analyzing based on the 
ECHR. Nevertheless, the UN’s Human Rights Committee (HRC) provided 
a set of comments on the situation of emergencies that provide relevant 
additions to the understanding of such emergency situations. For instance, 
the HRC pointed out that not “every disturbance or catastrophe” can be 
understood to constitute a situation which legitimizes the recognition of a 
state of emergency (not even instances of armed conflict would 
automatically trigger a situation of emergency the HRC held, thus 
establishing a high threshold). The same committee pointed out that it must 
be the predominant objective of a state derogating from rights obligations to 
return to a state of normalcy.62 The ICCPR moreover contains the demand 
that derogation measures can only be carried out “to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation,” provided that they do not 
interfere with other obligations under international law. Also on this 
condition, one can follow the ECtHR’s specification on this formulation in 
order to gain a more in-depth interpretation of this condition.63 Other than 
the ECHR, the ICCPR explicitly demands that derogation measures cannot 
be discriminatory. However, although this condition is missing in the ECHR, 
discriminatory derogation measures would still violate article 14 of the 
ECHR. As in the ECHR, certain specific articles of the ICCPR can never be 
object to derogation. This pertains to articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 
15, 16 and 18. These articles cover the right to life, the prohibition of torture, 
the prohibition of slavery and servitude, the prohibition of imprisonment 
merely based on inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, the prohibition of 
punishment outside of the law, the right to be recognized everywhere as a 
person before the law, as well as the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion.64 Just as the ECHR, the ICCPR does provide specifications on 
the options to limit the maximal enjoyment of specific rights (in articles 12, 
17, 18, 19, 21, 22), providing less demanding conditions for a limitation of 
the enjoyment of these rights as constituted by the explained derogation 
                                                          
61 Michaelsen, “Derogating from International Human Rights Obligations in the ‘War 
Against Terrorism’?” 125. 
62 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001). 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrc29.html#_edn3 
63 When the HRC pointed to the principle of proportionality in derogations, its comments were 
very much in line with the ECtHR’s take on the derogation conditions. Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrc29.html#_edn3 
64 ICCPR, article 4. Thus, the ICCPR adds three more articles to the list of rights that cannot 
be derogated, compared to the ECHR. Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of 
Conflict and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 80. 
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clause. Again, I will come back to these specifics in connection with 
individual rights.  
The conditions for derogation formulated in the CFREU are at first 
glance arguably somewhat less strict than in the ECHR and the ICCPR. The 
general provision on the option to derogate from rights in article 52 of the 
CFREU states that derogations must be provided for by law and must respect 
the essence of the CFREU’s rights and freedoms. Furthermore, derogations 
must be proportional, which means that they can only be applied if they are 
necessary and if they reflect objectives that answer to general interests of the 
EU or protect the rights of others.65 Therein, the CFREU does not demand 
an emergency situation threatening the life of the nation, as the ECHR and 
the ICCPR do. The CFREU does additionally not explicitly demand the 
upholding of the principle of non-discrimination in derogation practices, and 
it does not define a ‘core’ of rights that is never to be derogated. However, 
the options for a restriction of rights are in fact quite limited based on the 
CFREU, the rights lined out in the CFREU do not enjoy a lower level of 
protection against derogation as provided for in the other two treaties. This 
evaluation is based on the circumstance that important additional safeguards 
have been implemented in the CFREU’s derogation provision. For instance, 
the CFREU establishes not only that rights derogations must be provided for 
by the law and must be necessary, but they must also respect the essence of 
the CFREU’s rights and freedoms. Furthermore, derogations must be subject 
to the principle of proportionality.66 The first of these demands is not, or at 
least not explicitly, supplied in the ECHR or ICCPR.67 The demand for 
preserving the essence of rights and freedoms while derogating makes it hard 
to move too far away from the rights framework in terms of the degree of 
derogation. The demand on proportionality (very similar to the demand on 
that in the ECHR and ICCPR) makes it difficult to issue a derogation 
measure that undermines the rights of a big majority of individuals in society 
(potentially apart from the most serious emergency situations). Moreover, 
paragraph 3 of article 52 states that all those rights in the CFREU which 
overlap with corresponding rights established in the ECHR (which is valid 
for most CPRs in the CFREU) are protected at least to the same degree as in 
the ECHR, whereas a more extensive protection (e.g. via the provision on 
proportionality) is not prevented. The CFREU does not install additional 
limitations to rights provisions (as ECHR and ICCPR do), the exact same 
provisions are valid for all articles. Reflecting those points, it becomes clear 
                                                          
65 Thereby this provision is rather close to provisions on rights limitation in the ICCPR and 
ECHR, e.g. art 8, par. 2 in the ECHR. 
66 CFREU, article 52. 
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Committee. See Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism, 76. I will 
come to the limitation of individual rights in the next section. 
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that the CFREU raises the bar rather high in terms of opportunities for legal 
rights derogation. 
The derogation of rights does not necessarily equal an immoral or 
unjustified act, there can be a virtue in the attempt to preserve a minimum 
amount of rights in an exceptional situation. In such a situation, it might be 
justifiable to limit certain rights in order to protect the overall democratic 
order.68 Furthermore, as derogation provisions are manifested in the most 
important rights documents, they themselves, in a certain sense, constitute 
rights as well. Thus, various human rights advocates have pointed to the 
possibility of derogating rights in line with the above-mentioned 
preconditions, as a sufficient ‘margin of flexibility’ in order to tackle 
terrorism, without violating human rights obligations.69 However, as this 
thesis will argue, at times rights derogations are implemented without 
absolute necessity, or they are crossing red lines that they should not cross 
or derogations are ever extended, in terms of their reach, their severity, and 
their validity period. 
 
 Spirit of Rights 
Despite my detailed coverage of the legal status of human rights, it is 
essential to recall, that human rights are not only to be understood in a legal 
framework. Human rights must be regarded with a wider context in mind. In 
fact, human rights exist “prior to legal structures.”70 One might here speak of 
the general importance of or sense of human rights. Human rights aim at or 
exist via moral claims and a certain culture and spirit of rights and the 
realization of the same.71 They pertain the general relationship between state 
and individual. Thus, this understanding of rights opens up for an extended 
level of rights evaluation. This extended understanding of rights will here be 
denoted as ‘the spirit of rights’. So, rather than arguing solely on basis of 
                                                          
68 Clive Walker, “Policy Options and Priorities: British Perspectives”, In Confronting 
Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, ed. by Marianne van 
Leeuwen (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 18. 
69 Mary Robinson the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is one of them. 
Robinson as cited in Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, 33. The question of 
justifiable derogation has not only been covered by states or intergovernmental institutions 
such as the UN, but also by NGO’s. The so-called Johannesburg Principles laid out on the 
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Principles hold that a derogation of freedom of expression on grounds of national security is 
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70 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 69. 
71 On the idea of a spirit of right see e.g., Ben Dorfman, 13 Acts of Academic Journalism and 
Historical Commentary on Human Rights: Opinions, Interventions and the Torsions of 
Politics (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2017). 
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legal arguments, one should include reflections on the central and wider aims 
of the human rights idea - what one might call a spirit of rights - into 
evaluations concerning the eligibility of anti-terrorism policies. In a sense, 
the wider understanding of rights or the spirit of rights is the basis for the 
legal entrenchment of rights. The legal rights norms, in this sense, function 
as the instrument of the spirit of rights. The letter of the law and the spirit of 
rights framework are, therefore, to be regarded as interrelated and 
interdependent entities. Disregarding the wider spirit framework would 
diminish one’s understanding of rights, as well as one’s options for a critical 
analysis of potential rights problems in European anti-terrorism. 
As mentioned, the idea of the spirit of rights points to a wider 
understanding of rights. This understanding reflects the ‘the big picture’ of 
the idea of rights, behind the specific rights provided in rights documents; or 
in other words, the bigger meaning and aims of human rights (what rights 
are all about), on which the legal documents are built. One might use Samuel 
Moyn’s notion of human rights as the “highest moral precepts and political 
ideals,” and rights as “principles of social protection,” and “an agenda for 
improving the world,” aiming at securing every individual’s dignity, in order 
to emphasize this idea.72 
As shown above, claims circling around human dignity are often 
used as a justification for the legal entrenchment of human rights. However, 
enabling a life in dignity signifies the first core aim of the general idea of 
human rights. Establishing and consolidating a functioning human rights 
framework in a society is the condition for a life in dignity. Human rights, 
thus, can enable all human beings to be treated with dignified respect.73 
Therein, the idea of human rights arguably composes what Donnelly called 
“a comprehensive vision of a set of goods, services, opportunities, and 
protections that are necessary in the contemporary world to provide the 
preconditions for a life of dignity.”74 Thus, human rights are not supposed to 
provide what humans need for survival but to what is needed “for a life of 
dignity.”75 Human rights are according to this thought a legitimate concept 
                                                          
72 Moyn, The Last Utopia, Prologue. 
73 Samantha Besson, “Justifications,” In International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed., ed. by 
Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 47. Fittingly, Laura Donohue pointed out that rights “confer dignity and respect upon 
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National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison 
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75 Donnelly, International Human Rights, 21. Article 22 of the UDHR holds that rights are 
indispensable for human dignity. Although article 22 points explicitly to ESCRs, the 
undertone can be interpreted to signify the importance of the rights framework as a whole for 
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since they potentially ensure a life in dignity for all human beings if all 
established rights are upheld.76 The significance of the provision of dignity, 
as well as a recognition of dignity, for all humans can be traced in the variety 
of cases in which protest movements (e.g. fighting for minority rights such 
as LGBTQ movements or the Black Lives Matter movement) have 
demanded just that; to be provided with rights that secure certain groups of 
individuals to be regarded as dignified individuals.77 Perceptions of indignity 
can easily trigger severe grievances.78 The provision of rights can prevent the 
initiation of such processes. This point emphasizes that dignity (and its 
perception) does not only come via the provision of resources. It demands 
the provision and recognition of rights at a just and equal level. Therein, 
dignity, in its content, is reflected by the rights aims of equal justice and 
freedom, as well as equal recognition of personhood and the individual’s 
opportunity to free and full development.79 I will elucidate these rights aims 
in the following. 
The wider rights aim to provide universal justice emanates from 
documents such as the UDHR.80 Justice can be constructed by rights 
protecting against discrimination or by rights establishing rule of law. Thus, 
human rights are often understood to constitute the basis for a just system.81 
Accordingly, John Rawls pointed out that “the basic standards of justice” 
include human rights standards.82 A crucial point is though, that in order to 
reflect justice such rights must be distributed equally. Rights and liberties 
can only support the aim of justice if they are built on a principle of equal 
                                                          
the consolidation and construction of human dignity. 
76 As can be expected, attempts of justifying the concept of human rights do meet criticism. 
A realist strand of such criticism holds that the concept bears no relevance since power politics 
or ‘hard politics’ would still be the decisive factor in global policymaking, not ‘soft’ concepts 
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77 Francis Fukuyama, Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for 
Recognition (London: Profile Books, 2018), 7-8, 19. 
78 Fukuyama, Identity, 11, 21. 
79 The latter is aimed at in art. 29 of the UDHR. 
80 The UDHR argues that human rights are the foundation of justice. 
81 At the same time, human rights can be understood as a consequence of justice. Freeman, 
Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 80. 
82 John Rawls, ”The Law of Peoples,” In On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, 
ed. by S. Shute and S. Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 46. 
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liberties for all.83 Therefore, the aim of justice is entangled with the principle 
of equality (and constitutes, in a way, a precondition for dignity as well). 
The idea of equality here foremost pertains to the notion of equal 
worth. This understanding of equal worth, not only holds that all human 
beings carry the same worth but points to a perceived inherent value of 
personhood. According to this understanding, no one is supposed to be 
treated inferior based on this inherent value. Denial of equal status would 
disqualify individuals from participating “as an equal in important social 
practices or roles.”84 Human rights can now contribute to establishing a status 
of equal worth for all human beings, by creating entitlements to equal 
treatment and respect, by setting conditions for equal participation in society 
and politics and by contributing with a “fundamental public recognition of 
equality.”85 In other words, human rights help in constructing an equal status 
of individuals and in consolidating this status. Via human rights “individuals 
become actors of their own equality and members of their political 
community,” as Samantha Besson fittingly formulated.86 These ideas about 
equal human worth clearly reflect notions by Immanuel Kant, who perceived 
humans as ends in themselves (based on humans’ reason and rationality). 
Kant too held that justice requires the upholding of the rights of all human 
beings (since all human beings according to Kant are worthy of respect).87  
The points on equal respect and equal worth connect with a general 
human demand for recognition. Humans have historically shown a desire for 
(positive) recognition by their social environment (what Socrates identified 
as thymos).88 This (often) affects the initiation of demands for recognition of 
one’s equal worth. The idea of such a demand goes back on the ancient 
concept of isothymia, the human desire to be regarded “as just as good as 
everyone else.”89 What is requested here is the mutual recognition of the 
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64 
 
basic equal worth of all humans. Again, the denial of such recognition can 
spark severe social and political conflicts, by creating impressions of 
indignity, whereas the supply of such recognition via the help of human 
rights can provide the demanded dignity and equality (and can thus provide 
the basis for another wider aim of human rights, which is ‘peace in the 
world’). Societal recognition of the potential of each individual is a 
promising way of pursuing and achieving both the perception of equal worth 
and general human dignity.90 
Another wider aim of the human rights framework is freedom.91 
Human rights establish the groundwork for the enjoyment of individual 
freedom. This is valid in terms of negative freedoms, pointing to protection 
from the interference of authorities in an individual’s life, and positive 
freedoms, pointing to the provision of opportunities and services for 
individuals by the same authorities.92 Human rights thus reflect a general 
understanding of the relation between individual and state. On the one hand, 
it sets the necessary limits of state power. Fittingly, Laura Donohue 
emphasized, “rights create a shield within which individuals can maximize 
their freedom.”93 This is a crucial function, since state power is “always and 
endemically liable to abuse,” as Jeremy Waldron explains.94 On the other 
hand, it demands states to provide a sufficient level of opportunities.95 The 
establishment of rights frameworks thus supports the aim of enabling a 
human life including as much freedom - and as much freedom from state 
interference - as possible. By establishing the necessary conditions for the 
other discussed aims of the human rights framework, dignity, justice, and 
equal worth, sound conditions for a high level of individual freedom are 
established as well. 
Notions of dignity, the wider rights aims and the potential full 
enjoyment of rights are interrelated with the theoretical notion of human 
capabilities as developed by Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum holds that 
humans would possess capabilities that reflect the innate faculties of 
persons.96 These capabilities would promote the full human functioning of 
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little as possible, since freedom would constitute the ability to pursue one’s desires without 
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every individual, making life fully human. The concept thus puts its focus on 
human flourishing.97 Capabilities try to cover such components or abilities 
of human life that are so crucial that their abolishment would make a life in 
dignity (or justice) impossible. However, humans would be entitled to the 
fulfillment of these capabilities.98 In other words, certain capabilities could 
be identified which mark the lowest threshold of what life in dignity requires. 
Thus, Nussbaum’s concept aims at the potential full enjoyment of such 
human capabilities, and it would be the task of governments to enable this 
enjoyment.99 According to Nussbaum, such capabilities are: being able to 
live to the end of life, being able to have good health, being able to move 
freely from place to place and to be secure against violent assault, being able 
to use one’s senses and to imagine, think and to reason, being able to use the 
mind in ways protected by freedom of expression, being able to have 
attachments to things and people (including forming human associations), 
being able to form a conception of ‘the good’ (pertaining to liberty of 
conscience and religion), being able to live with and towards others, 
including social interaction (this includes the protection of freedom of 
assembly and free speech), being able to be treated in a dignified and non-
discriminatory fashion (including non-humiliation) based on humans’ equal 
worth, and being able to participate in political decision-making (pointing to 
the right to political participation, freedom of expression and association).100 
Nussbaum’s approach considers every individual worthy of equal respect 
and regard, it, therefore, connects not only to notions of dignity but also to 
notions of the universal equality of human worth (explained above).  
The capabilities approach does entail connection points to the ideas 
of other thinkers.101 For instance, since it emphasizes to see each person as 
an end in itself, it connects to a famous notion by Kant.102 The idea of 
capabilities additionally reflects John Stuart Mill’s notion of the highest end 
in human life, which is in his opinion free and full development of human 
faculties (Mill thus connects to the ideal of human flourishing as well).103 
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103 Mill clearly connected the concepts of liberty and self-development. Sandel, Justice, 51. 
Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 141. Although Mill is counted to the founding fathers of 
66 
 
The ability to utilize all available capabilities or faculties is essential for 
humans in order to fulfill their role of ‘progressive beings’ (the capabilities 
reflect this progressivity).104 The concept of capabilities can, arguably, be 
connected to ideas by John Rawls as well. Rawls deemed rights and freedoms 
important; not important for their own sake, but based on their potential to 
enable humans to fulfill their individual intentions and ends.105 These 
intentions and ends can easily be interpreted to reflect individual capabilities 
as well. At least, without the option to act on one’s capabilities, one will not 
be able to fulfill one’s intentions and ends.106  
What the notion of the spirit of rights, in the context of dignity, 
freedom, justice, equality, and capabilities points to is the idea of a potential 
maximal realization of human personhood and the free and full development 
of human personality. This inevitably relates to possibilities of self-
expression for human beings, and in a larger sense, the full enjoyment of 
rights by all human beings. Liberal democracies, if they want to be really 
free and liberal societies, must thus base themselves on individual human 
rights, aiming towards the fulfillment of dignified lives, reflecting justice and 
equal human worth and setting conditions for the enjoyment of one’s 
capabilities.107 These aims must be regarded in everyday political culture, but 
must additionally be enshrined on a legal basis. And indeed, important 
notions of this wider human rights framework, have been manifested in 
important rights documents, e.g., the Preamble of the Vienna Declaration 
reflects upon the: “global task of promoting and protecting all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms so as to secure full and universal enjoyment of 
these rights."108 Demand for the potential full realization of personality, via 
a connection with the concept of dignity, is included in the UDHR as well 
(art. 22).109 These demands in human rights documents emphasize the 
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connection between a wider spirit of rights understanding of human rights 
and their legal manifestation. Furthermore, the concept of capabilities does 
entail a not insignificant overlap with the norms enshrined in the UDHR as 
well. Since the list of capabilities would consist of rather abstract issues, 
Nussbaum herself proposes that capabilities might be enshrined in more 
specified fashions in constitutional law.110 Again, the spirit of rights, in this 
sense, constitutes the groundwork for the manifestation of concrete rights 
claims in rights treaties or documents, the spirit of rights thus becomes the 
‘spirit of the law.’  
In pursuing the aims of dignity, justice, and equality, human rights 
can play a special role for the disadvantaged groups in society, since human 
rights are often seen as the language of the weak, the disposed or generally 
victims of oppression. Tim Dunne, for example, defines human rights as “a 
language of moral legitimacy to the weaker members of the human race, the 
stateless people, prisoners of conscience, and ethnic minorities who are 
hounded for being different.”111 Timothy Garton Ash holds that human rights 
at its best give “power to the powerless,” and Donohue claims that human 
rights “confer dignity and respect upon individuals that do not have access 
to power.”112 This emphasizes the importance of the rights framework, for 
disadvantaged or discriminated groups in democracies. By pursuing the aims 
of dignity, justice, and equality a difference can be achieved for those groups. 
Moreover, democracies can come closer to the ideal democracy. However, 
the rights framework and its mentioned components are not only of crucial 
importance in democracies - far from - but in autocratic regimes as well. It 
is (often) in such regimes that requests for dignity, justice, and equality can 
bring sweeping transformations.113  
In general, the concept of human rights reflects a certain 
understanding of how individuals should treat each other, a treatment based 
on mutual ethical treatment reflecting senses of sympathy, empathy, and 
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compassion for each other.114 One might go as far as speaking of a certain 
‘spirit of brotherhood’ in this regard. Clearly, humans do not and cannot be 
expected to act along these lines at all times, however, ethical treatment and 
a sense of responsibility and compassion for all humans and humanity are 
core elements of the general atmosphere that the idea of human rights tries 
to construct. This general atmosphere of rights is, again, built on an 
understanding that all humans own inherent potential for a life in dignity and 
justice, that they should be treated along the ideal of equal worth and that 
they should be supported in enjoying the maximum of their human 
capabilities.115 
The ideas and understandings of dignity, equality and human 
capabilities presented above can additionally all be used as justification for 
having human rights in the first place. Because humans are imagined to have 
the capacity to a dignified life and for a life in the enjoyment of their 
capabilities and because they are imagined to own inherent equal worth, the 
idea of human rights is justified. Justified in order to support the 
consolidation and establishment of the aims of human rights, which again 
are the fulfillment of a life in dignity, justice, and freedom. 
This justification of human rights underlines that human rights are a 
mutual construction along the lines of social constructionism. Thus, human 
rights ideas are mutually agreed upon by human interaction. Different ideas 
about rights develop in different social and historical contexts.116 The 
demand for a dignified life, the demand for a life in fulfilled capabilities, for 
a recognition of equal worth, in a context of justice, is likewise reflecting 
demands that have been socially constructed in the last centuries and 
decades. One might here refer back to the historical starting points of the 
human rights idea, which I laid out at the beginning of this chapter. For 
instance, the initiation of rights during the Enlightenment (at least partly 
based on a construction of empathy as Hunt argued), the turn towards rights 
norms after the end of World War II, and the push for the idea of human 
rights via a human rights movement since the 1970s. It was at such moments 
in time that the social construction of rights ideas received an additional 
push. Today, and (as indicated) at least since the 1990s, human rights have 
become an integrated part of the everyday culture for many people around 
the globe, and for sure in most Western societies. Human rights have become 
a ‘way of life’ for many. The concept appears as something legitimate on a 
                                                          
114 Nussbaum e.g., held that in order for her capabilities approach to gain support, values of 
compassion (empathy) and solidarity would have to be present. Nussbaum, Creating 
Capabilities, 180. 
115 Dorfman, 13 Acts of Academic Journalism and Historical Commentary on Human Rights, 
176, 193-195.  
116 George Ulrich, “Universal Human Rights: An Unfinished Project,” In In Human Rights on 
Common Grounds: The Quest for Universality, ed. by Kirsten Hastrup (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2001), 214-215. 
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regular basis in the news, but also in books, movies, advertisement or music. 
Human rights have become a part, not only of our political thinking and 
culture but also our commercial culture and pop culture. Human rights have 
entered our ‘life-world’, they are by many (in the Western part of the world 
at least) simply taken for granted and regarded as something that is simply 
part of our lives. This has established the widespread feeling that human 
rights are right.117 This circumstance, that human rights have become an 
integral part of our life-world, reflects the mentioned common imagination 
that humans own capacity for a life in dignity, justice, and freedom, in 
addition, it is an indication of the socially constructed justification of rights 
explained above.118 
To the end of this section, two points which pertain to both the legal 
and the spirits’ side of my human rights framework are noteworthy. First, as 
mentioned, when evaluating anti-terrorism policies in this thesis, the ‘spirit 
of rights’ framework constitutes, an indispensable level of evaluation. On a 
conceptual note, it very much reflects, the basis for (the construction of) 
legally binding rights norms.119 Now, considering the point that the spirit of 
rights and the wider aims of rights provide the cornerstone for legally binding 
rights documents and that these documents are built on this spirit and these 
aims, one might argue that the utilization of such documents must include a 
teleological process or approach. A teleological judicial interpretation takes 
the aim of the legislator and the intention of the stipulated legal norms (the 
ratio legis of the articles in the documents) into regard.120 And indeed, claims 
on the aims of the idea of human rights are the starting point of the most 
important legally binding rights documents. When evaluating policies 
against human rights norms one should thus not only consider a narrow legal 
take, a wider take of human rights invoking the telos (the purpose or end of 
such legal claims) must be considered as well.121 The spirit of rights 
framework reflects this telos. An interpretation of anti-terrorism eligibility 
                                                          
117 Ben Dorfman, “Human Rights Life World,” Akademisk Kvarter, Vol. 5 (2012): 136. 
Still, as I have tried to point out above, it is often at moments of perceived indignity, of a 
treatment that is regarded as not reflecting justice or a conception of equal human worth, when 
demands for rights frameworks are the strongest.  
118 This does, however, not negate the observation, delivered in the Introduction, stating that 
lately the concept and idea of human rights has come under pressure, both on a global scale, 
but also in the context of the ‘Western World.’ 
119 For instance, Mitrou points out that dignity and freedom constitute the “basic parameters” 
of constitutional order in Europe. Lilian Mitrou, “The impact of communications data 
retention on fundamental rights and democracy – the case of the EU Data Retention 
Directive,” In Surveillance and Democracy, ed. by Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas 
(London: Routledge, 2010). 
120 Peter Josef Tettinger, Einführung in die juristische Arbeitstechnik (München: C.H. Beck, 
1982), 108-109. 
121 Sandel, Justice, 186. 
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based on the spirit of rights thus points to dignity, justice, equality, freedom, 
and capabilities as the telos of legal rights norms. 
Second, coming back to the issue of derogation, introduced in the 
last section, one might argue that derogated human rights are not really 
human rights at all, although states might not leave the space of legal 
permissibility by derogating on certain rights.122 Clearly, human rights norms 
and ideas were developed to provide for the maximum possible enjoyment 
of rights, not their derogation. In other words, human rights provisions 
should liberate – not serve as an excuse to deviate from them. If a state 
implements a wide range of anti-terrorism measures that can only be set in 
motion by derogating human rights, the essence of the spirit of human rights 
will be violated, even if all implemented derogations could be legally 
defended in terms of legal derogation conditionality. Additionally, all rights 
are – as mentioned – to be provided simultaneously, therefore, it can be 
argued that derogating some rights undermines the human rights concept as 
a whole. This becomes ever more relevant in a situation in which it becomes 
a trend to derogate from rights in order to tackle a perceived threat (such as 
terrorism). In such a situation, the idea of human rights as the basic principle 
ruling the relation of individual and state is diminished. Thereby, the 
individual sees some of its rights versus the state perish and its relation with 
the state is changed; away from a sense of rights being respected by the state 
to the reflection that rights are a luxury good that the state does not want to 
or cannot afford anymore. Knowing the enjoyment of rights to be restricted 
by continuous derogations, the perception of being treated in a dignified way 
is prevented as well. In this sense, derogation simply does not reflect the 
spirit of human rights. Therefore, I would like to argue that in such a situation 
derogated rights are not really human rights. From a spirit of rights 
perspective, human rights are really aiming for our best effort in relation to 
each other; not those moments at which we have to reduce each other’s 
existence.123 Therein, from a spirit of rights perspective, the derogation of 
rights should be an absolute exception and only be applied in extreme 
situations. When a situation is ‘extreme’ can be evaluated by utilizing the 
standards set by the ECtHR (explained above). In that way (some) part of the 
legal framework permeates the spirit framework, however, the court’s 
standards do not only seem reasonable and are the most tangible definition 
of emergency available, but underline the interrelation between a spirit and 
a legal take on human rights.124 
                                                          
122 Dorfman, 13 Acts of Academic Journalism and Historical Commentary on Human Rights, 
26-27. 
123 The standards were, again, the existence of an exceptional situation or crisis, afflicting the 
whole population, reflecting a threat to organized life reflecting an actual or imminent 
situation. Such a situation is given when the normal measures are not sufficient anymore in 
order to uphold public safety, order or health. 
124 The discussion about rights derogation and limitation, in a certain sense, also pertains to 
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 Relevant Individual Human Rights vis-à-vis Anti-Terrorism 
In this section, I will, as mentioned, introduce those specific rights that are 
overwhelmingly in focus in this thesis one by one in more detail. 
                                                          
the question as to who is responsible for high rights standards. One might, in any case, wonder 
about this responsibility after being introduced to my double-edged rights framework. So, is 
it simply states, or is it all kinds of organizations, including IGOs, NGOs, corporations, and 
maybe even individuals that are responsible for human rights? One might, first of all, point to 
the different obligations that emanate from rights frameworks. Here, Freeman identifies the 
obligations of not violating rights, to protect others from violations and to aid victims of 
violations. Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 81. Tim Dunne 
represents the orthodox view on the above-mentioned question (common in international 
human rights law), when he argues, that human rights can only be properly claimed against a 
state. Dunne, “The Rules of the Game are Changing,” 271. George Ulrich argues in a similar 
fashion when he remarks that only in the context of strong state formations human rights 
would be able to prosper. Ulrich, “Universal Human Rights,” 216. The idea of the state as the 
responsible institution for the implementation of rights is, furthermore, held by Nussbaum, 
who claims that it is the task of governments to guarantee that all capabilities are fulfilled to 
the least necessary degree. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 109. Already Contractarians, 
such as e.g., John Locke, emphasized that the rights one holds by being human cannot be 
enjoyed in a state of nature, institutions provided by the state would be essential for the 
enjoyment of rights. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 36. Thus, in a traditional understanding, 
it is the states that bear responsibility for the defense and advancement of rights. This can be 
seen as a paradox, since states, historically the biggest violators of human rights, are supposed 
to be the biggest human rights protectors. Still, not only states (and federations or associations 
of states) are responsible for high rights standards, or at least the acknowledgment of rights in 
societies. Civil society actors such as NGOs and social movements, as well as every individual 
and social actor play a role as well. Although the human rights duties of protection from rights 
deprivation, the provision of human rights enjoyment and aiding those being deprived of 
human rights are almost exclusively allocated to states, other social actors can tackle some 
parts of these duties. Donnelly, International Human Rights, 24. Fittingly, Hunt declares that 
human rights are only really meaningful when one understands them in the context of human 
societies. Therefore, she defines human rights as “the rights of humans vis-à-vis each other 
[…], they are rights that require active participation from those who hold them.” Hunt, 
Inventing Human Rights, 21. It is, of course, thinkable that different rights need different 
actors to ensure rights or aiding victims of rights abuses. Still, the idea that all members of 
society do hold a certain amount of responsibility for high rights standards does only appear 
logical, especially in the context of rights reflecting a mutually constructed norm. The activity 
of social actors can, and often does, contribute to a political culture that is beneficial to the 
concept of human rights. Without the acknowledgment of the importance of rights in political 
culture, it is hard to imagine how a ‘spirit of rights’ would be created. Thus, by pointing to 
the importance of rights issues and pushing rights issues on the political agenda civil society 
actors contribute to the construction and preservation of a spirit of rights. Thereby civil 
societies arguably bear responsibility for the idea of human rights as a whole. Of course, this 
study focuses on policies of states and the EU, and thereby overwhelmingly on their 
responsibility to provide and uphold rights. Still, the perspective of NGO’s and individuals on 
policies and affected rights does at times surface. 
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The first right that is of major importance in this thesis is the right to 
privacy, as established in the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR, and CFREU (art. 12 
UDHR, art. 17 ICCPR, art. 8 ECHR, art. 7 [and arguably 8] CFREU).  
Article 12 of the UDHR reads as follows:  
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence […]. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference 
or attacks.”  
Article 8, par. 1 of the ECHR reads: “Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” 
The right to privacy is enshrined in a very similar fashion in all four 
documents. However, in the newest of the four documents, the CFREU, an 
article on data protection is added. It specifically spells out the right to have 
one’s data protected, arguably another provision of privacy rights.  
Privacy rights are, however, subject to potential legal limitations. 
These limitations emanate from some specific formulations in the articles on 
privacy rights themselves (so-called limitation clauses). For instance, the 
ECHR, as the only of the four documents, adds a detailed paragraph on 
explicit conditions for possible limitations from the right to privacy. This 
paragraph (ECHR art. 8, par. 2) goes as follows: 
“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
The paragraph thus establishes three conditions for the limitation of 
privacy rights. First, limitation of privacy must always be in accordance with 
the law, which means it must be based on a valid piece of legislation adopted 
by the legislative.125 Second, the limitation must have a legitimate aim, e.g. 
national security. The formulation is quite broad in this regard, as it includes 
the economic well-being of a country as a legitimate reason to interfere with 
individuals’ privacy rights. Third, limitations are conditioned towards 
“necessity for a democratic society.” This means taking the principle of 
proportionality (explained above) into regard.126 The ECtHR clarified 
already in 1988 that derogations (and limitations) of rights must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, in order to be eligible.127 Based 
on these three conditions, (including proportionality) for a limitation of 
                                                          
125 Megret, ”Nature of Obligations,“ 111-112. At least at times, in a European context, a 
common law basis is sufficient. 
126 Megret, ”Nature of Obligations,“ 112-113. 
127 Council of Europe Guideline, 31. The UN’s Human Rights Committee reaffirmed this legal 
opinion in 2004. 
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privacy rights, the threshold for a reduction of rights is lower than constituted 
by the general conditions for derogation articulated in article 15 of the 
ECHR.128  
The ICCPR points out that no interference with privacy, which is 
“arbitrary or unlawful”, is eligible. This does determine a limitation of 
privacy as well. The conditions for rights limitation constituted by this 
formulation in the ICCPR are in fact very similar to the ones constituted by 
the clause in the ECHR. For example, a limitation not based on necessity, 
and without legitimate aim would be arbitrary, such a limitation would not 
be eligible. The UN’s HRC additionally pointed out that limitations cannot 
counter-act the essence of the affected right in the ICCPR.129 The CFREU, 
as mentioned earlier, does not provide any specific limitation clauses on any 
rights, but only works with its general provision on derogation as established 
in art. 52 of the CFREU. Therefore, I will not come back to the CFREU in 
terms of limitation clauses in this section. 
Privacy constitutes an essential right to every human being and 
privacy is clearly an important element of every human life.  Privacy 
contributes to the protection of human dignity and is central to the 
development of every individual.130 The importance of privacy derives from 
its protective function for individual autonomy and freedom, as well as the 
protection of everybody’s individual social space.131 Privacy constitutes “a 
condition for making autonomous decisions, freely communicating with 
other persons, and participating in a democratic society.”132 Privacy 
additionally protects our ability to establish and develop relationships with 
others (this has been acknowledged by the ECtHR as well).133 The perception 
to be free from unnecessary control and limitation in terms of thought and 
action is essential; for individuals’ abilities to define themselves, as well as 
their personal, moral and intellectual development. The same is valid for an 
individual’s political engagement. Individuals have to have the possibility to 
think of their own in a democracy, without being obstructed by worries of a 
breach of their privacy. In that sense, privacy is as well a precondition for a 
                                                          
128 Accordingly, the UN Human Rights Committee pointed out that clauses for rights 
limitations in rights treaties (when provided on specific rights) should be sufficient in order 
to deal with emergency situations, a utilization of the general derogation clause would not be 
necessary unless triggered by inadequate national legal regimes. Doswald-Beck, Human 
Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism, 101. 
129 Ibid., 69-71, 76-77. 
130 The German Constitutional Court in a verdict on the German BKA law acknowledged this 
in 2016. Bundesstelle für politische Bildung, ”Urteilsverkündung: BKA-Gesetz,” April 2016. 
131 Mitrou, “The impact of communications data retention on fundamental rights and 
democracy.” Constanze Kurz, Die Datenfresser (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 2011), 250-251. 
132 Mitrou, “The impact of communications data retention on fundamental rights and 
democracy.” 
133 Ibid., 132. 
74 
 
democratic order.134 In essence, privacy is a precondition for a life in dignity, 
an erosion of privacy interferes not only with an individual’s freedom and 
self-determination but also its dignity.135 Many writers and thinkers have 
emphasized this high importance of privacy for the individual in modern 
civilization, e.g. Louis Brandeis called the right to privacy “the right most 
valued by civilized man,” and Isaiah Berlin claimed that a decline of privacy 
“would mark the death of a civilization, of an entire moral outlook.”136 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn coined the famous words “our freedom is built on 
what others do not know of our existences.”137  
However, an important development has taken place in connection 
with privacy in the last decades and especially the last years. Originally, the 
right to privacy protected individuals from searches of themselves, their 
belongings and their homes, as well as their correspondence. The last was 
once almost exclusively letters. Later this was extended to protection from 
having one’s phone wiretapped. However, the technological development of 
the last years has let the options for security organs to interfere with people’s 
private data and communications grow to unprecedented levels. The 
digitalization of communication and work-life has, in essence, digitalized 
people’s lives. What can be stored and analyzed by security organs is no 
longer just communication, but the private relationships and in affect lives 
of millions of people; and this data is never to be lost or forgotten again. Data 
from different sources can be combined leading to a comprehensive picture 
of an individual’s life. Laura Donohue vividly emphasized this development, 
when she argued, “technology can be used to build a comprehensive view of 
formal and informal networks to which we belong, power relationships 
within and between groups, and levels of intimacy between us and others.”138 
Already existing and implemented, as well as newly developed systems of 
surveillance (e.g. facial recognition in public areas), are a severe threat to the 
right to privacy. 
Under such conditions, and when aware of lacking privacy, humans 
both act and develop differently.139 For instance, people might start to refrain 
from voicing their opinion freely in public or on the Internet when they are 
under the impression of continuous surveillance, equaling the initiation of 
processes of self-censoring, and undermining the empowering potential of 
                                                          
134 Donohue emphasized that “protecting private affairs from the state allows individuals to 
evolve.” Laura Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence: Privacy and Surveillance in a 
Digital Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 100-101. 
135 Mitrou, “The impact of communications data retention on fundamental rights and 
democracy,” 132. 
136 Cited in Garton Ash, Free Speech, 287. 
137 Rapport by the Council of Europe, “Mass surveillance - Who is watching the watchers?” 
138 Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence, 3. 
139 Ibid., 101. Markus Beckedahl and Falk Lüke, Die digitale Gesellschaft: Netzpolitik, 
Bürgerrechte und die Machtfrage (München: dtv, 2012), 53. 
75 
 
the right to privacy.140 A severely diminished level of privacy, additionally, 
constitutes a different relationship between state and individual to the clear 
advantage of the state. If the state knows everything, or potentially knows 
everything about its population, while the state’s system of acquiring such 
knowledge and its security processes, in general, are lying in the dark - 
including the criminalization of individual attempts to shed light on the 
security apparatus, as e.g. in the case of Snowden - an extreme imbalance of 
power between state and citizen is created.141 This opens up for a potential 
shriveling of the general level of freedom, as well as democratic standards.142 
Furthermore, such interference with privacy rights clearly clashes with 
established notions of human dignity and the human rights aim of a provision 
of a maximal amount of freedom.143 When citizens are chiefly regarded as a 
potential threat or information sources, it becomes tough to imagine how 
such an attitude could be combined with any notion of respect for the aim of 
human dignity.144 
As the last paragraph already indicates, the right to privacy and 
private life (and data protection as enshrined in the CFREU) is of utmost 
relevance in this thesis. Many of the anti-terrorism measures and policies that 
I will analyze restrict privacy rights of large parts, if not the overwhelming 
                                                          
140 Quentin Skinner pointed out the likelihood of such processes in a 2013 interview: “there 
is a danger that we may start to self-censor in the face of the known fact that we may be being 
scrutinized by powerful and potentially hostile forces. […] We don’t know what may happen 
to us. Perhaps nothing will happen. But we don’t know, and are therefore all too likely to keep 
quiet, or to self-censor. […] Surely, […] if the structures of power are such that I feel obliged 
to limit my own freedom of expression, then my liberty has to that degree been undermined.” 
Skinner continued: “my liberty is also being violated, and not merely by the fact that someone 
is reading my emails but also by the fact that someone has the power to do so should they 
choose. We have to insist that this in itself takes away liberty because it leaves us at the mercy 
of arbitrary power.” Quentin Skinner, “Liberty, Liberalism and Surveillance: a historic 
overview,” openDemocracy, July 26, 2013. 
A recent French study showed that a certain share of the population indeed acted different on 
the internet due to anti-terrorism measures (ten percent of the Muslim population and five 
percent of the control group). Francesco Ragazzi et al., "The Effects of Counter-Terrorism 
and Counter-Radicalisation Policies on Muslim Populations in France," Centre d'etude sur les 
Conflicts, Liberte et Securite (CCLS), 2018. 
141 Some of my points in this paragraph are somewhat loosely inspired by Garton Ash’s plea 
for free speech, Garton Ash, Free Speech, 330. 
142 Mitrou’s evaluation supports my point by emphasizing that “there is a serious concern that 
data-retention policies [a form of mass surveillance that will be analyzed later] may endanger 
open communication and affect democratic participation with further and considerable 
impacts on democracy.” Mitrou, ”The impact of communications data retention on 
fundamental rights and democracy.” 
143 Jacob Appelbaum, “Es geht um unsere Würde!“ Der Freitag, September 9, 2013. 
144 Sandro Nickel, ”The Double-Edged Effects of Social Media Terror Communication: 
Interconnection and Independence vs. Surveillance and Human Rights Calamities,“ In New 
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majority of populations. Examples for such restrictions emanate from a 
variety of surveillance measures, such as: data retention (conducted or 
supported by all three analyzed entities), mass surveillance by intelligence 
agencies (by both German and British agencies), the implementation of facial 
recognition systems in public (both in Germany and the UK), the 
implementation of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive at the EU 
level, or the increase of CCTV. The relevance of the right to privacy can be 
deduced from the essential role it played in the discourse around terrorism 
policies in the last few years, especially since the leaks of NSA material by 
Edward Snowden (a range of scholars, journalists, and NGOs have pointed 
out the vulnerability of that right in the course of terrorism policies).145 
Another human right that will be at the focus in this thesis is freedom 
of expression (art. 19 UDHR, art. 19 ICCPR, art. 10 ECHR, art. 11 CFREU). 
This right is formulated in a similar fashion in all human rights documents 
used in this thesis. For instance, article 10, par. 1 of the ECHR reads: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.” 
However, two of the documents, the ECHR and the ICCPR, deliver 
specific conditions for the limitation of this right. According to art. 10 of the 
ECHR, freedom of expression can be limited if restrictions are prescribed by 
law, are necessary in a democratic society and if certain acts of expression 
would endanger national security, public safety or order, territorial integrity, 
the protection of health or morals or the reputation or rights of others. The 
conditions are thus similar to the specific conditions for the curtailment of 
privacy in art 8. ECHR. Therein, the special provisions on the options to limit 
freedom of expression are less strict than the general provisions on rights 
derogation, formulated in art. 15 of the ECHR, which demanded a situation 
of war or national emergency threatening “the life of the nation” as a 
precondition for derogation and additionally demanded the derogations 
being limited to what is absolutely necessary. The ICCPR holds a specific 
provision for the limitation of freedom of expression as well (art. 19, par. 3). 
However, the ICCPR’s provision is very similar to the special provision in 
art. 10 of the ECHR.  
The importance of freedom of expression is manifested in its 
importance for every individual and society as a whole. Freedom of 
                                                          
145 For example, Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” as well as Eric Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), or Skinner, “Liberty, Liberalism and Surveillance,” the journalist 
Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, The NSA and the Surveillance State 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 2014), or the NGO Privacy International, “Privacy International 
et al. v. Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs et al. (UK Government 
Hacking)” May 9, 2016, to mention but a few. 
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expression protects one of the most basic human traits, the human need for 
communication and self-expression. Without the establishment and 
consolidation of opportunities to satisfy this need, humans cannot fully 
realize or fulfill their humanity and cannot pursue a life in dignity and 
freedom.146 
Furthermore, every functioning free and democratic society needs to 
offer the option to publicly voice dissent, to include a wide scope of 
opinions.147 This has been defined as a central component of every society 
interested in being a ‘rights society.’ For instance, John Rawls pointed out 
that any such society has to accept the “diversity of opposing and 
irreconcilable religious, philosophical and moral views.”148 Furthermore, 
Nussbaum rightly pointed out that assigning different degrees of freedom of 
speech to different groups constitutes a failure of any pursuit of providing 
full enjoyment of human capabilities (which were defined as preconditions 
for a life in dignity).149 Silencing dissent by a majority can be considered the 
antithesis of democracy and will make human societies worse off in the long 
run.150 However, dissenting opinions will provide a sound contest of ideas 
and will prevent societies from falling into conformity (as e.g. John Stuart 
Mill argued).151 The free exchange of opinions and ideas is the cornerstone 
of every functioning democracy.152  
The importance of freedom of expression can, again, be clarified by 
pointing to some of the negative consequences when this freedom comes 
under pressure, e.g. by measures of mass surveillance. Several state organs 
have argued in their anti-terrorism campaigns that an effective way of 
preventing terrorism would be to crack down on extremist sentiments being 
spread on the internet (by the help of surveillance), in effect resulting in an 
interference with freedom of expression. Widespread surveillance, however, 
undermines critical public debate and participation in the democratic 
political process. Under the impression of being surveyed, some people will 
                                                          
146 Costigan and Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 301. 
147 Ibid. This is also established by guaranteeing the right to inform oneself, pointing to the 
importance of media. Kevin Boyle and Sangeeta Shah, ”Thought, Expression, Association 
and Assembly,” In International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed., ed. by Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta 
Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 226. 
148 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3-4. Any 
rights based society would have to accept that some of its members would hold attitudes that 
maybe conflict with universal rights (e.g. people with racist convictions). Still, societies would 
have to accept such attitudes, and would have to allow such persons to speak their mind freely, 
as long as they are not initiating the violation of rights of others. Nussbaum, Creating 
Capabilities, 91. 
149 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 109. 
150 Costigan and Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 302. 
151 Sandel, Justice, 50. Majorities have no right to silence minorities Mill held. Costigan and 
Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 301. 
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be more cautious in terms of what they utter in public forums (including 
online). A certain share of people will start to apply self-censorship. For 
instance, individuals might stop posting critical comments on state policies 
or might refrain from getting involved in political debates in general. 
Individuals might rather try to stay inside the perceived boundaries of 
normality, in order to prevent making oneself suspicious to intelligence 
services.153 This hypothesis gains support from different sources of research. 
First, psychological research states that surveillance can bring individuals to 
tailor behavior. Individuals might become more conformist and might stop 
to express themselves in the same fashion as without knowledge of 
surveillance. This is already valid for scenarios in which individuals cannot 
be sure if they are surveyed or not. Simply the idea or perception that a high 
probability of surveillance exists can trigger the mentioned effects.154 
Second, a recent quantitative study conducted in France indeed showed self-
censoring effects because of anti-terrorism. For instance, more than a quarter 
of respondents claimed that they avoid providing opinions in public on topics 
such as foreign policy and ‘controversial social issues.’155 Such processes 
undermine peoples’ ability to debate politics or exchange ideas (the essence 
of freedom of expression). However, the strength of democracy depends on 
people’s ability to do just that.156 Processes of self-censoring can, in 
accumulation and over time, “change citizens’ relationship to one another 
and to the government.”157 They undermine the individuals’ capability to 
freely express oneself, as well as one’s pursuit for a life in dignity (as 
arguably, a life in which one has to self-censor does not reflect a dignified 
existence). This is not to claim that an overwhelming part of individuals in 
Western societies will start to employ mentioned self-censoring behavior. 
Still, even when only a minority of individuals in societies starts to censor 
themselves, this still constitutes a serious development; especially for 
societies aiming at being ‘the shining city on the hill’ in regard to democracy 
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standards.158 Furthermore, the share of individuals employing self-censoring 
behavior can be expected to be bigger with regard to certain more specific or 
vulnerable segments of society. Examples are likely to be people in certain 
occupations (for instance journalists), people who pursue a certain kind of 
activism, or people belonging to certain (ethnic) minorities (Muslims or 
refugees).159 It is specifically members of vulnerable societal groups (such 
as minority groups) that are in dire need of empowering via actively using 
their right and capability to free expression. However, by not taking part in 
public debate to the fullest amount possible the political vigor of such groups 
is undermined.160  
As the upper paragraphs already indicate, freedom of expression is 
a human right that becomes relevant for this thesis since it is endangered by 
a range of anti-terrorism policies. For example, it is reasonable to claim that 
via mass surveillance (online, via CCTV and facial recognition, etc.) 
tendencies for self-censoring might be triggered.161 Such a tendency would 
clearly undermine freedom of expression. Moreover, programs aimed at 
preventing terrorism and radicalization, such as the British Channel program 
(establishing a legal duty to refer radicalized individuals to the authorities) 
contain the risk of diminishing freedom of expression, both by denouncing 
certain kinds of public utterances and by potentially causing a trend of self-
censoring as well. The same is valid for the EU’s planned upload-filters and 
British legislation prohibiting ‘glorification of terrorism’. Furthermore, 
journalists’ options of working independently from interference from any 
kind of state authority are at times endangered by anti-terrorism provisions 
(e.g. in case of the crackdown on The Guardian after its revelations on 
British mass surveillance practices).  
Effects on freedom of assembly (art. 20 UDHR, art. 21 ICCPR, art. 
11 ECHR, art. 12 CFREU) in the course of anti-terrorism measures 
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implemented by Germany, the UK, and the EU will be at scrutiny as well in 
this thesis. This freedom thus constitutes the third individual-rights focal 
point of my thesis. The UDHR states in article 20 that “everyone has the right 
to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.” This right is enshrined in 
a very similar form in the relevant rights documents as well. For instance, 
the ICCPR holds: “The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.” 
Still, the ICCPR and the ECHR deliver the provision that freedom 
of assembly may be restricted. According to the ICCPR, art. 21, such 
restrictions can be granted if they “are imposed in conformity with the law, 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The same clause in 
connection with freedom of assembly is enshrined in the ECHR (art. 11). The 
limitation clauses are thus very similar to the ones relevant for freedom of 
expression. 
The right to assembly is of general importance for societies that 
pursue to raise or consolidate freedom, justice or the enjoyment of human 
capabilities. The right to assembly limits the power of authorities to interfere 
with the free assembly of individuals in public or private (indoors and 
outdoors). It additionally demands authorities to protect peaceful assemblies 
of various kinds. The right to assembly supports in this sense individual 
autonomy and in general, constitutes a crucial component for every free and 
democratic society.162 Such societies are dependent on the participation of its 
members. The right to assembly, now, offers - via the assembly and display 
of public protest - a vital tool for political participation and the expression of 
political dissent.163 It constitutes an instrument of making political elites 
aware of their accountability to the population. Democratic and free societies 
depend on the possibility to freely scrutinize power-holders. Ruth Costigan 
and Richard Stone fittingly observe, “protests have shaped history and 
achieved change.”164 Undermining processes of scrutiny and accountability 
will “paralyze the political life” of entities that are dependent on that life for 
their “own existence and evolution.”165 The right to assembly, however, 
aspires to provide for the potential recognition of demands of various groups 
in society, and therein, supports the human rights aims of dignity, freedom, 
and justice. 
The importance of the right to assembly can be clarified by 
delivering some assertions in the context of surveillance measures. Via new 
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mass-surveillance practices, state organs have not only a very good chance 
of reconstructing who is interested in or participating in demonstrations (e.g. 
via calls on Facebook or Twitter), but also who is organizing or supporting 
protests, or who is supporting the ideology standing behind protests. 
Certainly, one might always expect to have one’s personal data noted down 
by a police officer at a demonstration, however, via online surveillance 
interest in a demonstration might be recorded already before one even 
participates in the event itself. Furthermore, via the newest facial recognition 
technology, all participants would have to calculate with being personally 
recognized at a demonstration.166 In effect, fewer people might be eager to 
participate in demonstrations if their anonymity is not guaranteed 
anymore.167 Clearly, such a process would undermine the execution of a 
crucial human right and human capability and would diminish the 
functioning of democratic processes and democratic culture.  This 
evaluation, that surveillance has repercussions on freedom of assembly, and 
that curtailment of freedom of assembly has, in turn, negative effects on 
freedom of expression, has e.g., been emphasized by Martin Scheinin.168  
The right to freedom of assembly is relevant in the framework of this 
thesis as it is undermined by far-reaching state surveillance. This is 
especially valid in a situation where freedom of assembly is effected in 
interplay with other rights being undermined as well. An additional anti-
terrorism measure that pertains to freedom of assembly is the stop-and-
search practice of British police forces. 
Freedom of association constitutes the fourth individual-rights focal 
point in my thesis. This freedom is enshrined in art. 20 UDHR, art. 22 
ICCPR, art. 11 ECHR, and art. 12 CFREU. The ECHR holds in article 11: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests.” The right is enshrined in an almost 
identical fashion in the ICCPR and the CFREU. The clauses on the limitation 
of the right to association are congruent with the clauses presented above on 
the rights to assembly. 
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Freedom of association is a vital right for individuals and societies 
since it provides for opportunities to come together for collective action, in 
an independent fashion in order to promote common interests. It sets 
limitations for authorities to mingle with this opportunity of individuals. 
Freedom of association is linked with the possibility to establish trade unions 
and parties, crucial components of democratic systems. Freedom of 
association additionally constitutes the groundwork for individual 
participation at the civil society level, in other words, the opportunity to join 
and establish civil society groups (the right additionally provides the freedom 
to not be compelled to belong to a group). Via supporting the participation 
of the individual in society and the political system, freedom of association 
reflects a cornerstone of every free and democratic society.169 It likewise 
supports the human rights aim of freedom, supports the human capability of 
living with and towards others, and strengthens the pursuit for a life in 
dignity. 
As in case of freedom of assembly, delving into the example of mass 
surveillance will provide for further clarification of the importance of the 
right to association. Under surveillance, the possibility to form groups and 
associations without the oversight of state organs is heavily limited. 
However, if citizens are not able to establish or join associations, without 
being surveyed by the state, freedom of association is substantially restricted. 
This is especially relevant in connection with groups challenging viewpoints 
and policies of the government (what one might call counter-hegemonic 
groups). People might start to refrain from establishing or joining such 
critical groups based on their perception of being surveyed. This would 
constitute another form of (self-) mutilation in connection with human rights, 
mirroring the example on self-censorship in regard to the right to freedom of 
expression.170 Again, the argument that people change behavior when under 
surveillance becomes relevant. Clearly, freedom of expression and freedom 
of association are linked. Individuals not only want to express their own 
opinion, but they also want to connect to other individuals who hold the same 
opinion (freedom of assembly, covered above, is another extension of this 
interest to connect with others with the same worldview).171  
The right to freedom of association gains its relevancy in the context 
of this thesis overwhelmingly by being restricted via different surveillance 
measures. Surveillance is e.g., affecting the right to freedom of association 
via bulk interception by intelligence services. Due to such interception, 
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services such as the GCHQ are able to map the entire social network of a 
person. Intelligence services thereby gain oversight over all connections 
individuals make online, as well as offline since today's ‘offline’ relations 
are almost always followed up by online connections, mostly via social 
media. Data retention measures (conducted or backed by all three analyzed 
entities) can undermine freedom of association as well. The right to free 
association has further been compromised by British control orders. 
Potential discrimination of individuals based on anti-terrorism 
measures and policies is another focal point of this thesis. The right to be free 
from discrimination is implemented in all four human rights documents 
covered in this thesis (art. 1, 2 and 7 of the UDHR, art. 26 ICCPR, art. 14 
ECHR, art. 21 CFREU).  
The UDHR states in article 1 that “all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights.” Article 2 holds that “everyone is entitled to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind.” Article 7, additionally states that “all are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and 
against any incitement to such discrimination.”  
The ECHR holds in article 14:  
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.” 
The formulations on discrimination in the ICCPR and the CFREU 
are very close to the formulation in the ECHR. Other than with most other 
rights covered in this section, the right to non-discrimination cannot be 
subject to limitations. 
The right to non-discrimination is a basic right. Not only for every 
individual, but also for every society and, in fact, every rights treaty. The 
right to non-discrimination pursues to protect every individual from unjust 
treatment based on arbitrary grounds such as ethnicity or religion, by state 
authorities, as well as other societal actors (intended or not). It pursues to 
prevent unjust limitations of access to political, social and economic 
opportunities, to remove obstacles of the advancement of certain groups, and 
to constitute a tool for a transformation towards tolerant and progressive 
societies.172 The right to non-discrimination thus sets boundaries for how 
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members of society can be treated (and how differently they can be treated) 
based on certain characteristics and identities (the characteristics listed in the 
ECHR article above have all been sources of historical discrimination).173 
Even if a large majority decides on certain measures or policies, these might 
still be illegal, if they unjustly discriminate a minority. Therefore, liberal 
democracies are not plain systems of majoritarianism, but societies that 
protect minorities against the will of the majority (under certain 
circumstances).174 The right to non-discrimination thus reflects the idea that 
a societal majority is not supposed to impose its ideas about the right way to 
life on a minority (this pertains to both the right to non-discrimination and 
freedom of expression, as acts of suppression of minority opinions are often 
part of such processes).175 
The right additionally sets the groundwork for many of the other 
individual rights enshrined in the framework of legal and wider rights norms. 
It prevents the state or the public from diminishing the enjoyment of these 
other rights by certain groups.176 It pursues to establish an equal amount of 
freedom, justice, dignity, and capabilities for all members of society and 
pursues to establish the recognition of the basic equal worth of all humans.177 
A disregard of the right to non-discrimination (or the perception of 
discrimination) undermines the level of trust of affected societal groups 
towards state organs.178 However, a sound level of trust in the institutions of 
a democratic state is a precondition for a healthy political culture and a 
functioning democratic system.179 Additionally, as shown in a recent study, 
individuals who perceive themselves to be discriminated, have a higher 
likelihood of changing behavior (self-censoring behavior), especially in 
terms of refraining from engaging in public debate. Thus, discrimination 
erodes the enjoyment of other rights as well.180 Furthermore, if the right to 
non-discrimination is not upheld or not established in a society, not only are 
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the rights aims of freedom, dignity, and justice, as well as human capabilities,  
threatened, the human rights aim of peace is threatened as well. In other 
words, discrimination, as well as the perception of discrimination can easily 
divide societies and transform into violent conflict. To provide a historical 
example, the civil rights movement that stood at the beginning of the 
Troubles in Northern Ireland led a campaign against discrimination (i.a. the 
discrimination experienced in police practices). The aim was not to take up 
violence but to mitigate effects and perceptions of discrimination, injustice, 
and non-recognition. However, the perceived resentment provided the 
trigger for a range of individuals to move towards taking up violent measures 
of resistance.181  
Non-discrimination is a relevant focus for this study since it has on 
several occasions be claimed that anti-terrorism policies often entail the risk 
of discriminatory practices and tendencies.182 Waldron claimed that in case 
of a restriction of rights in the course of anti-terrorism (or in his words a 
balancing of rights in favor of security) not all groups in society would be hit 
equally. Some (minority) groups (e.g., ethnic groups or religious groups) 
would see their rights curtailed in a more intense fashion by anti-terrorism 
legislation than the majority of society.183 Practices that are critical in this 
regard are manifold, dragnet investigations, racial profiling (e.g. at airports 
or other public places), special legislation targeting foreigners, a ban on 
certain kinds of political expressions, or an overwhelming focus on members 
of a certain minority in anti-radicalization efforts (e.g. the British Channel 
program) are valid examples of policies that can trigger a process of 
discrimination. Thus, protection from discrimination aspired by the 
mentioned human rights documents can be eroded by a range of anti-
terrorism measures. Such practices can divide societies and constitute the 
groundwork for new episodes of violence. Critics have started to worry about 
the alienation of communities that are targeted more than others by anti-
terrorism measures of the British government, police and intelligence organs. 
In 2012, an alliance of sixteen NGOs claimed that discriminating tendencies 
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in connection with the English police’s stop-and-search practices destroyed 
trust and triggered resentment and negative relations between the targeted 
groups (mostly non-whites) and the police, thus heightening tension between 
certain groups and the state.184 Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton 
claimed already in a 2009 study that Muslims would experience 
discriminative tendencies and would thus constitute the new ‘suspect 
community’ in the UK (replacing the Irish).185 Due to these voices from both 
NGOs and researchers arguing on a theoretical as well as empiric level in 
terms of potential discrimination towards non-whites/Muslims in the course 
of anti-terrorism policies in the UK (and potentially elsewhere), my thesis 
will take these hypotheses up for investigation in the analysis. 
A sixth individual right at the focus in this thesis is the right to 
freedom of movement (art. 13 UDHR, art. 12 ICCPR, art. 2 Protocol 4 
ECHR, art. 45 CFREU). The UDHR reads in art. 13, par. 1: “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
state.” Freedom of movement is enshrined in a very similar fashion in all 
four documents. For instance, the ECHR holds in Protocol 4, art. 2: 
“everyone lawfully within a state's territory may move freely within that 
territory and choose their residence there.” 
However, both the ECHR and the ICCPR contain conditions for a 
limitation of freedom of movement, following the specific conditions that 
are valid for the rights mentioned above (limitations must be in accordance 
with the law, necessary in a democratic society, and in the interests of 
national security, public safety, and public order, etc.). Furthermore, article 
45 in the CFREU does, explicitly, only protect the freedom of movement of 
EU citizens. 
Freedom of movement is an essential right for all individuals. It 
guarantees all humans to be able to make use of their bodily freedom inside 
a state and thereby fulfill their human capability to move freely from place 
to place (see above). The ability to do this freely, that is without interference 
and oversight by authorities, is a part of freedom of movement and relates to 
human dignity as well. Constraints on free movement in the sense of having 
one’s movement restricted and tracked do not support a fully dignified 
everyday life and do not live up to the human rights aim of maximizing 
freedom (indeed, a relevant piece of case law by the ECtHR, pointed out that 
secret tracking of movement undermines the freedom in one’s movement).186 
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Surveillance measures do have a negative effect on freedom of movement, 
and thereby on the rights aims of dignity and freedom, as well as 
capabilities.187 It is therefore of importance that human rights norms protect 
a free, unrestrained and non-documented movement of individuals. 
The relevance of this right in the context of this thesis e.g. pertains 
to anti-terrorism measures such as the UK’s implementation of control 
orders, the EU’s Passenger Name Record directive, the tracking of 
movement via data retention measures (involving all three cases) and via 
intelligence services, and the newly developed measure of public facial 
recognition systems (involving all three entities as well). 
The last individual right that is part of the core of those individual 
rights that are predominantly discussed in this thesis is the right to life, liberty 
and security of person. This right is provided as one right in the UDHR (art. 
3) but is split up in two articles in the other three rights documents. ICCPR 
art. 6 (life) and art. 9 (liberty and security of person), ECHR art. 2 (life) and 
art. 5 (liberty and security of person), CFREU art. 2 (life) and art. 6 (liberty 
and security of person). 
The UDHR reads in article 3: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of person.” Whereas the CFREU is very close to the definition 
of the UDHR, rights to life, liberty and security of person do deviate 
somewhat in the ECHR and the ICCPR.188 The ECHR reads in art. 2: 
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived 
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court 
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by 
law.” The protection of life does thus not rule out the death penalty in certain 
circumstances. This does however not constitute a relevant issue in this 
thesis. The formulation used on the right to life in the ICCPR is very 
similar.189 As a reminder, the right to life is in both treaties a right that cannot 
be derogated (other than in cases of the death penalty or acts of combat). 
Article 6 of the ECHR manifests that ”everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in 
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.” 
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These following cases include: detention of a person after conviction by a 
court, other forms of lawful arrest (bringing a person in front of a court), 
detention to prevent a person to enter a country illegally, and detention in 
order to prevent the spread of diseases (etc.). The scope of the protection of 
the right does thus exclude the mentioned cases, however, an exclusion from 
the scope of protection based on particular security evaluations is not 
enshrined here. This is an important point in the context of my thesis. 
Other than the relevant article of the ECHR, the ICCPR does not 
provide a specific list of cases in which the protection of a person’s liberty is 
not guaranteed. However, article 9 of the ICCPR holds: 
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by law.” 
The last sentence, thus, diminishes the protection of the right to 
liberty to a significant degree. Detention is here regarded as lawful, as long 
as a legal basis exists (of course, other rights, such as the right to non-
discrimination would still have to be upheld, thus e.g. preventing the 
detention of all members of a national or ethnic minority). 
The general importance of the right to life lies in its protective 
functions, its ability to contribute to perceptions of dignity and to the 
fulfillment of a central human capability. The right essentially sets a limit to 
state power on matters of life and death, while it at the same time demands 
the state to protect one’s life, e.g., against terror attacks. Moreover, it 
prevents that the lives of individuals might become a means to other ends 
and that human lives are degraded to mere objects that states can decide 
upon. By preventing states from calculating the lives of one group of people 
against the lives of another group of people the right to life further prevents 
violations of the ideal of equal human worth and the occurrence of grave 
injustices. Moreover, the compliance to right with life has to be regarded as 
a precondition for the fulfillment and enjoyment of all other human rights 
and for a central human capability. Furthermore, to enforce state authorities 
to regard the life of every human with equal worth and respect provides for 
an advancement of the perception of equal human dignity in society (see 
above). 
The importance of the right to liberty and security of person springs 
from its protective effect as well, pursuing the human rights aims of freedom, 
justice, and dignity. The right to liberty and security of person emphasizes 
the importance of the physical dimension of freedom, again establishing 
limits of state power. It pursues to protect individuals from bodily harm or 
capture. Such interferences convert individuals to their most vulnerable state 
and dismantle the core of individuality. Therefore, the guarantee of said 
rights is of significant importance for every free society.  It is, likewise, one 
of the crucial characteristics of every free society that its individuals do not 
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have to fear to be arbitrarily arrested at any time.190 Therefore, the right to 
liberty and security additionally pursues to prevent state authorities to repress 
and subdue (legitimate) opponents and dissidents. It is important for the 
perceptions of freedom, justice, and dignity that restrictions of the right to 
liberty are only issued under absolute necessity, steered by a strict 
application of the principles of rule of law. 
The relevance of the right to life, liberty and security of person in the 
context of this thesis is e.g. reflected in the public discourse circling around 
the question how to treat (arrested) terror suspect and surfaces in anti-
terrorism policies such as the German Air Security Law, policies of 
indefinite detention (in the UK in terms of foreign terror suspects and in 
Germany on the state level), as well as in case of British control orders.   
Although each right presented here is distinct, many (if not all) of 
the rights in question are interrelated. It is a logical function of the rights 
framework that changes and curtailments of one right can have negative 
effects on other rights as well. Donohue fittingly points out that “changes to 
one right may have a snowball effect on the ability of citizens to claim – and 
to act upon – other rights.”191 More specifically, privacy is a pre-condition 
for freedom of expression and the “infringement of privacy in the name of 
security also carries a cost to speech.”192 Privacy is additionally an important 
component of guaranteeing the right to assembly since privacy is vital for 
mobilization processes resulting in assemblies of e.g., protesters.193 Freedom 
of expression, in the sense of political expression, and the right to assembly, 
in the sense of a political protest, are logically related as well. Freedom of 
association and freedom of expression are related as well, as the right to 
express oneself freely is vital when coming together with others in 
associations to pursue certain interests, in turn, the opportunity of forming 
associations supports the exchange of opinions, a vital aim of freedom of 
expression.194 Furthermore, privacy is inter-related with freedom of 
movement. As explained above, if one’s movement is tracked it does not 
really reflect free movement anymore. The right to privacy, freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly and association all contribute to the 
                                                          
190 Costigan and Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 85. Shah, ”Detention and Trial,“ 259-
260. 
191 Donohue, Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 66. 
192 Garton Ash, Free Speech, 285, 322.Human Rights Watch points to a connection between 
privacy rights and freedom of expression and association as well. Human Rights Watch, “US: 
Urgent Need for Surveillance Reforms,” June 2013. 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/11/us-urgent-need-surveillance-reforms. Neil Richards, 
Lilian Mitrou and Quentin Skinner see a connection between privacy rights and freedom of 
expression as well. Richards, “The Dangers of Surveillance.” Mitrou, ”The impact of 
communications data retention on fundamental rights and democracy,” 133. Skinner, 
“Liberty, Liberalism and Surveillance.” 
193 Aston, “State surveillance of protest and the rights to privacy and freedom of assembly”. 
194 Boyle and Shah, ”Thought, Expression, Association and Assembly,” 217. 
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construction of a sufficient level of political participation and a sound ‘public 
sphere’. Without the provision of these rights, no functioning debate or 
exchange of ideas, understandings, and knowledge is possible. Indeed, “the 
health of the political community depends upon” this possibility, as Donohue 
holds.195 As discrimination undermines the likelihood that those who are 
affected by such discrimination will make use of rights such as freedom of 
expression or association, negative effects of rights curtailment are further 
amplified.196  
All seven rights elucidated in this section are vital rights in a 
functioning democracy. They are important for every society oriented 
towards freedom and liberty and are equally essential rights for every 
individual. All societies pursuing the spirit of rights and every liberal 
democracy depend on these rights.197 Protecting such rights is a part of 
enabling individuals a life in dignity, freedom, and justice, enjoying a 
maximum of capabilities towards a free and full development of the self.
                                                          
195 Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence, 101. 
196 Ragazzi et al., "The Effects of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation Policies on 
Muslim Populations in France.” 
197 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 70. 
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Chapter II 
Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism 
In order to analyze anti-terrorism policies, a close look at the concept of 
terrorism is inescapable. Therefore, I will now try to clarify this concept. It is 
simply a necessity to look at the concept of terrorism itself, in order to 
understand what it is that states seek to tackle and what they are willing to 
curtail human rights for. Definitions and perception of terrorism clearly 
influence the definition, perception, understanding, and policymaking of anti-
terrorism.1 For instance, if one does not have a clear idea of what terrorism is 
one will not be able to assess the degree of threat it constitutes and the 
proportionality of authorities’ reactions.  Hence, the first section will offer an 
introduction to terrorism as a historical phenomenon and concept, as well as 
shed light on the definitional conundrums surrounding the term and will 
produce a working definition of terrorism for this thesis. It is likewise a 
necessity for this thesis to deliver a clear definition of the concept of anti-
terrorism. This will be accomplished in the second section of this chapter. 
 
Terrorism: History and Definitions 
 A Brief History of Terrorism 
David Rapoport and his metaphor of four waves of modern terrorism (an 
anarchist wave, an anti-colonialist wave, a new leftist wave, and a religious 
wave) have influenced much academic writing on terrorism history.2 My 
(short) history of terrorism will rely on Rapoport’s work. Although Rapoport’s 
‘wave model’ has its weaknesses, it provides a broad historical oversight over 
the development of modern terrorism and the understanding and prioritization 
of the threat of the same. The metaphor of the four waves is, in general, a 
useful organization device for an illustration of the modern history of 
terrorism. Furthermore, since anti-terrorism must be understood as a reaction 
of states to these perceived waves, Rapoport’s model delivers a starting point 
for the understanding of the development of anti-terrorism as well.3 So due to 
its influence and comprehensibility, I will initially follow Rapoport’s wave 
model.4 
                                                          
1 David Omand, “What Should be the Limits of Western Counter-Terrorism Policy?” In 
Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 61. 
2 The importance of Rapoport’s concept for the field has been pointed out by many, see e.g. 
Tom Parker and Nick Sitter, “The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves, It's Strains,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 28 No. 2 (2016). 
Modern terrorism is here understood as terrorism carried out from the late nineteenth century 
to the present. 
3 Adrian Guelke, “Secrets and Lies: Misinformation and Counter-Terrorism,” in Illusions of 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 97. 
4 Weaknesses and potential editions of Rapoport’s waves are discussed later. 
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However, before delving into modern terrorism, I would like to give 
a short account of the ancient history of terrorism, as well as the origin of the 
term itself. The first will be delivered in order to emphasize the fact that 
terrorism has existed for more than only 150 years (thus longer than the 150 
years that are covered by Rapoport’s waves). An understanding of the origin 
of the term underlines these historical roots and emphasizes the importance of 
one of terrorism’s most important features, the generation of fear in societies. 
This additional historical context will help in gaining another perspective on 
modern terrorism. 
The literature on terrorism is full of examples of early episodes of 
terrorism, going back to ancient terror groups. A starting point in many 
histories of terrorism is the example of the Sicarii, an anti-Roman group active 
in the first century AD in Judea. The Sicarii typically stabbed their victims 
(Roman military or civilians, or Jews collaborating with the Romans), during 
public assemblies. Another popular example of early terrorism is the Thugs, a 
group of religious criminals active in India between the thirteenth and 
nineteenth century. The Thugs carried out sacrificial strangulations to the 
Goddess Kali (‘the destroyer’) and killed on average 20.000 thousand people 
a year.5 The Assassins are another often-used example of early terrorism. The 
Shi’ite Order active in Syria, Palestine, and Persia during the time of the 
crusades sometimes applied public suicide attacks. The members of the order 
typically murdered Sunni Muslims or Christians in Mosques or public 
squares.6 Especially the Sicarii and the Assassins with their actions carried out 
in public resemble our modern understanding of a terrorist group. 
Furthermore, since most Sicarii or Assassin terrorists were killed during their 
attacks, the groups can also be seen as precursors of modern suicide terrorism. 
As concerns the word, the term ‘terror’ has its linguistic roots in the 
Latin term terrere, which means to frighten someone.7 However, the term was 
first used in connection with the reign of terror of the French Revolution, la 
Grande Terreur. Our understanding of the term terrorism stems from this 
                                                          
5 Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science, Vol. 299 No. 5612 (2003): 1534. The 
Thugs, who did not follow a clear political aim with their deeds, are in regard to the definition 
of terrorism employed in this thesis, rather resembling a murderous religious sect, instead of a 
terrorist group, since most modern definitions of terrorism demand a political motivation in 
order to label an act of political violence for terrorism. 
6 Walter Laqueur, David Whittaker, Erik Case, Andrew Heywood, Andreas Bock, Jonathan 
Matusitz and Scott Atran are examples of authors including these historical examples in their 
histories of terrorism. See: Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little Brown, 1987), 
12-15. Whittaker, Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat, 13-16. Erik Case, “Terrorism,” 
In 21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook, ed. John T. Ishiyama and Marijke 
Breuning (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2011), 4-6. Andrew Heywood, Global Politics 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). Andreas Bock, Terrorismus (Paderborn: UTB, 2009), 
28-31. Jonathan Matusitz, Terrorism &Communication (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013), 7-9. 
Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” 1534. 
7 Bock, Terrorismus. 
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period of the French Revolution.8 In the later stages of the French Revolution, 
the Jacobins (among their leaders the notorious Maximilien Robespierre), 
executed a strategy of spreading fear. What Robespierre had in mind, during 
the revolution’s most radical phase in 1793-94, was a state-directed system of 
terror, composing a ‘reign of fear.’ This was perceived necessary in order to 
“enable a fragile revolutionary council to order its new-found unity by 
terrorizing opponents.”9 A ‘reign of fear’, would contain dissent by the most 
rigorous means, in order to uphold the new order and the power of the 
revolutionary council.10 Robespierre explained the strategy of the new 
republic as follows: “We must smother the internal and external enemies of 
the Republic or perish with it; now in this situation, the first maxim of your 
policy ought to be to lead the people by reason and the people’s enemies by 
terror.”11 Robespierre believed that terror was necessary in order to help virtue 
and democracy to its victory. He appealed to “virtue, without which terror is 
evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless” and declared that: “Terror is 
nothing else than immediate justice, severe, inflexible; it is, therefore, an 
outflow of virtue, it is […] a consequence of the general principle of 
democracy applied to the most pressing needs of the motherland.”12 
Robespierre wanted to utilize fear in order to re-educate the population to 
uphold the new idea of virtues, consisting roughly of devotion to family, work 
and the ideals of the revolution.13 The characteristics of this demanded 
virtuous life were however rather vague, citizens could not prove to fulfill 
these demands, should they be accused of the opposite; a dilemma with fatal 
results for many.14 The consequence was thus a wave of mass executions, 
taking the lives of up to 40.000 real or alleged ‘enemies of the revolution’.15 
Ironically, Robespierre himself was among the last victims of his own 
campaign. The terror of the French revolution (la regime de la terreur) was 
carried out by state authorities, thus differing from the former early examples 
                                                          
8 It is an interesting fact that the French Revolution plays an important role for the development 
of both main concepts in this thesis, terrorism and human rights. 
9 Whittaker, Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat, 14. 
10 Mikkel Thorup and Morten Brænder, ”Staten og dens Udfordrere – Vold som Terror eller 
Krig,” In Antiterrorismens idehistorie – stater og vold i 500 år, ed. by Thorup and Brænder 
(Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2007), 42-45. Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1977). 
11 Robespierre, Speech to the National Convention, February 5, 1794 cited in Alex Schmid, The 
Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2013), 99. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Francis Leary, “Robespierre: The Meaning of Virtue,” VQR – A National Journal of 
Literature & Discussion, Vol. 72, No. 1 (1996) http://www.vqronline.org/essay/robespierre-
meaning-virtue 
14 Bock, Terrorismus, 24-25. 
15 Heywood, Global Politics, 283. 
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of terrorism, which were all committed by non-state actors (and also this thesis 
will differentiate between terrorism and state terrorism, see next section).16 
Returning to Rapoport’s waves, he posits that the first wave of modern 
terrorism was an anarchist wave. This anarchist wave emanated from Russia 
to other countries between 1880 and 1920. The primary strategy of anarchist 
terrorism was the assassination of prominent political personnel. This form of 
‘propaganda by deed’ accused modern society of being generally hostile to 
the individual and governments of being exploitative and unjust.17 The 1881 
Anarchist Congress in London called for the “annihilation of all rulers, 
ministers of state, nobility, the clergy, the most prominent capitalists and other 
exploiters.”18 The list of victims of anarchist terrorism includes prominent 
names, for instance, Alexander II of Russia, George I King of Greece, 
Umberto I King of Italy and US President William McKinley. However, 
anarchist violence or terrorism did not only kill prominent figures but also 
regular state representatives. For example, in May 1886 an anarchist bomb 
killed seven policemen at a labor agitation meeting at Haymarket Square in 
Chicago.19 Due to its spread, the wave of anarchist terror represented the first 
global terrorism experience.20 The first prominent group in this wave of 
terrorism was Narodnaja Volja (‘the will of the people’), operating in Czarist 
Russia between 1878 and 1881, who, for example, managed to kill Alexander 
II Czar of Russia with a bomb attack in March 1881.21 The group declared the 
aims of its terrorist campaign to be “the destruction of the most harmful 
persons in the government […], to break the prestige of the government, [and 
to] raise in that way the revolutionary spirit of the people.”22 Over the years, 
anarchist violence contributed to a change of the common perception of the 
                                                          
16 In this thesis, the term terrorism is confined to non-state violence; terrorist violence against 
civilians committed by states is classified as state terrorism, and thus constitutes another 
category of political violence. 
17 Case, “Terrorism,” 8. David Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” 
Anthropoetics, Vol. 8 No. 1 (2002). David Rapoport, “The four waves of modern terror: 
international dimensions and consequences,” In An International History of Terrorism: Western 
and non-Western experiences, ed. by Jussi Hanhimaeki and Bernhard Blumenau (London, New 
York: Routledge, 2013). Laqueur, Terrorism. 
18 Cited in Richard English, Does Terrorism Work? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
241. 
19 English, Does Terrorism Work?, 228. 
20 Rapoport, “The four waves of modern terror,” 282. 
21 Bock, Terrorismus, 36-37. 
22 “The People’s Will,” program of the executive committee of Narodnaja Volja, 1879, cited in 
Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 99. However, not all scholars would 
agree that the assassination of these prominent figures fall into the category of terrorism, which 
reveals the contested nature of the concept already with its first modern wave. Tamar Meisels, 
e.g., argues that these murders simply constitute political assassinations and not terrorism due 
to the lacking aim of killing civilians and inducing fear among the population. Tamar Meisels, 
“The Trouble With Terror – The Apologetics of Terrorism: a Refutation,” The Journal of 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 18 (2006). 
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term terrorism. Whereas the term might be seen to have originated from acts 
of state violence during the French Revolution, it was mostly applied to acts 
of political violence committed by non-state actors (sub-state groups or 
individuals) from the late 19th century onwards.23 
The second wave of terrorism was identified by Rapoport as anti-
colonialist terrorism - a wave aiming at the liberation of peoples from 
suppression by colonial empires (consequently these groups did not refer to 
themselves as terrorists, but were interpreted as such by many, including 
Rapoport). After WWII, such groups formed in various colonies of all empires 
and a range of them contributed to the foundation of new states.24 An example 
of this was the Algerian FLN (Front de libération nationale). This case 
provides an example of a violent movement actually achieving its ultimate 
goal, as political violence employed by the FLN, including terrorism, 
contributed to and accelerated the French departure.25 Another example falling 
into this category is the fight of the Viet Minh for independence from the 
French after the Second World War.26 Disaffected groups in developed 
countries, as e.g., Northern Ireland can be counted in this category as well. 
The anti-colonial wave receded as almost all colonial empires dissolved in the 
second half of the ¨twentieth century.27 
Terrorism of ‘the new left wave’, as Rapoport calls it, represents his 
third wave.28 Examples of groups connected to this wave are the Rote Armee 
Fraktion (RAF) in West Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. However, 
new left groups formed not only in European countries but also on a global 
scale. A non-European example is the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining 
Path) in Peru. Most of these groups were driven by Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
Some of them received support or help from communist states (e.g., the GDR 
sheltered former RAF members and furnished them with new identities).29 
However, most groups of the third wave dissolved or at least decreased their 
activity level with the end of the Cold War. Latest with some of the groups of 
this third wave, it becomes clear that Rapoport’s waves are not always fully 
                                                          
23 Andrew Silke delivers another nineteenth century example for this shift of understanding by 
pointing out that many newspaper commentators in the US denoted violence of the KKK as 
terrorism, as early as 1868. Andrew Silke, The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2011), 2.  
24 Rapoport, “The four waves of modern terror,” 288. 
25 English, Does Terrorism Work?, 222. 
26 The Vieth Minh was the leading organization in Vietnam’s struggle for independence from 
France. 
27 Rapoport, “The four waves of modern terror.” Laqueur, Terrorism, 173. 
28 Rapoport, “The four waves of modern terror.” 
29 This pertains to members of the second generation of RAF terrorists. Der 
Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik (BStU), "Informationen zur Stasi.“ 
https://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Aktenfunde/RAF/raf_node.html  
Der Spiegel, “Der Staat hat überreagiert,“ January 20, 2014 
96 
 
distinguishable. For instance, the RAF, identified as a third wave group, used 
an anti-colonial discourse, was in parts motivated by the struggle of the Viet 
Minh, and kept relations with second wave groups such as the PLO (RAF 
members e.g., received training in PLO camps in Lebanon).30 In addition, 
large parts of the members of the second-wave Provisional IRA identified as 
socialist, anti-capitalist or Marxist, thus resembling groups of the third wave.31 
   Rapoport’s fourth wave is a religious one, emerging in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.32 Also here, some groups show overlap with earlier waves. 
Still, during this fourth wave religion gained according to Rapoport “a vastly 
different significance”, for example concerning “supplying justifications and 
organizing principles.”33 Although Islam often comes into focus in this wave, 
Christian, Jewish, and Sikh terrorism is part of it as well. The US saw e.g., 
terror attacks of Christian extremists on abortion clinics, gay clubs, and the 
1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. The attack of the Aum Sect on the Tokyo 
subway can be connected with this wave as well. The attacks of 9/11 followed 
by attacks in other Western metropolises, such as in Madrid, Paris, London, 
and Brussels, form the most well-known examples of terrorism of the new 
religious wave. The so-called Islamic State, committing attacks both, inside 
of Western countries, and in the periphery of the European continent, is the 
newest prominent or infamous group of this fourth wave. 
Reflecting on this last wave, it is important to point out, that this thesis 
uses the label ‘Islamist terrorism’ for acts of terrorism carried out by its 
perpetrators ostensibly in the name of Allah and the religion of Islam. 
However, this violence does not reflect the religion as such, but rather an 
errant interpretation of the same; an interpretation that seemingly allows for 
the murder of perceived 'infidels' or political opponents (actually, all terrorist 
acts carried out in the name of a religion carry political goals and motives as 
well, e.g. influencing foreign policy). Therefore, the widespread usage of the 
label Islamist terrorism is not unproblematic, as it fabricates a connotation 
between a potentially peaceful religion and violent perpetrators. Islamist 
terrorism is therefore in this thesis to be understood as terrorism that is 
committed under this errand perception of Islam.  
As mentioned, Rapoport’s waves are in connection with specific 
groups not always clearly distinguishable. Rapoport concedes this when he 
explains that the PLO “primarily a nationalist group” became an important 
“body of the New Left Wave”, and that recently, “PLO elements became 
active in the Fourth Wave.”34 Problems in locating certain groups in certain 
                                                          
30 Peter Katzenstein, “Same War—Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism,” 
International Organization, Vol. 57 No. 4 (2003): 742. 
31 Rapoport, “The four waves of modern terror.” Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 130-131. 
32 Rapoport, “The four waves of modern terror,” 283. Heywood, Global Politics, 283. 
33 Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11.” 
34 Rapoport, “The four waves of modern terror,” 283-284. Furthermore, Rapoport counts the 
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waves spring from three factors: first, theoretical categories are always only 
ideally distinct, in reality, they often show overlaps with other categories. 
Second, certain groups might survive their original wave and change 
orientation in a changed context. Third, especially groups which, at least in 
part, are motivated by anti-imperialist sentiments, are hard to distinguish by 
the wave model, as many of the different terrorist movements across 
Rapoport’s waves had anti-imperial motivations aiming at the (at least 
perceived) imperial powers of the UK, the US and their allies.35 
Besides the blurred boundaries of the waves, Rapoport’s model has 
arguably another weakness: There is no distinction between xenophobic and 
nationalist/separatist terrorism. This is a weakness since, using Rapoport’s 
four waves, one is not able to fittingly categorize acts of terrorism committed 
by individuals motivated by purely racist or xenophobic ideologies. Terror 
attacks such as the one committed by the NSU (Nationalsozialistischer 
Untergrund) group in Germany, Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011 or the 
attack on the Oktoberfest in Munich in 1980 constitute cases of xenophobic 
terrorism. The nationalist and separatist terrorism of ETA and the PIRA ran 
under an essentially different ideology than terrorism by the mentioned 
xenophobic individuals and groups. Whereas groups such as ETA and the 
PIRA acted out of a minority position against hegemonic state agencies, 
xenophobic groups mostly act against civilians of minorities with foreign 
roots. From the perspective of this study, it makes, therefore, sense to 
distinguish between xenophobic and nationalist/separatist terrorism.36 A 
categorization of modern terrorism would thus, in my view, consist of five 
categories: anarchist terrorism, anti-colonial/separatist terrorism, left-wing 
terrorism, xenophobic terrorism, and religious terrorism. Of course, as with 
Rapoport’s model, potential overlaps between categories can never be ruled 
out. In addition, the genesis or spread of other forms of terrorism, besides the 
given five categories, is possible as well. In recent decades, the possibility of 
a spread of so-called ecology terrorism has been considered as another 
potential category of terrorism (e.g. attacks against facilities conducting 
animal experiments).37 This shows that terrorism is an ever-changing and 
                                                          
fight of the ETA to the third wave and finds the beginnings of PIRA terrorism belonging to the 
second wave; whereas he points out that the PIRA also resembled traits of the third and fourth 
wave. However, it seems that ETA and the PIRA have much more in common than, e.g., ETA 
and the RAF, or the PIRA and the FLN. 
35 English, Terrorism: How to Respond, 51. 
36 Audrey Cronin already took regard of that distinction in a 2002 publication. She spoke of 
both right-wing and ethnonationalist/separatist terrorism (besides left-wing and religious 
terrorism). Audrey Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” 
International Security, Vol. 27 No. 3 (2002), 39. 
37 Examples of animal rights groups using methods that can be seen as terrorist are the Animal 
Rights Militia or the Revolutionary Cells – Animal Liberation Brigade. Armin Pfahl-Traughber, 
“Terrorismus: Merkmale, Formen und Abgrenzungsprobleme,“ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 
Vol. 24-25 (2016): 17. 
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developing phenomenon and that new waves or categories of terrorism can 
arise, just as old waves might return. Furthermore, changes in the nature of 
terrorism will unquestionably have consequences on the way states react to 
terrorism. Different kinds of terrorism will trigger different reactions and 
different kinds of policies. 
 
 The Contested Nature of ‘Terrorism’ Definitions 
Having shed some light on histories of terrorism, I will now proceed to define 
the concept. I will present the major debates and fault lines in the scholarly 
literature on the issue, as well as carve out a position of my own.38 The 
construction of a working definition is intended to help provide an 
understanding of what it is that states and federations or international 
organizations try to tackle with their anti-terrorism policies, as well as reveal 
differences between states’ (and the EU’s) definitions and scholarly 
definitions. Definitional differences gain their importance from the effects 
they have on actual policies. By defining terrorism, one defines the 
groundwork for how to tackle the problem of terrorism. Thus, definitions do 
have an influence on actual terrorism policies, so that different definitions of 
terrorism will likely lead to different policies.39 Sometimes, as will be seen 
later, faulty or too wide or arbitrary definitions can cause problems from a 
rights perspective.  
However, before coming to the fault lines in the literature and my own 
working definition some remarks on the relationship between terrorism and 
the term political violence are necessary. Instead of understanding terrorism 
as a completely isolated concept, it must be seen as one particular form of 
political violence among a range of different forms of political violence. Other 
forms of political violence that differ from terrorism are for example warfare, 
guerilla war, civil war, genocide, ethnic cleansing, political assassinations, 
sabotage or rioting.40 
                                                          
38 Obviously, I could have chosen many more or different definitions, however I tried to include 
(for the most part) definitions that both reflect the different viewpoints in the debate and 
represent renowned scholars. 
39 Following the literature of policy analysis scholarship, one might understand the act of 
defining terrorism as an act of defining a ‘problem’. Each particular definition of a policy 
problem tries to install a certain “hypothesis of causality.” Acts of defining terrorism, as all acts 
of problem definition, are dependent on the political and social context and represent “a 
collective construction directly linked to the perceptions, representations, interests, and values 
of the actors concerned,” […] as well as an “ongoing, non-linear and open process.” Peter 
Knoepfel et al., Public Policy Analysis (Bristol: Policy Press, 2007), 126-127. 
40 Edward Crenshaw and Kristopher Robison, “Political Violence as an Object of Study: The 
Need for Taxonomic Clarity,” in Handbook of Politics, ed. by J. Craig Jenkins and Kevin T. 
Leicht (New York, London: Springer, 2010). Michael J. Boyle, “Progress and Pitfalls in the 
Study of Political Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 24 No. 4 (2012). Richard 
Jackson, “The Study of Terrorism 10 Years after 9/11: Successes, Issues, Challenges,” 
Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations, Vol. 8 No. 32 (2012). Jackson provocatively 
defines counter-terrorism as a form of political violence as well. 
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One might approach the issue of defining terrorism with a thought 
problem, which will emphasize the relevance of seeking a specific definition: 
was the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 an act of 
terrorism or a case of a political assassination? Are ISAF troops killed by a 
Taliban roadside-bombing in Afghanistan victims of terrorism or guerilla 
warfare? What about the American and French troops killed in the 1983 Beirut 
barracks bombings? Furthermore, are acts of violence by states, committed 
against civilians, to be categorized as terrorism as well? Such questions, and 
attempts to find an answer, take us to the heart of the matter. 
Thus, in the course of shedding light on the definitional fault lines in 
the literature, I will distinguish terrorism from other forms of political 
violence. Without such a differentiation, the concept of terrorism would 
encompass all sorts of violence and would become unrecognizable. However, 
the precise description and analysis of anti-terrorism demand a 
conceptualization of terrorism that is differentiated from other kinds of 
political violence. Certainly, distinctions between the different categories of 
political violence are not always easy, “given the amorphous and ambiguous 
properties of political violence.”41 Still, the construction of differentiations is 
possible as will be seen. 
Terrorism is an extremely contested term. In fact, it is one of the terms 
with the highest quantity of different definitions in all of social science. Alex 
Schmid listed more than two hundred different definitions of terrorism in his 
2013 Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research; a number which clearly 
underlines the vast amount of different understandings among scholars in the 
field.42 Still, most definitions of the term terrorism in the literature include 
                                                          
41 Crenshaw and Robison, “Political Violence as an Object of Study,” 237. In fact, some violent 
groups apply terrorism, while applying other forms of political violence, as well. Boyle, 
“Progress and Pitfalls in the Study of Political Violence,” 529. For example, the Taliban use 
both terrorism and other forms of political violence (guerilla warfare) in their struggle in 
Afghanistan. Rashmi Singh, “Counter-Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era: successes, Failures and 
Lessons Learned,” In Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 44. 
42 Even governments themselves are divided over definitions of terrorism. An often-cited 
example concerns the American Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS). 
The DoS defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to 
influence an audience.” According to the DoD terrorism is “the unlawful use or threatened use 
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Albert Jongman, Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, 
theories, and literature (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988), 33. Thus, whereas the DoS 
defines non-combatants as victims, the DoD speaks more broadly of individuals or property as 
victims of terrorism. The DoS only refers to politics as a possible motivation, whereas the DoD 
extends the range of possible motivations to religious or ideological objectives. The definition 
of the DoS furthermore focuses on the audience as the real aim of attacks, whereas the DoD 
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several or all of the following categories or ingredients: a specification of acts 
of violence falling under terrorism, claims on the motivation of terrorism, 
remarks on possible perpetrators of terrorism, information on possible victims 
and claims on the aims of terrorism.43 
However, no agreed-upon common definition of terrorism exists. The 
literature on terrorism is characterized by major disagreements, such as what 
kinds of violence should be described as terrorist violence, whether only 
political motivations should be named as motivation of terrorism (instead of 
including other motivations), whether state violence should be included in 
definitions of terrorism, whether an act is a terrorist act only when the victims 
are civilians, whether one should differentiate between terrorism, 
assassinations and guerrilla warfare, or whether one should include a moral 
component in defining terrorism. It is, moreover, debated if terrorists have to 
have the aim to spread fear in society.44 My study both presents and 
acknowledges these debates. I will use these major debates in the literature as 
an orientation for advancing towards my own definition of terrorism. 
Therefore, the rest of this section will be structured around these major fault 
lines in the literature. 
A central component of terrorism is violence. All functions of 
terrorism follow from a successful or failed attempt at committing violence. 
Without violence, terrorism would not be terrorism. The committed violence 
is the bargaining instrument of every terrorist group or individual (in the sense 
of ‘give attention to our political grievances, otherwise…’).45 However, there 
is disagreement around the term violence in the literature. This is the first fault 
line I want to touch upon. Scholars disagree on what kind of violence suffices 
to define a terrorist attack, and what acts of violence would have to be 
excluded from a definition. We could, for instance, ask if a terror attack is only 
a terror attack if it involves violence against human beings, or if the 
destruction of things cannot be terrorism as well. Are threats of violence 
terrorism as well? Furthermore, how severe do attacks have to be before we 
can call them terrorist? And what about failed attacks? 
Whereas the majority of scholars confine terrorism to violence against 
humans, some scholars include both violence against human beings and things 
(mostly mentioned as ‘property’ or ‘infrastructure’) in their definitions. 
Examples of scholars belonging to the latter category are Angelo Corlett, Jeff 
Lewis, Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez or Danica Gianola.46 For instance, Corlett 
                                                          
sees governments or societies as the focus. Moreover, whereas the DoS definition excludes 
states as perpetrators of terrorism, the definition by the DoD leaves this possibility open. 
43 For an extensive overview on scholarly definitions of terrorism, see e.g. Schmid, The 
Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 99-157. 
44 Schmid and Jongman conducted an in depth analysis on disputed elements of the term 
terrorism in the literature. Schmid and Jongman, Political terrorism. 
45 Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 78. 
46 Angelo Corlett, Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2003). Jeff Lewis, Language Wars: The Role of Media and Culture in Global Terror 
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speaks of “the actual or threatened use of violence against persons or property” 
in his definition and Palmer-Fernandez holds that terrorism is “the organized 
use of violence against civilians or their property.”47 Many other scholars, 
however, exclude violence against things, for example by defining terrorism 
as violence against civilians, non-combatants, ‘innocent people’, or simply 
humans. For instance, Schmid and Jongman define that terrorist violence 
causes “immediate human victims,” and Erik Case holds that terrorism is 
“violence against civilians.”48 Whereas scholars including violence against 
things are in the minority position in the scholarly field, many (if not most) 
terrorism definitions by states, IOs or federations do include such violence in 
their definitions of terrorism, see e.g. the definitions by NATO, the US 
Department of Defense (see above), the UK, and the EU (see Chapters 4 and 
5).49 
In regard to this issue, I take the position that politically motivated 
acts that are decidedly supposed to damage things only (e.g. a left-wing 
motivated wave of arson on luxury cars) are excluded from my understanding 
of terrorism and should rather be classified as rioting or sabotage, since 
otherwise, the concept of terrorism would become too broad and the label of 
terrorism could be used on a vast amount of acts.50 Furthermore, only severe 
violence, which is violence that tries to kill or heavily injure its victims, is to 
be seen as terrorist violence. However, failed attacks need to be classified as 
terrorism, or at least attempted terrorism, given that all other criteria of 
terrorism – which I will extract in the following - are fulfilled. An exclusion 
of failed attacks would be arbitrary. 
The second fault line that I want to explore is the one concerning 
terrorism’s motivation. Three scholarly factions can here be identified. Few 
authors do not go into defining motivations for terrorism at all. A considerable 
amount of scholars point to a political motivation for terrorism, and a third 
group adds other possible motivations. 
Brian Jenkins, one of the pioneers in the field, is one of the few 
authors not including any possible motivation for terrorism in his definition of 
the term. Walter Laqueur, another pioneer of terrorism studies, can be counted 
to the group of scholars who see the motivation for terrorism as deriving from 
politics. For instance, he defines terrorism as “the use of covert violence by a 
                                                          
and Political Violence (London: Pluto Press, 2005). Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez, “Terrorism, 
Innocence and Justice,” Philosophy and Public Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2005): 22-27. Danica 
Gianola, Il volto del terrorismo (Florence: Firenze Atheneum, 2009). 
47 Corlett, Terrorism, 119.  Palmer-Fernandez, “Terrorism, Innocence and Justice,” 24. 
48 Schmid and Jongman, Political terrorism. Erik Case, “Terrorism,” 6. Still, a range of scholars 
does not deliver a position on the issue, by omitting a clear formulation. For instance, Richard 
English holds that terrorist violence involves “heterogeneous violence […] it can involve a 
variety of acts, of targets, and of actors […].” English, Terrorism: How to Respond, 24. 
49 Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 142. 
50 Schmid argued in a similar fashion. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism 
Research, 71. 
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group for political ends.”51 As members of the third group, Alex Schmid and 
Albert Jongman include other motivations than political ones in their 
definition. They speak of “idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons” of 
terrorism.”52  Steven Best and Anthony Nocella add two more potential 
motives for terrorism in their 2004 definition, which is religious or economic 
ones.53  
By far the biggest majority of scholars see political motivation as a 
necessary ingredient of terrorism. This evaluation is shared by this thesis, all 
terrorist action contain political goals.  A political motivation will thus form 
part of my definition of terrorism. Without defining terrorism as a political 
phenomenon, the violence committed could not be distinguished from acts 
generally understood as acts of crime.54 The inclusion of additional 
motivations besides political ones is, however, unnecessary. First, the term 
criminal should not be used as a possible motivation for a terrorist act, since 
it would undermine the possibility of differentiating between terrorism and 
crime. Second, the term idiosyncratic is a too vague term to be used in a 
definition and should, therefore, be dismissed. Third, the addition of possible 
religious motives seems initially to make sense, however, virtually all terrorist 
attacks carried out in the name of religion also include a political component 
in their motivation.55 For example, the attacks of Al-Qaeda are maybe aimed 
at killing perceived infidels, but they also aim at driving Western troops out 
of the Muslim lands such as Saudi Arabia. The last is clearly a geopolitical 
(and thereby political) aim. Fourth, economic aims, as included in Best and 
Nocella, are merely a means of achieving either political change or criminal 
aims and do therefore not need to be mentioned independently.  
The third fault line in the definitional debate to be highlighted is the 
inclusion or exclusion of state actors as possible perpetrators of terrorism, in 
other words, the question if political violence committed by states should 
receive the label ‘terrorism’ as well. Schmid and Jongman, as well as Best and 
Nocella, do include states as possible perpetrators of terrorism.56 The same is 
valid for Paul Wilkinson, another prominent name in terrorism research, who 
                                                          
51 Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 72. 
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argued in 1974 “political terrorism […] is a sustained policy involving the 
waging of organized terror either on the part of the state, a movement or 
faction or by a small group of individuals.”57 However, the majority of 
scholars in the field exclude violence committed by states from their 
definition. Walter Laqueur is a member of this group, just as Walter Enders, 
Todd Sandler, Erik Case, and Mark Allen Peterson. They all define terrorism 
as acts of ‘sub-national’ groups or ‘non-state’ actors. Enders and Sandler 
write, e.g., that terrorism is “the premeditated use or threat to use violence by 
individuals or subnational groups […].”58 Most states likewise identify 
terrorism as violence perpetrated by non-state actors (see e.g. the definitions 
delivered in Chapters 4 and 5). The exclusion of states as perpetrators of 
terrorism by so many authors is an interesting fact, especially since the term 
terrorism, as mentioned, was first used to describe state actions; measures of 
French authorities during the reign of terror at the time of the French 
Revolution. Furthermore, endless acts of violence against civilians have been 
and are carried out by states. Clive Ponting estimates that during the twentieth 
century, “on a conservative estimate, governments killed about 100 million of 
their own people.”59 Richard English argues that “the largest-scale terrorizing 
violence with a political goal has been carried out by state, rather than non-
state, actors.”60 Why then, do most terrorism researchers exclude state 
terrorism from their definitions? Some scholars see terrorism as a ‘weapon of 
the weak’ instead of an instrument of (strong) states, pointing to the centrality 
of non-governmental, sub-state actors in this regard.61 Others refrain from 
including state violence, simply in order to uphold conceptual clarity. For 
instance, English holds “the dynamics of states and of non-state groups 
respectively are so different from one another that it makes sense to analyze 
them separately rather than synoptically.”62 Edward Crenshaw and Kristopher 
Robison argue in a similar fashion when they explain that state terrorism 
would be impossible to combine with non-state terrorism in one single 
definition, such attempts would necessarily result in too vague definitions. 
Thus, state terrorism should rather be specified with other terms from the 
vocabulary of political violence, e.g., repression, politicide or genocide.63 
In accordance with the majority of scholars in the field, I subscribe to 
perspectives placing state terrorism in a separate category. This does not mean 
that I evaluate non-state terrorism as more devastating, ‘more evil’ or more 
pressing problem. However, as pointed out by English and 
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Crenshaw/Robison, differentiating allows for a clearer definition of terrorism. 
Differentiating rules out all acts of state repression and state violence, which 
would muddle a definition of terrorism due to the different characteristics 
these acts reflect in comparison with sub-state violence. Gaining definitional 
clarity by excluding state violence seems fruitful in face of the main research 
object of this thesis, which is the reaction of European state authorities (and 
the EU) on sub-state terrorism. In other words, as this study has its focus on 
state reactions on sub-state terrorism, it makes sense to delimit the concept of 
terrorism to attacks of sub-state actors (individuals or groups). 
Here, some remarks regarding the issue which sub-state groups and 
individuals should be regarded as terrorist are in order.64 At times, one sees 
attempts to include or exclude certain perpetrators of violence from definitions 
of terrorism according to the ‘morality’ or the ends of the individual or group. 
Some would thus, for example, exclude the French Resistance during World 
War II from a potential list of terrorist groups while including groups such as 
Al-Qaeda. However, a differentiation based on morality or the ends is a 
dangerous undertaking. Whether the aims of a terror attack might be thought 
of as ‘ethical’ is often in the eyes of the beholder; especially since the term 
terrorism is often used for a wide range of different acts and is furthermore 
used to discredit the political or military opponent. Indeed, the term often 
functions as a political weapon, used with the aim to undermine the legitimacy 
and morality of the opponent.65 Jenkins had a point when he held back in 1974 
that for most people ‘terrorism seems to mean simply whatever the ‘bad guys’ 
are doing.66 However, who the ‘bad guys’ are, differs with perception. Thus, 
one should refrain from including any moral components in a definition of 
terrorism. One has to rely on as neutral characteristics as possible, such as the 
character of the acts, the nature of the perpetrators, the nature of the motive 
and the wider aim of the attack. 
Another debate in the literature, constituting another fault line, circles 
around a possible differentiation between terrorism and warfare. Also here two 
overall camps can be found in the literature. Richard English holds that 
terrorism “represents a subspecies of warfare, and as such, it can form part of 
a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage.”67 
Andrew Heywood claims that all acts of warfare to some extent aim to instill 
                                                          
64 Sub-state groups are here defined as groups not representing a state, not directed by state 
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65 Case, ”Terrorism,” 4. Heywood, Global Politics, 286. Thorup and Brænder, “Staten og dens 
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66 Jenkins as cited in Case, ”Terrorism,” 2. 
67 English, Terrorism: How to Respond, 24. 
105 
 
fear into the wider population.68 English and Heywood thus do not clearly 
separate war, guerrilla war, and terrorism. This idea clashes with perceptions 
and definitions of scholars who do see a clear demarcation line between acts 
of war and terrorism. Waldron argues that he does not want “to confuse 
terrorist action with the use of terrorizing coercion as an act of war.” Philip 
Heymann argues that the difference between (guerilla) warfare and terrorism 
rests on the characteristic of guerrilla warfare orientating itself towards 
gaining control over areas and defeating a military opponent, opposed to the 
major aim of terrorism, which is to communicate a political message and to 
instill fear in a society. In other words, whereas guerilla warfare may be 
understood as oriented around military goals, terrorism might be understood 
as a communication strategy.69 One would have to make an evaluation for each 
case of violence applied, and evaluate if the major aim was rather the creation 
of fear and the transmitting of a political message, or if the major focus was 
to cause military damage and potentially gain control over certain areas. In the 
case of the former, one would then speak of terrorism, and in case of the latter 
one would speak of warfare or guerilla tactics. It remains that such distinctions 
are, at least at times, a complicated matter and not easy to establish.70 For 
instance, reflecting the examples of the second wave of modern terrorism 
described by Rapoport, many groups of this wave reflect tricky cases in regard 
to a distinction between guerrilla fighters and terrorists, e.g., the Viet Minh, 
the PLO or the FLN. Many of these groups used both guerrilla tactics and 
terrorist measures. Still, a differentiation running along the lines of 
Heymann’s argument is possible. Therefore, this thesis will take up 
Heymann’s argument regarding the differentiation between terrorism and 
guerrilla warfare. However, grey areas can – naturally - not be avoided. 
The next definitional fault line pertains to a central and often-
mentioned function of terrorism, the creation of fear and anxiety in target 
populations or societies. It is emphasized by a wide range of scholars and 
omitted only in the minority of definitions.71 The fault line goes between those 
scholars who do include this major function of terrorism in their definitions 
and those who do not. The definitions of Jenkins, Schmid/Jongman, and 
                                                          
68 Heywood, Global Politics, 286. 
69 Philip Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society 
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Peterson all mention the creation of fear as an important aim or function of 
terrorism. Other authors underlining this function are e.g., Paul Wilkinson, 
Richard English, James and Brenda Lutz, Tamar Meisels and Bruce Hoffman. 
Paul Wilkinson argues that terrorism is “designed to create a climate of 
extreme fear.”72 English writes that terrorism “possesses an important 
psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among a directly threatened 
group and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximizing political 
communication and achievement.”73 James and Brenda Lutz hold that 
terrorism “is designed to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond 
the immediate victims of the violence.”74 Tamar Meisels holds that terrorism 
owns “the intent of instilling fear of mortal danger amidst a civilian 
population.”75 Bruce Hoffman emphasizes the creation of fear as an essential 
function of terrorism as well. He argued that terrorism constitutes “the 
deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence [having…] far-
reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s).”76 A scholar 
who does not mention the creation of fear as a function or aim of terrorism is 
Walter Laqueur.77 
I share the perception of the majority of scholars in the field, that the 
objective of creating fear is a central feature of terrorism and an important 
characteristic that differentiates terrorism from e.g., regular warfare or 
murder. For sure, regular warfare creates fear among populations as well. 
However, the main focus of warfare is the military action itself, not the 
creation of fear in an audience.78 The focus on generating fear is thus an 
essential characteristic of differentiating terrorism from other forms of 
political violence and will, therefore, be included in my definition of the 
concept.  
The identification of terrorism as an act of political communication is 
a logical consequence of the recognition of terrorism’s focus on the creation 
of fear. What is implied here is that terrorism is a form of threat-based 
communication, connecting the perpetrators via the immediate targets (the 
immediate victims) with a wider target or wider audience, which is the 
government and or the population of a political community, as well as 
potential followers. In other words, violence is carried out in order to transmit 
messages, to communicate with a wider audience.79 Terrorism is political 
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violence that ‘talks.’80 The military purposes of a terrorist act are negligible 
compared to its communicative purpose. It can, therefore, be argued that 
terrorism is not only a sub-category of political violence but also a form of 
political communication. Fittingly, terrorism was described as ‘propaganda by 
the deed’, by its anarchist perpetrators during the first wave of modern 
terrorism. Communication scholars emphasize this function of terrorism. For 
example, Brian McNair holds that terrorism “is a form of political 
communication, pursued outside the realm of constitutional procedures. […] 
Terror […] includes bombings, assassination, kidnappings, and hostage-
taking – actions which will in most cases be of minor military value, being 
designed rather to communicate messages of various kinds.”81 The 
communicative function of terrorism is an important characteristic of 
terrorism that differentiates this form of political violence from other forms. 
Guerilla warfare or political assassinations often gain a high degree of 
publicity as well. However, the major aim of these forms of political violence 
is rather to overthrow a government, to gain control over an area or to 
eliminate a specific political opponent, instead of merely having a 
communicative function, as is the aim of terrorists via their attacks (e.g., 
genocide or ethnic cleansing is often attempted to be hidden from the public). 
The communicative act of terrorism then contains several potential 
aims. A major aim, the creation of fear and intimidation, was already 
introduced. This essential aim of terrorism often comes together with the aim 
to influence politics. So, by the communicative act of a terror attack, terrorists 
aim at creating enormous amounts of publicity and reaching an audience as 
wide as possible, often in order to influence political decisions of the target 
government and society. An example would here be the beheading of James 
Foley, an American journalist, by IS. The murder had the objective to terrorize 
(in the sense of frightening) the American or rather Western public, and to 
intensify the conflict with ‘the West’ (since IS, at least during those years, 
utilized a strategy of escalation and division).82 Thus, terrorism owns the aim 
of pushing the target society or its government to implement change, be it 
political or social change.83 The pressure for change is constructed or at least 
co-constructed by the feelings of fear and intimidation spread in the target 
society. In other words, the terrorist strategy is “to coerce the government by 
terrorizing the population.”84 The creation of fear is therefore often a 
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prerequisite for generating the potential for change. This aim of pushing the 
wider target of the terrorist action to political change is another major 
characteristic of terrorism that differentiates it from other kinds of political 
violence. 
The creation of fear in a target society is furthermore an important 
trigger for another aim of terrorism, which is particularly important for this 
thesis. I refer here to the idea that terror attacks might be committed with the 
aim to tempt state authorities into overreaction.85 It is often due to the fear 
created among the population that states (over)-react to terror acts. Politicians 
will often be eager to calm populations by showing strength in their terrorism 
policies, independent from considerations of effectiveness or (rights) 
legitimacy. Waldron hypothesizes that terrorist groups might carry out terror 
acts in order to make “the targeted state […] engage in acts of political 
repression that will discredit it in the eyes of its subjects or the international 
community, and undercut its reputation as a paragon of freedom and a 
respecter of rights.”86 Grievances triggered by such overreaction can 
contribute to additional recruitment of terrorist groups.87 An overreaction 
might furthermore provide impetus to another potential aim of terrorists, 
which is a polarization of the target society (this is e.g. an aim of IS). Both 
terrorist violence and harsh state reaction towards potential ‘suspect 
communities’ can trigger such a process of polarization.88 A polarization 
process can then lead to an increasing number of supporters of terrorist 
violence, leading to ever hardening fronts.89 
Still, the function of creating fear is a necessary aim of terrorism, 
whereas the aim to entrap governments into overreactions is merely an 
additional aim. In other words, if political violence is not aimed at instilling 
fear or intimidation in a wider audience it is not classifiable as terrorism. For 
example, if an individual or a group kills without a motive to instill fear, this 
might rather be an act of political murder or assassination or a guerilla act. If 
a group simply retaliates on actions of state authorities via targeting state units 
such as soldiers, without using the act as a means of communication to a wider 
audience, and without the aim to intimidate that wider audience, the act might 
be closer to an act of guerrilla warfare than terrorism. Therefore, it is important 
to point out that the creation of fear or intimidation – from the perspective of 
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this thesis – is always a major aim of terrorist acts. The same is valid for the 
aim to trigger political change.  
The last important fault line I want to elucidate in the context of 
defining terrorism revolves around the identification of potential victims of 
terrorism, or in other words, the nature of the victim as a characteristic of 
defining terrorism. The fault line circles largely around the question if only 
civilians are to be defined as victims of terrorism, or if other categories of 
individuals have to be included, e.g., soldiers, police officers or high stake 
politicians. This fault line is one of the most controversial issues in defining 
terrorism.90 Many scholars engage in deliberations on differences between 
potential groups of victims and the resulting consequences triggered by the 
inclusion or exclusion of such groups for the concept of terrorism (such 
consequences are e.g., different understandings of the concepts of terrorism 
and anti-terrorism).91 
Some scholars speak of terrorism as violence against ‘the innocent’, 
thereby implementing a rather vague (and almost metaphysical) term into their 
definitions. For example, Cindy Combs limits terrorism to acts of violence 
against ‘the innocent’, when she writes that terrorism is “perpetrated against 
innocent persons.”92 Definitions identifying ‘the innocent’ as victims of 
terrorism raise the question of who could be identified as such. Surely, the 
term aims broadly in the direction of civilians. However, the term is too vague 
to be included in a definition. For instance, the victims of 9/11 were from the 
perspective of al-Qaeda not innocent, since they were perceived to be 
entangled with an oppressive and exploitative culture (besides being ‘non-
believers’). Thus, by including the term ‘innocent’ one opens up for 
discussions in the direction of the general responsibility of citizens for the 
doing of their governments. The construction of a neutral perspective on that 
question seems hard to achieve, therefore the term innocent seems unfit for a 
definition of terrorism. 
Many scholars define terrorism exclusively as acts of violence against 
civilians, e.g., Tamar Meisels speaks of “defenseless non-combatants” as 
targets of terrorism and Erik Case defines terrorist violence as “violence 
against civilians.”93 Via a definition excluding all other groups than civilians 
as possible victims of terrorism, one would e.g., exclude the bombings of 
                                                          
90 Case, ”Terrorism,” 5. Enders and Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism, 4. 
91 Still, some scholars do not invest much effort on defining potential victims of terrorism. As 
soon as a person is severely hurt by an act of violence, otherwise qualifying for terrorism, they 
would argue that those killed or injured were victims of terrorism, regardless if they were 
civilians, politicians or military staff. H.H.A. Cooper, an advocate of this approach, holds that: 
“From a definitional perspective, it ought not matter who does what to whom. Terrorism should 
be defined solely by the nature and quality of what is done.” H.H.A. Cooper, “Terrorism: The 
Problem of Definition Revisited,” In The New Era of Terrorism – Selected Readings, ed. by 
Gus Martin (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2004), 57. 
92 Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 11. 
93 Meisels, “The Trouble With Terror,” 465. Erik Case, “Terrorism,” 6. 
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Hezbollah on French and US military barracks in Lebanon in 1983 from 
constituting a terror attack. And indeed, Tamar Meisels, actually explicitly 
excludes the victims of this attack from being victims of terrorism.94 Therein, 
scholars who argue terrorism to exclusively be violence against civilians raise 
the question of how one is supposed to treat attacks on military personnel and 
police officers (and are state leaders really civilians?). Meisels would classify 
these bombings rather as part of guerrilla warfare, and attacks on politicians 
as political assassinations instead of terror attacks.95 Initially, Meisels seems 
to have a point when she holds that only when civilians are victims one can 
speak of a terror attack given the function of terrorism to indulge fear and 
intimidation among populations. This implies that assassinations of politicians 
and attacks on military personnel would not have such an effect. However, 
here the camp of scholars delimitating terrorism to attacks on civilians only 
runs into a problem. Is it really the case that only attacks on civilians spread 
fear and intimidation? This appears unlikely; the killing of e.g., a number of 
police forces can clearly create a climate of intimidation among a population. 
Furthermore, by imposing differentiations that e.g., exclude military forces 
and police officers as potential victims of terrorism one creates arbitrary 
categories as can be illustrated with a short example resting on the tragic 
events of 9/11. If one would only define attacks that mainly aim at civilian 
casualties as terrorism, then the victims caused by planes one, two and four, 
were victims of terror attacks, whereas the explosion caused in the Pentagon 
by the third plane would have to be categorized as another kind of political 
violence, since here almost as many military staff members were among the 
victims as civilians. Essentially, the exclusion of certain groups as potential 
victims of terrorism cannot solve the definitional problem of the term 
terrorism since problems will arise regardless of the chosen delimitation. 
In order to avoid such arbitrariness, my thesis will include all human 
beings as potential victims of terrorism. Admittedly, by taking this step, 
differentiation from other forms of political violence, for example, guerrilla 
warfare or political assassination becomes more difficult. Still, a 
differentiation towards these categories of political violence is possible in the 
framework of my other elaborations in this section, e.g., via utilizing the 
demand that terrorism reflects a mode of political communication and contains 
the aim to spread fear. 
The crucial categories for defining terrorism are the execution of 
serious violence against humans, the political motive of the act, the 
perpetrators being non-state actors, the communicative function of the act and 
its aim to spread fear, not the victims. Simply all kinds of groups or individuals 
can become victims of terrorism; it depends on the context in which the act is 
carried out, not the victims themselves. For example, the killing of soldier Lee 
Rigby in the streets of London in May 2013 would be excluded from being a 
                                                          
94 Meisels, “The Trouble With Terror.” 
95 Ibid. 
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case of terrorism by many definitions since the victim was not a civilian. Other 
scholars would argue that the case would qualify since Rigby was off-duty 
(however, he was still wearing his uniform). I would claim that the murder of 
Rigby was clearly a case of terrorism, since the attackers’ foremost aim was 
to create publicity for their cause, since the context of the attack was not at all 
resembling an act of guerrilla warfare (it involved no immediate attempt to 
control territory) and since Rigby was chosen in his function as a symbol of 
the British forces rather than himself personally (ruling out a targeted political 
assassination). Furthermore, it was not Rigby who was the major target of the 
attack (although it would tragically cost him his life), but the wider British and 
Western audience.96 It was due to that aim of creating as much publicity as 
possible that the attackers stroke at daylight in the center of London, not using 
long-range weapons and fleeing their victim, but waiting for security forces to 
show up, and shouting messages to bystanders. Had the major aim been the 
assassination itself and not the act of communication entangled with it, the 
attackers would most likely have chosen a different venue and strategy of 
attack.97 
After having presented some of the central debates in the literature in 
regard to defining terrorism, as well as, taking a position on these debates, I 
can now summarize my positions and deliver a definition of my own. For this 
study, the necessary ingredients of terrorism are: a symbolic act of severe 
violence against humans, the perpetrator being a sub-state group, the 
involvement of political motives, the usage of violence as a means of 
communication, the existence of the aim to instill fear and the aim to trigger 
political change. Combining my positions in regard to the presented debates, 
I thus define terrorism as: an act of severe violence against human beings 
(attempted or succeeded), functioning as a means of communication, 
committed by a sub-state group or individual, based on a political motive, 
aimed at instilling fear in the target society and triggering political change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
96 The other characteristics of terrorism that I have outlined so far were also given (political 
motive and non-state perpetrators). 
97 A further example for an attack on military forces that clearly resembles a terror attack rather 
than acts of guerilla warfare is delivered by an atrocity committed by the RAF in West 
Germany. The RAF’s bombings of US Army facilities in Heidelberg in May 1972 leaving three 
army members dead and wounding five, were clearly aimed at transmitting a message to the 
American and German governments and publics, instead of aiming at achieving territorial or 
military gains (as would be the case with guerilla attacks), therefore clearly resembling a terror 
attack.  
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Anti-Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Defining Two Often Confused 
Concepts 
When reviewing scholarly publications, as well as official documents, it 
becomes clear that no standard definition of ‘anti-terrorism’ and ‘counter-
terrorism’ exists. As I will analyze anti-terrorism policies of the UK, Germany 
and the EU regarding their effects on human rights, it is necessary to offer at 
least an operational definition of anti-terrorism for use in this thesis. This 
involves gaining an overview of the concrete measures that are described by 
scholars as potential parts of the terrorism policy toolbox. 
Now, when delving into the scholarly literature on reactions on 
terrorism with the aim to find a definition of anti-terrorism, one will 
undoubtedly soon discover a great confusion of terminology for terrorism 
policy in both academia and actual policy documents. In both official 
institutional and state documents, as well as the scholarly literature on 
terrorism policies, two different labels are used for policies trying to tackle the 
phenomenon of terrorism; that is ‘anti-terrorism’ and ‘counter-terrorism’. The 
confusion of terminology consists of the fact that some policymakers and 
authors label all terrorism policies for ‘counter-terrorism,’ whereas some label 
all policies ‘anti-terrorism’. Moreover, others use the terms as synonyms, 
whereas yet another group of scholars tries to differentiate between the two.98 
For instance, Andrew Silke, a major voice in the field, only uses the 
label ‘counter-terrorism’, when approaching states’ attempts to deal with 
terrorism. He uses this label both for highly repressive measures such as 
military interventions and for softer measures such as legislative acts and 
negotiations.99 In terms of policy actors, the EU represents an example of an 
institution exclusively using the term counter-terrorism in its official strategy 
to tackle terrorism.100 Few scholars exclusively use the label ‘anti-terrorism’ 
                                                          
98 Charles Townshend acknowledges this confusion in his work. See e.g., Charles Townshend, 
Terrorismus: eine kurze Einführung (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 2005), 156-157. Mylonaki 
and Burton point to a prevalent synonymous use of the two terms as well. Emmanouela 
Mylonaki and Tim Burton, “An Assessment of UK Anti-Terrorism Strategy and the Human 
Rights Implications Associated with its Implementation,” Journal on Terrorism and Security 
Analysis, Vol. 6 (2011). 
99 Silke, The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism, 3. Other scholars, who exclusively use the label 
counter-terrorism when referring to acts of states facing terrorism, are: Robert J. Art and Louise 
Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington D.C.: US 
Institute of Peace Press, 2007). English, Terrorism: How to Respond. Whittaker, Terrorism: 
Understanding the Global Threat. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism. Enders and Sandler, The 
Political Economy of Terrorism. Cornelia Beyer and Michael Bauer, “Introduction,” In 
Effectively Countering Terrorism, ed. by Beyer and Bauer (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 
2009), 1-3. Claudia Hillebrand, Counter-Terrorism Networks in the European Union: 
Maintaining Democratic Legitimacy after 9/11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 2-3.  
100 The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy. 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/ 
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for descriptions of responses to terrorism.101 Still, some examples can be 
found. For instance, Fernando Reinares called all efforts to tackle the problem 
of terrorism ‘anti-terrorism’ in a 1998 article on the subject.102 Anne Sørensen 
followed Reinares’ terminology in a 2007 publication and constitutes another 
example of a scholar exclusively using this term for all measures of terrorism 
policy.103 Sometimes policymakers or scholars treat the labels of anti-
terrorism and counter-terrorism synonymously. The British state is an 
example, as it’s legislation and strategy papers on measures tackling terrorism 
sometimes use the term ‘anti-terrorism’ and sometimes ‘counter-terrorism’ in 
the title. For instance, the UK saw the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act (ATCSA), as well as the 2006 UK Counter-terrorism strategy 
CONTEST. However, the ATCSA included measures similar to several of the 
categories introduced in CONTEST (e.g. prevent and protect measures such 
as data retention, the freezing of assets, detention regulations, etc.). Clearly, 
the labels were in between these documents used as synonyms. Finally, some 
authors do distinguish between anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism as labels. 
Examples of such authors are Brigitte Nacos and Gus Martin.104 
This confusion of labels creates an additional challenge when 
reviewing the literature on terrorism policies. In doing so, one needs to look 
beyond titles of publications and policy papers to find out if a certain scholar 
or paper refers to all possible actions on terrorism with a certain label or only 
some of them. Otherwise, one might misunderstand a scholarly account or 
policy paper. Furthermore, the different usages of the two labels demand this 
thesis to take a stand regarding this usage.  
Therein, this thesis will follow the last camp of defining and 
understanding anti- and counter-terrorism and will deliver a definition of the 
terms that establishes a differentiation of anti- and counter-terrorism. Without 
a working definition of both terms, this thesis would have to ignore the 
                                                          
101 This appears to be a consequence of the fact that the term counter-terrorism is more common 
in the English language, which is the dominant language of the literature. The picture looks 
different in other languages, e.g., in German (and thus German literature on the topic) the term 
anti-terrorism (‘Anti-Terrorismus’) is dominant, since no equivalent term exists in the German 
language for counter-terrorism (one could arguably point to the term ‘Terrorismusbekämpfung’ 
as an equivalent to counter-terrorism, however, there is no clear differentiation of measures in 
regard to these terms in the literature). In Danish terminology, one sometimes finds the usage 
of the word ‘kontraterrorisme’ (signifying counter-terrorism), however, the term 
‘antiterrorisme’ (anti-terrorism) is the dominantly used term. 
102 Fernando Reinares, “Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of 
Terrorism,” Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 44 No.3 (1998). 
103 Anne Sørensen, ”I krig mod ‘statfjende nr. 1’ – vesttysk terrorbekæmpelse I 1970’erne,” In 
Antiterrorismens idehistorie – stater og vold i 500 år, ed. by Mikkel Thorup and Morten 
Brænder (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2007), 169. 
104 Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues (Thousand 
Oakes: Sage Publications, 2013). Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central 
Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2002). 
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confusing situation regarding the labels in the literature and only speak of 
terrorism policy, although a qualitative difference between the two categories 
exists. Furthermore, by having two specific terms at disposal for different 
kinds of terrorism policies it becomes possible to be more specific in pointing 
out which kind of policies have an effect on the overall level of rights in the 
three cases. Although the stance to aim for differentiating between both terms 
reflects a minority position in the field, it makes good sense according to the 
above argumentation, and furthermore, reflects an innovative approach. 
Unsurprisingly, one finds disagreement inside of the camp of those 
trying to distinguish between anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. This is 
especially valid regarding the question of which measures are to be connected 
to counter-terrorism and which to anti-terrorism. Some measures, which some 
authors count in under counter-terrorism, are interpreted as anti-terrorism by 
others. For instance, whereas Gus Martin identifies policies that are supposed 
to deter terrorists as anti-terrorism, Brigitte Nacos evaluates such measures as 
counter-terrorist (taken for granted that such measures are of “offensive” 
character).105  It is in the course of finding a definition for this thesis thus 
necessary to gain an overview of the typical individual measures that different 
scholars point to as potential tools for anti- or counter-terrorism. Without an 
understanding of the content of terrorism policies, the mentioned decision on 
terminology would not be possible.  
Thus, a list of the typical measures of the wider toolbox of both anti-
terrorism and counter-terrorism, based on elaborations by scholars such as 
Paul Wilkinson, Robert Art and Louise Richardson, Andrew Silke, Gus 
Martin and Andreas Bock as well as police practitioners such as Barrie 
Sheldon, could look like the following: the usage of specifically trained police 
or military units to directly tackle terrorists (e.g. via commando actions), 
military intervention in areas controlled by terrorist groups or countries 
harboring terrorists, forceful campaigns of repression of terrorist groups, 
violent (sometimes lethal) retaliatory or pre-emptive strikes against terrorists 
or terror suspects (e.g., via drone-strikes), the surveillance of terrorists and 
terror suspects via intelligence measures, enhanced cybersecurity, the 
extension of police and intelligence powers, the introduction of various legal 
measures (up to the adoption of emergency powers), the increase of security 
measures around potential targets (e.g. airports or tourist areas), the 
introduction of more severe penalties for alleged deterrence purposes, the 
prevention of funding of terrorism, the introduction of tougher detention 
regimes (e.g. detention without trial), the curbing of extremist online 
propaganda, the initiation of negotiations with terror groups, the distribution 
of non-extremist counter-narratives (to win the “hearts and minds”), simple 
discursive reassurances of the public by political elites, the implementation of 
social reforms aiming at tackling root causes such as economic deprivation 
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and discrimination, as well as the general tackling of underlying grievances.106 
Many of these measures can be carried out by states in cooperation with other 
states or international institutions such as the UN or EU. Whereas this list 
resembles measures that are mentioned regularly in the literature, it is only 
one list of typical potential measures to tackle terrorism. Other lists might 
contain other measures and I could have included further measures, less often 
mentioned in the literature (e.g. intensified control regimes concerning 
firearms or the establishment of crisis management strategies).  No list of 
terrorism policies will ever be exhaustive since new measures are continually 
developed as terror threats change.107 
Yet, the major point here (and the mentioned scholars point to this as 
well) is that terrorism policies of states consist of very different tools and 
measures. They reflect a variety of potential measures consisting of political, 
legislative, judicial and more straightforward security measures, such as 
military or intelligence action.108 Some measures are highly repressive; others 
aim at tackling root causes and the elevation of resilience (e.g., by target 
hardening). Indeed, both the EU and the UK have developed broad general 
strategies to tackle terrorism, including many of the mentioned approaches 
outlined above. For instance, the EU implemented in 2005 its Counter-
Terrorism Strategy resting on the four pillars of prevention, protection, 
pursuing and responding. The British CONTEST strategy rests on similar 
pillars, called prevent, protect, pursue and prepare (I will provide more details 
on these strategies later on).109 
Now, in terms of finding a working definition of anti-terrorism and 
counter-terrorism, Barrie Sheldon and Gus Martin introduce some helpful 
differentiators in their accounts of terrorism policies. Sheldon, e.g., 
distinguishes between measures requiring the use of force and measures that 
do not require force. He mentions suppression campaigns, pre-emptive strikes, 
                                                          
106 Silke, “The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism: Critical Issues and Challenges,” 3. Barrie 
Sheldon, “Countering the terrorist threat,” In Policing Terrorism, ed. by Christopher Blake et 
al. (London: SAGE, 2012), 69-82. Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 432-462. Paul Wilkinson, 
Terrorism versus Democracy: The liberal state response. 3rd ed. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2011). Sørensen, ”I krig mod ‘statfjende nr. 1’,” 169. Art and Richardson, 
Democracy and Counterterrorism, 16-17. Bock, Terrorismus. 
107 I further refrained from including torture as a potential terrorism policy, although it is 
suggested as such by a minority of scholars, e.g. Alan Dershowitz claims that torture potentially 
can reveal or solve imminent terrorist threats. Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
108 Art and Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism, 16-17. 
109 States’ terrorism policies are not only diverse, but often include self-contradictious traits and 
might even counter-act each other. For instance, a state might run a campaign to prevent 
radicalization, but might at the same time implement discriminating measures. This can 
potentially undermine de-radicalization processes by creating an elevated impression of 
discrimination amongst a certain minority. In other words, different terrorism policies are not 
always compatible. However, the usage of clashing approaches is a widespread phenomenon 
as will be seen later. 
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punitive strikes, and covert operations, as measures requiring force and 
intelligence, diplomacy, social reform, concessionary options, economic 
sanctions and enhanced security (e.g. at airports) as measures not requiring 
the use of force.110 Martin describes counter-terrorism as “proactive policies 
that specifically seek to eliminate terrorist environments and groups,” and 
anti-terrorism as “defensive measures seeking to deter or prevent terrorist 
attacks.”111 The American Department of Defense claims likewise that anti-
terrorism resembles rather “defensive measures”, whereas counter-terrorism 
rather signifies activities that are aiming at neutralizing terrorists.112 I will use 
these variables of forceful versus non-forceful and offensive versus defensive 
actions in order to find a differentiating definition of anti-terrorism and 
counter-terrorism.  
Moving towards my own definition of anti-terrorism and counter-
terrorism, I maintain that counter-terrorism measures are simply more 
aggressive, violent and offensive and thus of a different character as anti-
terrorism measures. Therefore, a distinction in different categories of 
terrorism policies makes sense and provides for a more refined terminological 
toolbox, preventing misinterpretations and misunderstandings based on 
confusing labels. Thus, my working definition of anti-terrorism and counter-
terrorism looks as follows: counter-terrorist measures are measures that are 
highly offensive and aggressive; they include the use of force and aim at 
directly eliminating terrorist environments or terrorists themselves. This is 
valid whether this is carried out in ‘the homeland’ or abroad (although most 
Western counter-terrorism measures are currently carried out abroad).113 In 
contrast, anti-terrorism measures are defensive, less-aggressive measures, 
(largely) not including force, aiming at prevention, protection, deterrence, and 
resilience. Whereas counter-terrorism measures often hit a potentially small 
                                                          
110 Barrie Sheldon, Policing Terrorism, ed. by Christopher Blake et al. (London: SAGE, 2012), 
68. 
111 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 431. Martin constructs the following four categories of 
approaches facing terrorism: military and paramilitary repressive options, nonmilitary 
repressive options, conciliatory options and legalistic options. Military and paramilitary 
repressive options include suppression campaigns, punitive or preemptive strikes or covert 
operations by special-forces. Nonmilitary repressive options include cyberwar, intelligence, 
enhanced security of potential targets and economic sanctions. Conciliatory options include 
diplomacy, referring to negotiations with terrorists. Other conciliatory options are incident 
specific concessions and social reforms. Finally, legalistic options include law enforcement 
actions, in other words terrorism responses in the criminal justice system. Martin, 
Understanding Terrorism, 432-462. Nacos constructs a differentiation between offensive and 
defensive terrorism policies as well, however, her understanding does not directly accord with 
Martin’s, when she defines anti-terrorism as defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability 
to terrorist acts and counter-terrorism as “offensive action to prevent, deter, and respond to 
terrorist acts.” Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism, 138. 
112 US Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf 
113 For instance, in terms of military action, as recently seen in Afghanistan, Syria or Mali. 
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amount of people (at least inside of Western states), vast amounts of people 
are prone to the effects of many anti-terrorism measures. Counter-terrorism 
and anti-terrorism are here understood as actions of state organs or institutions 
built on state organs (e.g., the EU). Security measures by sub-state actors fall 
outside of this definition.114 My differentiation should not lead to the 
conclusion that anti-terrorism measures are exclusively ‘good’ or legitimate 
measures. Many defensive measures conflict with a range of human rights, as 
is argued in this thesis.115  
Having established a definition of anti-terrorism and counter-
terrorism, the question persists, as to which of the concrete measures listed 
can be placed under which category. Some measures with which authorities 
try to tackle terrorism are rather easily connected to one of the categories. The 
following are examples of measures falling in the category of counter-
terrorism: military interventions and suppression campaigns (e.g. in the style 
of Operation Enduring Freedom), retaliatory attacks on state-sponsors of 
terrorists, targeted killings of terrorists or terror suspects by either pre-emptive 
or punitive strikes (e.g. by drone strikes), and kidnapping of terror suspects, 
as e.g. carried out under the ‘extraordinary rendition’ program run by the 
CIA.116 Commando actions, e.g., covert operations by special forces would 
fall under counter-terrorism as well. 
A large range of other measures will be collected under the category 
of anti-terrorism in this study. The collection of intelligence (on terrorists or 
suspects), online or not, is a first such measure. Based on such intelligence or 
other sources of information, the construction of databases, aiming at filtering 
out potential terror threats, constitutes another anti-terrorism measure.117 
Furthermore, all legal measures and their enforcement are here defined as anti-
terrorism (from the introduction of more severe penalties, over the extension 
of police and intelligence powers, up to the adoption of emergency powers). 
All efforts to enhance the protection of potential targets (public areas, tourist 
spots, transport facilities, etc.) constitute anti-terrorism as well. The same is 
                                                          
114 Non-state counter- or anti-terrorism measures are not inconceivable. They are for instance 
carried out by so-called ‘gated-communities’ in Latin America. Thorup and Brænder, “Staten 
og dens Udfordrere,” 20. 
115 My definition of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism thus comes closer to Martin’s 
differentiation of the two labels, than Nacos’, however it is not fully in accord with Martin’s 
understanding either. 
116 Andrew Tyrie, Roger Gough and Stuart McCracken, Account Rendered: Extraordinary 
Rendition and Britain’s Role (London: Biteback Publishing, 2011). Claudia Hillebrand, The 
CIA’s extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme: European reactions and the 
challenges of future international intelligence cooperation (The Hague: Netherlands Institute 
of International Relations Clingendael, 2009). Rebecca Cordell, “Measuring extraordinary 
rendition and international cooperation,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 20 No. 2 
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117 For instance, the German Anti-Terrorism File (Antiterrorismusdatei) or the application of 
dragnet investigations. 
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valid for efforts to establish enhanced cybersecurity, e.g., enhanced security 
efforts in digital control or banking systems. The curbing of extremist internet 
content is here interpreted as anti-terrorism as well. Furthermore, efforts to 
undermine the funding of terrorism, for instance, the freezing of assets of 
terror groups or suspects, belong under anti-terrorism; this also goes for 
negotiations with or offering concessions to perpetrators of terrorism. Policies 
aiming at tackling the root causes of terrorism or undermining incentives for 
terrorism are likewise included under anti-terrorism. This encompasses, for 
instance, de-radicalization programs or social reform programs in order to 
tackle economic deprivation or discrimination. Symbol politics (e.g. the 
installment of cameras to prevent terrorism) or acts of discursive reassurance 
appear to fit into under the label of anti-terrorism too. Some law enforcement 
actions might not always be seen as defensive measures and might, therefore, 
be hard to identify as anti-terrorism at first. Examples of such measures are 
enhanced stop-and-search practices by domestic security authorities, the 
arrest, and detention of suspects under the law, or interrogation of suspects. 
All these could arguably be interpreted as rather offensive measures aiming at 
directly stopping terrorists and thus be categorized as counter-terrorism. 
However, such measures appear considerably less violent and aggressive as 
those measures listed under counter-terrorism. Moreover, they own a 
protective character and are included in the criminal justice system. Therefore, 
these measures will here be categorized as anti-terrorism measures as well.118 
Thus, anti-terrorism in the definition of my project confines all 
terrorism policies and actions besides the counter-terrorism measures of 
military intervention, suppression campaigns, retaliatory or pre-emptive 
violent strikes (including targeted killings), kidnappings of suspects or 
commando actions. Domestic police work and intelligence work are included 
under anti-terrorism, so is all legal action as well as various preventive 
measures. To that extent, my definition of anti-terrorism is rather broad, 
whereas counter-terrorism is defined in a rather narrow manner. However, 
such a broad and narrow definition fits nicely with the delimitations chosen 
regarding the analytical focus of my thesis, which is a geographical 
delimitation on the domestic or European arena, and delimitation on 
widespread (or severe) measures. Indeed, most terrorism policies that are 
                                                          
118 It is, however, important to remember, that certain rather defensive anti-terrorism measures 
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carried out inside of the three entities that are up for analysis rather resemble 
anti-terrorism than counter-terrorism policies. Most European counter-
terrorism measures have been carried out abroad.119 In the face of the 
confusion around the labels, all terrorism policies of the three entities that will 
be analyzed in this thesis have been evaluated regarding their compatibility 
with my definition of anti-terrorism. Therefore when policy documents, 
strategy papers, and academic sources use the label ‘counter-terrorism’, they 
might still be taken into regard and cannot be disregarded offhand simply 
based on the label used. 
It is important to note, that whereas scholars have tried to produce 
definitions of the term anti-terrorism, states, IO’s or federations of states do 
normally not deliver fixed definitions of the term (other as in case of 
terrorism). Rather, they adopt anti-terrorism strategies. In other words, 
authorities do often not own fixed definitions of anti-terrorism, but rather 
normative strategies of what anti-terrorism should be in terms of concrete 
measures. These strategies are mostly under constant revision, as anti-
terrorism (also from the perspective of authorities) forms a fluent, ever-
changing concept. This change is contingent on several variables, e.g. the 
perception of what terrorism is, which kind of terrorism constitutes the biggest 
threat (for instance in terms of ideological background or transnational vs. 
domestic terrorism), and how big this threat is. The lack of a fixed definition 
additionally allows states more room for maneuver. Thus, the three actors at 
the center of this thesis do not possess such fixed definitions either but act 
based on changing anti-terrorism strategies (I will elucidate these strategies 
when I will present the recent anti-terrorism context of these policy actors). 
Before moving to the empirical analysis of this thesis in the next 
chapter, I would like to (shortly) elucidate another confusion regarding the 
label anti-terrorism, which becomes apparent when reflecting on some of the 
measures that are presented to the public as terrorism policies. This is 
confusion between ‘real’ and ‘false’ or ‘side-effect’ anti-terrorism policies. A 
clarification of this issue will contribute to a better understanding of the term 
anti-terrorism and its at times misplaced usage in the public discourse. At 
times, states or other political institutions adopt policies supposedly due to 
                                                          
119 Whereas both of my two country cases have in the last two decades directly been involved 
in counter-terrorism policies carried out abroad, no large-scale counter-terrorism measures are 
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terrorism policies are therefore not per se irrelevant for this study, far from it. Relevant and 
widespread counter-terrorism policies that jeopardize the maintenance of a high rights level 
would thus have to be integrated into this study as well. Still, most terrorism policies that are 
carried out inside of the EU, including Germany and the UK, are anti-terrorism measures 
(compare e.g. the spread of online surveillance vs. the usage of special forces).  
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terrorism concerns; however, they rather satisfy other political objectives. It 
might be easier to push through a certain policy if it is labeled as a terrorism 
policy instead of something else, especially during a time shaped by a high 
threat perception.120 Thus, politicians might choose to sell a certain policy as 
an efficient or necessary anti-terrorism measure to the public, whereas the 
policy might be established in order to achieve other objectives and have no 
of anti-terrorism effects at all. This would constitute an instance of ‘false’ anti-
terrorism. Other policies might be established with the main objective outside 
of the field of anti-terrorism, but have a (minor) anti-terrorism effect 
anyway.121 Such policies often constitute a hybrid, e.g. between immigration 
and anti-terrorism or criminal justice legislation and anti-terrorism. However, 
as the major focus does not lie on anti-terrorism, such instances can be 
described as side-effect anti-terrorism. Thus, amongst the multitude of 
policies that are described as anti-terrorism policies in public discourse, one 
might find policies that rather resemble ‘false’ or ‘side-effect’ anti-terrorism 
policies and one will have to differentiate these policies from (the described) 
‘real’ anti-terrorism. These false or side-effect anti-terrorism policies are 
clearly problematic. They provide for a false picture as to the nature of the 
specific policies that are sold to the public in the name of anti-terrorism. 
Thereby, active processes of holding authorities’ for their policymaking are 
impeded and such processes thereby constitute tendencies that are threatening 
the quality of democratic control and democracy as such.  
Some examples of such false or side-effect anti-terrorism policies will 
clarify my point. The EU (in 2004) implemented the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW) by emphasizing its relevance in terms of anti-terrorism. However, it 
has mostly been used for covering ‘regular’ inter-state crime (only six hundred 
of the 130.000 issued warrants were connected to terror suspects).122 Another 
example of such a side effect anti-terrorism policy is the re-institutionalization 
                                                          
120 Lachmayer and Witzleb argue that the usage of an “anti-terrorism narrative” can make policy 
proposals “politically immune.” Konrad Lachmayer and Normann Witzleb, “The Challenge to 
Privacy from Ever Increasing State Surveillance: A Comparative Perspective,” University of 
New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 37 No. 2 (2014): 775. 
121 Richard Jackson et al., Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 235. TTSR (Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law) 
Research Project. Mapping Counterterrorism: A categorization of policies and the promise of 
empirically-based, systematic comparisons (2008), 12. https://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/. 
122 Jan Wouters and Frederik Naert, “Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extradition 
Deals: An Appraisal of the EU’s Main Criminal Law Measures against Terrorism after ‘11 
September’", Institute for International Law Working Paper No. 56 (2004). 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/working-papers/WP56e.pdf 
Wolfgang Kaleck, Der Europäische Haftbefehl – ein problematisches Instrument.“ Zeit 
Online, October 30, 2014. Europa.eu, “European Arrest Warrant.” https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_european_arrest_warrant-90-en.do, Europol, European Union 
Terrorism and Trend Report 2017 https://www.europol.europa.eu/tesat/2017/trends.html 
Europol, European Union Terrorism and Trend Report 2010 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/.../tesat2010.pdf 
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of EU-internal border controls. The EU and some member states justified this 
measure by pointing to terror threats, using the argument that current terrorism 
often involves interstate travel.123 However, the amount of terrorists 
originating from other member states or third states has been rather small in 
recent years and the border controls had as its biggest effect (and major 
intention) a reduction of the influx of refugees, as well as stopping crime, and 
not terrorism. Another example would be the many uses of surveillance 
measures (justified by terror threats) that saw its biggest effect on pursuing 
regular crime.124 
Symbolic anti-terrorism policies constitute another kind of false or 
side effect anti-terrorism. Symbolic policies (or measures) are here understood 
as anti-terrorism issues which foremost aim at reassuring the public or to 
portray activity and decisiveness of the policymakers (to show that ‘something 
is being done’), without the measure having any considerable effect on 
reducing or pursuing the terror threat. Symbolic acts are not confined to 
speeches but can encompass legislation or practical anti-terrorism measures 
as well. Wilkinson supports this point when he holds that even emergency 
powers are at times only adopted in order to deliver on the public revulsion 
terrorism triggers and on the psychological demand of seeing politics act 
against it.125 The installation of additional cameras in public areas is arguably 
another example of such symbolic anti-terrorism, based on its lacking 
efficiency in preventing attacks or diminishing their extent.126 Although some 
alleged anti-terrorism policies merely include anti-terrorism as a side effect 
(e.g. video surveillance), some remain relevant when analyzing terrorism 
policies from a human rights perspective. 
                                                          
123 For instance, the European Council lists intensified controls of the EU’s external borders as 
a measure to protect its citizens from terrorism on its own website. European Council, “EU 
fight against terrorism.” http://www.consilium.europa.eu/da/policies/fight-against-terrorism/. 
The then Danish Minister for Integration argued for the prolonging of EU internal border 
controls based on an alleged high terror threat in October 2017. Jyllands-Posten, “Støjberg 
begrunder forlænget grænsekontrol med terrortrussel,” October 11, 2017.  https://jyllands-
posten.dk/politik/ECE9942969/stoejberg-begrunder-forlaenget-graensekontrol-med-
terrortrussel/. France established controls after the Islamist terror attacks in Paris in November 
2015. Euractive.com, “France to extend internal EU border checks,” April 5, 2018. 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/france-to-extend-internal-eu-
border-checks/ 
124 Donohue pointed out that surveillance measures have often been used for other purposes, 
e.g. pursuing regular crime. Laura Donohue, “International Cooperation & Intelligence 
Sharing,” Presentation, The Future of Terrorism: Georgetown & St. Andrews University 
Conference, Washington, April 28-29, 2016. 
125 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 93. TTSR Research Project. Mapping 
Counterterrorism 12. https://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/. 
126 Allowedly, in rare cases the installation of cameras might help in pursuing terrorists that are 
still on the run, however, the overall main purpose of the installment is to deliver a symbolic 
act after an attack, as well as reassuring the public. Therefore, additional video surveillance is 
(at most) a side effect anti-terrorism policy as well. 
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Chapter III 
Germany as an Anti-Terrorism Actor 
In this chapter, I will shed light on the German case of anti-terrorism policies 
following 9/11. The first section focuses on the most important terrorist 
events and perceptions of terrorism in Germany since 9/11. The context I 
create in this first section will help in understanding the initializing of rights-
endangering terrorism policies. As it will become clear, the attacks of 9/11, 
as well as other terror attacks abroad and in Germany itself, raised awareness 
of terrorism as a threat and political problem. These attacks moreover 
delivered the political impetus for a widely increased policy activity 
regarding terrorism. Furthermore, the context section will provide some of 
the necessary background information for evaluating derogation and 
limitation conditions of human rights norms, since it will deliver some clues 
on the threat level that Germany has faced since 2001, and will thereby help 
in evaluating the proportionality of anti-terrorism measures. The second 
section will analyze some of the most important anti-terrorism policies that 
German authorities launched in the aftermath of 9/11. I will scrutinize these 
policies regarding their compatibility with the human rights framework 
defined earlier in this thesis. Thus, this second section will focus on the 
following German anti-terrorism laws and policies: the German Security 
Packages, dragnet investigations, the German Air Security Law, German 
data retention, the BKA law, surveillance practices of German intelligence, 
facial recognition system, and preventive detention. 
 
German Reactions to 9/11 and Post 9/11 Terrorism  
The attacks of 9/11 changed the perspective on terrorism in Germany. 
Suddenly terrorism was not only back on the political agenda and back in the 
collective awareness, but terrorism also posed a threat again.1 Although 
terrorism had been a prominent issue in West-Germany during the 1970s and 
1980s, it did not feature high on the political agenda of the country since the 
end of RAF activity at the beginning of the 1990s.2 This changed with 9/11. 
                                                          
1 Dorle Hellmuth, Counterterrorism and the State: Western Responses to 9/11 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 89. 
2 The RAF, initially known as Baader-Meinhof Group, was active between the late 1960s and 
the early 1990s. It was founded by Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof and Jan-
Carl Raspe who also constituted the leadership of the first RAF generation. A second and third 
generation held the group alive and carried on with violent attacks until 1993. The RAF 
justified its violence “as reactive violence to capitalism and especially American imperialism 
and its collaborators in the German government.” Wolfgang Heinz, “Germany: State 
Responses to Terrorist Challenges and Human Rights,” in National Insecurity and Human 
Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). The RAF additionally saw itself as ‘agents 
of the Third World’; references to conflicts in developing countries were numerous. 
Especially the war in Vietnam played a big role for the group’s motivation. Walter Laqueur, 
Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 207. The group furthermore aligned itself with Mao 
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It added to the public jolt in Germany, that four of the nineteen terrorists of 
the 9/11 attacks were members of an al-Qaeda cell situated in Hamburg.3 
                                                          
Tse-Tung’s manifestos and Marxist-Leninist ideology. See, RAF, Konzept Stadtguerilla. 
Terror attacks of the RAF included bombings of American military bases and the killings of 
prominent public figures that were interpreted to be agents of the ‘oppressing’ or ‘capitalist-
imperialist system.’ Between 1970 and 1977, the organization was responsible for forty-seven 
deaths (including seventeen dead RAF members). This number grew to slightly over seventy 
until the end of the operative phase of the organization in 1993. The German state authorities 
reacted by adopting new anti-terrorism laws and sharpening judicial and police measures e.g. 
by implementing road blocks and identity checks at the peak of RAF terrorism in the fall of 
1977, as well as dragnet investigations). Stefan Aust, Der Baader Meinhof Komplex 
(Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1997), 658-659. In sum, RAF terrorism initialized 
German terrorism policymaking after WWII like no other terror campaign. Additional 
German left wing groups that committed or were involved in terrorist attacks were the 
Revolutionary Cells and the June 2 Movement. Laqueur, Terrorism, 206. Bernhard Blumenau, 
“The United Nations and West Germany’s efforts against international terrorism in the 
1970s,” In An International History of Terrorism: Western and non-Western experiences, ed. 
by Jussi Hanhimäki and Bernhard Blumenau (London, New York: Routledge, 2013), 67. 
Anne Sørensen, ”I krig mod ‘statfjende nr. 1’ – vesttysk terrorbekæmpelse I 1970’erne,” In 
Antiterrorismens idehistorie – stater og vold i 500 år, ed. by Mikkel Thorup and Morten 
Brænder (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2007), 170. Heinz, “Germany,” 210. 
Besides the foundation and activity of the RAF, it was the attack on the Israeli team during 
the 1972 Olympics in Munich that pushed terrorism to the top of German public 
consciousness. In the early morning of September 5, 1972, a group of Palestinians, calling 
themselves ‘Black September’ entered the Israeli dormitory, killed two members of the Israeli 
team, and took nine more athletes as hostages. These hostages were tragically killed as West 
German security forces tried to overpower the Palestinians at an airport close to Munich (five 
terrorists and a police officer were killed as well during this failed operation). Richard English, 
Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 114. Another 
prominent incident of terrorism in Germany before 9/11 was the bombing of the Oktoberfest 
in Munich in 1980, killing thirteen and injuring around two-hundred, committed by a right-
wing extremist (and at least supported by others). However, although this attack raised 
considerable attention in media and public, it did not trigger the same kind of reaction from 
the side of state authorities or the public as the longstanding RAF campaign. Other than RAF 
terrorism, the bombing of the Oktoberfest was quickly deleted from public consciousness. 
Terrorism was in the aftermath not connected to right-wing extremism, the attack was rather 
seen as an isolated case. Ulrich Chaussy, Oktoberfest. Das Attentat: Wie die Verdrängung des 
Rechtsterrors begann (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2014).  
Although Islamist terrorism is the strand of terrorism currently leaving the biggest trace in the 
consciousness of citizens and politicians, it constitutes only a small share of terrorism in post-
WW-II Germany. The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base counted 486 terrorist incidents in 
Germany between 1968 and 2005, leading to ninety-nine fatalities. The fewest of these attacks 
were motivated by religion or Islamist ideologies. Cited in Edwin Bakker, “Differences in 
Terrorist Threat Perceptions in Europe,” In International Terrorism: A European Response to 
a Global Threat, ed. by Jörg Monar and Dieter Mahncke (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2006), 50. 
3 Mohammad Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan el Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah. Later, it became 
clear that the Hamburg cell was not the only Al-Qaeda cell in Germany at the time, a logistic 
and financial base had been established near Frankfurt. Adrian Hyde-Price, ”Germany: 
Redefining its security role,“ In Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and 
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Three of the four 9/11 pilots had studied in Hamburg and were radicalized in 
Germany.4 A rally aiming to show solidarity with the US in Berlin on 
September 14, 2001 collected around two-hundred-thousand people.5 In the 
aftermath of 9/11, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder emphasized the feelings of 
shock and consternation that the attacks had triggered. He spoke of the 
attacks as a “declaration of war on the civilized world as a whole”.6 Schröder 
hastened to secure the US Germany’s “unconditional solidarity”.7 
Germany’s government lived up to this promise in connection with the 
invasion of Afghanistan, although opposition amongst the government 
parties existed and a majority of the German population disapproved of 
German involvement in the war.8 Whereas counter-terrorist actions carried 
out on another continent was not a complete novelty in German terrorism 
policy, (e.g., taking in regard the German usage of a GSG 9 unit in order to 
free hostages in a Lufthansa airplane on the Mogadishu airport in 1977) 
supporting an invasion of a country hosting terrorists and subsequently 
occupying and restructuring such a country, was clearly a novelty and 
inconceivable in 1970s counter-terrorism policy.9 The expression that 
‘Germany’s security is defended at the Hindu Kush’ became a dictum.10 
However, Germany’s solidarity with the US rapidly faded with Bush’s 
intention to invade Iraq. As a result, the German government not only 
decisively denied joining the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ for the Iraq 
War in 2003, but also openly criticized the US for its detention practices at 
Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib. 
In general, the collective awareness of terrorism and specifically 
Islamist terrorism increased in Germany in the first decade of the twenty-
                                                          
Beyond, ed. by Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
4 Ulrich Schneckener, “Germany,” In Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of 
Six Nations, ed. by Yonah Alexander (Washington: Potomac Books, 2006), 72. Although the 
attacks were an enormous shock to almost all Germans, voices welcoming the attacks could 
also be found. Horst Mahler, a former pillar of the RAF, who later turned to the extreme right, 
is an example. However, such voices constituted only a small minority. Walter Laqueur, 
“What to Read (and not to Read) about Terrorism,” Partisan Review, 2002. 
5 Peter Katzenstein, “Same War—Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism,” 
International Organization, Vol. 57 No. 4 (2003): 748. 
6 Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, 186. Sitzung vom 12.09.2001, Stenographischer 
Bericht (Plenarprotokoll 14/186). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Katzenstein, “Same War—Different Views,” 748. 
One might further note that Germany was (in the widest sense) involved in the US’ 
extraordinary rendition scheme by providing access to Frankfurt Airport for a range of 
rendition flights. The Rendition Project, “Flight Database,” 
https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/flights/renditions/index.html 
9 Aust, Der Baader Meinhof Komplex. Schneckener, “Germany”. 
10 The claim was voiced first by Peter Struck, German Defense Minister at the time. Der 
Spiegel, “Struck verteidigt Reform: "Bundeswehr ist die größte Friedensbewegung 
Deutschlands"“, March 11, 2004. 
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first century due to big terror attacks such as the ones in Djerba 2002, Madrid 
2004 and London 2005. Although the bombing in Djerba was smaller in 
magnitude, it had a shocking effect on the German public, since fourteen of 
the nineteen victims of the bomb attack in the synagogue on the Tunisian 
island Djerba were German tourists. Awareness of terrorism was additionally 
nourished by several failed attempts of Islamist terrorism in Germany. 
Examples are here a failed attempt of bombing a couple of trains in 2006 and 
the 2007 arrest of the Sauerland Group, a group of Islamist extremist who 
planned terror attacks on American facilities in Germany.11 Another failed 
attack occurred in Bonn in 2012. A bomb was placed in the main railroad 
station, by an Islamist group, but did not go off.12 
Consequentially, a range of polls conducted over a number of years 
found that the German population regarded terrorism as a relevant threat. A 
poll by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, conducted in 2003, showed that 
sixty-nine percent of the population identified ‘international terrorism’ as a 
security threat.13 A 2007 poll showed that seventy-nine percent of the 
population feared terror attacks in Germany.14 Research by the European 
Values Survey in 2008 confirmed these numbers, finding that seventy-nine 
percent of Germans feared a terror attack ‘somewhere in Europe’ in the 
course of twelve months.15 Clearly, the evaluation of terrorism as a highly 
relevant security threat evolved since 9/11. 
After a few more ‘calm’ years in terms of Islamist terrorism in 
Europe (roughly during the last years of the 00 decade and the first years of 
the 2010s), Islamist terrorism in Europe saw an increase in effect and victims 
with a series of attacks carried out by or in the name of the so-called Islamic 
State. Examples are the attack on staff of the French Charlie Hebdo 
                                                          
11 Guido Steinberg, German Jihad: On the Internationalization of Islamist Terrorism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2013). Ilija Trojanow and Juli Zeh, Angriff auf die Freiheit: 
Sicherheitswahn, Überwachungsstaat und der Abbau bürgerlicher Rechte (München: Carl 
Hanser Verlag, 2009), 156. Peter Schaar, Das Ende der Privatsphäre: (München: Goldmann, 
2009), 63. German authorities had already arrested a cell of Al-Qaeda situated in Frankfurt 
who had developed plans to explode a bomb at the Strasbourg Christmas Market in December 
2000. Schneckener, “Germany.” Stefan Malthaner and Peter Waldmann, “Terrorism in 
Germany: Old and New Problems,” In Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat 
Perceptions and Policies, ed. by Marianne van Leeuwen (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), 115. 
12 Reuters, ”German Islamist charged over failed Bonn station attack in 2012,“ March 14, 
2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-islamist-idUSBREA2D1BA20140314 
13 Alexander Siedschlag, “Germany: from a reluctant power to a constructive power?” In 
Global Security Governance: Competing perceptions of security in the 21st century, ed. by 
Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (London: Routledge, 2007), 51. 
14 Der Tagesspiegel, “Terrorangst erreicht neuen Höchststand,“ July 6, 2007. 
https://www.tagesspiegel.de/umfrage-terrorangst-erreicht-neuen-hoechststand/979760.html 
15 Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldova, “Perception of Terrorism and Security and the Role 
of Media,” Paper prepared for the 7th ECPR General Conference (2013): 10. 
127 
 
magazine, in January 2015, a new, bigger series of attacks in Paris in 
November 2015, killing more than 130, an attack on a group of German 
travelers in Istanbul in January 2016, killing eight, an attack on a subway 
station and the airport in Brussels in March 2016, killing thirty and injuring 
nearly three hundred, and a truck attack in Nice in July 2016 killing eighty-
four. In the spring of 2017 Islamist attackers struck three times in the UK, in 
March a car drove into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge in London (killing 
five and injuring around fifty), in May a bombing of a concert in Manchester 
killed twenty-two people, and in June a group of attackers killed seven 
people on London Bridge via driving into pedestrians and subsequently 
stabbing passersby.16 In the summer of 2017, a series of Islamist attacks 
shook Spain, when a group of attackers killed in total sixteen people and 
injured more than 120 by driving vehicles into pedestrians in Barcelona and 
Cambrils.17 Although these attacks took place outside of Germany, they 
stirred awareness towards terrorism among the country’s population and 
policymakers. They thus contributed to an increasing demand or policy 
pressure for implementing additional measures to tackle the threat of 
terrorism in general and especially Islamist terrorism.   
In 2016 and 2017, several cases of Islamist terrorism played out in 
Germany itself. Until then, the only Islamist terrorist attack that led to 
casualties in Germany in that century was an attack on American soldiers at 
Frankfurt Airport in March 2011, when a German citizen of Kosovo-
Albanian descent shot four American soldiers, killing two of them.18 Now, 
in April 2016 three German-born teenagers committed a bomb attack on a 
Sikh temple in the city of Essen (with homemade explosives). Three people 
were injured in the attack. The motives were a mixture of Islamist 
                                                          
16 Zeit Online, “Drei Tage Terror in Paris,“ January 15, 2015. 
http://www.zeit.de/feature/attentat-charlie-hebdo-rekonstruktion. Zeit Online, “Paris - Was 
wir über die Anschläge wissen,“ November 14, 2015. 
http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2015-11/paris-ueberblick-anschlaege. Zeit 
Online, “Anschlag in Istanbul: Acht Deutsche in Istanbul getötet,“ January 12, 2016. 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-01/istanbul-explosion-sultan-ahmet-moschee-
tuerkei. Thomas Lauritzen, “Bruxelles mellem afmagt og trods,” Politiken, March 24, 2016. 
Katharina Peters, ” Nizza-Attentäter: Vor dem Lkw-Anschlag machte er ein Selfie,” Spiegel 
Online, July 18, 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/nizza-anschlag-was-wir-ueber-
den-attentaeter-wissen-a-1103507.html. BBC, ”Westminster attack: What happened,” April 
7, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-39355108. The Guardian, ”Manchester attack: UK 
threat level reduced from critical to severe – as it happened,” September 21, 2017 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2017/may/26/manchester-attack-arrest-police-
search-accomplices-live. Caroline Davies, ”London Bridge attack: last of eight victims 
identified as Xavier Thomas,” The Guardian, June 7, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/jun/07/london-bridge-attack-last-of-eight-victims-identified-as-xavier-thomas 
17 Stephen Burgen, “Spanish attacks death toll rises to 16 after woman dies in hospital,” The 
Guardian, August 27, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/27/death-toll-
spain-terror-attacks-rises-barcelona 
18 Steinberg, German Jihad, 4. 
128 
 
convictions and ethnic nationalism (perceptions of mistreatment of Muslims 
by Sikhs in Northern India).19 Whereas this incident did not receive much 
public attention, an attack by a young asylum seeker from Afghanistan raised 
considerable media focus in July 2016. The refugee attacked travelers on a 
train near Würzburg, causing several heavy injuries. Only a few days later 
an asylum seeker from Syria detonated a bomb at a music festival in the 
provincial town Ansbach in Bavaria, killing himself and injuring more than 
a dozen people. In the latter two cases, the perpetrators had aligned 
themselves with the pseudo-state IS.20 A year later, in July 2017, a 
Palestinian asylum-seeker randomly attacked people in a Hamburg 
supermarket with a kitchen knife, killing one and injuring six. However, in 
all three cases, it remains unclear to which degree the attacks were committed 
due to ingrained political motives since in all cases the perpetrators were 
mentally very unstable and seemed to have mental health issues. For 
example, Ahmad A, who stabbed people in a supermarket in Hamburg, was 
on the one hand under investigation for constituting a potential terrorist threat 
since 2016 and shouted ‘All ahu Akbar’ during his attack, however, he was 
on the other hand in January 2017 diagnosed to be suffering from mental 
illness.21 The attacks might thus lie somewhere in the grey area between 
amok runs or public suicide and a terror attack. Nonetheless, the attacks were 
in the public discourse overwhelmingly regarded as terror attacks, and 
Chancellor Merkel categorized these attacks as instances of Islamist 
terrorism in her 2016 New Year’s address.22  
On December 19, 2016, Germany saw the most destructive Islamist 
terror attack in the country so far. Anis Amri, an Islamist, who pledged 
                                                          
19 Deutsche Welle, ”German teens sentenced for Sikh temple bombing in Essen,” March 21, 
2017. http://www.dw.com/en/german-teens-sentenced-for-sikh-temple-bombing-in-essen/a-
38043937 
20 Spiegel Online, ”Attacke in Ansbach: 27-Jähriger tötet sich in Menschenmenge mit 
Sprengsatz, July 25, 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/bayern-explosion-in-ansbacher-
innenstadt-ein-toter-a-1104496.html 
Angelika Finkenwirth, ”Attacke im Zug: Was wir über den Angriff in Würzburg wissen,” Zeit 
Online, July 19, 2016. http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-07/attacke-zug-
wuerzburg-axt-faq 
21 Justin Huggler, “Hamburg knife attacker had 'Islamist motive',” The Telegraph, July 31, 
2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/31/hamburg-knife-attacker-had-islamist-
motive/amp/ 
Andrea Backhaus, Astrid Geisler und Philip Faigle, “Anschlag in Bayern: Das Phantom von 
Ansbach,” Zeit Online, August 5, 2016. http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-
08/anschlag-bayern-taeter-ansbach-terror/komplettansicht. Zeit Online, ”Attentäter von 
Würzburg: De Maizière sieht keinen direkten IS-Befehl,” July 20, 2016. 
http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-07/attentaeter-wuerzburg-thomas-de-
maiziere-is-propaganda-angestachelt 
22 Zeit Online, ”Die Neujahrsansprache von Angela Merkel,” December 31, 2016. 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-12/neujahrsansprache-angela-merkel-
dokumentation/komplettansicht 
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allegiance to IS, drove a truck into the crowd at the Christmas market at 
Breitscheidplatz in Berlin. Twelve people were killed and at least forty 
injured. The attack constituted the deadliest terror attack in Germany since 
the attack on the Oktoberfest in 1980. The perpetrator fled the crime scene 
and the country but was killed by Italian police units in a shootout a few days 
after the attack.23  
In her immediate reaction to the attack, Merkel warned of “the 
paralyzing fear of evil” and declared that Germans would not be willing to 
give up a “free, jointly and open life.”24 Later, in her New Year’s address, 
she endeavored in a similar pathos when she called on the population to 
decisively confront the “world of hate” with “humanity and solidarity.” She 
continued by denoting Islamist terrorism as the “most difficult test”, and 
promised the German public to have “the state do everything to ensure 
security in freedom.” In connection with this, she declared the necessity to 
implement new political and legislative measures to support security 
organs.25 Already after the attacks in the summer of 2016, Merkel 
summarized the official perception of Islamist terrorism, and the German 
state’s course of action, as follows: “Terrorists want to undermine our 
cohesion and solidarity. They want to undermine our way of living, or 
openness and our willingness to harbor people struck by an emergency. They 
implant hate and fear amongst cultures and religions.” However, the reaction 
of the German state would be oriented towards achieving security while 
bringing security and freedom “into balance.”26 Merkel thus emphasized the 
common interpretation of Western state leaders, which holds that Islamist 
terrorism aims at and threatens a particular set of Western values. She 
furthermore marked Islamist terrorism as the most dangerous kind of 
terrorism currently facing German society and legitimized counter-reactions 
by the state, albeit underlining the importance of freedom in the execution of 
protective measures.  
This tendency of leading politicians to define a shining and 
benevolent values system as a reason for becoming the target of Islamist 
terrorism appears unconvincing. Such a discourse around the reasons for 
terrorism avoids real self-reflection, of both domestic and foreign policy and 
thereby mutes the potential ‘hard answers’, but rather sticks with the ‘easy’ 
                                                          
23 Kai Biermann et al., ”Weihnachtsmarkt: Was wir über den Anschlag in Berlin wissen,“ 
Zeit Online, December 19, 2016. http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-
12/berlin-breitscheidplatz-gedaechtniskirche-weihnachtsmarkt. Mattias Leese, “Prevention, 
knowledge, justice: Robert Nozick and counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 
Vol. 10 No. 2 (2017). 
24 Biermann et al., ”Weihnachtsmarkt.“ 
25 Zeit Online, ”Die Neujahrsansprache von Angela Merkel.” 
26 Zacharias Zacharakis, "Angela Merkel: Keine Angst,” Zeit Online, July 28, 2016. 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-07/angela-merkel-fluechtlingspolitik-
terrorismus-innere-sicherheit-pressekonferenz 
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explanations. Several critical authors in the field share this evaluation. For 
instance, Adrian Guelke points to the lack of self-criticism of Western 
politicians in regard to the occurrence of terror attacks.27 Richard English 
emphasizes that such explanations would constitute a “dead end” and would 
rather provide easy answers. Other, harder answers would include issues 
such as revenge and poverty and would thus be embarrassing but more 
fruitful in terms of analyzing motivations.28 However, due to this 
embarrassing nature of an alternative discourse on terrorism, most leaders, 
however, stick to the ‘easy answers’. 
In any case, the attacks in 2015 and 2016 brought the perceived 
terror threat to a high level again, after the perceived threat potential of 
Islamist terrorism had previously decreased. Several representative surveys 
show this. A survey from summer 2015 (after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, 
but before the events in Paris in November 2015) found that fifty-two percent 
of Germans were afraid of terrorism, which meant that this fear had risen by 
thirteen percent points since 2014. Terrorism thus came in on rank three of 
the twenty possible issues people could be afraid of in this survey.29 Another 
survey conducted in 2016 found that at the beginning of 2015 only forty-five 
percent feared terror attacks in Germany, whereas this number had increased 
to sixty-nine percent by early 2016.30 A survey conducted in between the two 
attacks in Germany in July 2016, found that seventy-seven percent of 
Germans feared an imminent terror attack in Germany.31 Thus, the issue of 
terrorism has not only become an everyday notion in Germany but also ranks 
                                                          
27 Adrian Guelke, “Secrets and Lies: Misinformation and Counter-Terrorism,” in Illusions of 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 104. Ibrahim Seaga Shaw even spoke of a superior Western self-perception in 
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Muslims in society. Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, “Stereotypical representations of Muslims and 
Islam following the 7/7 London terror attacks: Implications for intercultural communication 
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28 Richard English, “Protect: Keynote Panel, Are Our Current Counter Terror and Security 
Tactics Working?” World Counter Terror Congress, London, April 19-20, 2016. Conor 
Gearty is another author criticizing the generalization of violence against states “into a global 
challenge to the liberal democratic order itself.” Conor Gearty, “No Golden Age: The Deep 
Origins and Current Utility of Western Counter-Terrorism Policy,” In Illusions of Terrorism 
and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 87. 
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2015/grafiken-bundesweit.pdf 
30 Infratest dimap 2016. ”ARD-Deutschlandtrend,“ January 2016. http://www.infratest-
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However, terrorism only comes in on rank seven of the perceived most important political 
issues in the beginning of 2016. 
31 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, “Politbarometer Juli II, 2016. 
http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen-
/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer_2016/Juli_II_2016/ 
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among the political issues that worry the population the most. 
Still, the German public reacted with comparative composure to the 
attacks; this is especially valid for the attack in Berlin (despite the headline 
of Germany’s biggest tabloid paper Bild screaming “Angst” the morning 
after the attack at Breitscheidplatz).32 The Christmas market at 
Breitscheidplatz re-opened just a few days after the attack, arguably in an act 
of defiance. In a poll conducted shortly after the attack only eleven percent 
declared that they would increasingly avoid public places, five percent even 
declared an intention to seek public places more.33 
That especially Islamist terrorism had gained prominent status in 
German public perception and consciousness with the rise of Islamist 
terrorism since 9/11, and again in 2015 and 2016 became very clear in regard 
to a shooting in Munich on July 22, 2016. During the evening, the news of a 
shooting in a mall in Munich resulting in the death of nine people shocked 
the German public. Commentators and wide parts of the public (via social 
media) directly assumed another Islamist attack in connection with the latest 
wave of IS-inspired terrorism. This can be regarded as an understandable 
impulse since the Islamist attack of Nice and the Islamist inspired attacks of 
Würzburg and Ansbach were just a few days old. The public perception that 
gross public violence is most likely an event connected to Islamist terrorism 
became very clear during these hours of uncertainty. Due to this uncertainty, 
larger parts of the population of Munich – especially those active in social 
media – fell in a state of public collective hysteria. Later it would show that 
the perpetrator took his inspiration from amok shootings, as well as right-
wing terror attacks, and carried xenophobic motives.34 
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http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/so-reagieren-zeitungen-und-leser-auf-den-
anschlag-in-berlin-14586161.html 
33 Die Welt, “AfD klettert – Mehrheit für Seehofers Forderungen,” December 25, 2016. 
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34 This was e.g., signaled by the date of the attack – the fifth anniversary of the xenophobic 
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Justice Office officially evaluated the incident as motivated by political extremism.  Zeit 
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132 
 
This incident underpins the important point that in the current 
German context other strands of terrorism exist besides Islamist terrorism, 
although public consciousness often seemed to neglect this fact after 9/11. 
Albeit with one famous exception. In 2011, the country was unsettled about 
learning that a radical right-wing group (the ‘Nationalsozialistischer 
Untergrund’, NSU) had committed acts of terrorist political violence in the 
country between 2000 and 2007, without being identified by authorities. The 
group was responsible for the killings of nine shop-owners of Turkish or 
Greek descent, a German police officer and two bombings in Cologne, 
injuring over twenty people.35 The investigations of German security 
institutions were misled and ineffective, as the deeds of the NSU were 
categorized as part of a gang war in the German migrant milieu. Both during 
and after the NSU campaign, German authorities lacked determination and 
effectiveness, first in terms of preventing NSU violence and then in terms of 
illuminating their own shortcomings.36 Still, terrorism was in the aftermath 
of the revelation of NSU terror not perceived as a systematic problem 
connected with right-wing extremism, the attack was rather seen as an 
isolated case.37 
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muenchener-amoklauf-extremismus-einstufung-bundesbehoerde 
35 Although the NSU is publicly labeled as a terror group, one could argue that they might not 
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Namen des Volkes: Vigilantistischer Terrorismus,“ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. 24-
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Abgrenzungsprobleme,“ 18. Olaf Sundermeyer, Rechter Terror in Deutschland: Eine 
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36 Spiegel Online, “Bilanz nach Beweisaufnahme: NSU-Ausschuss rügt Totalversagen der 
Behörden,” May 16, 2013. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/nsu-ausschuss-ruegt-
totalversagen-der-behoerden-a-900388.html. 
Tanjev Schulz, "Reaktion der Sicherheitsbehörden auf die NSU-Morde: Wenn der Aufstand 
der Anständigen ausbleibt," Süddeutsche Zeitung Online, November 4, 2012. 
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August 27, 2013. https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rechtsextrememordserie104~_page-
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Not only in case of the NSU the danger of terrorism from the right 
of the political spectrum has been underestimated in Germany, despite the 
fact that increased potential for right-wing terrorism has existed for a number 
of years.38 For example, Wilhelm Heitmeyer noted a rise of pro-violence 
right-wing extremists in Germany between 1995 and 2000, from around 
6.200 individuals to 9.700 individuals. Still, Heitmeyer himself evaluated in 
2005 that there were no indications for developments of terrorist right-wing 
groups.39 The revelation of NSU terror should prove Heitmeyer wrong; the 
group was already carrying out its acts at the time of Heitmeyer’s claim. 
Furthermore, several other right-wing groups were established in the latest 
years that are classified as a terrorist group by German state authorities. Two 
of such groups were the Gruppe Freital (Group Freital) and the Oldschool 
Society. The former aimed to instill a climate of fear amongst asylum seekers 
and supporters of the same via bombing attacks. The group managed to carry 
out two such attacks before security agencies managed to dissolve the group 
in the spring of 2016. Luckily, only one person was injured.40 The Oldschool 
Society was a similar group of right-wing individuals planning to commit 
bombing attacks and to induce “a war against asylum seekers and 
supporters.” The group had, moreover, planned to blame attacks on schools 
and kindergartens on “foreigners and Salafists.” However, the group was 
dissolved by security agencies in May 2015.41 The foundation of such groups 
shows that the phenomenon of right-wing terrorism has been on the rise in 
Germany in the last years.42 Thus, it is not only Islamist terrorism that is on 
the increase. 
However, despite this development, only few specific anti-terrorism 
policies were put in place concerning right-wing terrorism. Terrorism 
policies focused overwhelmingly on Islamist terrorism, whereas right-wing 
terrorism was underestimated in Germany for many years.43 A telling 
example is here the re-construction of the institutional framework around the 
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41 Sebastian Lipp, "Oldschool Society: Nach außen Terror, nach innen banal," Zeit Online, 
March 15, 2017. http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-03/oldschool-society-
terrorismus-rechtsextremismus-prozess-haftstrafen. 
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issue of terrorism after 9/11. In 2004, a Common Terrorism Defense Center 
(Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, GTAZ) was established. The 
Center is supposed to coordinate the work of security authorities at both 
federal and state-level and collect information on terrorist threats. Employees 
of the federal police, state police, and secret service are supposed to establish 
this coordination. Telling - concerning the new understanding of terrorism 
and its roots - is that the GTAZ is only working on Islamist terrorism or terror 
threats.44 First in 2012, with the establishment of the Extremism and 
Terrorism Defense Center, a similar institution was formed in order to face 
right-wing terrorism (besides left-wing extremism, as well as extremism of 
foreigners and espionage). Similar to the GTAZ on Islamist terrorism, the 
center is supposed to improve the information exchange between police and 
intelligence services.45 Still, the big majority of implemented policies are – 
also after the revelation of the NSU group – aiming at Islamist terrorism. 
That right-wing political violence, including terrorist acts, constitute 
an increasing problem in Germany entered public consciousness in 2015 and 
2016, when Germany saw a steep rise in cases of violence against refugees 
and asylum seekers (or asylum facilities), carried out by right-wing groups 
or sympathizers. This kind of political violence had already been virulent in 
Germany in the early 1990s when seventeen people were killed by arson 
attacks and other assaults by right-wing groups.46 In 2015, the number of 
violent acts against asylum seekers and asylum seeker homes increased 
drastically. The official police statistic counted 177 cases of arson, assault or 
attacks with explosives.47 The German TV-channel ARD reported 163 acts 
of violence against asylum seeker homes in 2015, compared to twenty-eight 
in 2014, including seventy-six cases of arson compared to only six in 2014.48 
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In 2015 nobody was killed by these attacks, the number of injured was 
unclear. In September 2016, the magazine Der Spiegel reported that 
according to police statistics the number of incidents of xenophobic violence 
against asylum seekers and refugees had again doubled in the first eight 
months of 2016. Seventy-eight cases of arson had been counted until 
September 2016.49 The Zeit reported in November 2016 of four attempted 
homicides in 2015 and six in 2016.50 Often it was pure luck that prevented 
people from being killed, taking the many instances of attacks by arson, 
explosives and attempted homicide into consideration. Clearly, such attacks 
constitute cases of political violence, and many of them qualify for acts of 
terrorism according to my definition.51 
As mentioned, the circumstance that a range of these attacks on 
asylum seekers constitutes terrorist acts entered the understanding of the 
German public in the course of 2015 and 2016. Angela Merkel warned 
against a new wave of right-wing terrorism already in 2015.52 Several 
commentators specifically labeled attacks against asylum seekers for right-
wing terrorism, e.g., Sascha Lobo in an article for the Spiegel magazine.53 
The deeds of the Gruppe Freital and the Oldschool Society were often 
denoted as terrorism as well by commentators (e.g., on Spiegel Online or by 
the Welt).54 A growing awareness of right-wing violence amongst the 
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52 FAZ, “Merkel warnt vor neuem Rechtsterrorismus,“ September 5, 2015. 
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German public surfaced in an October 2016 survey, in which a broad 
majority of Germans identified the danger of right-wing assaults as big or 
very big (eighty-four percent). Interestingly this number surpassed the 
perceived danger of Islamist (sixty-eight percent) or left-wing (fifty-two 
percent) assaults.55 This survey might, on the one hand, signify a potential 
turning point in terms of public awareness of right-wing violence in 
Germany; however, on the other hand, it lacks a clear connection between 
this right-wing violence and the term terrorism.56 And both, policymakers 
and security organs have continued to focus mostly on the danger spinning 
from Islamist terrorism. For instance, despite the steep increase of incidents 
of right-wing political violence in Germany in 2015 and 2016, only twenty 
right-wing extremists were categorized as a potential terrorist threat by the 
authorities in 2016. In comparison, 520 Islamist extremists were declared to 
constitute such a potential threat.57 In addition, as mentioned, most policy 
initiatives by the German government in the field of terrorism policy focus 
on Islamist terrorism, not right-wing terrorism. This clearly constitutes a 
difference in focus and prioritization between different kinds of political 
violence and terrorism from the side of German authorities. 
Until latest years, right-wing terrorism was not only underestimated 
in Germany but also rather regarded as being roughly as dangerous or non-
dangerous as left-wing terrorism. Although Germany indeed owns a past of 
very active left-wing terrorist groups (see e.g. the history of the RAF from 
the 1970s to 1990s), the relevance of such violent leftist groups declined 
during the last twenty-five years. The same is, as demonstrated, not valid for 
rights wing groups. Still, German authorities tried to crack down hard on 
violent leftist groups when they appeared, as can be seen with the example 
of the group Das Komitee. In general, the group, which existed only for a 
short period, is not of overwhelming importance in regard to German left-
wing terrorism; however, its example shows the amount of effort and 
determination German authorities invested in order to dismantle such groups 
in the last twenty years. In 1995, Das Komitee, consisting of only three 
members, tried to blow up a building that was designated to function as a 
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deportation prison for rejected asylum seekers. However, their cover blew 
before the bomb was detonated and the three men went underground. 
Subsequently, police forces launched heavy measures in order to capture the 
group, e.g., the search of the editorial office of a newspaper, the wire-tapping 
of the phones and emails of the lawyers and acquaintances of the group’s 
members, as well as cooperation with Egyptian police forces. Such activities 
were upheld up until the 2000s (the members have by now all fled to 
Venezuela).58 Such effort and determination was and still is, often lacking 
concerning right-wing terrorism, as the example of the NSU terror campaign 
demonstrated. This is not to say that left-wing terrorism is an impossibility 
in Germany. Still, the threat potential of left-wing terrorism appears currently 
considerably lower in Germany than that of right-wing or Islamist inspired 
terrorism.59   
When talking about threats and threat perception, I miss to make an 
important point on the significance of terror threats as compared to other 
threats of human life. Thus, the incongruence between the threat perception 
that terrorism causes and the factual threat that terrorism actually constitutes 
is another important feature of the terrorism context in Germany (and other 
Western European countries). It is evident that the importance we assign to 
the phenomenon of terrorism does not reflect its actual danger for individuals 
in Western societies. In most Western societies, terrorism and terrorist 
threats construct a higher threat perception than other social or global risks, 
although the latter is responsible for far more casualties and affects 
individuals in Western societies with a far greater probability (many 
examples could be provided here, e.g., accidents in traffic, at work, or in the 
household, sickness due to obesity, or smoking). The threat of terrorism is 
                                                          
58 Der Spiegel, “Knapp daneben ist auch vorbei,” No. 15, 2017. 
59 Furthermore, the term terrorism is at times very willingly used against different forms of 
left-wing political activism or political violence, even if the circumstances do not fit. 
Examples can easily be found. For instance, when Berlin witnessed a campaign of damaged 
and burned cars in protest against gentrification in the latest years, the conservative Senator 
of the Interior of Berlin connected these acts to the concept of terrorism, by labeling the 
incidents as “street-terror.” Another conservative member of Berlin’s Senate declared that the 
leftist groups standing behind would “terrorize the citizens.” Zeit Online, "Wir werden dem 
linken Mob nicht die Straßen überlassen," February 9, 2016. 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-02/linksextreme-gewalt-berlin-gefahr. Some of 
the riots playing out around the G8 summit in Hamburg in the summer of 2017 were by some 
observers evaluated as left-wing terrorism. This evaluation appears doubtful. Not all acts of 
violence were aimed at human beings, and those that were cannot necessarily be interpreted 
to have represented a political agenda or functioned as a way of communication (to use some 
of the criteria of defining terrorism as elaborated in this thesis). The incidents rather seem to 
reflect another form of political violence, rioting. This evaluation does not negate the illegal 
or illegitimate character of the riots, however, a characterization of the events as terrorism, as 
e.g., to be found in the newspaper Die Welt or insinuated by the chief of the German 
Chancellery, Peter Altmaier, is not accurate. Ulrike Baureithel, "Das Feindphantom," Der 
Freitag, July 20, 2017. https://www.freitag.de/autoren/ulrike-baureithel/das-feindphantom. 
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for most people in the Western World merely a perceived threat, rather than 
an acute one: Donnelly outlines that around three hundred Americans died 
from terrorism between 9/11 and 2013, which is – as he remarks laconically 
– “roughly the same number of people who die annually from drowning in a 
bathtub. […] Thirty times as many are killed by drunk drivers. Two hundred 
times as many people die each year from air pollution.”60 Surely, the number 
of victims of terrorism in several Western states has increased since the start 
of the latest IS terror campaign (and thereby since Donnelly’s calculation), 
however, e.g., in Germany it is still more likely to be killed by lightning than 
by a terror attack.61 In 2016, the risk to die from a terror attack was estimated 
to amount to only 0.0000028 percent for an average European citizen.62 
Besides the potentially arbitrary nature of such calculations, it is a fact that 
the number of victims caused by terrorism is small when compared to 
casualties caused by crime, not to mention other social problems such as 
alcohol abuse or smoking. These phenomena do, however, not trigger a 
comparably intense perception of threat, insecurity or even fear among 
populations, and we certainly see no government ‘wars’ on the same. In 
essence, the overrated perception of terrorist threats reflects a widespread 
inability to calculate risks.63 Many people overestimate the probability of 
rare events such as terror attacks, based on the strong emotions such an event 
triggers and the continuous reminders about such events in the media, as 
Daniel Kahneman explains.64 Cass Sunstein argues in a very similar fashion 
and coined the term ‘probability neglect’ for instances of an overestimation 
of risks.65 Generally, people tend to fear spectacular risks more than abstract 
or unimposing risks, and ‘fast’ risks more than ‘slow’ risks.66 Based on these 
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points it must be stressed that terrorism, besides being real and besides 
causing, unfortunately, victims, does not constitute a threat for the existence 
of Western states per se or a situation comparable to war (at least currently). 
However, as will be seen in the following chapters, and as Gerd Gigerenzer 
holds, certain politicians try to take advantage of exaggerated risk 
perceptions in terms of having tougher security policies adopted.67  
Indeed, terrorism (and here foremost Islamist terrorism), has been 
met by German authorities with a significantly increased level of anti-
terrorism policymaking activity. Examples of anti-terrorism policies are the 
two Security Packages the German parliament adopted shortly after 9/11, 
dragnet investigations, an Air Security Law, data retention laws, extended 
options of detaining terror suspects or surveillance measures (these policies 
will be scrutinized in the next section). A basis for this anti-terrorism 
policymaking was the establishment of a legal definition of terrorism in 
Germany. After 9/11, in reflection of terrorism being increasingly perceived 
as a global issue by the German government (or at least a problem spanning 
over the Western world), which demanded international cooperation, the 
German government contributed to efforts for a European definition, instead 
of establishing a specific German definition.68 The result of these efforts for 
a European definition is the EU definition mentioned below (which is, 
however, still rather broad, see Chapter 5). Accordingly, the German 
government draws on the common EU definition from 2002 in terms of 
defining terrorism. To that extent, the German definition and the vague EU 
definition are identical. Some general aims concerning terrorism 
policymaking have been developed as well in Germany. Although Germany 
does not own an independent full-fledged anti-terrorism strategy at the 
highest level (other than e.g., the UK with its CONTEST strategy), German 
authorities do have developed a set of major objectives of policymaking. The 
German Ministry of the Interior has provided the most straightforward 
concept. The ministry claims to possess a ”comprehensive strategy” about 
terrorism, containing five main aims (as of 2015). These are: First, the 
destruction of terrorist structures, which is claimed to succeed with the 
highest probability by obtaining a high level of information (intelligence) 
and a high level of information exchange between the different domestic and 
international authorities. The second aim is defined as “fighting the causes 
of terrorism.” The main focus here is the prevention of radicalization. It is 
telling that radicalization is here explained exclusively in the context of 
Muslims and Islam, which, again, reveals that anti-terrorism in Germany, is 
mostly perceived as anti-Islamist terrorism. The third aim is a “reduction of 
vulnerability” in regard to potential attacks, which equals an emphasis on 
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(Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz), January 2002. 
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measures of ‘enhanced security’, also called ‘target hardening’. The fourth 
aim is to tackle the consequences of possible attacks as good as possible, by 
improving the status of crisis management and support for victims. The last 
main objective is to increase cooperation on terrorism policies via 
international organizations, including the EU, the UN, and NATO, as well as 
increased bilateral cooperation.69 In fact, these five aims of the German 
Interior Ministry reflect to a high degree the four major points of the UK’s 
anti-terrorism strategy CONTEST, which has the four focal points of 
Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. This is already an indication for the 
inter-related nature of European anti-terrorism. 
Several major points are to be taken from this section on the German 
terrorism context. First, terrorism indeed constitutes a threat in Germany, 
both right-wing terrorism and Islamist inspired terrorism. This threat has 
increased since the 1990s. Second, the threat perception on the side of the 
German population and the German authorities has increased as well. The 
former was demonstrated by various polls on the matter, and the latter can 
be concluded based on the considerably increased policymaking activity in 
the field of anti-terrorism. Policy activity typically increased in the direct 
aftermath of prominent international attacks (9/11, Madrid 2004, London 
2005 or the attacks in France in 2015), or after attacks or attempted attacks 
in Germany itself, constituting a cycle in which a new big attack is followed 
by new anti-terrorism measures.70 Still, and this is my third point, the threat 
of terrorism does not constitute a threat that equals an emergency situation 
as defined earlier. Fourth, the threat by terrorism is mostly perceived as a 
threat by Islamist terrorism.71 Right-wing terrorism has for many years been 
underestimated in Germany, although it has been increasingly acknowledged 
as a threat in latest years. , policy activity towards terrorism is continuing to 
focus on Islamist terrorism. The German population has likewise perceived 
terrorist threats as stemming overwhelmingly from Islamist terrorism for 
many years. In the course of Germany’s policy activity towards terrorism, 
and especially in efforts to prevent radicalization and track down radicalized 
individuals, German authorities fittingly focus mostly on the country’s 
Muslim minority, which has led to a non-proportional pressure on the civil 
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Bundesministerium des Inneren, ”Terrorismus,“ 2015. 
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and political rights of this group. This problem, as well as other rights issues, 
will be under scrutiny in the next section. 
 
Anti-Terrorism in Germany since 2001: A Human Rights Perspective 
The attacks of 9/11 triggered an almost immediate response by German 
authorities, both in terms of investigation measures and policymaking. For 
instance, the German Federal Criminal Police (BKA) reacted by launching 
an extensive investigation, involving the assignment of around six hundred 
staff members with the task to investigate on Al-Qaeda networks in 
Germany.72 In terms of policymaking, Germany’s parliament quickly 
adopted a range of new laws in order to meet the newly perceived threat of 
Islamist terror. Otto Schily, the Minister of the Interior at the time, pledged 
that the government would show “absolute toughness” against Islamists in 
Germany.73  
 
 The Security Packages 
The first of these new laws were Security Package I and Security Package II. 
Package II was also denoted as the ‘Prevention of Terrorism Act’ 
(Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz, TBEG). Both laws were drafted and 
sponsored by the German Interior Ministry.74 The two packages were drafted 
already in late 2001 and adopted in early 2002. The hasty adoption was 
supposed to signal determination to the population, given the 9/11 attacks. 
However, parts of the content of the packages had been prepared (and 
publicly debated) already before the fall of 2001.75 Describing the security 
packages is relevant at this point since they provided the legal and political 
basis for several subsequent German anti-terrorism measures. At the same 
time, they included components that are questionable from a spirit of rights 
perspective. 
The two security packages included a range of measures. As a first 
step, Security Package I declared the mere support of or membership in a 
foreign terrorist organization a criminal offense; being a member of a 
terrorist group not active in Germany itself had until then not been illegal. 
This provision exemplifies the importance of the definition of terrorism. 
Security Package I, furthermore, enabled the ban of religious associations, if 
their goals are directed at committing criminal acts or if they oppose the 
German constitutional order. This was possible by abolishing the special 
legal protection of such associations.76 The approval of the first security 
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package resulted in almost immediate crackdowns on Islamist groups in 
Germany. More than twenty such groups were banned in December 2001.77 
The interesting and questionable point with the last two measures is, 
that, at the time of the adoption of the security packages, Germany did 
actually not possess a legal definition of terrorism (a legally binding and 
modern definition of the issue was lacking until the country aligned itself to 
the newly established common EU definition in 2002).78 This means that – 
for some months at least - individuals could be charged for supporting 
terrorism and religious associations could be banned e.g., for supporting 
terrorist goals, without a legal definition of the term terrorism at hand. Under 
such circumstances, it is not a given that the label ‘terrorism’ is not used in 
a too broad manner, in which case it would undermine the rights to 
association and expression of groups and individuals. Furthermore, since the 
clear focus of the ban of religious associations was on Muslim associations, 
one could detect a sign for a tendentious approach early on in German post-
9/11 anti-terrorism. Thus, a problematic issue could already be detected for 
the first German attempts to answer on the events of 9/11. 
Security Package I additionally enabled an enhancement of data 
exchange between authorities and set the legal basis for integrating biometric 
data of citizens into passports and ID-cards.79 Biometric passports were 
subsequently implemented in Germany in 2005, demanding a biometric 
photograph. In 2007, this was extended by including digitalized fingerprints 
in the document. These new measures are supposed to alleviate tracing 
processes (e.g. of international terror suspects) as well as increase fraud-
resistance of passports (although fraud of passports had been a very rare 
offense at the time).80 Although the implementation of biometric passports 
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had been enabled via the German security packages from 2001, the 
implementation of biometric passports in Germany was eventually rather the 
product of international anti-terrorism trends. The EU had adopted a 
directive in 2004 obligating its member states (with the exception of the UK, 
Ireland, and Denmark), to implement biometric data in passports (providing 
another example of the relevance of the EU in European anti-terrorism). The 
EU’s directive was itself (at least in part) a product of political pressure from 
the US, who threatened the European states to abolish visa-free travel to the 
US if biometric data would not be included in European passports in the 
future.81 In 2013, the ECJ declared in a ruling that the inclusion of 
fingerprints in electronic passports is admissible. The court pointed out that 
the right to privacy and the right to data protection (enshrined in the CFREU) 
would indeed be interfered with, but that the storage of biometric data would 
be eligible since the measure would contribute to enhanced security and since 
the storage of fingerprints would not be a sensitive issue. The court did, 
however, emphasize that storage of biometric data is only eligible in the 
passport document itself, the construction of biometric databases would not 
be eligible.82 Although the implementation of biometric data in passports is 
legally permissible, it appears still somewhat questionable from a spirit of 
rights perspective. Thereby, the issue serves as an example of a measure that 
might be legally defendable but questionable when scrutinized by including 
the wider aims of human rights. The collection of biometric pictures and 
especially fingerprints leaves a perception of regarding every citizen as 
potential suspect from the side of the state. Many who have tried to leave 
their fingerprints on an official form will recognize this feeling. The 
procedure might thus affect general notions of dignity and freedom (the EU’s 
Agency for Fundamental Rights acknowledges this perception).83 The 
measure, furthermore, increases the power of the states versus its citizens 
(due to the improved control and the increase of data and knowledge). 
Additionally, risks for the misuse of such data are created. And indeed, in 
2017, the German legislator gave all German security authorities (all police 
and intelligence agencies) consent to access the biometric data collected for 
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passports. This opens the possibility for such data to be transferred to 
intelligence databases for further use, contrary to the original intended 
purpose of biometric ID.84 
Security Package II span over a broad range of issues. The package, 
for instance, increased the options of German authorities to limit the 
activities of extremist associations of foreigners (e.g., the religious 
organizations mentioned under Security Package I).85 The major aim was, 
however, an increase in the capabilities of state security organs. For instance, 
the legislation clearly extended the powers of German intelligence services 
in terms of surveillance. The German Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) and the sixteen state intelligence agencies 
gained competences to collect information from telecommunication 
companies, banks, airlines and mail services (not at a mass level, but on 
individual request and under tight scrutiny and observation). The law 
furthermore gave the federal police access to additional databases, e.g. social 
security data, which could then be used for dragnet investigations.86 Security 
Package II was thus the first in a range of post 9/11 steps in Germany that 
increased the capacity of security organs to collect information on 
individuals and the start of a general trend of ever-growing data collection at 
the expense of privacy rights (and connected rights).87 
Security Package II was initially only valid for five years, thus 
erecting what is also called a “sunset provision.”88 Such sunset provisions 
can be evaluated as a sign of a somewhat cautious approach from the side of 
the legislators concerning anti-terrorism legislation. It can be interpreted as 
a sign that German authorities are aware that the increase of power on the 
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side of security organs due to a terrorist threat should not be permanent, but 
rather dependent on the development of the contextual threat. It might thus 
be an expression of an awareness of the often-cited balance between security 
and liberty, or anti-terrorism and human rights.89 However, since the 
adoptions of the security package under a sunset provision; the package has 
been renewed ever since. This might not be surprising taking the current 
wave of IS terrorism into regard. However, one might make the argument 
that the threat of Islamist terrorism had been on the decline for a number of 
years in the second half of the zero years; still, security provisions in the 
security package were not rolled back.90 In the course of prolonging the 
security package (and the same is valid for other prolonged anti-terrorism 
legislation), competencies were added instead of rolled back. For instance, 
in 2006 preconditions for security authorities to access communication data, 
banking data and flight data were eased.91 In 2015, authorities gained the 
option to withdraw passports and ID-cards from so-called ‘violence-prone’ 
Islamists.92 
 
 Dragnet Investigation   
A questionable tool of anti-terrorism policy in post-9/11 Germany, which I 
would like to scrutinize by the help of my human rights framework, is the 
tool of dragnet investigation (Rasterfahndung). Dragnet investigations are a 
way of searching for suspects by aiming at the population at large to begin 
with, in order to step-by-step filter out individuals via certain characteristics. 
This investigation tool was already applied in Germany in the 1970s in the 
wake of the terror campaign of the RAF.93 After 9/11, it was applied again 
in Germany in order to detect so-called terrorist ‘sleepers’. In the course of 
dragnet investigations, German authorities collected data from both public 
and private databases.94 Consequentially, the data of approximately 8.3 
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million people, ten percent of the German population, were processed.95 
Search criteria were e.g.: being male, being under forty years old, being a 
Muslim, having links to countries with predominantly Muslim populations, 
being a current or former student (especially in engineering schools).96 As a 
result, around thirty-two thousand individuals were identified as potential 
‘sleepers’ and became the object of further investigation (and at least some 
several hundred individuals had their houses searched). However, the 
program was clearly a failure: not a single ‘sleeper’ could be identified by 
this dragnet investigation, not a single terrorism-related charge was issued.97 
However, the German Minister of the Interior at the time, Otto Schily, 
pronounced plans to make the tool of dragnet investigation an EU-wide 
measure in European anti-terrorism.98 
Unrelated to its investigative success, such dragnet investigations 
trigger the creation of a problematic discriminatory tendency on the side of 
investigators. While in the 1970s it was more likely to become a suspect of 
terrorism for being a young left-wing activist, it is now more likely to come 
in focus of intense investigation when falling in the above-described 
category of men with Middle-Eastern descent. Such tendencies are clearly 
quite problematic concerning the right to non-discrimination guaranteed by 
various human rights documents that Germany is a party to (e.g., art. 2 and 
7 of the UDHR, art. 26 ICCPR, art. 14 ECHR). The German Constitutional 
Court ruled in 2006 that the concrete usage of dragnet investigation by 
German authorities in the aftermath of 9/11 was unconstitutional. The judges 
held that the measure was only to be used in the face of a concrete threat, not 
in case of a general threat perception. A practice of using dragnet 
investigations as a preventive measure would not be compatible with the 
German constitution and the general presumption of innocence of every 
individual. Consequently, the practice of dragnet investigations was 
restricted considerably by the German constitutional court.99 Furthermore, 
one can argue that dragnet investigation involving millions of individuals 
does not fulfill the demands of limiting human rights (or derogating from 
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rights), in terms of the conditions of necessity and proportionality. Since the 
investigation was a preventive action, there was no acute emergency and 
therein no absolute necessity to carry out the dragnet investigation. 
Additionally, since the investigation hit millions of individuals and led to 
intense check-ups on thousands the measure appears everything else but 
proportional, especially when reflecting upon the number of resulting 
criminal charges (zero!).  
The measure was not only illegitimate on a legal basis, but also in 
terms of the general spirit of human rights. The inherent discriminatory 
tendency counter-acts the crucial aim of the concept of human rights, which 
is the establishment of a life in dignity for all humans. Instead, dragnet 
profiling undermines the perception to be treated as a dignified individual for 
those affected by the measure. Profiling undermines equal (legal) protection 
for all individuals, which is a necessary precondition for a life in dignity. 
Thereby, dragnet profiling additionally undermines one of the human 
capabilities mentioned by Nussbaum, the capability of being treated in a non-
discriminatory fashion. The discriminatory tendency, moreover, collides 
with the wider human rights aim of equal justice, as rights are not distributed 
equally anymore between all members of society. It undermines the 
perception of equal worth, recognition, and respect for every individual in 
society, as well as the acknowledgment of an equal value of personhood. It 
violates the general desire to be regarded ‘as good as everyone else’. 
Furthermore, it undermines a general presumption of innocence valid for all 
members of society. Consequentially, humans and especially certain groups 
of individuals are not regarded as ends in themselves anymore, but as 
potential threats.100 Measures which (potentially) trigger the perception that 
some groups in society are withheld an equal recognition might undermine 
trust in state institutions and stir resentment, which might turn out to be 
counter-productive from a security perspective (see Chapter 1). Therefore, 
the measure of profiling, as employed in dragnet investigation, might be 
counter-productive in the long run, as it might alienate targeted minorities 
and lead to increased social tension, which in the end might lead to increased 
recruitment of individuals for terrorist purposes. Fittingly, a study conducted 
in Germany in 2007 showed a link between radicalization and “experiences 
of marginalization and discrimination.”101 
The German government reacted on the abolishment of the option of 
preventive dragnet investigation by establishing a new vehicle for collecting 
information on Islamist suspects that could be used for investigations, the 
Central Anti-Terrorism File (Antiterrordatei).102 Implemented in 2007, 
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based on the Joint Database Act, the Central Anti-Terrorism File is a file 
combining information on suspects of international terrorism, as well as 
contact persons of terror suspects (including family and neighbors). The file 
combines input from police and intelligence services and allowed for 
common access for security services (thirty-eight services to be exact). 
Specific information on individuals listed in the file can include: information 
on individuals contacts, membership in terrorist groups, stays in terror 
camps, gun ownership, telecommunication and internet metadata, bank 
connections, family status, religious affiliation, lost ID documents, travel 
activity or employment status. The file additionally consists of information 
on associations, foundations or companies who are presumed to be connected 
to terrorist activity. The law providing for the anti-terrorism database 
received a sunset clause of ten years.103 As a result, the file included 13.000 
individuals already at the start of its operation.104 The file includes almost 
exclusively individuals that were connected to networks of Islamist terrorism 
and is thus a telling example of the overall focus of German security policy 
after 9/11. Considering this focus, it is clear that most individuals listed in 
the file belong to the Muslim minority in Germany. First in 2012, after the 
revelation of NSU terrorism, a special file on right-wing extremists was 
established.105 The Central Anti-Terrorism File continued its former focus. 
This is, as explained before, one of many indications that Islamist terrorism 
is still receiving the overwhelming attention of security agencies and 
legislators in Germany. 
The establishment of a central anti-terror file was met with criticism 
by civil rights activists and challenged in front of the Constitutional Court. 
In 2013, the German Federal Constitutional Court declared the file and the 
connected accumulation of data as legal and justified, however, 
improvements to the current law were demanded since certain practices 
concerning the anti-terror-file were evaluated as too far-going. For instance, 
contacts of suspects were only allowed to be integrated into the file if they 
knowingly supported radical activities, not simply based on their relation to 
the suspect. Furthermore, the mere approval of political violence would not 
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be enough for an individual to be included in the file. Lastly, more 
independent and public control of the accumulated data was demanded. The 
BKA was demanded to report regularly to both parliament and the public on 
the data stock. The German Data Protection Commissioner was additionally 
given the right to regular insight into the data.106 One might add from a spirit 
of rights perspective, that the exclusive focus on Islamist terrorism and 
thereby the Muslim minority, constitutes a problem. This limited focus 
provides for an unequal focus of security institutions and accordingly an 
unequal treatment of different groups in society. This might thus, again, lead 
to perceptions of discriminatory tendencies on the side of the Muslim 
community and perceptions of violation of individual dignity and justice 
(following the same arguments as above in connection with dragnet 
investigations). Again, accumulated perceptions of discrimination can lead 
to further grievances, potentially initializing a counter-productive effect in 
the long run and undermining the wider human rights aim of peace in the 
world. 
 
 Air Security Law 
Another hotly debated terrorism policy that was implemented by the German 
government after 9/11 was the so-called Air Security Law 
(Luftsicherheitsgesetz), adopted by the German parliament in June 2004. 
This is the third example of German post-9/11 anti-terrorism that I would 
like to analyze here. The Air Security Law gave - in last consequence - the 
Minister of Defense the competence to order the Federal Armed Forces 
(Bundeswehr) to shoot down civilian airplanes, including civilian 
passengers. This competency was valid in case a plane was abducted and 
threats of using such a plane as a weapon or the suspicion of the same were 
given.107 The law rested obviously on worries that a 9/11 scenario could be 
repeated in Germany. This concern was reinforced when in January 2003 a 
sports airplane with a confused pilot crossed Frankfurt’s airspace for a couple 
of hours (the pilot had actually threatened to steer the plane into one of 
Frankfurt’s skyscrapers).108 
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Also in case of the Air Security Law, the German Constitutional 
Court stepped in and declared the part of the Air Security Law enabling for 
the shooting of civilian airplanes, containing passengers, for unconstitutional 
(in 2006).109 The court evaluated that the law infringed on the right to life of 
the passengers, which is manifested in article 2 of the German constitution, 
and in several human rights documents (art. 3 UDHR, art. 6 ICCPR, art. 2 
ECHR and art. 2 CFREU). A derogation from the right to life is prohibited 
by the ICCPR and the ECHR, even in times of emergency. The legal 
interpretation of the Air Security Law was therefore rather straightforward, 
and the law proved to be legally unsustainable. According to the German 
Constitutional Court, the law degraded the passengers to mere objects (e.g., 
via seeing them as part of the aircraft), thus violating the protection of human 
dignity as manifested in article one of the German constitution.110  
Since the aim of pursuing towards a maximum level of human 
dignity is the cornerstone of modern concepts of human rights, the law 
undermined the basic feature of the modern understanding of human rights 
and the cornerstone of the spirit of human rights perspective that I apply in 
this thesis. The law diminished the perception that the state is setting value 
on human dignity and did not value every individual’s personhood. It rather 
equaled the introduction of traditional utilitarian thinking in the tradition of 
e.g., Jeremy Bentham.111 To set the interest in a common good (e.g., security) 
over the rights of the individual is, however, ineligible from a modern rights 
understanding.112 To try and calculate the lives of some against the lives of 
others, even a much larger group, furthermore, violates understandings of the 
equal worth and the equal recognition of and respect for every individual and 
therein violates the wider rights aim of justice. It additionally undermines a 
central human capability (to live to the end of life). Furthermore, since the 
right to life can logically be regarded as the precondition for the enjoyment 
of all other rights, these rights were compromised as well. The law was 
ineligible since it appears deeply unjustified to sacrifice the lives of innocent 
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civilians from the side of the state, even in an emergency situation. This 
circumstance is further in conflict with the human rights objective to set 
necessary limits to state power (in order to pursue the wider aim of freedom). 
One might argue that downing an airplane in such a situation would 
still be justified, given that the passengers in the plane would, in any case, be 
losing their life, either by being used as a human bomb in a terror attack or 
by being shot down by e.g. a fighter jet. However, this argument is flawed. 
It is not sure the hijackers would, in the end, succeed with their plan of using 
the airplane as a weapon; e.g. they might miss the target building, or they 
might even be overpowered by crew or passengers in the plane (passengers 
of Flight 93 – ‘the fourth plane’ high jacked under the 9/11 attack - managed 
to do so). In such situations, some or all of the passengers might survive. In 
any case, the argument that the passengers on board will die either way (or 
with a high probability) does not negate the state’s obligation to protect 
instead of killing its citizens. Reflecting on the provisions of the law and 
taking the evaluations of the court, as well as the idea of the spirit of rights 
into regard, the Air Security Law clearly constitutes an example of a 
terrorism-related policy that compromised human rights in the German 
case.113 
 
 Data Retention 
The next issue that I would like to scrutinize is the German data retention 
law (Vorratsdatenspeicherung). Around this law, a struggle evolved between 
the Christian Democrats (CDU), the Social Democrats (SPD), the German 
Constitutional Court, the ECJ as well as NGOs. The (first) German data 
retention law was adopted based on an EU directive from 2006 that obliged 
all member states to implement a data retention scheme. The data retention 
law is thus a good example of an anti-terrorism policy which was initiated at 
the EU level and quickly spread to all member states.114 This data retention 
law provided for the saving of telecommunication metadata for six 
months.115 These data were saved by the communication providers and could 
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then be used by German police authorities. Metadata do not deliver the 
precise content of an act of communication but deliver e.g. precise details on 
who is in contact with whom, at what time, for how long and the location of 
the cell phones involved. In aggregate, such data provide a great amount of 
insight into an individual’s life.116 Stewart Baker, former General Counsel of 
the American NSA pointed out that “metadata absolutely tell you everything 
about somebody’s life. If you have enough metadata, you don’t really need 
content.”117 The detailed insights metadata produce have eroded the 
boundary between such data and content data in terms of the information 
level they provide on an individual.118 The purpose of storing these data was 
the prevention of terrorism as well as improved possibilities concerning 
criminal prosecution. 
However, thousands of German citizens took legal action against the 
data retention law. Both, Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger and the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection, joined 
the camp of critics. The Commissioner bemoaned the acquisitiveness of state 
agencies in collecting telecommunication metadata.119 In 2010, the German 
Constitutional court declared the data retention law for unconstitutional, 
since it would violate article 10 of the German constitution (guaranteeing the 
privacy of postal and telecommunication services) and due to inadequate 
data security and missing safeguards and transparency of the law in practice, 
and ordered the deletion of all saved data. The court held that the data 
retention law would create a “feeling of surveillance.”120 Furthermore, in 
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2014 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared that the directive allowed 
security authorities too far-going data access. The ECJ ruled that the EU data 
retention directive was invalid as it interfered with the rights to privacy and 
protection of personal data in a non-proportionate manner, exceeding what 
is strictly necessary in a democracy (in other words not upholding the 
conditions for a derogation from the relevant rights according to the CFREU 
standards), due to the indiscriminate nature of data collection. Therefore, the 
directive would be incompatible with the CFREU.  
However, after the January 2015 terror attacks in Paris, the German 
government coalition between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
started a new attempt for adopting a reformed version of the data retention 
law.121 The new version of the law passed the German parliament in October 
2015 and obligated internet providers to save user data for either four or ten 
weeks, depending on the nature of data from mid-2017 onwards. Critics 
subsequently declared to once more appeal to the German Constitutional 
Court.122 In December 2016, the ECJ decided in relation to data retention in 
Sweden and the UK that “general and indiscriminate retention” of electronic 
communication is not legal, it would be in violation of the right to privacy 
and the right to data protection guaranteed in the CFREU. Exclusively data 
interception with the purpose to combat serious crime (including terrorism) 
would be legal and only if the interception was targeted at specific 
individuals. Data retention would provide for a serious interference, it would 
allow for “very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning […] private 
lifes.” Non-transparent and indiscriminate data retention would potentially 
leave the impression of “constant surveillance.” The court, moreover, 
acknowledged that such an impression of constant surveillance might lead to 
a preventive change of behavior of members of society (self-censoring online 
or change of behavior in public). Therefore, general and indiscriminate 
retention of the data of all members of society (since virtually all citizens in 
European societies use electronic communication) would exceed “the limits 
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of what is strictly necessary.”123 The court thus argues based on the condition 
of necessity in regard to the derogation of CFREU rights. The court, 
additionally, held that an unnecessarily excessive practice of data retention 
would be at odds with what is justified in a democracy (another condition for 
justifiably derogating from privacy rights under the CFREU).124 Therefore, 
it can be argued, that the newest German data retention law is more than 
questionable from a legal perspective since it likewise aims at collecting bulk 
data, a procedure that has been declared ineligible by several relevant courts 
in the past. The fact that the timeframe of the storage of the data has been 
reduced does not make up for this fact since it does not fix the crucial 
proportionality problem of the collection of data of virtually all members of 
society. In consequence, the current German data retention scheme might 
meet the same legal fate as its predecessor.  
Data retention is not only questionable from a legal perspective but 
also a wider, spirit of rights perspective. Data retention undermines the 
cornerstone of the spirit of rights, human dignity since privacy is an integral 
part of what it means to be human and of every human life. Privacy protects 
individuals’ freedom and social space and is central to the development of 
every individual. The perception to be free from unnecessary control and 
limitation in terms of thought and action is essential; for individuals’ abilities 
to define themselves, to build relationships, to move freely in one’s 
surroundings, to make autonomous decision, as well as their moral, 
intellectual, and personal development (the latter is e.g., covered by article 
29 of the UDHR). The same is valid for an individual’s political engagement. 
Individuals have to have the possibility to think of their own in a democracy, 
without being obstructed by worries of a breach of their privacy. The 
perception of being treated in a dignified way and of enjoying the respect of 
one’s personhood must be affected in a negative fashion by mass surveillance 
measures. Such surveillance also undermines several human capabilities 
(e.g. for political engagement, to think and reason freely and to move 
freely).125 Since mass surveillance via data retention might create the 
perception of being under constant control, the wider rights aim of freedom 
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is undermined and perceptions of living in a panoptic society might be 
triggered. Consequently, humans might start to act and develop differently 
when they are aware of lacking privacy.126 I would further like to argue that 
applying the measure of mass data retention intervenes negatively in the 
relationship between individual and state. First, the general presumption of 
innocence, one of the cornerstones of rule of law (and therein a crucial 
component for the human rights aim of justice), is undermined, everyone, in 
theory, becomes a suspect.127 Second, via the collection of data and 
knowledge about millions of individuals in society, the power balance is 
significantly changed towards the advantage of the state (already previously 
the stronger of the two).128 The state starts to exert control by applying a 
precautionary principle of data collection. Rapidly increasing state power, 
however, has the potential to undermine the “social, political and legal 
fabric” of Western societies, in other words to damage the core of such 
societies.129 Data retention, furthermore, endangers important preconditions 
of functioning democratic societies. For instance, via the mentioned potential 
creation of processes of self-censoring. Self-censoring blocks for vital 
components of every democratic society, such as holding power accountable 
and securing the human capability of free expression.130 This hypothesis, that 
a certain proportion of the population might begin to be increasingly careful 
when communicating over the Internet, triggering processes of self-
censoring, was strengthened by the results of a survey conducted in Germany 
in November 2013. Ten percent stated that they became increasingly 
cautious when communicating via the internet (e.g., writing emails) based on 
Snowden’s revelations of surveillance practices.131 Already months before 
the Snowden revelations, a group of self-identified ‘internet-savvy 
individuals’ was well aware of the risks concerning privacy online. Many 
claimed to be highly cautious online and requested enhanced anonymity.132 
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Via applying intense surveillance, the populace’ notion of and behavior 
towards privacy rights, as well as freedoms of expression, association and 
assembly might develop in highly undesirable directions: a certain amount 
of careful users will perceive their rights and liberties to be in decline and 
potentially undertake the described self-censorship. Such individuals would 
in effect sacrifice some share of the mentioned freedoms in order to retain 
privacy. Those who have already been desensitized in terms of privacy rights 
would not undertake such behavior, but simply accept the situation, 
potentially unconscious of lost freedoms.133 The latter group appears to make 
for a considerable share of the populace already, as a study by Bernhard 
Debatin et al. suggested.134 These processes of desensitization are, at times, 
used (somewhat ironically) to defend far-reaching surveillance measures of 
Western states.135 
Still, unimpressed by such reasoning, the German government, in the 
spring of 2017, decided to use the data obtained by data retention for tracking 
down offenders in cases of housebreaking. However, the data retention 
practice had been justified to the public by the threat of terrorism (and some 
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severe crimes such as homicide, high treason, and distribution of child 
pornography).Thereby, the government violated its own pledges to only use 
data retention on terrorism and the most severe forms of crime.136 This move 
of the government further emphasized that governments will continuously 
find ways to use and re-use data once they are collected, no matter what the 
original purpose of the collection of the data was. 
 
 BKA Law 
In 2008, the German parliament adopted (by the help of the votes of Christian 
Democrats and Social Democrats) a law that gave the Federal Criminal 
Police Office (BKA) new competencies.137 For the first time the BKA was 
allowed to take preventive measures in anti-terrorism (this had until then 
exclusively been a task of Germany’s sixteen state police institutions).138 A 
proposal to provide the BKA with preventive investigation competencies had 
already been drafted around the time Security Package II was drafted but 
had, back then, been abandoned. After the failed bombing at German railroad 
stations in 2006, these plans were activated again.139 Under the 2008 law, the 
BKA could now, for instance, intercept the communication data of terror 
suspects, as well as survey a suspect outside and inside of his accommodation 
(or the accommodation of a relative or acquaintance of a suspect). The BKA 
was now also allowed to use metadata of communication providers in its 
investigations. Furthermore, the BKA gained the competence to secretly 
infiltrate computers, e.g. by the use of trojans. The secret infiltration of 
computers, other than the previously mentioned measures, demanded the 
evaluation of a concrete danger and infiltrations could only be ordered with 
judicial approval. The BKA law additionally contained the option to apply 
the tool of dragnet investigations (however, since dragnet investigations as 
purely preventive measure had been declared to be in breach of civil rights 
in 2006 by the German Constitutional Court, the use of such investigations 
was now connected to the demand of concrete preparations of terror acts).140 
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138 Hyde-Price, ”Germany: Redefining its security role.“ Hellmuth, Counterterrorism and the 
State, 94. 
139 Hellmuth, Counterterrorism and the State, 111. 
140 Bundeskriminalamtgesetz, § 20j, “Rasterfahndung.“ 
https://dejure.org/gesetze/BKAG/20j.html 
 Bundesstelle für politische Bildung, ”BKA-Gesetz,” September 2008. 
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The federal German police thus gained a range of competencies that are 
usually lying in the portfolio of domestic intelligence services.141   
The law rather immediately faced a challenge at the German 
Constitutional Court. The claimants (amongst others the former German 
Minister of the Interior Gerhart Baum) held that the new competencies of 
infiltrating computers and surveying accommodation were too extensive, 
privacy rights would not be protected sufficiently. The secret search of hard 
drives was the most debated new measure. Representatives of the German 
state claimed that the extended investigation measures enabled by the law 
would be proportional, given an increase of terrorist threats. The law would 
furthermore have helped in preventing several terror attacks. It took until 
2016 for the case to see a verdict.142  
The court held that, the mentioned provisions of the BKA law indeed 
constituted an interference with privacy rights, but that the law, in principle, 
was permissible. Still, the court decided that the law was in violation of the 
demanded principle of proportionality on several points (since laws that 
constitute interferences with constitutional rights, such as civil and political 
rights have to be proportional to the threat that this interference is supposed 
to tackle). For instance, the court ruled that surveillance of accommodation 
of a suspect’s relatives or acquaintances is in violation of the privacy right 
of ‘sanctity of accommodation’ as stipulated in the German constitution 
(similar to the right of privacy in art. 12 UDHR, art. 8 ECHR, art. 17 ICCPR, 
which all contain protection of the privacy of one’s home). Since the 
surveillance of one’s home would be an especially deep interference with the 
right to privacy, such surveillance cannot be extended to third persons, the 
court held. Second, the court declared it for insufficient, that long-term 
surveillance measures would according to the law not have to be sanctioned 
beforehand by a court. Third, the court ruled that the BKA law in terms of 
the option of surveying suspects outside of their accommodation, did not 
contain any provision that would restrict the use of this measure to only such 
cases in which a person with its individual behavior justifies a ‘concrete 
probability’ that this person in the near future will commit a terrorist crime. 
Therefore, this measure could be applied excessively. The court demanded 
that the BKA has to justify its evaluation of an individual with concrete facts, 
                                                          
http://www.bpb.de/politik/hintergrund-aktuell/69588/bka-gesetz-15-09-2008. Hellmuth, 
Counterterrorism and the State, 113. Joerg Diehl and Dietmar Hipp, ”Urteil zum BKA-
Gesetz: Polizisten murren über Verfassungsgericht,” Spiegel Online, April 20, 2016. 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundesverfassungsgericht-karlsruhe-bremst-bka-
gesetz-a-1088298.html. 
141 Wefing, ”BKA-Gesetz: Ein Sieg der Verhältnismäßigkeit.” 
142 Bundesstelle für politische Bildung, ”Urteilsverkündung: BKA-Gesetz,” April 2016. 
Tagesschau.de, “Sicherheitsmaßnahmen in Deutschland.“ Hellmuth, Counterterrorism and 
the State, 111. 
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vague suspicions would not be enough.143 Fourth, the BKA law’s provisions 
on interference with communication data would be too vague and 
disproportionate, thus a misuse would be possible. Fifth, the court held that 
the possibility of data exchange with EU-external services, as provided in the 
BKA law, would not be sufficiently limited, e.g. to only severe cases of 
crime, such as terrorism. It would, furthermore, not be guaranteed that 
German rules on data protection are upheld in such data exchanges. Thus, 
this provision would be unproportional as well. In general, the court 
bemoaned a range of vague formulations in the law, opening the door for 
exploitation or excessive use of measures. Moreover, the court held that a 
competency like a secret search of hard-drives can only be used in connection 
with the protection of very important ‘rights issues’ [Rechtsgüter], e.g., to 
prevent a threat to life or freedom, or at moments when a concrete danger 
can be foreseen. The court thus demanded the German legislator to renew 
the BKA law by 2018, and therein to solve the problems, which the court had 
pointed out in its verdict.144 
Although the verdict of the court on the BKA law did not declare the 
law as a whole to be invalid based on rights issues, as with other post-9/11 
German anti-terrorism laws, but rather ruled that the law in principle was 
permissible, the court’s verdict still demonstrates human rights problems of 
the 2008 BKA law. First, the court declared one part of the law invalid (the 
part on surveying the home of third persons, see above), and second, the court 
pointed to a number of criticizable issues from a rights perspective, e.g., the 
vagueness and unproportionality of many of the provisions, or the lack of 
external control and general transparency. Thus, although the law was not as 
directly rebuffed by the court as other German anti-terrorism laws after 9/11 
(e.g., the Air Security Law), the verdict still shows that the 2008 BKA law 
did run into legal problems in terms of civil rights, especially concerning its 
breach of proportionality demands for eligibly limiting the right to privacy 
                                                          
143 The court gave some examples of this procedure. A surveillance measure could e.g., not 
be justified based on the mere visit of a suspicious mosque, whereas it can be justified if there 
is proof that an individual has visited a terror training camp. Ronen Steinke, “Wie ein neues 
Gesetz das BKA mächtiger macht,” Süddeutsche.de, May 25, 2018. 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundeskriminalamt-wie-ein-neues-gesetz-das-bka-
maechtiger-macht-1.3991246 
144 The court additionally criticized missing transparency and control mechanism of many of 
the competencies on a general level (e.g., regulations concerning the documentation of 
investigation measures, the notification of surveyed individuals, or regulations on the erasure 
of data).  
Bundesverfassungsgericht, “Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen die Ermittlungsbefugnisse des 
BKA zur Terrorismusbekämpfung teilweise erfolgreich,” Pressemitteilung Nr. 19/2016, April 
20, 2016. 
Bundesstelle für politische Bildung, ”Urteilsverkündung: BKA-Gesetz.” Wefing, ”BKA-
Gesetz: Ein Sieg der Verhältnismäßigkeit.” Diehl and Hipp, ”Urteil zum BKA-Gesetz: 
Polizisten murren über Verfassungsgericht.” 
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(as demanded in the ECHR, ICCPR). Now, since proportionality is crucial 
in order for rights limitations (or derogations) to stay in the realm of legality, 
the court’s verdict reflects serious shortcomings of the German legislators. 
Therefore, the law can be evaluated as undermining binding rights standards. 
Apart from the legal evaluation, the BKA law is clearly questionable 
from a spirit of rights perspective. First, since the law provides for the use of 
metadata, the same points are valid as already delivered further above in 
relation to data retention of metadata. As mentioned, the saving and usage of 
metadata essentially interfere with human dignity, humans’ potential for 
political engagement and development and the relation between individual 
and state. Second, since the 2008 BKA law does not contain any notification 
procedure for secret searches of hard drives, it provides for the potential 
development of uncertainty on side of the population (and especially among 
specific groups) as to whether one might be surveyed by state authorities or 
not.145 One can never for sure know if one is the target of surveillance or not 
(e.g. since surveillance is used as a preventive measure, one does not have to 
have been in contact with authorities in order to be surveyed). This, again, 
reflects the metaphor of the Panopticon. Such uncertainty processes could 
also be triggered by the law’s provision allowing for the surveillance of 
(homes of) acquaintances of suspects under which such acquaintances might 
themselves become targets of surveillance. The general unproportionality 
and vagueness of almost all provisions of the law increase the potential of 
this uncertainty process. When individuals cannot be certain anymore to be 
free from surveillance and have no way of finding an answer to the question 
of whether they are surveyed, a perception of an interference with their 
dignity (e.g. the perception of being recognized in one’s personhood) as well 
as their general freedom (a wider rights aim) might be provided.146 This 
potential development of surveillance uncertainty is especially valid for 
certain specific groups in society. In the current terrorism context, this group 
is the Muslim minority, and especially its share of young, male adults 
(reflecting a ‘suspect community’ or suspect group). Therein, perceptions of 
not being regarded as equal in front of the security apparatus and in terms of 
one’s rights in society can be triggered, leading to perceptions of 
                                                          
145 The secret search of hard drives via the utilization of security gaps in software constitutes 
another problem as several observers pointed out. By detecting security gaps, but leaving them 
open in order to use them for the own surveillance, the BKA itself provides for potential 
security problems of the digital infrastructure, since it is a realistic possibility that sooner or 
later others, potentially criminals will detect and use the same security gaps. Hakan 
Tanriverdi, “IT-Sicherheit: Netzpolitiker warnen vor Einsatz des Staatstrojaners,” 
süddeutsche.de, January 28, 2018. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/it-sicherheit-
netzpolitiker-warnen-vor-einsatz-des-staatstrojaners-1.3844670 
146 The court evaluated that the protection of privacy in one’s home (e.g., from surveillance 
of state authorities) is of special importance for providing a life of dignity. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, “Pressemitteilung Nr. 19/2016.” 
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discrimination, disrespect, and injustice based on ethnicity. This must 
reinforce the perception of interference with one’s dignity and personhood, 
with the mentioned potential consequences for the political climate and 
security situation. Third, since dragnet investigations can be used again with 
the 2008 BKA law, discriminatory tendencies in investigations can be 
expected to not only be rough perceptions but a tangible reality. Although 
dragnet investigations are supposed to be non-discriminatory, it appears 
highly doubtful if this ideal can be upheld. If one tries to preventively find 
so-called ‘endangerers’ in a mass of people, one will naturally need to use 
search criteria that point to a specific group in society, and in a terrorism 
context, in which terror threats are localized to come mostly from the 
domestic Muslim minority, it must be expected that members of this group 
have a much higher probability to be filtered as potential threats by the 
system than other members of society.147 The measure of dragnet 
investigation can thus reinforce inequality in terms of rights standards for 
certain groups in the population. Clearly, unequal standards are detrimental 
to the human rights ideal of equal rights, dignity, and justice for all humans. 
Dragnet investigations (with the reformed version of such investigations) 
deliver another example of a measure that is legally permissible, but still 
criticizable from a spirit of rights perspective. And again, dragnet 
investigations change the power relation between individual and state to the 
disadvantage of the individual in a similar fashion as described above in the 
section on data retention. Furthermore, the option to exchange data with the 
American NSA, as established in the BKA law, does interfere with the 
perception that the preservation of privacy rights (and, maybe, all parts of 
the human rights framework) is an important issue on the agenda of the 
German legislator. 
Although the court – once again - tried to limit excessive German 
anti-terrorism policymaking, its verdict turned out to have the contrary 
effect. First, the renewed BKA law from 2018 included once again extended 
competencies, including subjecting suspects to imperative powers such as 
wearing electronic tags, contact bans or residence restrictions (measures that 
resemble those included in the UK’s control orders, which were declared to 
breach human rights norms (see below).148 Thus, the BKA became in effect 
more powerful by the reform of the excessive 2008 BKA law, not less.149 
                                                          
147 The term ‘endangerer’ roughly pertains to individuals “likely to threaten public security,” 
and is mostly used in connection with suspects of Islamist terrorism. The term is supposed to 
signify that an individual is willing to commit politically motivated violence. Leese, 
“Prevention, knowledge, justice: Robert Nozick and counterterrorism.” 
148 Such measures might trigger the trend of police forces trying to control a larger group of 
suspects instead of issuing in-depth investigations. It might be cheaper and more time 
effective to supply five suspects with electronic tags rather than carrying out five in-depth 
investigations. Steinke, “Wie ein neues Gesetz das BKA mächtiger macht.”  
149 The BKA is furthermore pooling several databases on individuals regarded as a threat in 
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Second, the fact that the highest German court with its verdict in theory 
approved preventive police measures in order to meet the threat of terrorism 
instigated several German state governments to extend the competencies of 
their police forces in new police task laws (see below). 
 
 Mass Intelligence Surveillance 
Mass surveillance measures of German intelligence agencies constitute 
another problematic issue of German post 9/11 anti-terrorism. As shown 
above, options for surveillance by German intelligence were extended 
already via the security packages adopted in the fall of 2001. Surveillance 
competencies and practices have been on the increase ever since. I would 
like to provide two problematic examples of secret service surveillance, the 
first pertaining to surveillance of journalists, and the second pertaining to 
mass surveillance of the broad public. In February 2017, it was revealed that 
the BND-law (BND-Gesetz) formed the basis for surveillance of foreign 
journalists, conducted by the German secret service (BND). After gaining 
insight into files of the German parliament’s commission of inquiry on the 
NSA scandal, the Spiegel magazine revealed at least fifty cases of BND 
surveillance conducted against journalists and editorial offices in the UK, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria since 1999. The list of editorial boards 
spied on (e.g. via surveying phones and emails) included high-ranked 
institutions such as the BBC, the New York Times and Reuters. The BND 
defended this practice with its alleged relevance in terms of a stable security 
situation in Germany. The BND law formed the basis for these measures as 
it allows for the surveillance of foreign journalists outside of Germany 
without reasonable suspicion of any offenses.150  
However, the argument of security agencies that surveillance of 
journalists is necessary in a security context seems far-fetched. It appears 
rather unlikely that the editorial boards of the BBC or the New York Times 
were regarded as threats; the objective of the surveillance must rather have 
been to gain access to sensitive information transmitted by the journalists’ 
informants. However, even if the surveillance of these informants would 
have provided valuable information to the BND, e.g. about terror networks 
abroad or in Germany, spying on journalists and editorial boards constitutes 
a clear interference with freedom of expression and privacy rights. This 
interference seems to lie in the legal grey area. One might make the argument 
that the measure is legally eligible since the conditions for limiting the rights 
to freedom of expression and privacy as manifested in the ECHR and ICCPR 
                                                          
different fields (e.g., football hooligans or Islamists) into one big database, thus removing 
restrictions on search possibilities for the different departments of the police institution. 
Steinke, “Wie ein neues Gesetz das BKA mächtiger macht.” 
150 Zeit Online, “Ausländische Reporter klagen gegen BND-Gesetz,“ January 30, 2018. Maik 
Baumgärtner, Martin Knobbe and Jörg Schindler, “BND bespitzelte offenbar ausländische 
Journalisten,” Spiegel Online, February 24, 2017. 
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are upheld. Since the surveillance of journalists appears to be resting on a 
legal basis (the BND law), is arguably undertaken in the interest of national 
security and does not constitute a mass surveillance measure, and could thus 
be interpreted to not be unproportional, it could potentially be defended in 
face of existing limitation demands. However, one might make the point that 
the limitation demand of necessity is not met anyway when individuals who 
do clearly not pose a security threat (the journalists) are surveyed. 
Furthermore, since journalists increasingly work in global networks (e.g. in 
case of the Paradise Papers) not only the press freedom and freedom of 
expression of foreign journalists but also domestic ones who are 
collaborating with surveyed foreign journalists are endangered. Surveillance 
of domestic journalists is, however, not covered by the legal basis of the 
measure. Moreover, the ECtHR decided in September 2018 that a British 
practice of surveying journalists violated the right to freedom of expression, 
thus a precedent for the BND’s practice might just recently have been 
created.151 Therefore, the measure of surveying foreign journalists seems to 
be placed in a legal grey area in terms of both restricting freedom of 
expression and privacy rights.152 Several international investigative reporters 
have as a consequence of the revelations initiated an act of appeal against the 
BND law at the German Constitutional Court.153 The legal evaluation is 
currently pending. 
However, even if the court would declare such surveillance practices 
as legal, I would still argue that the use of surveillance on journalists is 
unjustified. Because of such surveillance, informants cannot trust in their 
anonymity anymore, thus, the work of journalists is undermined and press 
freedom (covered by the human right of freedom of expression) is eroded. 
By surveying journalists and alienating them from their sources, a crucial 
component of democratic societies is undermined, which is the opportunity 
to present a multitude of opinions, to voice dissent and the potential to 
publicly scrutinize those in power. The potential of human rights (here: the 
right to freedom of expression) to make a difference on behalf of the ‘weak’ 
towards more powerful actors (e.g. government actors) would be 
undermined, threatening the functioning of a free democratic society (which 
is a necessity for the full enjoyment of rights). Indeed, the ECtHR 
acknowledged in 2018 that surveillance of journalists can have a chilling 
effect on press freedom (meaning that processes of self-censoring among 
journalists might be launched).154 Therein, the measure furthermore 
undermines a general sense of freedom and dignity in societies. Since one 
                                                          
151 EDRi, "ECtHR gives a half-hearted victory against UK mass surveillance," September 26, 
2018.  https://edri.org/ecthr-gives-a-half-hearted-victory-against-uk-mass-surveillance/. 
152 Additionally, journalists are provided with special protection according to German 
legislation, since they are regarded as so-called ‘secret carriers’. 
153 Zeit Online, “Ausländische Reporter klagen gegen BND-Gesetz.“ 
154 EDRi, "ECtHR gives a half-hearted victory against UK mass surveillance." 
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might furthermore argue that the law in allowing the practice of surveying 
foreign journalists only, includes a discriminatory tendency, the wider 
human rights aim of (equal) justice, or recognition of equal worth for all 
individuals, is undermined as well (and likewise the capability for leading a 
life in a non-discriminatory fashion).155 
Besides surveillance of specific groups such as journalists, the 
German intelligence agency BND is, similar to the British GCHQ, involved 
in direct mass surveillance measures of online communication. For instance, 
the BND directly scans data transmitted through the world’s biggest data 
junction point, the De-Cix, located in Frankfurt. The junction point has data 
traffic of up to six terabytes per second and encompasses data flows from big 
parts of Europe, but also Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Data is here 
scanned in order to filter for suspicious content, using specific search terms. 
The BND has in the process of such scanning used the NSA’s XKeyscore 
program, a program that enables the filtering, sorting and analyzing of large 
amounts of content and metadata. Therein, XKeyscore functions as a ‘super-
Google’.  
Entering a legal reflection on the BND’s scanning practice, it is 
noteworthy that the German Federal Administrative Court ruled in May 2018 
that the BND’s scan practice is legally justifiable given that a domestic legal 
framework provides for this possibility.156 However, two reservations need 
to be made here. First, the court merely decided upon the legal basis of the 
scanning practice but did not deliver an evaluation of its human rights 
implications. Second, the BND is legally only allowed to scan foreign 
communication or communication between a German and a foreign source, 
not domestic communication. However, a clear differentiation between the 
exact locations of communicators appears technically extremely hard to 
achieve, given the vast amount of data and the complex ways online 
communication travels. From a universalist human rights standpoint, it is 
irrelevant if surveillance affects citizens or non-citizens, residents or non-
residents. Thus, one might doubt the justifiability of this scanning practice. 
Privacy rights enshrined in several important rights documents (art. 12 
                                                          
155 Whereas the surveillance might hit German journalists as well, given an increasingly 
internationalized journalist network structure, as mentioned above. 
156 Stefan Heumann and Ben Scott, “Law and Policy in Internet Surveillance Programs: 
United States, Great Britain and Germany,” Impulse, September 2013. Patrick Beuth, “Die 
weltgrösste Überwachungsmaschine,“ Die Zeit, September 25, 2015. Eike Kuehl, “Weiterhin 
frohes Datenfischen,“ Zeit Online, May 31, 2018. 
https://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2018-05/bnd-ueberwachung-de-cix-internetknoten-
klage. 
Spiegel Online, “BND darf am Internet-Knoten weiter Daten abzapfen,” May 31, 2018. 
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/de-cix-betreiber-von-internet-knoten-verliert-
klage-gegen-bnd-a-1210243.html. Troels Heeger, "Tysk efterretningstjeneste udleverede data 
til NSA," Information, August 7, 2013 https://www.information.dk/udland/2013/08/tysk-
efterretningstjeneste-udleverede-data-nsa 
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UDHR, art. 17 ICCPR, art. 8 ECHR) are interfered with by the BND’s 
surveillance practices. From a legal perspective, one might argue that large-
scale scanning of communication data appears to be ineligible since such 
practices are similar (or equal) to measures that were earlier declared illegal 
by relevant court decisions. For instance, the decision of the ECJ to declare 
large-scale data retention illegal based on the arguments that they would be 
non-proportional when covering millions of individuals could be used as a 
clear indication for the potential legal trouble the BND’s measure might face. 
The ECJ additionally included in its negative evaluation of data retention, 
the possibility that individuals would be unaware of surveillance practices 
and therefore be left with a constant perception of being surveyed, which 
would be a worrying circumstance. The same is, however, the case with the 
BND’s scan of data. Furthermore, the ECtHR in a case against Hungary in 
January 2016 and the ECJ in a case on data retention later in 2016 clarified 
that only selected individuals can be subject to electronic surveillance and 
not the broad public.157 In September 2018, the ECtHR declared the British 
GCHQ’s practice of scanning fiber-optic cables for being in violation of 
articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR. The ECtHR held that this kind of mass 
surveillance (equaling the method used by the BND at the De-Cix) is 
“incapable of keeping the ‘interference’ to what is necessary in a democratic 
society.”158 Thus, legal justification of the BND’s measure in the framework 
of the ECHR (or CFREU) is thus not easy to imagine. If the criteria for 
justifiably restricting privacy rights have not been met in the comparable 
cases above, it appears questionable that they have been met in the BND 
case. Therefore, I would regard the BND’s surveillance as questionable from 
a legal standpoint. 
The measure is, in any case, to be criticized from a spirit of rights 
perspective. Mass surveillance infringes the wider aims of rights and the 
spirit of human rights in the same fashion as the already described measure 
of data retention (since it does here not make a difference if data are directly 
scanned by government agencies, or first stored by private providers and then 
accessed by state authorities). Mass surveillance undermines notions of 
human dignity, personal human development and unfolding, as well as 
                                                          
157 European Court of Human Rights, “Judgment Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary - legislation on 
anti-terrorist secret surveillance,” January 12, 2016, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-
press?i=003-5268616-6546444. 
158 EDRi, "ECtHR gives a half-hearted victory against UK mass surveillance," September 26, 
2018. Privacy International, "UK mass interception law violates human rights - but the fight 
against mass surveillance continues," September 13, 2018.  
https://privacyinternational.org/feature/2267/uk-mass-interception-law-violates-human-
rights-fight-against-mass-surveillance. Owen Bowcott, “GCHQ data collection regime 
violated human rights, court rules," The Guardian, September 2018. 
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human capabilities (to associate and engage with others, to think and reason 
freely and to move freely).159 It undermines humans’ social space and human 
freedom and autonomy, as well as political engagement, and effects the 
general relation between individual and state towards a perception of being 
under constant control (see my argumentation on that above). Again, 
processes of self-censoring, with all their detrimental effects for society 
might be launched.160  
One could now try to defend such surveillance measures by the help 
of two arguments: one, that surveillance measures would only concern 
suspicious or dangerous individuals, and two, that such measures would be 
a necessary, because effective, tool against terrorism. However, both 
arguments are false. First, everyone’s data is scanned in order to filter out 
suspicious content. Second, a range of instances in which individuals ended 
in unfortunate situations due to being mixed up with other terror suspects 
based on falsely interpreted surveillance data was reported in the last years 
(e.g. the case Khaled El-Masri from Germany). Third, surveillance of whole 
societies does not solve the problem of terrorism. The newest wave of terror 
attacks, taking place while surveillance practices are intensified, shows this. 
The collection of more and more data has actually made it trickier for 
security institutions to keep an overview. This was exemplified by the attack 
on a Christmas market in Berlin in 2016. The authorities had many data on 
the attacker (from traditional sources, not mass surveillance). However, they 
were not able to process them in an effective way. Therefore, to simply throw 
more hay and the haystack will not solve the problem. The effective 
accumulation and processing of data on individuals constituting a threat 
would be a better course of action.161 
Surveillance measures by intelligence services contain another risk. 
This pertains to intelligence cooperation. If intelligence services aim at 
surveying foreigners, in order to be in accordance with domestic laws, and 
subsequently cooperate with foreign services, including data exchange, it 
                                                          
159 The ECtHR held in a 2010 judgment that tracking movement undermines one’s freedom 
of movement. European Court of Human Rights, “Case of Uzun v. Germany (Application no. 
35623/05) Judgment Strasbourg.” 
160 As mentioned, the ECJ acknowledged a risk of self-censoring under circumstances of 
continuous surveillance in its 2016 ruling on data retention. Spurrier, “Investigatory Powers 
Act: You’re not being paranoid.”  
Moreover, a recent study conducted in France did indeed show self-censoring (online) 
behavior of a certain share of the population triggered by awareness of anti-terrorism 
measures. Francesco Ragazzi et al., "The Effects of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-
Radicalisation Policies on Muslim Populations in France," Centre d'etude sur les Conflits, 
Liberte et Securite (CCLS), 2018. 
161 Already the 9/11 Commission Report pointed out that one of the failures of authorities 
before 9/11 was an overreliance on SIGINT, disregarding HUMINT (in other words 
prioritizing the interception of communication signals over collecting intelligence through 
interpersonal contact). Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 29. 
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becomes a realistic scenario that data are traded. In other words, via such 
collaboration intelligence services receive data on their own citizens from 
friendly services, data that they otherwise would not be allowed to collect 
themselves, constituting a circular swap of data. This practice has already 
taken place as the Snowden revelations showed.162 In 2016, a legal basis for 
this exchange of data was established with a new anti-terrorism package, 
adopted with the votes of Christian-Democrats and Social Democrats. The 
package opened up for the automated exchange of information between 
German and foreign databases (e.g., other EU member states and NATO 
partners). Such databases contain information from surveillance measures.163 
Such policy moves clearly constitute the attempt of legalizing formerly 
illegal activities.164 The package received criticism from other political 
factions, e.g., the Green party and the Left (Die Linke), who claimed that the 
measures were legalizing questionable international data-transfer without a 
solid constitutional base. Indeed, especially the constitutional right to 
informational self-determination could clash with the 2016 package. Critics 
emphasized the potentially enhanced collaboration of the BND with 
intelligence agencies such as the American NSA, whose practices were by 
many justifiably evaluated as rights-abusing in the course of the Snowden 
revelations.165 A circular swap of data would for sure increase interference 
with the rights to privacy. Privacy rights are undermined in a similar fashion 
as in the other examples of surveillance and data retention presented above. 
Collaborations on data exchange are furthermore non-transparent to the 
public, making it virtually impossible to challenge such practices.166 Even 
                                                          
162 Eric Toepfer, “Mass surveillance, technologies of control and unaccountable states” 
(presentation, statewatch conference, London, June 25, 2016). The ECtHR recognized the risk 
for such practices in a recent verdict on UK mass surveillance practices. Lorna Woods, 
“Analysis of the ECtHR judgment in Big Brother Watch: part 1,” EU Law Analysis, 
September 16 (2018). 
163 Deutscher Bundestag, ”Bundestag verabschiedet Antiterrorpaket,” June 24, 2016. 
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165 Ibid.  
The relationship between the NSA and the BND, Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, has 
been “intimate” for the past fifteen years. Revelations that the NSA spied on Angela Merkel’s 
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the German parliament is not sufficiently informed about such 
cooperation.167 This violates a demand by the German Constitutional Court 
from 2016, who had in the verdict on the BKA law called for full 
accountability concerning intelligence cooperation, a demand that is ignored 
by the 2016 anti-terror package.168 This in-transparency interferes with one 
of the preconditions for every healthy democratic system, which is the 
opportunity to be able to hold authorities accountable (as explained above). 
Critics additionally pointed out that German institutions would potentially 
end up collaborating with states whose security authorities practice torture to 
gain information.169 Therein, cooperation on data exchange might in the long 
run not ‘only’ undermine privacy rights, but might have consequences in the 
form of harsh counter-terrorism actions such as renditions, torture, or drone 
strikes since information delivered to the US might be used as the basis for 
such actions. Such cooperation would thus add to the violation of wider 
rights aims via mass surveillance as explained above, and complicity in 
processes that might lead to acts of torture would certainly aggravate such 
spirit of rights problems. Thus, the exchange of information by intelligence 
services constitutes another risk for civil rights.170 
 
 Facial Recognition Systems 
The issue of surveillance will also be at the center of my next example of 
questionable German anti-terrorism. After the attack on the Christmas 
market in Berlin in December 2016, the German government implemented a 
set of extending measures to tackle Islamist terrorism. For instance, the 
German Minister of the Interior demanded an extension of video surveillance 
of public space. The German parliament adopted a law enabling such 
enhanced video surveillance (especially by companies) in March 2017.171 
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The German public seems to show support for CCTV surveillance according 
to several polls.172 However, video surveillance or CCTV is a technology that 
has started to include other features than simply taking a live picture of public 
places; it is increasingly combinable with automatic scans of number plates 
or biometric data.173 Consequently, a measure, which has been developed 
recently and is promoted as an anti-terrorism measure is facial recognition 
technology in connection with CCTV surveillance. Such systems will be my 
next example of debatable German anti-terrorism.  
Security authorities such as the Ministry of the Interior and the 
federal police (BKA) argue that such technologies might make it possible to 
spot so-called endangeres before committing a terror attack, which could 
thus prevent the attack. Experiments with such technologies have taken place 
in European societies, including Germany, for a number of years.174 An early 
experiment with facial recognition was conducted in Germany already in 
2006 when a camera system was tested at the main railroad station in the city 
of Mainz. Already back then, the German government pushed for expanded 
use of CCTV in railroad stations and other public places, following a failed 
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Islamist bombing attack at two railway stations in the summer of 2006.175 
However, the test was not successful at the time due to a very high failure 
rate in terms of actual recognition.176 Still, plans of using such systems were 
not dropped but rather set on hold. Recently, between the summer of 2017 
and the summer of 2018, ten years after the first attempt, another, improved, 
3-D based system was tested at a railroad station in Berlin, since the newest 
developments of recognition technology promised to be more accurate.177 
And indeed, the German Ministry of the Interior declared the experiment in 
Berlin as successful in October 2018 and held that such systems provided a 
beneficial new measure of police work, recognition systems would now be 
ready for “widespread usage.” Authorities held that the system now worked 
with a success rate of “more than 80 percent.” In other words, whenever one 
of the searched individuals (simulated by volunteers) crossed the cameras, 
the system recognized the searched individual in more than eighty percent of 
the cases.178 The probability of false alarm, that is the recognition of an 
innocent individual, would according to German authorities only be at 0.1 
percent of all cases. This means that one out of a thousand individuals trigger 
a false alarm. Although this seems, at first sight, to be a very low share, one 
should bear in mind that such systems are supposed to be used at spots that 
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are frequented by thousands, if not tens of thousands of people every day, 
which would mean a range of false alarms on a daily basis. If one million 
people would be scanned by the system every day, the system would 
currently produce at least one thousand false alarms on a daily basis. Despite 
being aware of this circumstance, the ministry regards this risk as being 
acceptable and points to future improvements of the system. An extended 
and continuous usage of recognition systems has thus been recommended by 
the relevant police authorities and is met with approval by the ministry of 
interior. The ministry has dropped the general question, if the system should 
be used at all, it is now rather to be evaluated, under which circumstances 
and to which extent the recognition system should be introduced (e.g. at all 
big railway stations and airports).179 That facial recognition technologies will 
be used in the future became ever more likely with the formation of the new 
German government in the spring of 2018 who established in its coalition 
agreement that, “intelligent video surveillance can be an enhancement,” and 
that IT structures should ensure that so-called ‘endangerers’, “can be 
identified all over Europe.”180 
Although recognition software has evolved, the problems, which 
such facial recognition systems constitute from a rights perspective, are still 
the same as in 2006. When the faces of thousands (and maybe soon millions) 
of individuals are scanned and analyzed, a range of human rights might be 
undermined by such measures. First of all, by being publically surveyed, 
anonymity in public place is counter-acted, which constitutes a reduction of 
privacy. Moreover, freedom of movement is undermined if one cannot move 
in public without being recognized (or without the worry to be recognized). 
Additionally, in cases of such technologies being used in areas that are 
venues of demonstrations or assemblies, the rights to freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and freedom of assembly are diminished.181 Indeed, 
the Bavarian CSU is already working on implementing legal options for the 
usage of facial recognition at demonstrations in the south German federal 
state.182  
Such limitations of guaranteed rights could only be justified from a 
legal position if it could be convincingly argued that they fulfill the demands 
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for a limitation of the affected rights, as defined in the relevant legally 
binding rights treaties (ECHR and ICCPR). However, it appears questionable 
if that is the case. One of these demands is that limitations should not go 
further than what is necessary (in other words, they need to be proportionate). 
As the ECtHR clarified in 1988, limitations of privacy rights must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, in order to be eligible. And 
again, it deems unlikely that this demand for proportionality is upheld, given 
the high number of people that will potentially be covered by the tested 
systems. Thousands if not hundreds of thousands or millions of people would 
be scanned by recognition technology on an everyday basis. For sure, the 
threat of terrorism is real, Germany witnessed some terror attacks in recent 
years, the worst at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin, and trying to tackle the threat 
of terrorism is a legitimate aim. However, it has in the past been evaluated to 
be non-proportionate by relevant courts to scan information of millions of 
people, even in the face of a general terror threat, in order to find information 
on a few dangerous individuals, as e.g. the case law on data retention laws 
shows (see above). Furthermore, the usage of facial recognition systems 
might be in collision with the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation, 
since the regulation demands that citizens must give consent in order for their 
personal data to be used and processed. Furthermore, individuals are 
demanded to be able to control the usage of their personal data, have an 
insight into how data is used and be able to withdraw consent of data usage 
in an easy way.183 All this appears not to be given for currently planned usage 
of facial recognition. Thus, facial recognition systems might not only clash 
with valid European legal standards of human rights but also the latest EU 
legislation on data protection. Based on these points, it would appear 
questionable to claim that the widespread usage of facial recognition 
technology, covering thousands or millions of people, would not run into 
legal problems.184 
The measure of facial recognition technology is, in any case, highly 
questionable from a spirit of rights position. To not be able to move in public 
space without being recognized and thereby being under a certain amount of 
control by state organs clearly collides with the wider human rights aim of 
freedom. The state does not live up to its obligation to protect individuals’ 
social space and to provide a maximum of freedom and opportunities. 
Rather, not only will thousands of innocent passers-by be covered by the 
system, due to a still existent error margin of at least 0.1 percent, many will 
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see themselves be falsely marked as a threat by the system. The 
consequences of such errors for innocent individuals cannot be foreseen, but 
would with all probability lead to a high number of additional police searches 
and questionings of innocent individuals at surveyed spots, possibly 
additional covered surveillance of such individuals and potentially 
unjustified detentions. Therein, the measure threatens to erode various 
individual rights (rights to privacy, freedom of expression, association, 
assembly or movement) and rule of law standards. Furthermore, the measure 
collects, again, more power in the hands of the state (and big companies) 
enhancing the state’s control over its population and moving power away 
from the individual.185 However, it is an objective of the idea of human rights 
to enable and empower individuals, not institutions of power such as state 
authorities (the spirit of rights ideal is rather for the state to set sufficient 
limits to its own power). This equals a decrease of democratic quality (in the 
sense of the word). And again, rapidly increasing state power is a threat to 
the structures of all democratic societies.186 The wider aim of establishing 
equal justice in human societies is undermined as well, taking the still high 
amount of individuals into regard that will trigger false alarms by the system 
and will be faced with unjustified scrutiny. Facial recognition additionally 
undermines the possibility of individuals to freely enjoy their capabilities 
(e.g. in regard to social interaction and association, movement, or political 
engagement) to the fullest. For instance, free participation in democratic 
processes, a vital opportunity in every functioning democracy, might be 
endangered by such systems if used at demonstrations. A certain share of 
populations might as a result switch to more adaptive behavior. The general 
level of scrutiny towards authorities might thus start to decline. Effects on 
the freedom of association, which is a precondition for collective action and 
participation in civil society, follow with. The pursuit of (equal) dignity of 
every individual is arguably degraded as well by erecting large-scale public 
Panopticons in the form of recognition systems. Humans are not regarded as 
such (as ends in themselves), but rather as potential threats (or suspects) that 
need to be controlled. Again, it is not really possible to reach a self-
perception of being free and of exercising one’s right and one’s capability to 
make use of one’s bodily freedom if one owns the feeling of being under 
constant surveillance. Since the ability to move freely without being tracked 
add to a perception of dignity, tracking processes in effect undermine the 
general notion of dignity, the cornerstone aim of the modern idea of human 
rights.187 In essence, facial recognition systems appear to constitute another 
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exemption from the rights framework; however, unraveling this framework 
piece by piece is the essence of undermining the spirit of rights. 
The same is valid for another potential future anti-terrorism measure, 
similar to facial recognition. Authorities have started to test systems that 
evaluate movements and behavior in real-time. For instance, the police in the 
German city of Mannheim currently conducts an experiment with seventy-
two cameras installed in public areas that are supposed to trigger an 
automatic alarm (calculated by an algorithm) if an individual is behaving in 
a suspicious manner; this could be simple movements such as running or 
falling (or any behavior deviating from ‘normal behavior’.188 Facial 
recognition was not used here, but could in the future easily be integrated, at 
least from a technological standpoint. Moreover, effective facial and 
behavior recognition software could in the future be combined with other 
databases. For instance, in 2017, German police and intelligence authorities 
have gained automatic access to biometric pictures from passports (via new 
legislation).189 It is not to be excluded that German intelligence units will 
start constructing their own biometric picture database based on such access 
rights.190 The usage of the same in connection with facial recognition and 
behavior recognition would allow a direct, potentially real-time, connection 
of face, location, behavior, and name.191 This would again have grave effects 
on privacy rights, the right to free movement, assembly, and expression, as 
well on general notions of dignity. 
 
 Police Laws 
Whereas a wide range of laws and policies that are relevant in regard to anti-
terrorism have been adopted at the federal level, the specifics of the German 
political system provide for some relevant policies to be adopted at the state 
level as well. One example of an anti-terrorism law at the state level that 
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deserves scrutiny from a human rights perspective is the recent Bavarian 
reforms of its police law, opening up for preventive detention. This will be 
my last example of questionable German anti-terrorism policies. Police laws 
have been revised in order to give police forces more competencies in other 
German states as well (e.g. Lower Saxony, Saxony, Hesse, Baden-
Württemberg, and North-Rhine Westphalia). Although these laws naturally 
do not apply to all German citizens, they do apply to a considerable amount 
of people (thirteen million people in Bavaria alone). Therefore, and since 
some of these laws constitute considerable threats to human rights, the 
inclusion of an example of such a law in this analysis is necessary. 
The recent wave of reforms of police laws in several German states, 
covering the majority of the German population, is a direct reaction to the 
BKA law verdict from 2016. Since the court decided that preventive policing 
measures are not per se invalid, the states reacted by establishing extended 
preventive policing competencies for the state police forces as well (which 
covers the vast majority of police forces in Germany, since all regular police 
forces are administered by the sixteen German states).192 
With the adaption of recent laws by the Bavarian conservatives 
(CSU), such as the Polizeiaufgabengesetz (PAG, police task law), the 
Bavarian state opened up for new far-going competences in terms of search 
and surveillance measures.193 Whenever the police evaluate a ‘looming’ 
danger to be existent, individuals can be searched, their phones wired or their 
online activity analyzed. Police forces are furthermore allowed to open 
letters and packages and to conduct extended DNA analysis. Such data can 
then be handed over to intelligence services as well. The police are allowed 
to use all these new competencies without the necessity of a concrete 
suspicion against individuals, e.g. in terms of concrete plans for a violent act. 
Rather, in order to use the new competencies, a judge must evaluate that the 
situation of a ‘looming’ danger (drohende Gefahr) is given.194 The scenario 
of looming danger is a newly defined category of threat. It first appeared in 
the verdict of the German Constitutional Court on the BKA law in 2016. 
Looming danger ranks under the threat situation of a ‘concrete’ danger, thus 
falling short of the category of ‘concrete’ danger, which involves concrete 
plans of violence. Looming danger rather covers situations in which certain 
individuals are evaluated as a dangerous threat and willing to commit serious 
violent crimes and where a probability for such acts in the foreseeable future 
is evaluated to be given, but without that any concrete plans are known or 
can be sufficiently predicted (let alone proven). Again, these measures are to 
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be seen as a mode of preventive policing, since individuals do not concretely 
have to be involved with violent plans in order to trigger mentioned 
measures, but simply be evaluated as potentially dangerous somewhere in 
the future.195 
Earlier, in 2017, the Bavarian government had already opened up for 
another preventive measure, the option of preventive detention. Suspects and 
endangerers could then be imprisoned if they were evaluated to constitute a 
‘concrete’ danger, in other words, if there is a good reason to believe that 
they are planning a concrete act of serious violence (they are evaluated to 
commit a crime soon, but have not yet committed one). This preventive 
detention can, in theory, run indefinitely (a judge is, however, re-evaluating 
the detention every three months).196 The new police task law from 2018 now 
adds the possibility to carry out preventive and potentially indefinite 
detention in cases of looming danger as well (thus lowering the threshold 
from the previously demanded concrete danger), e.g. in cases when an 
individual violates demands to wear an electronic tag.197 A report from 
August 2018 showed that the measure of preventive detention without 
charges had until then been used in eleven cases.198 The measure of indefinite 
detention had already been proposed in the German context after the attacks 
in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005. The Interior Minister at the time, 
Otto Schily, demanded “preventive detention for suspected foreign terrorists 
without charge or trial” (in other words: indefinite detention). His suggestion 
did, however, not receive sufficient support in the German parliament.199 
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Years later, the measure has now been implemented in German anti-
terrorism legislation (at the state level). That this is happening at a time when 
IS terror is in the decrease shows, once again, that the implementation of new 
anti-terror legislation is not necessarily contingent on the actual development 
of threat potentials, and underlines the development of an ever-growing 
arsenal of anti-terrorism measures. 
I would like to argue that the category of looming danger is an odd 
category. It is a rather vague concept or category since it is logically 
somewhere in between a concrete danger and no suspicion at all. Whereas 
the category of concrete danger points to current or imminent danger, 
operating with concrete indications for plans of serious violence (coming 
close to certainty), the concept of looming danger operates based on 
probability evaluations about the future behavior of individuals, without 
clear indications for future plans. Looming danger accordingly rests on non-
concrete suspicions and triggers rights invasive measures. It points to 
individuals who are evaluated as radicals and as likely to commit violence in 
the foreseeable future, however, how far this future is away is not clearly 
defined (e.g., hours or months?).200 The broad nature of the concept of 
looming danger further opens up for the potential usage of the concept in 
connection with many different individual cases, especially since the 
Bavarian authorities seem to interpret the concept of looming danger much 
wider than the German Constitutional Court initially indicated when it 
delivered the concept in its 2016 BKA law verdict. For instance, whereas the 
court clearly confined the concept to be used only in instances of terror 
threats, the Bavarian law opens up for other areas of usage as well (e.g. the 
protection of ‘considerable property’ or sexual self-determination).201 The 
Court furthermore delivered some concrete examples for the usage of the 
concept, which should demonstrate its applicability. One example was the 
return of IS fighters from Syria. However, the Bavarian authorities open up 
for the usage of the concept on all individuals that are evaluated as violence-
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prone extremists.202 Thus, all individuals who might be evaluated as in some 
way dangerous, but who cannot be connected to any concrete plans of 
violence would face the risk of being pertained by measures of preventive 
detention. There is, furthermore, no guarantee that the participation in a 
demonstration or utterances in social media are exempted from being 
included in such evaluation of looming danger.203 As mentioned, some other 
German states have sharpened police laws as well. No state has produced a 
law that is as far-going as the Bavarian one.204 
From a legal perspective, the vagueness of the concept of looming 
danger makes it tricky to evaluate the concept against preconditions for 
derogating from the right to liberty as established in relevant human rights 
documents. If one does not really know how dangerous a ‘looming danger’ 
is, how can one evaluate if it justifies a rights derogation in order to prevent 
a situation of public emergency “threatening the life of the nation” (one of 
the central demands for derogating from rights according to the ICCPR and 
the ECHR).205 Since the measure of preventive detention is extremely far-
reaching, it could only be justifiable if a concrete emergency situation is 
given, including knowledge about concrete plans of violence by specific 
individuals. This is, however, not the case with preventive detention based 
on a vague concept such as ‘looming danger’. This vagueness and the fact 
that the concept of looming danger rests largely on the discretion of police 
forces can lead to misuse.206 Additionally, in those cases when suspects are 
released after a few months, the question is how those cases shall be handled. 
                                                          
202 Constanze Kurz, "Vorverlagerung von Eingriffsbefugnissen: Die “drohende Gefahr“ in 
Polizeigesetzen," Netzpolitik.org, August 8, 2018. 
https://netzpolitik.org/2018/vorverlagerung-von-eingriffsbefugnissen-die-drohende-gefahr-
in-polizeigesetzen/. 
203 Amnesty, “Amnesty über Polizeigesetz-Reformen: Das ist ein langsamer Abschied von der 
Rechtssicherheit,” https://kattascha.de/amnesty-ueber-polizeigesetz-reformen-das-ist-ein-
langsamer-abschied-von-der-rechtssicherheit/. 
204 Nevertheless, some questionable measures have been implemented in other states as well. 
For instance, Lower Saxony introduced the possibility to preventively detain endangerers for 
up to seventy-four days (the detention is first limited to thirty days and can then be extended 
by a judge). The measure is specifically aimed at potential acts of Islamist terrorism by 
Islamist endangerers. North-Rhine Westphalia likewise increased preventive detention of 
endangerers from forty-eight hours to thirty days and additionally allowed for the surveillance 
of mobile phones and computers in situations of individual behavior establishing a ‘concrete 
probability’ of a threat. Süddeutsche.de, “Bayern als Vorbild,“ May 24, 2018. 
205 Furthermore, additional legislation is in case of concrete plans for violence unnecessary, 
since the preparation of a terrorist act is already a felony according to German law. German 
Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), Article 89a. https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/89a.html. 
206 For instance, in June 2018 a leftist protester was detained in the run up to protest against 
an AfD party convention, based on the argument that the person had “committed crimes in 
the past.” Amnesty, “Amnesty über Polizeigesetz-Reformen.” 
179 
 
Will such individuals be detained again after a while? And if not, what would 
the purpose of detaining them have been in the first place?207 
Furthermore, the measure of indefinite detention existed in the UK 
as well for a few of years after 9/11 and was ruled to be in violation of the 
rights to liberty guaranteed by the ECHR (art. 5) in 2004. Back then, the 
British House of Lords Judicial Committee decided that the right to liberty 
was breached and that this breach could not be defended as a proportional 
derogation from rights obligations since the Committee evaluated that a state 
of emergency allowing for a derogation of this right was not observable in 
the UK at the time. Now, if one takes into regard that the threat level in the 
UK in 2004 was at a similar level or arguably higher than currently in Bavaria 
(or the whole of Germany for that matter), a court using the same 
conditionality would potentially come to the same verdict on the Bavarian 
version of indefinite detention. Thus, the law might be declared as being in 
violation of legally binding human rights obligations (in this case provided 
by the ECHR). Indeed, several groups and parties have announced to 
challenge the Bavarian law in front of the German Constitutional Court. This 
legal process is, however, still in the beginning. Still, as the British and the 
Bavarian measures of indefinite detention are rather similar, and as both 
relate to the ECHR, it can be claimed that they might meet the same legal 
fate. Indeed, German law professor Matthias Baecker expects the 
Constitutional Court to declare the provision of preventive and indefinite 
detention for invalid, based on a breach of the right to liberty.208  
From a spirit of rights perspective, the measure of preventive 
detention is problematic. Preventive detention interferes with one’s right to 
liberty and the (physical dimension) of the rights aim of freedom.  It stands, 
furthermore, in opposition to the wider rights aim of justice, since it appears 
unlikely that the practice of detaining individuals before they have 
committed a felony reflects this wider aim of human rights. The detention 
measure additionally collides with the idea of pursuing a maximal amount of 
dignity for all humans. If individuals in a society have to wonder whether 
they might be detained, although they are innocent from a legal perspective, 
the idea of a dignified life in a free and democratic society must be regarded 
as damaged (since it is a crucial characteristic of every free society that its 
members do not have to live with such worries). Since detention brings 
individuals to their most vulnerable status (severely interfering with one’s 
notion of being regarded as a dignified person), it is essential that detention 
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is only triggered under absolute necessity and under the principles of rule of 
law. If this is not provided, (as is arguably the case here) the wider rights aim 
of justice is undermined. Furthermore, the detention practice undermines the 
capabilities of social interaction, of moving freely and of being treated in a 
dignified way. Again, similar to some of the other cases presented above, the 
power of the state versus the individual is enhanced instead of viable 
boundaries of state power being defined. Via preventive detention, the state 
does not provide a notion of individual protection that emanates from rights 
frameworks, but rather the opposite. If the measure of preventive detention 
would be predominantly used against members of a certain suspect group (as 
could arguably be feared), the measures’ conflict with the spirit of rights 
would naturally be aggravated. In essence, preventive detention constitutes 
another exception to enshrined rights norms.  
 
 Summarizing observations 
Some general observations of German terrorism policies post 9/11 can be 
made based on the previous analysis.  
First, a trend towards more extensive security measures is 
observable in Germany since 9/11, a considerable amount of new anti-
terrorism legislation and measures has been adopted. This is noteworthy, 
since Germany already possessed a range of anti-terrorism policies 
beforehand, due to its past with RAF terrorism.209 Germany has seen a 
general trend towards more data collection and data sharing, more 
surveillance, extended preventive policing and increased centralization of 
information and competencies (e.g., via the GTAZ or the central anti-
terrorism file or competencies being located at the BKA instead of the sixteen 
state police forces).210 Several of these new policies and measures are in 
conflict with human rights standards (often legally, but especially in terms 
of the spirit of rights). Thus, German policymakers were, and still are, willing 
to go quite far. This trend is consistent, independent of the exact constellation 
of the German government. All German governments holding office since 
9/11, be it the red-green coalition (sitting until 2005), the Christian 
Democrat-Liberal coalition lasting from 2009 until 2013, or the Christian 
Democrat-Social Democrat coalitions (from 2005-2009 and again since 
2013), were implementing laws and measures that aimed at strengthening 
security by taking a loss of liberties into account.  
Especially noteworthy is the tendency of German legislators to 
undermine the rights of data protection and privacy (which often has 
repercussions on the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, association, 
movement and the right to be free from discrimination). The German 
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government implemented a range of anti-terrorism policies that conflict with 
legal privacy rights norms and data protection standards (e.g. set forth in the 
country’s constitution and the CFREU). Examples are legislation and 
measures such as the implementation of biometric data in ID cards and 
passports, dragnet investigations, data retention laws, facial recognition, and 
surveillance measures of German intelligence. This circumstance is not very 
surprising when reflecting on some remarks of leading members of German 
governments in the course of the years after 2001. For instance, Otto Schily, 
the German Minister of the Interior in the years after 9/11, declared that the 
“principle of protecting the people’s personal data must not stand in the way 
of fighting against crimes and terrorism.”211 In 2006, Merkel produced a 
remarkable bloomer when she claimed, “actually everything is going fine, 
still we need more surveillance.”212  
A range of these new security measures in Germany seems to be 
supported by a majority of the population, at least partly or at times of crisis. 
For instance, confronted with the scenario that a terror attack was about to 
happen, in a 2006 ISSP survey, seventy percent agreed with the authorities 
being allowed to tap telephone conversations (thirty percent stated that 
authorities definitely should have this option, forty percent answered 
‘probably’).213 After the attacks in Paris in November 2015 and on a German 
tourist group in Istanbul in 2016, a survey by infratest dimap found that 
seventy percent of Germans were in favor of a general intensification of 
surveillance measures. Eighty-two percent were in favor of intensified 
surveillance of public areas.214 However, not all polls reflected a supportive 
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attitude on harsh anti-terrorism among the German population. For example, 
when asked about the potential measure to detain terror suspects indefinitely 
without trial ‘only’ forty-six percent agreed.215 Moreover, the German 
population does show concern about surveillance at times, especially foreign 
surveillance. When the surveillance practices of NSA and GCHQ were 
revealed in 2013, many Germans showed concern over the issue. A survey 
from August 2013 showed that many Germans were critical of the revealed 
mass surveillance, fifty-six percent of the population were very concerned or 
somewhat concerned about NSA surveillance, and fifty-one percent stated 
that they did not want ‘somebody to be able to check what I am doing on the 
internet.’216 Thus, whereas Germans often seem to support the government’s 
course in anti-terrorism in various surveys, it is important to emphasize that 
surveys on anti-terrorism do not always deliver a clear picture in Germany. 
And, even if majorities of the population (especially at times of intensified 
threat perception) would agree with far-reaching and even rights-breaching 
anti-terrorism policies, such a majority opinion would not legitimize rights 
invasive policies. A democratic government is, in general, supposed to 
defend a certain minimum standard of rights, irrespective of the actual public 
majority opinion. Thus, human rights obligations are not to be negated, even 
if a majority should be in agreement with, or demand, a diminishing of rights 
standards. 
Second, in the course of the development of German anti-terrorism, 
the focus has shifted from international terrorist networks to home-grown 
(glocal) terrorism.217 In reflection of this, the focus shifted from pursuing 
potential members of international networks (as e.g. via the dragnet 
investigations in the first years after 9/11) to preventive policing and 
preventing radicalization.218 Preventive policing here refers to measures that 
are supposed to track down and control radicalized and violence-prone 
individuals (also called ‘endangerers’). Thus, police forces are not supposed 
to wait for concrete dangers to occur anymore but are expected to actively 
search for dangers (concrete or looming).219 Examples of an enhanced focus 
on preventing radicalization are easily found in the newest policymaking, 
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e.g. the explained measures of facial recognition, preventive detention or 
BKA surveillance. Additionally, in 2016, following the Islamist terror 
attacks in Germany that year, Chancellor Merkel presented a new nine-point 
plan on terrorism, including plans for an ‘early-warning-system’ in relation 
to the radicalization of asylum seekers.220 Furthermore, in March 2017, the 
German government, again, published plans to intensify efforts to prevent 
radicalization or to de-radicalize individuals. 180 million Euros were 
budgeted for this purpose. One of the focal points of these efforts was the de-
radicalization or prevention of radicalization of individuals in German 
prisons.221 This trend is a reaction to the context of terror attacks and failed 
terror attacks being overwhelmingly planned by individuals who are 
residents of the country, instead of entering the country with violent 
purposes, as well as terrorists being often only loosely attached, or not 
attached at all to international terror networks (e.g. individuals who commit 
terror attacks inspired by IS terrorism).222 The focus of German authorities 
has in this overwhelmingly been on Islamist terrorism and therein the 
Muslim minority in the country, reflecting a tendentious threat perception 
and policy approach, setting the groundwork for discriminatory 
tendencies.223 However, this reflects a breach of the state’s obligation to 
uphold a rights standard as high as possible for all citizens or residents. All 
individuals are supposed to enjoy the same amount of rights, and often it is 
especially minorities that deserve protection rather than heightened scrutiny.  
Third, although terror threats change over time, extended 
competencies of police and intelligence institutions are not rolled back, even 
if threats decrease. As mentioned, when Germany entered a quieter phase in 
terms of terrorism during the zero-years, extended provisions were not rolled 
back. Rather, provisions were kept alive by renewing existing sunset clauses. 
Furthermore, even such policies that once have been abolished on the order 
of courts (the Constitutional Court or the ECJ) tend to surface again, in 
slightly remodified fashion, after some time. One example is here the 
German legislation on data retention, which had been ruled invalid twice and 
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enjoyed a comeback nonetheless. Another example is the dragnet 
investigation which was declared unconstitutional in 2006 and re-
implemented via the BKA law (although in a different form) in 2008. 
Another example of a policy enjoying a comeback is a provision in the new 
Bavarian police law that, e.g., allows police forces to stop a vehicle by use 
of heavy weapons or explosives in order to prevent an immediate terror 
attack (for instance in a scenario when a truck would try to drive into a crowd 
as seen during the terror attack in Nice in 2016). This would according to the 
law still be possible even if the death of passersby would be a probable 
outcome.224 This provision reflects the Air Security Law discussed above 
(and creates human rights problems in the same fashion).225 
Fourth, the Constitutional Court and the ECJ have in general been 
quite critical of implemented anti-terrorism legislation in Germany. The 
courts often sought to halt a loss of liberty and have therein functioned as a 
guardian of individual rights. Several times after 9/11, the highest German 
court declared anti-terrorism laws and measures for invalid, in part or in 
whole. It has thus taken its role as a judicial watchdog of potentially 
extensive anti-terrorism policymaking serious.226 The often rigid approach of 
the German judiciary in terms of rights problems in the course of anti-
terrorism rests in part in the country’s special history of National Socialist 
state crimes, which triggered an emphasis on upholding rule of law in the 
following decades.227 One might now claim that when the courts have 
curtailed rights invasive policies and measures, the political system as a 
whole is working, reflecting a separation of powers in which the executive 
would, at times, push for excessive laws, the legislature would adopt them 
and the judicative would roll entire laws or individual provisions back and  
set boundaries for reformed or new laws. However, I would argue that this 
does in essence not reflect a working system (or at best only partly). First, 
courts can only become active after laws have been adopted, and normally 
years pass between the adoption of a rights invasive law and a verdict by a 
court that might declare such a law for invalid. Thus, during those years 
rights-invasive measures are carried out, although they are violating valid 
rights norms (in both a legal and spirit of rights sense). Second, courts do not 
always act on rights invasive measures, some policies or measures might 
never be challenged by claimants in front of a court and thus the judiciary 
can in such cases not perform its watchdog role. Third, both in the German 
case and the British case, legislators have often tried to circumvent negative 
court verdicts by adopting new legislation that is very close, yet not identical 
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with previous abolished legislation. For instance, the German government 
has twice implemented new data retention laws after old laws had been 
declared to be in breach of civil rights by the Constitutional Court and the 
ECJ. Thus, although courts might fulfill their role, governments might 
simply adopt new slightly changed and slightly less invasive laws, opening 
up for a new long-lasting phase of judicial scrutiny before a new verdict 
might take down the new legislation as well. Fourth, the argument that the 
system is working when the judiciary is scrutinizing rights invasive laws, 
that the executive and the legislature have adopted, while (at least at times) 
being aware that such laws probably are unsustainable from a rights 
perspective, does not hold water. It is not only the responsibility of the 
judiciary to find orientation in rights norms, but of all political actors in a 
democratic system, including the government and the members of 
parliament. Thus, in a working system, it would be the exception rather than 
the rule, to see legislation being abolished based on court rulings declaring 
them in breach of basic civil and political rights. And lastly, as I have argued 
above in connection with my points on the spirit of rights, not every piece of 
legislation or every measure of anti-terrorism, that is legally permissible and 
that has not been declared illegal by a court can be regarded to be congruent 
with the aims and ideals of a human rights framework. It is indeed possible 
that legislation that is legally defendable still violates the bigger aims of what 
human rights are all about. 
The fifth overall point on German anti-terrorism is that it clearly 
comprises important international connections. Germany has actively been 
pushing for enhanced European cooperation on anti-terrorism and Germany 
has continuously emphasized the special importance of anti-terrorism 
cooperation on a European level (mostly through the EU).228 For example, 
already Joschka Fischer in his time as German Foreign Minister pushed for 
a common European response on terrorist threats, including a push for a 
European Arrest Warrant. Lately, the German Social Democrats demanded 
the creation of a common European anti-terrorism center in order to increase 
the coordination of European security institutions.229 Furthermore, Germany 
itself has been influenced by European policymaking on anti-terrorism, as 
well as wider international trends on anti-terrorism. In effect, both European 
and American influences have been manifested. This is valid for both the 
institutional structure surrounding terrorism policies and the content of 
policies. For instance, the establishment of both the Central Anti-Terrorism 
File (Antiterrordatei) and the Common Terrorism Defense Center (GTAZ) 
was following a trend of implementing anti-terrorism structures inspired by 
                                                          
228 Heinz, “Germany,” 174-175. 
229 Hyde-Price, ”Germany: Redefining its security role.“ Deutscher Bundestag, "Bundestag 
verabschiedet Antiterrorpaket," June 24, 2016, 
https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2016/kw25-de-terrorismus-428780. 
186 
 
examples established earlier in the United States. In terms of the content of 
terrorism policies, the enhanced focus on digital surveillance, data retention, 
and facial recognition systems, the use of biometric data, the increased 
intelligence cooperation, and extended possibilities of detaining terror 
suspects reflect international trends as well. Still, whereas international 
trends have clearly left a footprint on German anti-terrorism, Germany has 
developed measures and policies that are connected less with international 
trends but more with its own anti-terrorism tradition as well. An example is 
e.g., the resumption of dragnet investigations, that was invented in the 1970s. 
Sixth, German policymaking after 9/11 provided for several 
examples of ‘false’ anti-terrorism policies. For instance, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (Security Package II) has been used by the German secret 
service organization BND as the judicial basis for collecting information 
among asylum seekers.230 Furthermore, as described above, data obtained via 
data retention has been used in order to investigate in cases of 
housebreaking.231 Again, data that have once been obtained will be used, 
sometimes for other purposes than originally intended. 
To summarize, human rights have been undermined by anti-
terrorism policies and practices of German authorities since 2001, 
endangering a range of rights of regular citizens, residents, and visitors, e.g. 
the right to privacy, freedom of expression, the right to life, the right to non-
discrimination or the right to liberty. Both, the rights we find guaranteed in 
legally binding rights documents, and the wider aims of the idea of human 
rights were undermined (or were at least placed in a grey area in legal terms). 
I tried to show the first e.g. by pointing to recent court rulings detecting rights 
violations in anti-terrorism. I additionally argued that infringements of the 
aims and spirit of rights can be detected since a range of anti-terrorism 
policies undermine human dignity, equality, justice, senses of individual 
freedom (e.g. versus the state), as well as human capabilities. All of these are 
essential parts of the wider concept of human rights, which provides the 
groundwork for the more narrow legally binding rights norms. It is such 
policies that let criticism on German terrorism policies rise after 9/11. For 
example, Adrian Hyde-Price held already in 2003 that Germany headed 
towards a “‘transparent citizenry”, and Verena Zöller claimed that after 9/11 
the “balance between liberty and security in Germany tipped towards the 
latter.”232 Certainly, far from all anti-terrorism policies collide with human 
rights standards, but, as seen above, German policymakers joined the trend 
of establishing an increasing amount of rights infringing measures, rather 
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than trying to tackle terrorism by non-infringing (and potentially more 
effective) means.
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Chapter IV 
The UK as an Anti-Terrorism Actor  
This chapter will elucidate the British case of post 9/11 anti-terrorism. In the 
first section, I will present the context, focusing on the most important terror 
attacks from a British perspective, their perception, and the UK’s overall anti-
terrorism strategy. This context delivers some insight into the impetus for the 
initialization of a range of anti-terrorism measures and policies. It will 
furthermore give some indications for the threat level in the UK since 2001, 
an important point in terms of evaluating the justifiability of rights limitation 
and derogation. In the second section, I will elucidate human rights problems, 
which played out in the UK since 2001 in the course of anti-terrorism. Again, 
I will evaluate these policies towards their compatibility with the rights 
framework established earlier. Therein, this section will focus on policies of 
indefinite detention, a ban of the glorification of terrorism, mandatory 
surveillance in public institutions, data retention, intelligence surveillance, the 
Investigatory Powers Act and facial recognition systems. Some of these policy 
categories answer on categories discussed in the previous chapter, some are 
different. The differences are rooted in the different focal points and legacies 
of anti-terrorism in Germany and the UK (e.g., the German legacy of dragnet 
investigation vs. the British legacy of internment policies). Still, all categories 
are in alignment with the criteria set earlier (see the methodology section), 
pointing to policies that potentially affect a considerable amount of individuals 
or are of potentially severe character in terms of rights curtailment.1 
 
UK Reactions to 9/11 and Post 9/11 Terrorism 
In the UK, other than in Germany, terrorism was not a forgotten phenomenon 
before the attacks of 9/11. The perception in the UK was different, given the 
continuing PIRA terror.2 After the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, the 
                                                          
1 I will come back to differences and similarities between my three cases later on (see Chapter 
6). 
2 The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was the major terror threat to the UK for 
several decades, from the start of the Troubles in Northern Ireland in the 1960s until the end of 
the 1990s. In Northern Ireland, violence reemerged in the late 1960s. A civil rights movement 
(the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Alliance, NICRA) had campaigned against discrimination of 
the nationalist Catholic minority. Protests turned violent and subsequently wide-scale violent 
conflict broke. However, without including the unionist/loyalist community in the equation, the 
conflict cannot be properly explained, since the loyalist and the republican communities were 
“mutually antagonistic political communities.” Violence and counter-violence of the two 
communities turned into a “self-fuelling dynamic of violence”. The rationale of the PIRA was 
that by carrying out terrorist violence, the British could be brought to withdraw if they would 
feel that the costs of withdrawal were smaller in comparison to the losses the PIRA would inflict 
on them. The PIRA targeted British troops, members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and 
politicians, mainly in Northern Ireland, but also on the British mainland. Civilian victims were 
taken into account. PIRA followed a strategy of escalation, especially between 1971 and 1975. 
This aggressive strategy included shootings and bombing campaigns, the most infamous 
example being Bloody Friday (July 21, 1972), when twenty-six PIRA bombs killed nine and 
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perception of being faced with an imminent terror threat faded in the UK as 
well. However, only for a short while. After the terror attacks in the US on 
9/11 (killing 67 British nationals), a perception of being threatened by 
terrorism spread yet again, this time by Islamist terrorism instead of nationalist 
terrorism. This represented a clear change of threat perception since no 
Islamist terror attacks had been committed in the UK between 1995 and 2001.3 
Politicians and officials emphasized the threat of Islamist terrorism and 
                                                          
injured 130 civilians in Belfast in the course of just over an hour.  The British government 
started deploying regular troops in 1969. Whereas the British troops were initially seen as 
neutral, they did get involved rather quickly into the daily violence and started to primarily fight 
the republican paramilitaries. The nationalist movement was, in general, met with harsh policies 
by British and Ulster authorities, the prime example being Bloody Sunday, when British Army 
forces killed fourteen civil rights activists in in Derry in 1972. This harshness can with hindsight 
be evaluated as counter-productive. According to an ex-IRA man, this response led to the 
British Army being “the best recruiting agent” of the PIRA. Richard English, Terrorism: How 
to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Despite fierce violence being committed, 
the British government upheld a secret strategy of engaging in negotiations with PIRA 
terrorists. Peter Williams, “Irish terrorism: the UK experience,” In Policing Terrorism, ed. by 
Christopher Blake et al. (London: SAGE, 2012), 65. Andreas Bock, Terrorismus (Paderborn: 
UTB, 2009), 77. It was the willingness to break the rule of ‘no negotiation with terrorists’, that 
led to serious dialogue and consequently to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Andrew 
Heywood, Global Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 300. Statistics on the 
number of victims of the conflict naturally diverge. For example, English counts 3665 victims, 
whereas Todd Landman refers to 3,297 deaths (as well as more than 10,000 injuries, 15,000 
bombs, and 35,000 shootings). These numbers do not include acts of terrorism on the British 
mainland, including assassinations and bombings. Disregarding these differences, these 
numbers give a clear picture of the widespread nature of violence during the Troubles. Todd 
Landman, “The United Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and Counterterror,” In National 
Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison Brysk and 
Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 79. Richard English, Armed 
Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Books, 2012), 379. 
Although PIRA constitutes the most commonly known and discussed ‘source’ of terrorism in 
the British context, Britain also dealt with other campaigns of terrorism in its empire after 
WWII. Examples are terror campaigns in Palestine (committed by the Irgun, LEHI, or 
Haganah), Cyprus (committed by the nationalist group EOKA) or Kenia (committed by 
members of the Mau-Mau uprising). J.A.S. Grenville, A History of the World: From the 20th to 
the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2005). Randall D. Law, Terrorism: A History 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2009), 186. The New York Times, “Irgun’s Hand Seen in Alps 
Rail Blast,” August 16, 1947. The New York Times, “Irgun Bomb Kills 11 Arabs, 2 Britons,” 
December 30, 1947. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the 
Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Charles Foley 
and W.I.  Scobie, The Struggle for Cyprus (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975). Toyin 
Falola, Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002). 
Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: 
Henry Holt, 2005). 
3 Frank Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the 
Shadow of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 28. David Omand, “What 
Should be the Limits of Western Counter-Terrorism Policy?” In Illusions of Terrorism and 
Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 64. 
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evaluated that an attack was very likely to occur. For instance, the then 
Director of the MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, claimed in a 2004 speech, that 
a serious and sustained terror threat existed. Ian Blair, Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police, agreed with this view in a statement in April 2005.4 
The first post 9/11 UK experiences with Islamist terrorism killing 
British citizens were delivered by a couple of attacks taking place outside of 
the country. In 2002 bombings on the Indonesian island Bali killed 202 people 
and injured another two hundred. The attack was aimed at Westerners in 
nightclubs. Twenty-three British citizens were killed by the attack, carried out 
by members of Jemaah Islamiyah, allegedly in cooperation with Al-Qaeda.5 
In November 2003, bombings of the British consulate and an HSBC bank 
branch in Istanbul killed thirty and injured several hundred (the British consul-
general was among the victims). The attack was committed by Turkish 
Islamists, albeit financially supported by Al-Qaeda.6 
The feared attack by Islamist extremists on the British mainland 
occurred on July 7, 2005. Four suicide bombers exploded bombs in London’s 
transport system, hitting three trains and a bus. All four terrorists were British 
residents and three of them British citizens. The bombs killed fifty-six people 
(including the bombers) and injured hundreds.7 Although the attackers were 
inspired by al-Qaeda, they were not directly connected to the Islamist terror 
network.8 Despite the previous public perception of being a potential target 
society of Islamist terrorism, the attack came as a shock to the British 
population. The attack “bloodily announced the true arrival of the post-9/11 
era in England,” as Richard English explains.9 The fact that all attackers were 
British residents or citizens added to the shocking effect of the attack.10 
Tony Blair, British Prime Minister at the time tried to reassure the 
population that “terror will not win”, and that “we [the British] will hold true 
to the British way of life”.11 Blair thus insinuated that the attacks aimed at 
changing British culture and society. The then leader of the Conservative 
Party, Michael Howard, declared, “this country is completely united in our 
determination to defeat terrorism and to deal with those who are responsible 
for the appalling acts that we have seen today.”12 As a G8 summit took place 
                                                          
4 Barrie Sheldon, “9/11 and the UK response.” In Policing Terrorism, ed. by Christopher Blake 
et al., (London: SAGE, 2012), 89-90.  
5 BBC, “Bali death toll set at 202,” February 19, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2778923.stm 
Tony Parkinson, “Bin Laden voices new threat to Australia,” The Age, November 14, 2002. 
6 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, 31. 
7 Sheldon, “9/11 and the UK response,” 90. 
8 Ibid., 91. 
9 English, Terrorism: How to Respond, 56. 
10 Omand, “What Should be the Limits of Western Counter-Terrorism Policy?,” 68. 
11 BBC, “Blair says 'terror will not win',” July 7, 2005 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4659933.stm 
12 Ibid. 
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at the time of the attack, the G8 leaders delivered a common statement just 
hours after the bombings. The G8 leaders emphasized solidarity with the 
British by declaring that the blasts were "an attack not on one nation but on 
all nations and civilised people everywhere".13 Thus, similar to reactions on 
9/11, a wave of solidarity expressions was uttered. Blair further declared on 
behalf of the G8 leaders, that the “bombings will not weaken in any way our 
resolve to […] defeat those who would impose their fanaticism and extremism 
on all of us.”14 Thereby Blair delivered the official reasoning for additional 
counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism measures.15  
Indeed, during a press conference on August 5, 2005, Tony Blair 
declared that “the rules of the game are changing”, and argued for new 
thinking in face of terror threats, signifying a harsher policy line in order to 
prevent terrorism. The tone of British authorities and policymakers became 
more resolute in the aftermath of the attack in London. John Reid, then Home 
Secretary, held that [we] “may have to modify some of our freedoms in the 
short-run in order to prevent their abuse by those who oppose our fundamental 
values and would destroy our freedoms and values in the long-term.”16 The 
Head of the MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller agreed: “The world has changed 
and there needs to be a debate on whether some erosion of what we all value 
may be necessary to improve the chances of our citizens not being blown apart 
as they go about their daily lives.”17 
  As can be seen from the quotations above the proclamation of a game 
change included the UK government’s understanding of human rights as a 
norm in this fight against terrorism. Human rights protection and effective 
terrorism policies were rather seen as policy options that exclude each other.18 
Indeed, human rights lost their status of importance in general policymaking 
                                                          
13 The Guardian, “Full text: G8 leaders' statement,” July 7, 2005. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jul/07/g8.july7 
14 Ibid. 
15 As mentioned earlier, scholars such as Conor Gearty, Adrian Guelke and Richard English 
have criticized Western politicians for generalizing violence against states as challenges “to the 
liberal democratic order itself,” and for their lack of self-criticism in regard to the occurrence 
of terror attacks. 
16 John Reid, August 9, 2006, quoted in Landman, “The United Kingdom: The Continuity of 
Terror and Counterterror,” 75. 
17 Manningham-Buller, September 1, 2005, quoted in Landman, “The United Kingdom: The 
Continuity of Terror and Counterterror,” 75. However, to be fair, government voices demanding 
the importance of rule of law and freedom rights could be heard as well. For instance, when 
Jack Straw, Home Secretary at the time pointed out that: “we will have handed the terrorists the 
victory that they seek, if in combating their threats and violence, we descend to their level and 
undermine the essential freedoms and rule of law that are the bedrock of our democracy.” Clive 
Walker, “Policy Options and Priorities: British Perspectives”, In Confronting Terrorism: 
European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, ed. by Marianne van Leeuwen (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 17.  
18 I will come back to the relationship between those two concepts in the discussion chapter of 
this thesis. 
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in the UK after 2001. The Labour government held the view that Islamist 
extremism could only be defeated by passing a series of harsh anti-terrorism 
laws, and often, the government bought into a discourse of danger. This 
allowed for measures such as indefinite detention to be adopted, or for the UK 
to construct a dense network of surveillance, undermining privacy rights and 
other human rights obligations (see below).19  
The attacks of July 2005 clearly increased the threat perception in the 
UK. In a 2006 European Values Survey, the overwhelming majority of UK 
citizens (ninety-one percent) expressed that they feared a terror attack to occur 
in the course of twelve months ‘somewhere in Europe’ (forty-eight percent 
deemed this very likely, another forty-three percent likely). The ninety-one 
percent of UK citizens who feared such an attack constituted the highest value 
among the twenty-three European countries included in the survey. In the 
following years, the number of citizens fearing an immediately forthcoming 
terror attack slightly decreased, but still represented a big majority of UK 
citizens. In 2008, eighty-five percent deemed an attack for either very likely 
(thirty-one percent) or likely (fifty-four percent), which still constituted the 
highest number of the original twenty-three countries included in the survey.20 
The UK has since 2005 witnessed a range other acts of terrorism on 
the British mainland, including some failed attacks. Already two weeks after 
the bombings on July 7, 2005, another suicide-bombing attempt took place in 
London. Arguably inspired by the 7/7 attacks, several suicide bombers 
planned to detonate bombs in London’s public transport system. Luckily, only 
the detonators exploded and nobody was harmed.21 Another failed attack, 
which gained prominence, played out in August 2006. Al-Qaeda affiliates had 
planned to explode several transatlantic planes - departing from the UK - mid-
air (by use of liquid explosives). The British police disrupted the plan, which 
could have led to hundreds or more than a thousand victims.22 London saw 
another failed bombing attempt in June 2007. Two car bombs were placed in 
the Haymarket area but were discovered before detonation.23 A further 
example of a failed attack was an attempt to drive a car with explosives into 
Glasgow Airport on June 30, 2007 (the attempt was linked to the Haymarket 
plot). However, security-bollards stopped the vehicle before the building so 
                                                          
19 Tim Dunne, “The Rules of the Game are Changing: Fundamental Human Rights in Crisis 
After 9/11,” International Politics, Vol. 44 (2007): 280-281. 
20 Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldova, “Perception of Terrorism and Security and the Role 
of Media,” Paper prepared for the 7th ECPR General Conference (2013): 9-10. In 2008, the 
threat perception was according to this survey slightly higher in Israel and Turkey, however, 
these countries had not been included in the 2006 survey. 
21 However, an innocent Brazilian citizen was shot and killed a day later by the police, as he 
was confounded with one of the perpetrators. BBC, “Attacks, escapes and arrests,” July 11, 
2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6752991.stm. 
22 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, 30. 
23 Vikram Dodd et al., "Two car bombs found in London," The Guardian, June 29, 2007. 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/jun/29/terrorism.uksecurity 
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that nobody was seriously harmed (besides the driver of the car). All of these 
attempted attacks were afterward classified as attempts of Islamist terrorism.24 
Further attacks, still in the planning stage, were prevented by the authorities 
(the exact number is unclear, as well as many details on prevented attacks, a 
consequence of the secretive nature of anti/counter-terrorism bodies).25 
After several years with an increased occurrence of Islamist terror 
attacks in Western states at the beginning of the twenty-first century (roughly 
between 2001-2006), the frequency of Islamist attacks in Western countries 
decreased for a number of years (roughly 2006-2011). Al-Qaeda, the 
organization responsible for the majority of big attacks in the first half of the 
zero years had lost momentum, both in terms of organizational structure and 
support. Still, the occasional Islamist attack took place in Western countries, 
without being coordinated by an overall organization. This picture changed 
once again with the start of an IS terror campaign, which to begin with stroke 
in the European periphery (e.g. Tunisia and Egypt), but finally started to target 
European capitals as well. Both, coordinated attacks and ‘lone wolf’ attacks 
are part of IS terrorism. Consequently, the threat perception of governments 
and the public in European countries rose again. For instance, the British 
authorities raised the official threat level triggered by Islamist terrorism in the 
UK from ‘substantial’ to ‘severe’ (the latter indicating that a terror attack is 
highly likely).26 Accordingly, Theresa May, then the UK’s Home Secretary, 
evaluated in 2015, that “a terrorist attack in this country [the UK] is now 
highly likely.”27 
An act of Islamist terrorism had already taken place in 2013 with the 
beheading of British soldier Lee Rigby in broad daylight in the streets of the 
inner city of London on May 22, 2013.28 Rigby, who was off-duty, was 
attacked and killed with knives and a cleaver by two British men of Nigerian 
descent. The attackers remained with the body until police arrived, stating 
revenge for Muslims killed by British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan as their 
motive to passers-by. The perpetrators charged at the police as well, before 
                                                          
24 Mark Townsend, Jo Revill and Paul Kelbie, "Terror threat 'critical' as Glasgow attacked," 
The Guardian, July 1, 2007. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/jul/01/terrorism.world2 
25 In March 2017, UK authorities, however, reported that thirteen terror attacks would have 
been prevented in the UK since 2013, often based on information and hints form the public. 
BBC, “Security services 'prevented 13 UK terror attacks since 2013',” March 6, 2017. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-39176110. 
26 ‘CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism: Annual Report for 
2015, 7. 
27 Foreword to ‘CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism: 
Annual Report for 2014. 
28 According to the definition of terrorism used in this thesis this case qualifies for being labeled 
terrorism, whereas other definitions would refrain from categorizing this act as terrorism, since 
the target was not civilians but a soldier and police officers. 
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being shot and wounded.29 Another terror attack that increased the threat 
perception in the UK played out in Tunisia. During a shooting at a tourist 
resort near Sousse in June 2015, thirty-eight people were killed and thirty-nine 
injured. Although this attack did not take place in the UK, the targeting of 
British nationals makes it relevant for the perception of threat in the UK (thirty 
of the thirty-eight killed and twenty-six of the thirty-nine wounded held UK 
passports). A single gunman with contacts to the organization Ansar-al-Sharia 
carried out the attack.30 In 2017, the British public was struck by three IS-
related attacks in the UK. During the first, in March 2017, the first bigger 
terror attack in the UK since 2005, an attacker drove a car into pedestrians on 
Westminster Bridge in London and subsequently stabbed a police officer at 
the parliament building. The attack killed five and injured nearly fifty. In May 
2017, a bomb attack on a concert in Manchester killed twenty-two people, 
including many children and teenagers. Moreover, in June 2017, seven people 
were killed by terrorists on and around London Bridge, when the attackers 
drove into pedestrians and subsequently stabbed passersby.31    
Although Islamist terrorism shaped the understanding and perception 
of terrorism in the UK after 9/11, non-Islamist terror attacks (or attempted 
attacks) took place as well in the UK. One example is a letter bomb campaign 
conducted by Miles Cooper a former caretaker, playing out in 2007. He sent 
letter bombs to institutions and companies, which in his opinion were taking 
part in building a surveillance state. The explosives were luckily only of minor 
magnitude and the victims suffered only minor injuries.32 A series of incidents 
                                                          
29 Rashmi Singh, “Counter-Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era: successes, Failures and Lessons 
Learned,” In Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 39. The Telegraph. “Lee Rigby murder timeline, by 
prosecution,” November 29, 2013. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10483853/Lee-Rigby-murder-
timeline-by-prosecution.html. 
30 Robert Mendick et al., "'Why weren’t we told of Sousse suicide bomber?’," The Telegraph, 
July 4, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11718614/Why-
werent-we-told-of-Sousse-suicide-bomber.html. 
31 Spiegel Online, “Westminster-Anschlag: Die Ereignisse in London im Überblick,” March 
23, 2017. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/london-die-ereignisse-des-anschlags-im-
ueberblick-a-1140102.html 
BBC, ”Westminster attack: What happened,” April 7, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
39355108 
The Guardian, ”Manchester attack: UK threat level reduced from critical to severe – as it 
happened,” September 21, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/live/2017/may/26/manchester-attack-arrest-police-search-accomplices-live. Caroline 
Davies, ”London Bridge attack: last of eight victims identified as Xavier Thomas,” The 
Guardian, June 7, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/07/london-bridge-
attack-last-of-eight-victims-identified-as-xavier-thomas. 
32 This example is especially interesting, since it in its motive directly answered to increased 
anti-terrorism measures (surveillance). “BBC, Man convicted over letter bombs,” September 
27, 2007. 
196 
 
that can be categorized as xenophobic terrorism took place in 2013. Pavlo 
Lapshyn, a Ukrainian Ph.D. student, stabbed and killed an elderly Muslim and 
placed in the following months three bombs around Mosques in order to 
‘trigger a race war’ as he confessed in court. The bombs did only by chance 
not injure anybody.33 The UK public and the broader European public was 
shocked in June 2016 by a political murder, which must be categorized as 
right-wing terrorism. On June 16, 2016, Joe Cox, a British Labour MP, was 
stabbed and shot to death on open-street after a constituency meeting. The 
perpetrator had right-wing motives for committing the atrocity.34 The death of 
Joe Cox shook the British public (albeit it was caught in an intense debate 
regarding the upcoming Brexit referendum). In June 2017, a right-wing 
extremist drove a van into the crowd outside of a mosque, killing one and 
injuring twelve.35 Prevented right-wing attacks included e.g., an attack on a 
gay pride event in a pub in June 2017.36  
Many of the mentioned cases triggered a vast echo in mainstream 
media, as well as social media and emphasized - together with cases of 
terrorism from other parts of the Western World - the threat of terrorism in the 
eyes of the British public. This is especially valid for the Islamist attacks. 
Clearly, Islamist terrorism is currently defined as the main terrorist threat in 
the UK, especially IS and individuals declaring allegiance to IS are seen as a 
severe threat (defined e.g. in the annual CONTEST reports). Terrorism by 
(Northern-) Irish dissidents is considered the second biggest terror threat, 
although it is perceived as being confined to Northern Ireland and by far not 
as severe as the threat by Islamists. The threat from right-wing extremists was 
for many years after 9/11 evaluated as relatively low.37 This perception is 
potentially slowly starting to change in the UK, given the right-wing terror 
incidents mentioned above. Signs for such a change of perception can be 
                                                          
33 The Guardian, “Student gets 40 years for terror campaign against Muslims,” October 25, 
2013. 
 http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/student-40-years-terror-campaign-
muslims. 
34 Claire Phipps, Andrew Sparrow and Chris Johnston, "Jo Cox MP killed in West Yorkshire - 
how the day unfolded," The Guardian, March 13, 2018. 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2016/jun/16/eu-referendum-live-osborne-brexit-
budget-leave-tories. Dave Higgens and Amy Murphy, "Thomas Mair: The far-right extremist 
who murdered MP Jo Cox," The Independent, November 23, 2016. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/thomas-mair-guilty-tommy-verdict-jo-cox-
mp-murder-trial-court-latest-quiet-neighbour-a7434011.html. 
35 Kevin Rawlinson, "Darren Osborne jailed for life for Finsbury Park terrorist attack," The 
Guardian, February 2, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/feb/02/finsbury-
park-attack-darren-osborne-jailed 
36 Lizzie Dearden, "Ethan Stables trial: Neo-Nazi convicted of planning terror attack at gay 
pride event," The Independent, February 5, 2018. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/ethan-stables-trial-latest-convicted-terror-
offence-neo-nazi-far-right-gay-pride-cumbria-leeds-court-a8194996.html. 
37 CONTEST Annual Report for 2015, 7-8. 
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deduced from statements of high stake security officials, e.g., Mark Rowley 
Assistant Commissioner at the Metropolitan Police remarked in 2018 that “the 
right-wing terrorist threat is more significant and more challenging than 
perhaps the public debate gives it credit for,” and pointed to a “growth of right-
wing terrorism.”38 Additionally, the UK is planning to issue threat-level 
warnings for right-wing terrorism in the future as was reported in March 
2019.39 
Despite the described series of terror attacks, it is important to 
mention that the number of terror victims in the UK since 2001 has been rather 
low when compared to the number of victims counted during the Troubles. 
2005 and 2017 were the outlier years, due to the attack in London in 2005 and 
several attacks in 2017. Otherwise, there were less than ten victims for each 
year between 2001 and 2015 according to data by the Global Terrorism 
Database (these data exclude British victims abroad, as e.g. caused by the 
attacks on Bali and Indonesia). The number of victims varied between sixty 
and 370 for all years between 1971 and 1992, most of them caused in Northern 
Ireland.40 Nevertheless, the threat perception has been high regarding attacks 
on mainland UK. In the same context, the policies of the British state to tackle 
terrorism were both extended in scope and severity. 
One of the cornerstones for British anti-terrorism since 2003 has been 
the British ‘Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ CONTEST (COuNter TErrorism 
STrategy).41 I will shortly elucidate its major features. The UK developed a 
counter-terrorism strategy in the years after 9/11, in order to gain groundwork 
for its terrorism policy. The strategy was first drafted in 2003 by the British 
Home Office (e.g., under the collaboration of former GCHQ Director David 
Omand). It aimed at reducing the risk of international terrorism.  It was made 
publicly available – in a revised version - only in 2006. Since then the strategy 
has been revised three times, the latest version stems from 2018; the main 
principles, however, remained the same. The CONTEST strategy contains 
four different categories or streams of action, called the ‘four P’s’, these are, 
‘Prevent’, ‘Protect’ ‘Pursue’ and ‘Prepare’.42 Prevent and Pursue are broadly 
                                                          
38 Lizzie Dearden, “Four far-right UK terrorist plots foiled since Westminster attack, police 
reveal," The Independent, February 26, 2018. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/terror-attacks-uk-threat-far-right-national-
action-isis-nazis-westminster-finsbury-park-a8229876.html 
39 Vikram Dodd, “UK to start issuing far-right terrorism alerts," The Guardian, March 19, 
2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/19/uk-to-start-issuing-far-right-
terrorism-alerts 
40 Numbers retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database. 
41 Despite being labelled Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the strategy mainly contains anti-
terrorism measures in the understanding of this thesis. 
42 CONTEST, The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, July 2011. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy
-contest.pdf  
Omand, “What Should be the Limits of Western Counter-Terrorism Policy?” 65. 
198 
 
speaking supposed to reduce the likelihood of terror attacks, whereas Protect 
and Prepare are supposed to reduce the vulnerability of the country to terror 
attacks.43 
‘Prevent’ measures are supposed “to stop people becoming terrorists 
or supporting terrorism.” Measures under this stream of CONTEST include 
the tackling of radicalization and the confrontation of ideologies that justify 
violence. Richard Chalk (from the British Home Office) denoted such efforts 
as trying to create a “counter-narrative space.”44 This includes e.g., the 
removal of radical online content. But also programs that attempt to reduce 
the likelihood of people turning to violence have been created.45 In connection 
with radicalization, factors such as discrimination and disadvantage are taken 
into regard as well, pointing to underlying social issues. Andrew Silke 
evaluated that Prevent is the stream “most keenly aimed at winning the battle 
for hearts and minds.”46 Therein, Prevent is in part aiming at tackling root 
causes, with a clear focus on Islamist radicalism. However, control methods, 
such as detection and referral of individuals, carried out by state authorities 
are a large part of the stream as well.47 For instance, in the latest years, UK 
authorities have started to demand public institutions such as universities or 
schools to report instances of seemingly radicalized individuals. This new 
approach non-surprisingly caused a wave of heated debate concerning the 
right of freedom of expression (see below).48 
‘Pursue’ applies to methods aimed at “identifying and disrupting 
existing terrorist networks and operations.”49 Measures collected under Pursue 
are broadly aimed at curbing or stopping terrorist activity as early as possible. 
Intelligence is a vital instrument for this purpose, especially in order to 
identify and understand threats in the first place.50 Thus, increased cooperation 
of intelligence services in order to strengthen the capabilities of identifying 
threats is a focal point of Pursue. Other focal points of Pursue are e.g., the 
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disruption of terror sponsors, or the collection of evidence in order to secure a 
conviction.51 
‘Protect’ methods are, put simply, supposed to strengthen the UK’s 
protection against terrorism by reducing the country’s vulnerability. One 
measure for this purpose is enhanced border security. Another central 
objective is ‘target hardening’, the process of making it harder for terrorists to 
hit specific potential sites of terrorism. Especially critical infrastructure 
(facilities that would cause high disruption of public life if attacked), has 
received such ‘target hardening’ measures. Examples of relevant sites are the 
UK’s transport system or energy supply system. The ever-increasing trend of 
surveillance of public places in the UK is related to Protect as well. 
‘Prepare’ aims at mitigating the impact of terror attacks. ‘Prepare’ 
measures are resting on the assumption that not all terror attacks can be 
prevented. The creation of capacities to react to such attacks is thus the aim of 
the last stream. The focus is first of all on risk and impact assessment and the 
development of scenarios for attacks. Based on such assessment and scenarios, 
the construction of fitting response capabilities, as well as the provision of 
effective training to respond to potential terror attacks are the central aim of 
Prepare.52 
The CONTEST strategy was met by criticism from both civil rights 
groups and parts of the media. Criticism aimed e.g., at the question whether 
non-violent protesting and dissenting could be criminalized, how far human 
rights restrictions should go in the course of anti-terrorism policymaking and 
whether the CONTEST strategy is simply a forerunner for further 
restrictions.53 Since 2011 annual CONTEST reports have been implemented 
which follow up on recent developments in UK terrorism policy (in the 
framework of the CONTEST strategy). 
Although the CONTEST strategy connects to specific measures that 
are proposed under each category, the overall framework of the strategy is 
rather broad. Thus, it appears that the strategies on terrorism are consciously 
constructed in broad categories by policymakers, so as to leave a high amount 
of leeway for adapting to specific situations and threats, narrowly defined 
strategies would limit the options of reacting on terrorism. However, too broad 
and vague strategies might lead to confusion among public security organs 
and administrations and are thus potentially counter-productive. 
Several points can be taken from this section on British terrorism 
context since 9/11. First, the threat by Islamist terrorism has indeed been on 
the rise in the UK since 2001, especially during the years 2001-2006 and again 
since 2013. However, right-wing political violence and terrorism have 
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featured as a threat as well. Second, the perception of terrorism as a threat has 
mostly been circling around Islamist terrorism. It is thus not a surprise, that 
most efforts to tackle the problem of terrorism focused on Islamists as 
potential perpetrators, which is valid for the major legislative acts adopted by 
the British parliament as well as the overall anti-terrorism strategy of the UK, 
CONTEST.54 The threat perception of terrorism did increase to rather high 
levels after 9/11 and the London attack of 2005, both among the public and 
government officials. Governments have perceived terrorism as a threat to 
British values and civilization and have tried to tackle the phenomenon by 
adopting harsher measures on a range of issues. Security was often seen as a 
priority, human rights lost their ‘momentum’ during the zero years. Still, the 
security situation in the UK during any of the years since 2001 cannot be 
regarded as resembling an emergency situation.55 In fact, the number of 
victims by terrorism were higher for almost all years of the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, new anti-terrorism policies were adopted 
continuously over the last eighteen years, many of them including rights 
evasive measures as will be seen below. 
 
UK Anti-Terrorism since 2001: A Human Rights Perspective 
As the UK has a long history of experience with terrorism, accordingly the 
country has a long history of anti-terrorism (and had already before 9/11 
accumulated more anti-terrorism legislation than almost any other developed 
democracy).56 Especially the anti-terrorism legislation and anti-terrorism 
measures concerning the conflict in Northern Ireland have shaped the British 
context. Todd Landman lists not less than twenty acts of counter-/anti-
terrorism legislation entering into force between 1967 and 2006.57 This legacy 
of British anti-terrorism has at times surfaced in the British response to the 
terror of 9/11 and the bombings of July 2005 in London (e.g., in relation to 
internment policies).58 
Still, the event of 9/11, gave anti-terrorism policymaking 
unprecedented momentum. David Omand explains, “after 9/11, measures 
were rushed through in the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 and 
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55 Todd Landman, "Imminence and Proportionality: The U.S. and U.K. Responses to Global 
Terrorism,” California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38 No. 1 (2007): 103. 
56 Dorle Hellmuth, Counterterrorism and the State: Western Responses to 9/11 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 139. 
57 Landman, “The United Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and Counterterror,” 81. 
58 Landman holds that “legislation passed just before 9/11 and since 9/11 has made the 
temporary […] measures adopted in the context of Northern Ireland permanent, deeper, and 
broader in scope.” Landman, “The United Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and 
Counterterror,” 78. 
201 
 
further counter-terrorist Acts then passed every year […].”59 Indeed,  several 
new acts of anti-terrorism legislation were implemented in the UK after 9/11, 
including the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 2005, the Terrorism Act of 2006, the Counter-Terrorism Act 
2008, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, and the 2016 
Investigatory Powers Act.60 I will present some of the major provisions of this 
legislation and will point to the human rights problems which some of these 
measures caused and still cause. 
Already before the events of 9/11, Britain saw with the Terrorism Act 
of 2000 new legislation on terrorism, which was not only an ‘update’ of the 
anti-terrorism legislation from the 1970s but also an attempt at constructing 
permanent anti-terrorism legislation. In other words, it replaced the 
‘preliminary’ anti-terrorism acts which had been implemented in the 1970s 
and 80s in the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland (although this 
legislation had been thought of as preliminary, it had existed for twenty-six 
years). It was the Labour Government under Tony Blair that established such 
permanent legislation. The major provisions of the act were the establishment 
of a new definition of terrorism, the creation of a list of proscribed 
international terror organizations, an extension of stop-and-search powers, 
including the ability to hold terror suspects without charge for up to seven 
days, and the introduction of new offenses related to terrorism. One of these 
newly implemented offenses was the incitement of terrorist acts overseas; 
another was the provision of training for a terrorist purpose, a third the 
collection of information, likely to be useful for anyone preparing a terror 
attack. 61 That these measures were based on the simultaneously established 
definition of terrorism shows how important institutionalized definitions of 
terrorism are for concrete anti-terrorism measures. 
In general, the new legislation provided a distinctive change of policy 
focus, away from legislation supposed to cover a very specific conflict in a 
specific area (Northern Ireland), to legislation that was supposed to cover all 
instances of terrorism.62 This legislative move was a reaction to the Good 
Friday Agreement from 1998.  
As mentioned, via the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000), the UK 
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established a new definition of terrorism. Again, terrorism policies can be 
expected to stand in relation to the understanding and definition of terrorism. 
In other words, in order to understand the reaction of authorities to terrorism, 
one needs to gain a picture of how these authorities see terrorism; I will, 
therefore, provide the relevant definition used in the UK. 
Thus, terrorism is, according to the TA 2000, constituted by action 
that, 
“(a) involves serious violence against a person,  
(b) involves serious damage to property,  
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the 
action,  
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public, or  
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic 
system.”63  
However, such actions (or the threat of such action) are only defined 
as terrorism, if they are designed to influence the government or to intimidate 
the public and be undertaken for the purpose of advancing a political, religious 
or ideological cause. The definition includes terrorist activities outside of the 
UK and includes influence on governments and publics other than the 
British.64 It is a peculiarity of this definition that it points out that the use of 
firearms or explosives constitutes terrorism even without the aim to influence 
the government or intimidate the public. What is the difference between 
attacks with guns and attacks committed by knives or by the use of vehicles, 
one may ask?65  
Later, with the Terrorism Act 2006, the UK introduced an amendment 
to its definition of terrorism from the Terrorism Act 2000. Now the definition 
not only included that terrorists might try to influence governments but also 
“an international governmental organisation,” the last would e.g., cover the 
EU as an intergovernmental and supranational organization.66 The Counter-
Terrorism Act 2008 widened the definition of terrorism to also include acts of 
violence based on racial causes, besides political, religious or ideological ones 
(although such violence arguably was already covered by the political or 
ideological causes mentioned in the TA 2000).67 
Reflecting on differences between scholarly definitions of terrorism 
provided earlier (Chapter 2) and state definitions, the UK definition omits two 
of the mentioned five typical categories of terrorism since there is no talk of 
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potential perpetrators or victims of terrorism. By omitting comments on some 
of the fault lines discussed earlier, the UK follows a trend of state definitions 
of terrorism, as most of them deliver intentionally rather broad and vague 
definitions (this can be seen for the definitions of all the three entities at the 
focus in this thesis).68   
By invoking the mentioned broad formulations, the definition spans 
over a large volume of potential acts of violence, including actions that are not 
only aiming at humans but things or objects as well (the inclusion of things as 
potential targets of terrorism is a trait of many state definitions). This 
broadness brings the problem that certain acts, which are normally not 
regarded as terrorism, could, in theory, be evaluated as such based on this 
definition. For instance, a riot damaging facilities of shops and banks, as seen 
in Europe in the course of the financial crises or during G8 and G20 summits, 
would qualify for terrorism according to this definition. The hacking of 
databases would under certain circumstances fall under the definition as 
well.69 Furthermore, the UK definition declared incitement to terrorism abroad 
illegal. However, the definition does not distinguish between foreign targets 
of terrorism, for example between groups applying violence against brutal, 
dictatorial regimes or extremist groups trying to topple established 
democracies.70 This circumstance created a problem. It was, in consequence, 
left unclear who in practice would be charged for such a fallacy and on what 
grounds. Practices of double standards were opened up for.71 The definition 
became highly important in subsequent years. It, basically, functioned as 
“lynchpin” of a range of further anti-terrorism measures (e.g., the ban of 
glorification of terrorism, see below).72 
The broadness of the UK’s terrorism definition was not only criticized 
by scholars in the field, e.g., Costigan and Stone (arguing that it sets a low 
threshold for the use of extended powers in course of terrorism policies), but 
even the UK’s Supreme Court. The court expressed concern regarding the fact 
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that extensive and intrusive police powers are based on such a wide definition 
and welcomed any narrowing of the definition. However, British legislators 
have delivered no such narrowing so far.73 
Although the TA 2000 passed before 9/11, it had some consequences 
after 2001 that are relevant for this thesis. Besides the newly established 
definition, the major relevant point for the purposes of this thesis is that the 
TA 2000 extended the police’s stop-and-search powers (under section 44 of 
the Act). The section allowed police officers to stop and search individuals for 
evidence of terrorism. In specifically designated areas, such searches could be 
conducted even without the presence of reasonable suspicion.74 In the 
following years, thousands of random searches of individuals in public places 
were conducted by the British police based on section 44. Todd Landman 
reports that the number of searches quadruplicated in the period 2001-05 
compared to the previous four years (from roughly 27.000 to 112.000). Human 
Rights Watch even reported 450.000 searches between 2007 and 2009. 
Several institutions and researchers claimed that members of minority groups 
and especially ‘Asian’ men (often of Pakistani or Bangladeshi ethnic origin) 
were strongly over-represented amongst those searched by the police.75 
Numbers by the Metropolitan Police showed that the increase of searches of 
black or Asian people was considerably higher in comparison to Whites in the 
years between 2001 and 2003.76 Newer numbers provided by a study 
published by the Police Foundation confirmed this trend, especially the 
increase of searches of members of the Asian community.77 Researchers 
Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton concluded in a 2009 publication that 
stop-and-search-practices provided day-to-day harassment of Muslims.78 A 
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study by Stefano Bonino from 2015 reported discriminatory tendencies in UK 
police practices.79 A study by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and 
counter-terrorism confirmed such trends.80 In the summer of 2012, sixteen 
NGOs officially complained to the Home Secretary over such tendentious 
profiling practices. They claimed that such practices destroyed trust and 
triggered resentment and negative relations between the targeted groups and 
the police.81 Clearly, although the practice was in theory aimed at terror 
suspects, in practice it was (mis-)used, also for other purposes than the practice 
of apparent racial profiling described above. For instance, in 2003 protesters 
against the Iraq war were stopped under section 44 during a protest march to 
an RAF base (thereby arguably undermining freedom of expression and 
assembly).82 In the face of these problems of the TA 2000, the Act triggered 
“plenty of public controversy”, as Whittaker explains. The Act was also in the 
public debate criticized for contributing to further alienation of the Muslim 
community in the country.83 
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Later in 2010, the ECtHR ruled that section 44 of the TA 2000 
violated article 8 of the ECHR, the right to private and family life. The ruling 
was based on stop-and-search powers not being “sufficiently circumscribed” 
and in lack of "adequate legal safeguards against abuse." The court 
furthermore criticized the fact that searches could be carried out without any 
tangible suspicion. Therefore, it actually concluded that stop-and-search 
powers were not ‘in accordance with the law,’ as demanded for eligibly 
limiting rights obligations under the ECHR. The ECtHR moreover held that 
"the risks of the discriminatory use of the [stop and search] powers" were "a 
very real consideration". The ECtHR thus overruled a verdict by the British 
High Court from 2003, which had held that potential rights violations via stop-
and-search powers were proportionate in light of the threat of terrorism.84 
Section 44 was thus repealed and replaced by a similar section (47A), which 
can only be used under stricter provisions (e.g., a search can only be 
authorized by a senior officer if there is ‘reasonable suspicion’ that a terror 
attack will take place).85  
From a spirit of rights perspective, it can be claimed that 
discriminatory tendencies in stop-and-search practices undermine the wider 
human rights aims of equal justice and freedom and inflict with a general 
notion of equal human dignity. Clearly, the mentioned statistics document 
extensive and precautionary use of the practice, and furthermore usage which 
reflects an unequal practice of security organs and an unequal treatment of 
certain groups in society. This inflicts with the wider human rights idea of 
equal protection by the law for all individuals, in other words, equal justice. 
A situation in which some parts of society have to give up more of their rights 
in order to reach an alleged increase of security (as mentioned Jeremy 
Waldron warned against such trends) does not reflect such notions of equal 
justice (or equal recognition and respect) and undermines the perception of 
being ‘as good as everyone else’. Now, if certain individuals lose more rights 
than others, and are treated differently than others only based on their 
ethnicity, their general human dignity is under attack as well since feelings of 
unjustified unequal recognition from the side of the state might be triggered. 
This can lead to the creation of grievances, which might heighten tensions in 
society and turn out counter-productive from a security perspective. The 
notion of dignity is additionally undermined as search practices furthermore 
interfere with one’s right to privacy (privacy was defined as being of essential 
importance for the notion of dignity). Stop-and-search practices furthermore 
limit the overall level of freedom individuals enjoy instead of limiting the 
power of the state versus individuals’ freedom and autonomy (but rather 
extend state power). The practice moreover undermines the human capability 
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of moving freely from place to place (and of being treated in a dignified 
fashion). Reflecting the stop-and-search practice, already a piece of anti-
terrorism legislation that was implemented before 9/11 (but continued after) 
came into trouble in terms of human rights obligations, due to lacking 
safeguards and skewed everyday usage of the measure. These issues should 
become recurring problems.  
 
 Indefinite Detention and Control Orders 
The 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) was adopted in 
the direct context of the 9/11 attacks. For example, Britain’s Defence 
Secretary Geoff Hoon saw the country after 9/11 as a “prime target” and in a 
state of emergency.86 ATCSA was thus formed as an attempt to eradicate 
loopholes of earlier legislation and to implement “a rigorous system of 
protection and deterrence.”87 The Act formed a quite comprehensive and 
detailed document, including fourteen sections and twenty-seven schedules. 
Based on the dramatic events of 9/11, the act “was rushed through 
Parliament.”88 Some of the major provisions involved: the interception of 
“communications data […] for the purpose of safeguarding national security” 
(the providers were asked to volunteer to cooperate), the regularization of 
certain police powers (e.g., in regard to stop-and-search-arrests and 
examinations of persons and vehicles), the freezing of terrorist cash and 
property, the establishment of “incitement to racial or religious hatred” as a 
penal offence and stricter control of air transport and nuclear facilities. The 
most far-reaching and questionable part of the 2001 Act was, however, the 
provision enabling indefinite detention of foreign terror suspects, without 
charge or trial.89 Such indefinite detention could be based on vague claims of 
“national security grounds.” The British government thus excluded 
noncitizens from the same degree of legal protection in case of being 
suspected of terrorism.90 With the measure of indefinite detention, the UK 
derogated from article 5 of the ECHR (the right to liberty of person). The 
British government issued a notice of derogation to the Council of Europe and 
argued for such derogation from the standpoint of a perceived public 
emergency “threatening the life of the nation.”91 Therein, the UK was at that 
                                                          
86 Cited in David Whittaker, Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat (London: Longman 
Pearson, 2002), 176. Hoon added – in a lower key – that terrorism would require “integrated 
political, economic, legal and military actions.” 
87 Whittaker, Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat, 175. 
88 Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, 49. Indeed the act was adopted just three 
months after 9/11. 
89 Whittaker, Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat, 175. Landman, “The United 
Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and Counterterror,” 83. 
90 Paul Hoffman, “Human Rights and Terrorism,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26 (2004): 
947. 
91 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, 212.  
Liberty, "Liberty Briefing on Derogations and the Human Rights Act," September 2016. 
208 
 
time the only EU member state to have declared a state of emergency after 
9/11.92 During indefinite detention, evidence could be kept secret and no 
communication with supplied lawyers was allowed. With this, the British 
government denied such detainees the right to an effective defense. The 
British government thereby further interfered with article 6 of the ECHR and 
article 14 of the ICCPR, which emphasize the right to a fair trial.93 
However, the Act did not pass without scrutiny by the House of Lords 
or civil liberties/human rights organizations.94 Members of the British upper 
chamber uttered concern about the conventional presumption of innocence 
before any conviction of guilt as being in danger.” There was also worry about 
“the prospect of the authorities trawling through confidential emails and 
Internet browsing.”95 Human rights lawyer and Amnesty International activist 
Paul Hoffman criticized the UK for applying discriminatory tendencies by 
excluding noncitizens from the same legal protections in case of being 
suspected of terrorism.96 The Lords thus provided for certain concessions, so 
that full legal representation of the suspects had to be provided.97 Still, the 
overwhelming core of the ATCSA stayed intact and the provisions mentioned 
above entered into law, including indefinite detention for foreign terrorism 
suspects.98 Consequently, eight foreign terror suspects were picked up in the 
week following the adoption of the ATCSA, more followed in the years 
after.99 
However, in December 2004, the Law Lords (then the UK’s highest 
judicial authority) deemed indefinite detention of foreign terror suspects 
incompatible with Britain’s own Human Rights Act of 1998 and the ECHR. 
It was thus eventually abolished in March 2005. The Lord’s evaluation was 
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based on a breach of the right to liberty (art. 5 ECHR), as well as the 
discriminatory policy of indefinitely detaining foreign nationals only; 
providing a violation of the right to non-discrimination (art. 14 ECHR). The 
Lords deemed that a state of emergency allowing for a derogation of these 
rights was not observable; hence, indefinite detention was evaluated as 
unproportional.100 Law Lord Hoffman defended the ruling by claiming, “the 
real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance 
with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but 
from laws such as these.”101 The ruling constituted a debacle for the British 
government. Reflecting on ATCSA – with the fate of its major provision in 
mind - David Whittaker concluded that the ATCSA was a “tentative flexing 
of government muscle” and that “the balance between security and liberty in 
the context of threats from international terrorism was never got quite 
right.”102 Thus, already the first major anti-terrorism legislation, implemented 
in the UK after 9/11 violated legal human rights obligations of the country.  
The legal fate of indefinite detention in the early 2000s does not 
constitute a surprise when reflecting upon an earlier piece of British legislation 
enabling for the detention of terror suspects. In 1974, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act enabled for the detention of terror suspects without charge for 
up to seven days (initially forty-eight hours, however, another five days could 
be added).103 The UK government argued that its policy was defendable under 
article 15 of the ECHR, which allows for derogation from most human rights 
norms in times of emergency. However, the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled later that the 1974 Act violated article 5 of the ECHR, which demands 
authorities to bring suspects ‘promptly’ before a judge.104 Thus, if seven days 
of internment without charge were not eligible according to article 5 in the 
1970s, the non-eligibility of indefinite detention in the 2000s was rather 
predetermined (especially since the threat level was not lower during the 
Troubles in the 1970s than three decades later). 
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From a spirit of rights perspective, the measure of indefinite detention, 
established via the ATCSA undermined the wider human rights aim of equal 
justice for all individuals since it was only aimed at foreigners. Clearly, a 
detention measure that aims only at a specific minority does not reflect the 
rights ideal of equal worth and recognition of all individuals in society. The 
state did furthermore not live up to its obligation to deliver an equal amount 
of rights protection to all individuals in society, rather the opposite; again a 
certain group had to concede more rights than the rest of society. The measure 
additionally undermined the notion of universal human dignity, since the 
restriction of justice pertaining to only a certain group, exclusively based on 
their nationality, does not reflect the idea that every individual earns an equal 
amount of respect and recognition and possesses an equal amount of worth; 
or in Kantian terms, is to an equal degree an end in itself (from the perspective 
of authorities). Furthermore, by detaining certain individuals indefinitely, 
without charge or trial, in other words, not setting a clear limitation and 
definition of punishment, and not providing the opportunity for defense or 
acquittal in a regular trial, the measure attacked the general notion of rule of 
law. This in itself, disregarding the discriminatory component, undermines the 
wider aim of justice, as it erodes one of the major principles of establishing 
justice in free societies. However, as mentioned earlier, since detention brings 
humans into a most vulnerable condition, detention schemes must seek to 
uphold the concept of rule of law to a maximal degree. Furthermore, indefinite 
detention undermined the human capabilities of moving freely, social 
interaction, and of being treated in a dignified way.  
However, despite the fact that the UK undermined valid human rights 
law and the general idea of human rights, already in its first bigger piece of 
anti-terrorism legislation after 9/11, the government continued with a course 
of anti-terrorism policymaking that went to the boundaries of what is 
permissible in terms of human rights obligations; and not infrequently these 
boundaries were crossed (instead of trying to avoid further human rights 
violations). A historical comparison shows that rights infringing detention and 
internment measures were not a novelty in a British anti-terrorism context. 
Wide-scale internment campaigns had been carried out before by British 
authorities, however, rather abroad than in the homeland. Examples are (as 
mentioned) internment campaigns during the Troubles in Northern Ireland or 
while trying to face anti-colonial movements during the last decades of the 
British Empire. For instance, British forces had detained around two thousand 
individuals when facing a violent and terrorist campaign by the Cypriot 
nationalist group EOKA in 1958.105 Furthermore, from 1954 onwards the UK 
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launched a detention campaign against members of the  Kikuyu tribe in Kenia. 
The exact number of people interned in the detention and work camps is a 
highly debated issue, the estimated range spans from 80.000 to 320.000.106 In 
Northern Ireland, the British and Ulster authorities, implemented, as 
mentioned, harsh counter-measures against PIRA activity. One of them was 
the internment-without-trial initiative from 1971 to 1975 (Operation 
Demetrius).107 During the internment initiative, more than one thousand 
people were interned, under the alleged suspicion of being members of 
paramilitary units. However, most of the interned persons were neither 
members of PIRA nor its rival the Official IRA.108 Operation Demetrius and 
the detention campaigns in former colonies thus clearly reflect the critical 
nature of historical British terrorism policies and emphasize the legacy of 
rights-infringing measures in UK politics when trying to face terrorist threats. 
To the UK’s credit, one could, however, point out that the recent indefinite 
detention scheme did not lead to usage of internment as broad as during the 
Troubles.109 
After indefinite detention was declared to be in violation of binding 
human rights law, the British government initiated new policy measures on 
terror suspects. Thus, the government introduced the Prevention of Terrorism 
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Act 2005, which as its core provision included the measure of so-called 
control orders. The major aim of the new Act was to reach a new procedure 
for detention and deportation of terror suspects while ensuring the public that 
the government did not violate civil and human rights.110 
The control orders were supposed to function as a kind of substitute 
for the abolished detention practice. They gave the British Home Secretary the 
possibility to impose a range of restrictions on the liberty of terror suspects. 
They could be imposed on anyone inside the British jurisdiction.111 Control 
orders essentially regulated and restricted movement and communication 
options of terror suspects. Control orders, for example, included restrictions 
on the usage of mobile phones or the internet, restrictions concerning 
movement or residence, including the imposition of curfews and house arrest, 
forced relocations, restrictions of communication or association with other 
individuals, electronic tagging and in general constant monitoring. 
Furthermore, suspects were required to cooperate with surveillance of their 
communication or movements, as well as surrender their passports. Control 
orders could be imposed for up to twelve months at a time, with renewals 
possible; a breach of the orders could be punished with a prison sentence of 
up to five years.112 Conor Gearty evaluated that at their extreme the control 
                                                          
110 But not only control orders were implemented as a reaction to the abolishment of indefinite 
detention, a reform of detention of ‘regular’ terror suspects was implemented as well. In 2005, 
the government drafted an amendment to the upcoming Terrorism Act 2006 by which it should 
be made possible to hold terror suspects for ninety days, resting on the argument that ninety 
days granted police units more time for investigation. The legal timeframe for such arrests at 
the time was just fourteen days, stemming from the Terrorism Act 2000. Whittaker described 
opposition to the ninety days as “relentless,” and described these plans of the government as a 
“head-on challenge to traditional liberties.” The draft could not be upheld in face of fierce 
criticism and instead, the detention period was extended to twenty-eight days. Whittaker, 
Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, 70. Anthony Richards, “Countering the psychological 
impact of terrorism: Challenges for homeland security,” In The Psychology of Counter-
Terrorism, ed. by Andrew Silke (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 194. Later (in 2008) 
the UK government proposed an extension to forty-two days of detention without charge. 
However, the proposal was defeated in the House of Lords and the government was eventually 
unsuccessful with the proposal. Liberty, “Extended Pre-Charge Detention,” 
https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/countering-terrorism/extended-pre-
charge-detention. Richards, “Countering the psychological impact of terrorism,” 195. 
Hellmuth, Counterterrorism and the State. Public debate on this proposal was once again fierce, 
demonstrating, that human rights norms were not absent from public discourse on anti-terrorism 
measures in the UK; however, arguably in the minority position. Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism 
and Human Rights, 9. In 2011, under the coalition government, including the Liberal Democrats 
(2010-2015), the maximum amount of days of pre-charge detention was reduced to fourteen 
days. Nonetheless, this was still double the number of days than before 2003, more than three 
times the limit in comparison with someone suspected of murder, and more than in any other 
Western country (Ireland grants seven days of pre-charge detention, the US two and Canada 
just one). Liberty, “Extended Pre-Charge Detention.” 
111 Gearty, Liberty and Security, 91. 
112 Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, 50+68. Landman, “The United 
213 
 
orders could “imposition what is effectively house arrest.”113 A range of 
individuals thus became subject to a daily curfew of up to eighteen hours, 
without ever being faced with criminal charges. Secret evidence was used in 
the process. Control order thus operated outside of the regular law. Precedents 
of the control order regime can be traced in the British colonial emergency 
rule.114 In order to implement all control orders the British legislator, once 
again had to derogate from article 5 of the ECHR (for some of the most far-
going orders).115 
The establishment of the control orders triggered much controversy. 
David Whittaker reports of a “gale that blew in Parliament’s two Houses and 
in the press.”116 The House of Lords e.g. demanded an automatic expiry of the 
Act and claimed that judges rather than politicians should decide on the orders 
(this did however not become reality). Whittaker criticized that the Act 
enabled politicians to deprive citizens of their liberty, “under a thin veneer of 
legality”.117 Conor Gearty claimed that control orders might be used against 
others than terror suspects, for instance, civil libertarian protests and that they 
consequentially could have a negative influence on the political freedom in 
the UK.118 However, the British government claimed in 2007 that control 
orders would only be used against a limited number of persons, that each order 
would receive a mandatory review by the High Court and that strong 
safeguards would protect human rights of the affected individuals. The orders 
were evaluated to be a “necessary and proportionate response” to terror 
threats.119 In total fifty-two individuals (all suspected of connections to 
Islamist terrorism) were subject to control orders during their existence, a low 
number, given the potential of the legislation and the wider debate surrounding 
it. Some were living under the orders for only a few months, some for years.120  
The UK judiciary challenged the practice of control orders in several 
instances. In April 2006, High Court Judge Justice Sullivan branded the 
control orders as “an affront to justice.”121 In June 2006, Sullivan quashed 
                                                          
Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and Counterterror,” 84. Foley, Countering Terrorism in 
Britain and France, 215.  Matthew Ryder, “Control orders have been rebranded. Big 
problems remain,” The Guardian, January 28, 2011 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/jan/28/control-orders-
protection-of-freedoms-bill 
113 Gearty, “Terrorism and Human Rights,” 359. 
114 Gearty, Liberty and Security, 91. Roach, The 9/11 Effect, 240-243. 
115 Hellmuth, Counterterrorism and the State, 150-152. 
116 Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, 68. 
117 Ibid., 68-69. 
118 Gearty, “Terrorism and Human Rights,” 359. 
119 Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, 67. 
120 Gearty, Liberty and Security, 92. Some suspects absconded while being the subject of 
control orders. Peter Walker, “Control orders breach human rights, law lords say,” The 
Guardian, October 31, 2007. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/oct/31/terrorism.politics 
121 Vikram Dodd and Carlene Bailey, "Terror law an affront to justice - judge: Control orders 
breach human rights," The Guardian, April 13, 2006. 
214 
 
control orders against six terror suspects, based on his evaluation that they 
breached article 5 of the ECHR (the right to liberty of person) in an 
unproportional manner. Sullivan claimed that he had taken the importance of 
protecting the public into account, but that "human rights or international law 
must not be infringed or compromised".122 In 2007, the Law Lords demanded 
changes to the control order process. They declared that the practice of not 
giving the suspects insight into the evidence against them was ineligible. They 
additionally ruled that eighteen hour long curfews were indeed a breach of the 
human right to liberty of person. However, they ruled that shorter curfews 
were acceptable (possibly up to sixteen hours) and that the system as a whole 
could be upheld.123 Still, the successor regime to the indefinite detention 
scheme ran into legal problems as well, including a ruling acknowledging 
breaches of human rights obligations.  
Besides these legal issues, it is to be emphasized that the control 
orders arguably breached the spirit of rights. The rights ideas of justice (by 
imposing orders on individuals who did not face charges and based on secret 
evidence) and freedom (by imposing house arrests, etc.) were undermined.124 
The rights aim of equal justice was undermined since control orders were 
exclusively used against Islamist terror suspects. Therein, one might claim that 
control orders reinforced the mainstream perception of terror threats, and 
thereby contributed to a discriminatory tendency of UK anti-terrorism.125 
Again, the perception of discriminatory tendencies or the disregard of all 
humans’ equal worth can increase social tension and create security 
backlashes. The rights aim of freedom was negatively affected as well, since 
the orders undermined the physical dimension of freedom of those affected, 
since the orders lacked to set a sufficient limit to state control and power, and 
since control orders undermined freedoms of association and movement 
(again, of individuals who had not been charged according to ordinary judicial 
procedures, let alone convicted).126 Moreover, control orders interfered with 
the affected individuals’ human capabilities to move freely (to use one’s 
bodily freedom) or to social interaction. The negative interference with these 
rights aims and capabilities can be expected to have a detrimental effect on 
the perception of being recognized in one’s dignity and personhood by those 
affected. Being limited in a significant way in one’s abilities by control orders 
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must likely trigger a perception of not being regarded as a dignified individual 
by the state. The same effect might be spread among the minority that is 
reflecting those targeted by control orders (foremost Muslims).  
In light of the control orders’ legal troubles, the instrument was 
repealed in 2011 by the implementation of the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act (TPIM Act).127 The TPIM was, however, a ‘re-
branding’ (as claimed in the headline of a Guardian article on the matter) of a 
reduced version of the control orders, in other words leaving a good range of 
original control order instruments intact under a different name. Still, the 
TPIMs did not necessitate a derogation under article 5 of the ECHR any more. 
Control order measures that were abolished were the possibilities of forced 
relocation, total bans of internet or phone use, as well as the total prohibition 
of association with other individuals (restrictions of the last issues were, 
however, still possible). All the other measures (enumerated above) stayed in 
place under a different label (TPIMs).128 The TPIM thus provided a kind of 
‘control order light’.129 Therein, many of the spirit of rights problems that were 
elucidated for the control orders stayed intact as well (e.g., in relation to 
human capabilities, and the rights aims of freedom, justice, and dignity). The 
reform of control order measures into TPIMs was a compromise between the 
British Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats who were the minor part of 
the coalition government at the time. The latter had promised during their 
election campaign to “scrap control orders.” However, legislative reality 
played out slightly different.130 This shows that also parties, who are in 
principle strongly favoring civil liberties over an ever-expanding security 
apparatus, are ready to make concessions once in government.131 
 
 Terrorism Act 2006 - Banning the Glorification of Terrorism  
In 2006, the Terrorism Act 2006 was adopted. The Act was a reaction to the 
July 2005 bombings in London; it thus tried to close some perceived gaps in 
British legislation.132 An important legislative move of the 2006 Act was that 
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it made ‘glorification’ of terrorism a criminal offense since this could in the 
understanding of British legislators incite people to terrorism. The provision 
of or training in terrorist techniques was defined as a criminal offense as well, 
together with the distribution of material that might induce others to terrorism 
or that could be useful in terms of preparing terror acts (e.g. manuals for 
producing explosives).133 The Act defined that glorification was “a statement 
that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to 
whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other 
inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism.”134 In other words, the speech act is not required to incite to 
imminent violence, or to directly incite to violence, in order to be banned 
(other than e.g., in the US).135 The ban was not only valid for speech acts but 
could furthermore be utilized by police authorities to request internet 
providers to remove content that is evaluated (by the police) as “unlawfully 
terrorism-related.”136 The ban of glorification of terrorism built on another 
historical anti-terrorism legacy of the UK. During the Troubles, the UK had 
proscribed various kinds of expression in Northern Ireland associated with the 
IRA (or republicanism as such).137 The criminalization of ‘glorification’ of 
terrorism in 2006 caused fierce debate. It was claimed that the definition of 
glorification was too broad. Concern was that the provision would undermine 
freedom of expression and might be used in unintended cases (e.g. against 
groups trying to topple a foreign repressive regime).138 Jeremy Corbyn 
claimed that the ban of glorification would prevent legitimate debate.139 
The criminalization of glorification of terrorism led to twenty-three 
convictions per year (on average) in the years following its implementation. 
An example is the conviction of a student under section 2 of the Act 
(dissemination of terrorist publications). He had uploaded videos that showed 
attacks on forces of the international coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan. This 
upload resulted in a five-year jail sentence.140 The criminalization of terror 
glorification was clearly aimed at Islamist extremism, support for right-wing 
extremism, political violence or terrorism was not subject to charges under the 
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new legislation.141 Therein, the policy added to a tendentious trend in UK anti-
terrorism.142 
Entering a legal reflection on the ban of terror glorification, it has to 
be pointed out that no in-depth court ruling has been issued which declares the 
legislation for either eligible or ineligible.143 However, based on some of the 
specifics of the legislation one might argue that the legislation is placed in a 
legal grey area. First, the very wide definition used in the legislation makes it 
necessarily difficult to produce tangible handling of the legislation on an 
everyday basis and makes it difficult for all members of society to detect the 
legal boundaries of freedom of expression. Therein, individuals might not be 
able to predict which expression is permissible and which not. However, to be 
able to predict the consequences of one’s speech with a “reasonable certainty” 
is a legal demand. The vagueness of the provision on glorification can thus 
constitute a relevant legal problem for the legislation in the long run, as courts 
might demand a more narrow and clear definition which allows individuals to 
predict the consequences of speech acts.144 Second, the clear one-sided focus 
of the legislation on only one kind of terrorism and therein only one kind of 
social group might additionally be regarded as a problem with potential legal 
relevance. Since this might contribute to a discriminatory tendency, courts 
might evaluate such tendencies as a substantial enough reason to declare the 
legislation for ineligible. The fact that the discriminatory practice of the stop-
and-search scheme was one of the reasons for the ECtHR to declare the stop-
and-search legislation for rights invasive and ineligible supports this 
argument.145 Third, a valid piece of case law from the ECtHR indicates that 
the British glorification ban’s provision to also cover indirect 
“encouragement” might be ineligible. In 1999 the ECtHR ruled that Turkey 
had violated the right to freedom of expression via cracking down on cases of 
glorification of terrorism (in connection with PKK-related cases at the time), 
which did not directly incite to violence.146 Based on these points the UK’s 
glorification ban appears to exist in a legal grey area. 
From a spirit of rights perspective, the ban is very questionable. The 
very vague definition of glorification (‘likely to be understood by some 
members of the public’) opens up for a range of possible convictions under 
this law.147 In other words, it can be used in a disproportionate and extensive 
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manner. Such unclear provisions can, as mentioned, cause doubt amongst the 
public concerning the legality of certain public statements. A chilling effect 
on public debate is thus a possibility when very broad definitions of both 
‘glorification’ and ‘terrorism’ are used (as mentioned earlier both terms are 
defined broadly in the UK, amplifying the effect).148 The measure of 
criminalizing glorification of terrorism or dissemination of terrorist 
publications opens up for a grey area in which it is hard to draw the line 
between permissible dissent in the spirit of freedom of expression and 
ineligible cases of hate speech and incitement to violence.149 This grey area 
can potentially be used for banning controversial viewpoints or minority 
positions. However, freedom of expression should only be curtailed if public 
utterances or images are clearly supposed to lead to violence.150 When the 
glorification of a concept that is so fiercely debated and that does rest on a 
rather broad definition is criminalized, elements of arbitrariness will 
necessarily be created. Not to be misunderstood, the criminalization of certain 
speech acts that clearly try to incite (terrorist) violence or even call for 
concrete acts of (terrorist) violence can and should be punishable, however, 
there must be concrete evidence that a speech act or dissemination of material 
is doing just that (concretely inciting violence). A provision in the fashion of 
‘likely to be understood as such by somebody’ does not fulfill this demand. 
Moreover, the inherent discriminatory tendency of the ban on 
‘glorifying’ terrorism undermines the cornerstone concept of human rights 
which is a pursuit towards a dignified life for all humans, as well as the wider 
human rights aim of equal justice for all (based on the idea of equal human 
worth and equal recognition of one’s personhood). The almost exclusive focus 
on Islamist terrorism and therein the Muslim minority, in terms of items of 
expression that are to be banned, reflects a one-sided focus of security organs 
and provides thereby for unequal treatment of different groups in society. 
Again, one specific group appears to lose more of their right to free expression 
than the rest of society.151 Such an unequal treatment can stir further notions 
of injustice and discrimination among members of the Muslim community, as 
well as perceptions of interference with one’s dignity. As explained earlier, 
practices, as well as perceptions of discrimination, can construct grievances 
and alienation on the side of targeted minorities, in effect increasing the 
number of individuals who might be willing to use violent acts instead of 
peaceful measures of political protest. This is an especially valid point in a 
                                                          
celebrating the actions of Nelson Mandela in the 1960s. Stuart Macdonald, “Prosecuting 
suspected terrorists,” In Critical Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Lee Jarvis and 
Michael Lister (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 137. 
148 Costigan and Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 482-483. 
149 Art. 20 of the ICCPR states that: “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” 
150 Therein this thesis shares a viewpoint by Timothy Garton Ash, Free Speech: Ten Principles 
for a Connected World (London: Atlantic Books, 2016), 331. 
151 Gearty, Liberty and Security, 102. 
219 
 
scenario in which options for free expression in the public sphere are actively 
curtailed.152 A one-sided focus on banning Islamist content might, therefore, 
proof counter-productive and additionally undermine another wider human 
rights aim, peace in the world. Therein, the ban on acts of glorifying terrorism 
(in its vague form), furthermore undermines individuals’ potential to enjoy 
their capabilities (such as free expression or leading a life not affected by 
discrimination). Furthermore, by interfering with freedom of expression, the 
ban inflicts with one of the central components of every functioning 
democracy. Restrictions on expression undermine the human need for 
communication and self-expression and restrict the possibilities for voicing 
public dissent and the inclusion of a multitude of opinion in public debate. 
Therein, a characteristic of every rights society, the acceptance of a diversity 
of opposing views (as e.g., emphasized by Rawls, see Chapter 1) is not 
fulfilled. In essence, the ban damages a general sense of freedom in society 
and enhances state power (again, significantly increased state power is a threat 
to democratic societies).153 Hence, by endangering freedom of expression, 
processes of self-censoring are potentially set in motion, which endanger an 
essential part of citizens’ individuality and societal influence.154 Therein, it is 
vital for anti-terrorism policymakers and practitioners, to remember that 
carrying a non-mainstream political opinion does not equal a willingness to 
commit political violence. In fact, most political viewpoints that are perceived 
as extremist are covered by the human right to freedom of expression; they 
are in other words not only legal but also a natural function of every 
functioning democracy.155 Their acceptance must be part of a sound 
democratic culture. Adrian Guelke rightly underlined that a sole focus on 
extremist viewpoints in efforts to prevent terrorism is illogic, given that these 
viewpoints are shared by hundreds of thousands “who have never broken the 
law.”156 
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Recently (in 2018), the UK government introduced plans to intensify 
its fight against incenting speech and material via a tool that can allegedly 
automatically recognize terrorist content, which can then be blocked 
manually. The tool is to focus on Jihadist content by IS (and sympathizers). 
This tool thus continues the tendentious focus of anti-radicalization efforts in 
the UK. Further, although the company standing for the tool claims that the 
software will only produce a false alarm in 0.005 percent of cases, this would 
still mean hundreds of false alarms a day given the number of uploads.157 
Again, issues of self-censoring might be created. The EU is currently working 
on a regulation that is trying to do something similar, however, the EU’s 
approach would block the upload in the first place (I will come back to the 
EU’s scheme in the next chapter). 
 
 Extension of Prevent Strategy to Mandatory Surveillance in 
Public Institutions 
In 2015, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 was approved by the 
British parliament and entered into force in July that year.158 The Act received 
cross-party support and entailed a much-debated reform of the so-called 
Channel program under the Prevent stream of CONTEST. This reform made 
it mandatory for employees in all public authorities to refer individuals 
(including youths and children) to anti-radicalization authorities whom they 
deemed as radicalized or vulnerable for radicalization. Such institutions are 
e.g., schools, universities, prisons, or NHS trusts.159 An official formulation 
                                                          
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 104. 
157 Dave Lee, “UK unveils extremism blocking tool,” BBC, February 13, 2018. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43037899. 
158 The Act furthermore enabled for the possibility of a temporary passport seizure of 
individuals “intending to travel to engage in terrorist-related activity” and a temporary 
exclusion order, allowing for British citizens “suspected of involvement in terrorist activity 
abroad” to be temporarily denied return to the UK. CONTEST – Annual Report for 2014, 13. 
Clearly, these measures were implemented due to the threat IS fighters currently constitute for 
several European states, including the UK. However, exclusion orders are not unproblematic in 
connection with human rights obligations. Protocol 4 of the ECHR clearly spells out that “no 
one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national.” 
ECHR Protocol 4, article 3, paragraph 2. Now, the exclusion orders provide for just such a 
deprivation. This means that the UK would – again – have to derogate from valid human rights 
obligations in the course of anti-terrorism policies. The actual threat posed by IS members or 
sympathizers amongst Western citizens, in combination with the provision in the exclusionary 
orders that a denial of entering the country would be ‘temporary’, might legally justify the 
orders (a legal decision on them is to be awaited). However, by implementing derogation the 
UK is taking another step out of legal normality and towards exceptions becoming the rule. 
BBC, “Internet data plan back on political agenda,” November 23, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30166477. Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, 
Chapter 6. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/pdfs/ukpga_20150006_en.pdf. 
159 Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act points to the duty to “have due 
regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.” Counter-Terrorism and 
221 
 
by the British authorities reads that the program wants to ensure that 
vulnerable individuals “receive support before their vulnerabilities are 
exploited.”160 The definition of extremism, which provides the groundwork 
for the procedure of referring ‘extremist’ individuals, is as follows: "vocal or 
active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule 
of law, individual liberty, mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and 
beliefs."161 In practice, individuals are to be referred to the Channel program, 
which will then make an effort to de-radicalize the referred individual.162 
However, if an individual refuses to engage with the Channel program, it 
cannot be forced.163 Before 2015 such referrals were possible as well, but not 
mandatory.164 This demand is a new trait of the British Prevent strategy, which 
is – as mentioned above – one of the four components of the country’s overall 
counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST.  
Based on making the practice of referring people to the Channel 
program mandatory, the amount of individuals referred has seen quite an 
increase in the latest years. The steep increase in referrals moreover suggests 
that awareness around the issue of radicalization has substantially grown in 
the UK.165  In 2014, when referring was not mandatory yet; only 1.681 
individuals had been referred t. In 2015, 3.955 individuals had been referred 
to, more than twice as many.166 In 2018, the number had risen to more than 
seven thousand individuals.167 Individuals reported to Channel included 
children “aged nine and under.” In England and Wales 415 children aged ten 
or under had been referred in 2015, 1.424 of the referred had been between 
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eleven and fifteen years old.168 In the West Midlands, the only region 
delivering detailed data, sixty-eight children aged nine or under were referred 
in 2015, 183 were between ten and fourteen years old (out of a total of 788 
referred individuals). Almost half of the referrals were made by educational 
institutions. Muslims constituted the biggest share of referred individuals. In 
2013, only fourteen percent of the referrals were based on right-wing 
extremism, while fifty-seven percent of the referred were Muslims, in 2018 it 
was forty-four percent referrals for Islamist extremism and eighteen percent 
for right-wing extremism).169 Although the program, in theory, is aimed at all 
forms of terrorism, including right-wing terrorism, such numbers suggest that 
Muslims are overrepresented amongst referred individuals. The 
overrepresentation becomes even clearer when reflecting that although three 
times more individuals were referred to based on suspicion of Islamist 
extremism as compared to right-wing extremism, the number of individuals 
deemed in need of support programs (the next stage of the process after being 
referred to) was roughly the same for both camps of extremists in 2018.170 
Based on Channel’s tendentious focus, many Muslim organizations, which are 
funded by the Prevent program, are due to their connection with Prevent 
vilified by their communities.171 In this way, Channel can undermine the 
connection between the state’s anti-terrorism institutions and the British 
Muslim community. The overrepresentation of Muslims in the process can be 
evaluated to be a consequence of the focus on Islamist terrorism in the context 
of terrorist threats. 
Even before referring individuals became mandatory, only twenty 
percent of those referred were evaluated as being in actual need of an 
intervention, as The Guardian reported in September 2015 (meaning that four 
out of five were referred to without reason).172 After referring became a duty, 
this percentage dropped further. Since 2016, only five percent of those 
referred were evaluated to be in need of support programs (forty-five percent 
are instead offered welfare support such as housing or mental health care.173 
The very broad nature of the referral approach must be seen as one of the 
reasons for this very low percentage. Thus, critics have rightly claimed that 
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the referral measure is arranged on a too broad basis. For instance, Rizwaad 
Sabir held that the definition of extremism (see above) would be too broad, 
especially when some values have never been clearly defined.174 Already 
strong disagreement with e.g., the UK’s foreign policy in the Middle East or 
British authorities in general, could lead to becoming a target of this measure, 
without any plans of carrying out violence. Research by Charlotte Heath-Kelly 
has documented that employees in the British NHS system have referred 
individuals based on demonstrated “anger at foreign policy.”175 One might, 
therefore, claim that public employees receive too little guidance and training 
in order to separate regular behavior and legitimate forms of criticism from 
signifiers of radicalization.176 Still, one should remember that making such an 
evaluation is not actually the work task of such employees.  
No court verdicts have declared the reporting duty under the Channel 
program for directly ineligible yet. However, in March 2019 the Court of 
Appeal ruled that the Prevent Duty Guidance (the legal guidance document to 
the law) did not put enough weight on the importance of the preservation of 
freedom of expression. This gives an indication that the Channel duty is in a 
legal grey area concerning the rights norm of freedom of expression (art. 19 
ICCPR, art. 10 ECHR). Indeed, both relevant legally binding human rights 
documents (in case of domestic British legislation), the ICCPR, and the ECHR 
allow for a limitation of freedom of expression in the course of measures 
establishing national security. However, the Channel program might run into 
legal problems in regard to the demands for rights limitation. The measure 
might uphold two out of three limitation criteria in the ICCPR and the ECHR 
since the Channel program is prescribed by law and is supposed to serve the 
aim of national security. However, the ICCPR and the ECHR add the 
condition of necessity in a democratic society (and therein proportionality). 
However, with its widespread approach, spanning over the whole of British 
society, Channel appears to be in conflict with the condition of proportionality 
(emanating from the provision of the ECHR that limitations must be based on 
what is necessary in a democracy). Furthermore, the tendentious focus of the 
referral duty in practice (see above) could constitute a legal problem as well. 
As seen, the stop-and-search practice was criticized by the ECtHR also based 
on its tendentious application in terms of ethnicity. 
Besides potential legal shortcomings, the Channel program clearly 
undermines the general spirit of rights and wider aims of human rights - in 
several ways. First, by effectively undermining the freedom of expression of 
regular individuals in democratic societies, one of the cornerstones for such 
democracies is weakened. As mentioned before and as argued by political 
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theorists such as Chantal Mouffe, or Adam Przeworski, the opportunity for 
political debate is vital for every functioning democracy.177 However, due to 
Channel, e.g. classrooms are no longer a free space for debate. Students might 
feel under constant scrutiny towards potential accusations of carrying 
extremist thoughts and teachers are transformed from educators to members 
of the “security-apparatus.”178 By cracking down on the option for free debate 
in classrooms, and by constituting the impression that simple criticism of 
foreign policy might lead to referrals, a process of self-censoring can be 
launched. Indeed, the ECJ acknowledged a risk of self-censoring under 
circumstances of continuous surveillance in its 2016 ruling on data retention 
and a recent study conducted in France found that twenty-nine percent of 
Muslim parents advise their children to be careful regarding “what they say at 
school.”179 Such processes of self-censoring are a clear sign of damage to a 
sound political atmosphere and the public sphere, undermining free debate in 
a democratic society. Reports from different sources suggest that the concern 
regarding self-censorship in public institutions and especially education 
institutions in the UK is justified. The Guardian reported that some educators 
had observed that “Muslim pupils had become more careful about what they 
talk about for fear of being referred.”180 Rob Faure Walker, both a school 
teacher and a Ph.D. student on the issue, reports of students (especially 
Muslim students) stopping to engage in political and social debate in 
classrooms due to fears of being reported in the course of the Channel 
program.181 Other reports pointed to a noticeable change of atmosphere at 
British universities, constituting a chilling effect on free debate (again, 
especially on the side of Muslim students) and preventing the invitation of 
controversial speakers.182 Thereby, the Channel program rather supports 
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conformist attitudes and behavior. However, democracy and a general sense 
of freedom in society thrive under conditions that support controversy, not 
conformism.183 Peter Neumann rightly points out that non-violent extremism 
should be faced with “a healthy debate, not a punitive response.”184 The 
Channel program thus undermines a general sense of freedom as one of the 
wider aims of human rights. A process of self-censoring could even be 
counter-productive in terms of anti-terrorism. If options for free controversy 
and debate are abolished or undermined and the impression of discrimination 
is reinforced, the probability that more individuals will take up violent 
measures of political action (including terrorism) increases rather than 
decreases.185 Kundnani agrees to this evaluation when he argues that an 
atmosphere of self-censorship might create even more potential terrorists, as 
angry youths had “nowhere to engage in a democratic process and in a 
peaceful way, […] that’s the worst climate to create for terrorist 
recruitment.”186 The measure of referring individuals via the Channel program 
might thus indirectly contribute to undermining another wider human rights 
aim, ‘peace in the world’. With its clear focus on Muslims minorities, the 
Channel program contributes to the discriminatory tendency of UK anti-
terrorism that was visible in other measures and policies as well (stop-and-
search practices or indefinite detention for foreign suspects).187 Thus, the 
program undermines the rights norm of non-discrimination.188 In the course of 
such discriminatory tendencies, perceptions of injustice and ill-treatment 
amongst the relevant community must be nourished and perceptions of equal 
worth and recognition undermined. Such a process is in conflict with the 
central concept of human dignity and the wider human rights aim of justice 
for all. Perceptions of dignity and justice must be expected to be in decline in 
a policy system that nourishes discriminatory tendencies (as an equal rights 
protection and equal protection of personhood are preconditions for the 
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perception of dignity and justice).189 The Channel program moreover 
undermines the capabilities of being able to use one’s mind in ways protected 
by freedom of expression and to participate in political processes. In sum, the 
Channel program sets in motion a process that mutes legitimate dissent, 
initiates processes of self-censoring, divides communities and stigmatizes 
children, and violates the spirit of rights, including the general notion of equal 
human dignity. Non-surprisingly, protest evolved against the Channel 
program. In July 2015, almost three hundred academics, lawyers, and public 
figures criticized the new duty to refer individuals in a public letter. They 
argued that the practice would “divide communities, clamp down on 
legitimate dissent and have a chilling effect on freedom of speech.”190 
 
 Data Retention 
Similar to many other European governments (e.g. Germany as seen above), 
the UK government supports the practice of retaining the communication data 
of UK citizens and residents. Again, the term data retention describes the 
practices of saving certain metadata of internet users, usually for a particularly 
defined timeframe. The EU had via a 2006 directive established an obligation 
for all member states to implement a data retention legislation (agreed upon 
during the 2005 British European Council Presidency). Telecommunication 
data (phone calls, emails, and text messages) had to be stored by service 
providers for a minimum of six and a maximum of twenty-four months, with 
the aim to provide security services access to such data.191  
It is to be mentioned that the UK already owned a legal regime 
covering (some) data retention prior to the EU’s directive via the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) from 2000, since RIPA allowed for the 
gathering and storage of metadata (but demanded ministerial consent to access 
any content).192 However, in 2009 the UK adopted a new regulation on data 
retention and therein tied its data retention practices to the EU directive.193 It 
was, therefore, a legal blow to the UK when in 2014, the ECJ ruled the 2006 
EU directive allowing for data retention to be in breach of CFREU (see 
Chapter 5). 
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Subsequently, in order to enable security services continued access to 
telecommunication data, the British parliament adopted national data retention 
legislation in 2014, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 
(DRIPA).194 The Act was with the support of the three main parties 
(Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) rushed through parliament as 
‘emergency legislation’ leaving only a single day for debate. It received 
criticism for infringing the right to privacy by NGOs in the field, such as 
Liberty, Privacy International, and the Open Rights Group, but also by 
discordant MPs. On the initiative of two such MPs (Labour deputy leader Tom 
Watson and the conservative David Davis), supported by the mentioned 
NGOs, the legislation was taken up by the British High Court. The High Court 
ruled in July 2015 that the DRIPA was unlawful, as it would not respect a 
previous ruling by the ECJ from 2014 and would, therefore, be incompatible 
with EU law. The High Court underlined in particular, that there was no 
independent review of the usage of retained data from a court or other 
independent bodies.195 The ruling was in 2018 confirmed by the UK’s Court 
of Appeal.196 Although DRIPA was declared unlawful, it had already paved 
the way for another piece of legislation the Investigatory Powers Act (IP Act), 
which should replace the DRIPA in 2016 (I will cover the IP Act separately 
below).  
After the High Court had declared DRIPA unlawful, the UK 
government appealed and the case was referred to the ECJ. The ECJ decided 
in December 2016 that the DRIPA was not legal. It would be in conflict with 
the rights to privacy and data protection, since “general and indiscriminate 
retention of electronic communication” cannot be justified in a democratic 
system. Indiscriminate retention would provide for a serious interference in 
people’s private life and would allow for accurate conclusions on the same, 
potentially triggering the perception of constant surveillance and a change of 
people’s behavior in face of such surveillance. General and indiscriminate 
retention of the data of all members of society (since virtually all citizens in 
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European societies use electronic communication) would exceed “the limits 
of what is strictly necessary” (one of the major conditions for a legal limitation 
of the right to privacy).197 The court thus argued based on the condition of 
necessity in regard to the derogation of rights as explained earlier. The court 
furthermore held that an unnecessarily excessive practice of data retention 
would be at odds with what is justified in a democracy.198 This argument 
connects to my argumentation that data retention’s negative impact on privacy 
rights undermines the necessary groundwork of democracy and the wider aims 
of human rights (or the ‘spirit of rights’). The court held that only targeted 
interception with the purpose to combat serious crime (including terrorism) 
would be legal. In addition, each act of targeted retention would demand a 
prior authorization by a court or independent body. Furthermore, individuals 
affected by surveillance would have to be notified as soon as such notification 
would not endanger investigations anymore.199 These conditions were the 
‘safeguards’ that the ECJ demanded in order for data retention to be 
combinable with EU law. In January 2018, the British Court of Appeal 
confirmed the earlier rulings by the High Court and the ECJ by declaring the 
DRIPA for unlawful. It followed the argumentation lines of the earlier rulings, 
pointing to a non-sufficient judicial oversight of data access, lacking 
safeguards such as restriction of data access to cases of serious crime and 
declared the DRIPA due to this lack of safeguards to be “inconsistent with EU 
law.”200 Although the DRIPA was anyway replaced by the IP Act only a few 
days after the ECJ’s ruling, the position of the ECJ on DRIPA is still highly 
important, since the ruling bears great relevance for the legality of the IP Act 
as well (see below).201 Rulings like the ones described above are highly 
relevant legal blows for surveillance schemes and underline the violation of 
rights as evaluated from a legal perspective. 
From a spirit of rights perspective, the UK’s data retention scheme is 
criticizable as well. The argumentation is here similar to my points on German 
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data retention. The level of individual privacy is clearly restricted by such 
measures. Privacy is a precondition for individuals’ ability to define 
themselves, for preserving personal autonomy and protecting the individuals’ 
social space, as well as for avoiding the feeling of being under constant 
control. When individuals perceive to be under constant surveillance (or at 
least cannot be sure to not live in such a condition) their capacity for 
development is limited. This is valid for all moral, personal, intellectual and 
political development, including shaping relations with others or freely 
expressing opinions. Thus, the perception of general freedom and in 
consequence political engagement might actually be reduced, (especially 
among vulnerable minority groups in society). Individuals might refrain from 
trying to organize protest online or even from criticizing the government 
online and might rather choose more conformational behavior (self-
censoring).202 Such trends would threaten a vital function of every open 
democratic society, the ability of populations to hold those in power publicly 
accountable. This would feed into the development of the state extending its 
power versus its citizens and residents.203 Therein, the human capabilities for 
political engagement, thinking and reasoning freely, as well as moving freely 
would be undermined as well. The latter pertains to the fact that metadata 
retention collects location data as well. However, as mentioned before, tracked 
movement does not reflect a genuinely free movement any longer (the ECtHR 
supported this view in 2010).204 Furthermore, by collecting information on all 
members of society in order to subsequently utilize these data in terror or 
crime investigations, the state is indirectly defining all citizens as potential 
suspects (and undermines the general presumption of innocence). The last, 
together with the possible perception of constant control and processes of self-
censoring, negatively affects individual dignity. Since privacy constitutes an 
important component of human life, the overall dignity of citizens (and non-
citizens) is undermined by data retention. Since equal human dignity is the 
center of modern human rights understandings, including its wider aims, the 
concept as a whole is under pressure. 
 
 Mass Intelligence Surveillance 
Apart from the implementation of new legislation, the British authorities also 
extended their practice of attaining information via intelligence services after 
9/11. Not only were the capabilities of the country’s own intelligence service 
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enhanced (e.g., via the RIPA from 2000 and subsequent amendments to the 
same), but also cooperation with ‘friendly’ foreign services was intensified. 
These practices were revealed with the help of information provided by 
Edward Snowden and later other whistleblowers, and have by now been 
published widely in venues such as The Guardian, The Washington Post, or 
The Intercept. Thus, the British intelligence service GCHQ has become 
notorious, not only for its connections to the American NSA but also for its 
own surveillance measures. As the public learned in 2013 due to leaks by 
Snowden, the GCHQ tapped via programs such as TEMPORA 
intercontinental fiber optic cables and internet junction points and copied large 
amounts of data of internet users from all over the globe. The tapped raw data 
were thus transferred to a databank (the ‘Black Hole’). In 2012, this databank 
captured fifty billion events (metadata units) per day; the aim was to reach one 
hundred billion as quickly as possible. Captured were for instance metadata 
of emails or messenger services, the browser history, data on social media 
usage, as well as search terms.205 
Another aim was the creation of profiles of website users. The 
programs enabling the collecting of such vast amounts of data are called 
KARMA POLICE and MUTANT BROTH. The first program reveals which 
IP-address accesses which web page, whereas the latter searches cookies of 
web pages and services for user data or email addresses. The GCHQ therein 
gained the ability to construct profiles of all IP-addresses and thereby users 
(individuals). Another program used by the GCHQ, called SAMUEL PEPYS, 
can analyze content data almost in real-time, allowing to project trends and 
political developments. The GCHQ is additionally using the NSA’s notorious 
program XKeyscore (just as the German BND and the German Federal Office 
for the Protection of the Constitution).206 XKeyscore makes it possible to 
filter, sort or analyze large amounts of content and metadata. The program can 
categorize data in connection with over eight hundred different services and 
applications. It can, therefore, be considered a gigantic sorting tool. It further 
allows for keyword searches in the saved data. For the intelligence services 
using this program, XKeyscore functions as a ‘super-Google’. However, the 
program is capable of more than that: In addition, it can analyze full content, 
as well as create profiles of users based on metadata. The program can show 
unknown connections between different user accounts (e.g., an email address 
and a Facebook account). The program is e.g., additionally capable of filtering 
all users sending an email with a certain header or including certain keywords, 
as well as showing all activities of specific users. The program can thus make 
the online activity of individuals fully transparent.207 In 2014, the British 
government furthermore had to admit that its services use widespread hacking 
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methods. The GCHQ was hacking both computers and mobile phones, e.g. 
enabling access to stored information and log keystrokes, to corrupt, plant or 
delete files and data, to send fake communication from the device, as well as 
covertly turn on webcams and microphones.208 Such hacking practices, in 
other words, enable all-around surveillance of individuals. 
In connection with mass surveillance, it is important to recall that the 
information obtained can lead to severe extra-legal consequences for terror 
suspects, including extraordinary rendition and drone strikes. Due to British 
cooperation with American services, British surveillance can in effect 
contribute to such consequences (or could, in case of the abolished 
‘extraordinary rendition’ scheme).209 Under the program of ‘extraordinary 
rendition,’ the CIA kidnapped individuals suspected of being terrorists and 
transported them across international borders in order to deliver them to 
security services of ‘friendly’ nations who regularly practiced torture. For Jack 
Donnelly, this program reflects “a cynical evasion of even the most 
rudimentary principles of the rule of law.”210 The UK got involved with the 
American rendition program, by e.g. providing airbases to CIA flights on their 
rendition circuits (e.g. in Prestwick Scotland or the Island of Diego Garcia in 
the Indian Ocean).211 Via drone strikes, the US has conducted extrajudicial 
executions of terrorists and terror suspects. US military infrastructure in both 
the UK and Germany has been used for the preparation and coordination of 
drone strikes.212 The information gained via mass surveillance has played a 
not unimportant role in the preparation of such strikes. Michael Hayden (a 
former NSA chief) is infamously quoted with the statement that the US “kill 
based on metadata.”213  
Regardless of the magnitude of ‘bulk interception’ or mass 
surveillance, as well as the dubious practices mentioned in the last paragraphs, 
surveillance has many advocates in the British security community. For 
example, David Omand held in 2016 that public fear of mass surveillance 
would be unjustified. A moral panic would have been created around the issue. 
Omand explained that the threats of terrorism would again have become very 
                                                          
208 Privacy International, “Press Statement on the Second Reading of the Investigatory Powers 
Bill,” March 15, 2016 https://privacyinternational.org/node/806 
209 Hopkins, “Huge swath of GCHQ mass surveillance is illegal, says top lawyer.” 
210 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013), 243. 
211 Andrew Tyrie, Roger Gough and Stuart McCracken, Account Rendered: Extraordinary 
Rendition and Britain’s Role (London: Biteback Publishing, 2011), 161. As mentioned, also 
Germany provided landing rights for rendition flights. The Rendition Project, “Flight 
Database,” https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/flights/flight-database.html 
212 Christian Fuchs and John Goetz, Geheimer Krieg: Wie von Deutschland aus der Kampf 
gegen den Terror gesteuert wird (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2013). Ryan Gallagher, “Inside Menwith 
Hill: The NSA’s British Base at the Heart of U.S. Targeted Killing,” The Intercept, September 
6, 2016. 
213 David Cole, "We Kill People Based on Metadata," The New York Review of Books, May 10, 
2014. https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/05/10/we-kill-people-based-metadata/ 
232 
 
clear in 2015, and would have underlined the necessity of gaining information 
via bulk interception. Several attacks would have been stopped by British 
intelligence services in 2015, for which the bulk interception would have been 
vital. He added that there would be no right to absolute privacy.214 Sir 
Malcolm Rifkind (i.a. former Foreign Secretary and former Chairman of the 
British Intelligence and Security Committee), likewise evaluated the 
mentioned surveillance practices as defendable, based on the argument that 
they would have helped to prevent terror attacks.215 However, the 
effectiveness of mass surveillance in terms of preventing terrorist threats is 
questionable. Many observers have pointed out that the positive effect of bulk 
surveillance in the course of anti-terrorism is at best doubtful. For instance, 
when General Keith Alexander, head of the NSA claimed that collection of 
communication data had prevented more than fifty terror plots in the US, his 
deputy had to reveal subsequently that in fact only one of the plots was 
possibly prevented due to mass surveillance.216 
Regardless of its effectiveness, mass surveillance does have a 
negative effect on human rights. In opposition to proponents of mass 
surveillance, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared 
in 2015 that it evaluates mass surveillance as fundamental threat to human 
rights, and showed “deep concern” over mass surveillance applied by the UK, 
which would endanger article 8 (right to privacy) and 10 (freedom of 
expression) of the ECHR.217 Indeed, the right to privacy is the human rights 
norm that is most obviously affected by bulk interception. However, other 
human rights are affected as well, e.g. the right to freedom of expression, the 
right to freedom of assembly and association, or the freedom of movement. 
The interference with these rights will be described in the following 
paragraphs. 
For years after the Snowden revelations, no court directly took up 
British intelligence mass surveillance (in terms of international human rights 
law, the ECtHR is the relevant court on the UK’s intelligence surveillance 
practices). Still, some court verdicts pointed clearly in the direction of this 
mass surveillance being conducted in a legally ineligible fashion. 
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First, the character of (part of) the data scanned and the scale of the 
operation is very similar to that of data retention regulated by the relevant 
policy acts (e.g. German or British data retention schemes). As explained, data 
retention schemes were declared ineligible by the ECJ in both 2014 and 2016 
and the British data retention scheme DRIPA was declared ineligible by the 
UK High Court in 2015. All these rulings based their argumentation on the 
fact that data retention would be non-proportionate and lacked judicial 
oversight. Non-proportionality and lacking oversight are, however, clearly 
given for secret mass surveillance as well. In fact, secret mass surveillance by 
the GCHQ goes further than data retention in terms of the subsequent 
processing and analysis of the collected data (see e.g. the data analysis via 
programs such as XKeyscore explained above). Reflecting this circumstance, 
it appears that practices that go further than the one that was several times 
declared to infringe rights in an unacceptable manner, infringe rights 
obligations as well. A different evaluation of the standards set by the ECJ 
could only be thinkable if the context of threat and emergency would be 
different. However, this scenario can be dismissed since the ECJ’s rulings are 
very recent. Therefore, the threat level must logically be roughly the same. 
And in fact, mass surveillance by the GCHQ in cooperation with the NSA was 
already carried out before the new wave of big Islamist attacks inspired by IS 
hit Europe.218 The fact that the ECJ ruling rested on the legal demands of the 
CFREU, whereas secret surveillance by UK services would have to be 
evaluated on basis of the ECHR does not change this argumentation (the 
ECHR is the relevant legal human rights document covering secret 
surveillance, whereas the CFREU covers the data retention schemes 
emanating from the EU’s data retention directive). The formulation of the 
right to privacy is virtually identical in the ECHR and the CFREU, and the 
demands for a limitation of the right to privacy in the ECHR (art. 8 par. 2) and 
a derogation from rights in the CFREU (art. 52) are virtually identical as well. 
Both articles point to the conditions of a legal basis, a legitimate aim, and 
necessity (proportionality). By applying these conditions, mass surveillance 
measures used in the UK appear to provide an ineligible interference with the 
right to privacy since practices by the GCHQ were not proportionate and not 
(fully) covered by a legal basis (since the RIP Act from 2000 on which GCHQ 
activities rested did not fully relate to the intelligence agencies activities any 
longer). As the ECtHR decided already in 2006, the demand for necessity is 
related to the characteristic of proportionality; therefore, non-proportionate 
surveillance is ineligible.219 Since the scanning of online data of hundreds of 
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millions of people cannot be deemed proportionate in order to gain 
information on a small number of terror suspects (remember e.g. the ruling of 
the ECJ on this point in 2014 and 2016 in relation to data retention) the 
proportionality demand for derogation appears not to be upheld. 
A second precedent pointing to likely ineligibility of the UK 
intelligence services’ mass surveillance was delivered by a recent ruling from 
the ECtHR. In an ECtHR ruling against Hungary from January 2016, the Court 
found that Hungary’s secret surveillance program constituted a breach of 
article 8 of the ECHR since the surveillance was violating the demand of 
proportionality. This demand would have been violated since surveillance 
could have captured potentially every citizen of the country and not only 
suspicious individuals.220 The ECtHR emphasized that any measure of secret 
surveillance, which does “not correspond to the criteria of being strictly 
necessary for the safeguarding of democratic institutions or for the obtaining 
of vital intelligence in an individual operation would be prone to abuse by 
authorities.”221 The court thus clarified that only selected individuals can be 
subject to surveillance and not the broad public (as the ECJ did in its 2016 
ruling on data retention). Based on this judgment broad surveillance measures 
applied by the UK appears to reflect an illegal infringement of article 8 of the 
ECHR.222  
And third, since secret surveillance measures track location and 
thereby movement as well, the British practice is related to a relevant piece of 
case law by the ECtHR, ruling that secret tracking of movement violates one’s 
rights to privacy.223 
After years of insecurity, the ECtHR finally delivered a verdict on 
GCHQ data collection in September 2018 (the case had been brought to the 
ECtHR by NGOs such as EDRi and Privacy International). It held that the 
UK’s services had violated articles 8 (privacy) and 10 (freedom of expression) 
of the ECHR with their bulk interception of communication data, e.g., via their 
scanning of data passing through fiber-optic cables (as well as the obtainment 
of data from service providers). The court held that the GCHQ’s surveillance 
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was “incapable of keeping the ‘interference’ to what is necessary in a 
democratic society.” In other words, the court followed earlier legal 
evaluations (by the ECJ) and declared that such measures were not 
proportional, even when taking the threat of terrorism into regard (which the 
court did).224 The ECtHR furthermore held that metadata collection is not less 
intrusive than the collection of content. Due to this unproportional 
surveillance, the right to privacy as guaranteed in the ECHR was ruled to be 
violated. Moreover, the court held that also freedom of expression had been 
violated since surveillance measures had covered journalists as well and thus 
interfered with freedom of the press. The court additionally acknowledged that 
interference with journalists’ communication can trigger a “chilling effect” on 
press freedom.225  
Based on the precedent verdicts and the ECtHR’s recent verdict it 
must be evaluated that the British intelligence services’ mass surveillance is 
ineligible in its current fashion. Just as the data retention schemes, such 
surveillance does not uphold the legal demand for a limitation of privacy 
rights, since it does not uphold the demands of proportionality and necessity. 
In consequence, the British government hurried to base mass surveillance on 
a new legal footing with the IP Act (see further below). 
From a spirit of rights perspective, secret mass surveillance clearly 
violates the general idea of human rights. Mass surveillance undermines the 
spirit of rights and the wider aims of the human rights framework in the same 
way as the measure of data retention (as mentioned before, it does not make a 
difference from a spirit of rights perspective, if data are directly scanned by 
government agencies, or first stored by private providers and then accessed by 
public authorities). Since privacy is an important component of what it means 
to be human, the attack on privacy rights equals an attack on the idea of human 
dignity, the cornerstone idea of the concept of human rights. Control and 
limitation via surveillance undermine individuals’ perception of freedom, 
their autonomy, their ability to define themselves, to enjoy their full range of 
capabilities (e.g. in regard to thinking and moving freely), and to develop their 
moral, intellectual, and personal components.226 Surveillance additionally 
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inflicts with individuals’ abilities for unobstructed political engagement. 
Secret mass surveillance additionally undermines the presumption of 
innocence, a central feature for every system resting on the principle of rule 
of law.227 Surveillance moreover tips the power balance between individual 
and state to the advantage of the latter and counteracts the rights aim of 
maximizing freedom for every individual while setting boundaries to state 
power.228 Individuals might, in consequence, start to act differently, 
potentially culminating in self-censoring behavior.229 Such self-censoring 
behavior can mean to refrain from publicly stating one’s opinion, or from 
participating in public protests or joining a protest group, which equals a 
reduction of one’s freedoms of expression, assembly, and association. Besides 
its effects on rule of law, mass surveillance further inflicts with the wider 
human rights aim of justice since it does not leave affected individuals 
(accumulating to millions) the option to seek for legal remedy. Based on these 
points, it must be evaluated, that secret surveillance of whole societies 
threatens the cornerstones and functioning of free democratic societies; which, 
again, are a precondition for individuals’ full enjoyment of rights and 
capabilities. 
 
 Investigatory Powers Act 
When in 2013 some of the surveillance practices described in the paragraphs 
above, were revealed to the public the British administration reacted. 
However, not by rolling back the critical measures, but by simply erecting an 
allegedly fitting legislative base for them.230 This was the aim of the 2016 
Investigatory Powers Act (IP Act). The IP Act was proposed in 2015 by the 
then Home Secretary Theresa May in the aftermath of Snowden’s revelations 
on intelligence activities by the NSA and the GCHQ. The Act was proposed 
and backed by the Conservatives. It sought to formalize access of British 
security authorities to personal data and install a legal basis for bulk data 
collection.231 The act processed through British institutions, and was in the 
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course of that object of heavy debate, both in parliament and public. 
Originally, Labour had threatened to vote the IP Act down.232 However, 
Labour eventually voted in favor of the Act in the House of Commons in June 
2016, resulting in an overall vote of the House of Commons of 444-69 in favor 
of the IP Act. The Labour party based its support on a few concessions by the 
Conservative government; for example, the implementation of a so-called 
‘double-lock system’, which gives Judicial Commissioners the competence to 
scrutinize the issuing of a warrant by the Home Secretary.233 However, the 
core of the IP Act – including some of the heavily criticized parts - stayed 
intact and the act was finally adopted in November 2016.234 
The IP Act contains a range of renewed, new or extended measures. 
The act extends the data retention requirements, as it demands phone 
companies and internet providers not only to store records of phone calls, 
emails, and text messages but also to store records of websites visited and apps 
used for everyone in the UK for twelve months. Police, security services, and 
dozens of other public institutions are granted access to such data (without 
independent oversight). The law expatiated the authorities’ powers concerning 
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the bulk collection of data (mass surveillance) worldwide (including the inside 
of the UK). Bulk collection of data here refers to the collection of large 
quantities of internet data, as well as the collection of personal information 
from digital databases by the security organs.235 The IP Act also created a 
statutory footing for mass hacking practices of networks and devices (called 
‘equipment interference’). Companies were demanded to support authorities 
in this regard, e.g., by bypassing encryption.236 Thereby, the UK became the 
first liberal democratic country to create a statutory footing for such hacking 
practices.237 The IP Act, furthermore, gave the opportunity for issuing 
‘thematic warrants’, which were not aiming at specific individuals but a 
certain group of individuals fitting to certain characteristics (e.g., all 
individuals who traveled to a specific country in the last three months).238  
The introduction of the IP Act is to be regarded as legalizing practices 
that were already taking place without any legal base. In effect, Snowden’s 
revelations did not lead the British authorities to stop illegal intelligence 
activities, but rather to legalize the questionable activities. A critical point of 
the IP Act is additionally that it enabled law enforcement agencies to access 
data in cases not related to terrorism or serious crime. The act, for example, 
enabled data access in order to protect public health, “in the interests of the 
economic well-being” of the UK, or “for the purpose of assessing or 
collecting any tax.”239 
Proponents of the IP Act perceive the conducted surveillance to be 
proportionate. Lord Carlile (amongst other functions a Deputy High Court 
Judge) for example argued that all irrelevant information would be filtered out 
of the gathered data before human eyes would look at the content. It would 
additionally not be possible to listen to everything and look at everything. 
Furthermore, such programs would not be able to steal the population’s 
privacy since an overwhelmingly big share of information (Carlile speaks of 
around ninety-nine percent) on a modern society’s citizen would already be 
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on the Internet. People would freely give away this information via social 
media such as Facebook and Twitter. Proponents such as Lord Carlile 
additionally hold that terror attacks such as the one in Brussels in March 2016 
could have been prevented with more international information sharing based 
on such measures as included in the IP Act. On this basis, Carlile evaluated 
the IP Act as a proportionate response for the protection against terror 
threats.240 In a similar tone, Theresa May claimed that “the Bill ensures that 
the security and intelligence agencies and law enforcement continue to have 
the powers they need to keep us safe against a backdrop of an increasingly 
complex, serious and unpredictable threat.”241 May furthermore held that bulk 
surveillance had already played an important role in preventing several terror 
attacks in 2015 and 2016.242 In addition, David Omand deemed the IP Act to 
be the “new gold standard” for keeping the country save while protecting 
liberty and the rule of law.243 The British Human Rights Committee (BHRC, 
a parliamentary committee of the House of Commons and the House of Lords) 
evaluated in June 2016 that the IP Act was “capable of being justified” from 
a human rights perspective, and, resting on the general conditions for rights 
limitation discussed earlier, bulk surveillance would not be “inherently 
incompatible with the right to respect for private life.”244 The BHRC 
altogether welcomed the efforts for the IP Act, that would constitute an “a 
significant step forward”, in regard to human rights, provided that mentioned 
conditions were met and sufficient legal safeguards enshrined (the Committee 
e.g., demanded safeguards in connection with the communication of 
parliamentarians and journalists).245  
However, several human rights and civil rights groups, as well as 
academics and lawyers, and even the association of internet providers voiced 
concern and criticism. Critics created the pejorative label ‘Snoopers’ Charter’ 
for the IP Act.246 Eric King argued that an invasion of privacy is already given 
when data is gathered, not first when human eyes are going through the 
collected data, as for example, IP Act proponent Lord Carlile argued.247 
Campaigners of civil liberties groups claimed that the Act cleared “the way 
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for mass surveillance of UK citizens”.248 Amnesty International warned that 
“wide-ranging snooping powers” were installed at “break-neck-speed.249 The 
Internet Services Providers Association agreed to such criticism when they 
showed concern about “the ambitious timetable of the bill.”250 The Open 
Rights Group claimed that the act would install “one of the most draconian 
surveillance laws of any democracy […].”Martha Spurrier, Director of the 
NGO Liberty, held that the Act created “the most intrusive surveillance regime 
of any democracy in the world,” and a group of senior lawyers (including the 
chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee) and representatives of forty British 
law schools claimed in a letter to The Guardian that the new law threatened 
to destroy privacy.251 And, David Anderson, appointed as ‘independent 
reviewer of terrorism legislation’ uttered in June 2016 concern that the bulk 
collection of data enabled by the IP Act would not be compatible with the 
ECHR.252 Thus, the IP Act caused a heavy debate in the UK. Lord Carlile 
evaluated that the IP Act triggered more debate and discussion than “any other 
Bill in history.”253 
The civil rights NGO Liberty, challenged the IP Act at the British 
High Court, arguing that the act would violate the right to privacy in an 
unjustified manner. In April 2018, the court decided that the part of the IP Act 
demanding the retention of communication data by service providers is indeed 
unlawful (no rulings have been issued on the other parts yet, e.g. covering the 
competence for hacking into phones, laptops, and tablets), since it would be 
incompatible with privacy rights demands in the CFREU (art. 7). The judges 
ruled that this part of the IP Act is unlawful since it opens up for data retention 
for other purposes than serious crime and without independent review. The 
fact that a quarter-million requests for warrants to access personal 
telecommunication data were issued in 2017 based on the IP Act (revealed by 
a Home Office report), indeed shows that IP Act surveillance is with a high 
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likelihood not about surveillance on cases of serious crime or terrorism only 
(under RIPA only 3.400 warrants were issued in 2012) and that the system of 
surveillance is based on the issuing of general (or thematic) warrants (which 
signifies a scrutiny). The court demanded the British legislative to amend the 
IP Act so that a breach of rights can be omitted in the future.254 If the British 
government will follow up on the demand in a sufficient way is to be awaited. 
However, on the evaluation that data is ineligibly collected for cases of non-
serious crime, the government’s course of action was to simply change the 
definition of ‘serious crime’, by including all crime from a twelve months 
prison sentence onwards into the definition. Formerly, the threshold for 
defining serious crime was a sentence of three years. It appears questionable 
if the limitations to cases that could spur a prison sentence of twelve months 
or more fulfill the requirement of ‘serious crime’.255 The government reaction, 
in any case, demonstrates that legal jugglery indeed can be part of anti-
terrorism policymaking. 
Although the judgment by the High Court declared one part of the IP 
Act to be unlawful, it did not cover all parts of the IP Act and did not go as far 
as some earlier judgments on data retention by other courts, especially the 
ECJ. However, legal action in front of other relevant international courts is 
pending. For instance, Privacy International, together with five other activist 
groups (e.g., the German Chaos Computer Club), decided in 2016 to challenge 
the use of hacking measures by British security authorities at the ECtHR. The 
NGO argued that the practice of hacking violates articles 8 and 10 of the 
ECHR (respectively protecting the rights to privacy and freedom of speech). 
The group argues that the government would allow the hacking of large groups 
of people, without individual suspicion and judicial authorization, which “fails 
to protect against arbitrary interference and abuse.”256  
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There is justified reason to assume that the ECtHR might rule the IP 
Act to be ineligible and in breach of the ECHR. First, the ECHR hinted already 
that it might evaluate the British IP Act as ineligible, or in other words, 
limiting human rights standards without a justified base, with a ruling against 
Hungary from January 2016.257 As explained in the last section, the Court 
evaluated that Hungary’s secret surveillance program constituted a breach of 
article 8 of the ECHR since the surveillance was violating the demand of 
proportionality. The court saw this demand to be in violation since 
surveillance could potentially have captured every citizen of the country and 
not only suspicious individuals.258 However, since the same is provided in case 
of British data collection under the IP Act, a similar evaluation of the ECtHR 
does not appears unlikely. Moreover, in its recent verdict on British 
surveillance measures from September 2018 (which did not cover the IP Act), 
the ECtHR declared that mass surveillance via optic cables and mass data 
retention would be ineligible due to not meeting the criteria of proportionality 
(see above). These parts of the ruling deliver strong indication that the ECtHR 
will decide likewise on similar provisions in the IP Act.259 
Second, the rulings of the ECJ on data retention can be taken as a 
useful reference point as well.260 When comparing the conditions for 
limitation of privacy rights in art. 8 ECHR and derogation from rights in art. 
52 CFREU, one will find that conditions are quite comparable. This includes 
the norm of proportionality, which is demanded directly in article 52 of the 
CFREU but was also emphasized by the ECtHR in a 1988 ruling. The ECJ, as 
mentioned, decided in 2014 that the EU’s directive on data retention from 
2006 was incompatible with the CFREU. The Court ruled that the directive 
inferred with the rights to private life and the protection of personal data. The 
directive did in the eyes of the court not comply with the principle of 
proportionality. The rights interference was not evaluated to be “limited to 
what is strictly necessary.” This was based on the circumstance of the directive 
covering “in a generalized manner, all individuals, all means of electronic 
communication and all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or 
exception being made in the light of the objective of fighting against serious 
crime.” In other words, data retention was ineligible since indiscriminate data 
retention would not be a proportionate means of surveillance. Furthermore, 
the fact that the data would be used without informing the affected individuals 
would be “likely to generate in the persons concerned a feeling that their 
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private lives are the subject of constant surveillance.”261 After this ruling, some 
European countries took new efforts for national data retention legislation 
(e.g., the UK in 2014 with the DRIPA and Germany in 2015). Therefore, the 
ECJ was once more called upon to decide on data retention. In December 
2016, the ECJ ruled that the bulk collection and retention of traffic and 
location data (a collection without concrete reason and specific target), as 
practiced in the UK and Sweden, is ineligible. The ECJ argued that the storing 
of such data would allow for “very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning 
[…] private lives.” Again, bulk collection of metadata would be exceeding the 
limits of what can be evaluated as strictly necessary (and therein 
proportionate) and could not be justified in a democratic society. Only targeted 
data retention would be allowed if such targeted retention were subject to prior 
review by a court or an independent body.262 Taking the ECJ’s case law on 
data retention into regard, it appears likely that the UK is running into legal 
problems with the ECHR via its surveillance measures under the IP Act. The 
surveillance practices enabled by the act are even more invasive than those 
enabled by the sanctioned data retention directive (e.g. due to the added 
hacking measures), while conditions for rights restrictions are similar.  
Furthermore, the UK is as mentioned not only bound to the ECHR, 
but also the human rights obligations provided for by the ICCPR. As 
mentioned, the conditions for the limitation of privacy rights in the ICCPR are 
very similar to the conditions defined in the ECHR. The IP Act, thus, appears 
to be in conflict with the legal obligations of privacy right protection 
emanating from the ICCPR as well. However, other than the ECHR, the 
ICCPR is not enforced by binding rulings of an international court (but only 
scrutiny of the UN Human Rights Committee).263 
Indeed, based on these observations of relevant rulings, it can be 
claimed that the UK appears to be, also after the implementation of the IP Act, 
in conflict with legally binding human rights obligations by executing mass 
surveillance. ‘Bulk interception’ or mass surveillance appears to ineligibly 
interfere with several basic human rights enshrined in the mentioned 
documents.264  
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Entering the evaluation of the IP Act from a spirit of rights angle, I 
would like to iterate that human rights (also) reflect a general understanding 
of the relation between individual and state and the necessary limits of state 
power. I argued before that both the relation between individual and state, as 
well as the general culture of human rights, or importance of human rights, 
can be damaged by policies based on human rights derogations or limitations, 
also if they are formally eligible. Thus, by implementing a system of 
surveillance that covers all individuals in society, encompasses large parts of 
every individual’s life and is constructed to be a continuous tool without a 
limitation concerning its duration, the UK interferes with human rights, 
notwithstanding the potential legal quarrels. By establishing and applying the 
measure of continuous mass surveillance, the British state clearly intervenes 
in the relationship between citizen and state. The power balance is 
significantly changed towards the advantage of the state (already previously 
the stronger), thereby endangering the social and political structure of 
democratic society. Via such surveillance measures the state implements a 
precautionary logic and opens up for regarding every individual as a potential 
threat rather than displaying support for every individuals’ rights, freedom and 
personhood. The fact that affected individuals have no realistic option for legal 
remedy available underlines this skewed power balance and emphasizes 
problems in terms of the rights aim of justice. Detrimental effects on 
democracy can additionally be triggered by potential processes of self-
censoring, which can be created by surveillance measures.265 Furthermore, 
surveillance undermines the personal dignity of all affected individuals, since 
privacy is an essential and integral part of what it means to be human and since 
privacy is central to the development of every individual. The perception to 
be free from unnecessary control and limitation in terms of thought and action 
is essential; for individuals’ abilities to define themselves, as well as an 
individual’s political engagement. Individuals have to have the possibility to 
think of their own in a democracy, without being obstructed by worries of a 
breach of their privacy. Consequently, humans both act and develop 
differently when they are aware of lacking privacy.266 However, the 
mentioned surveillance measures result in just such arbitrary interference with 
privacy, including the potential inducement of self-censoring processes. 
Therein, one might claim that IP Act measures undermine the human 
capabilities for political engagement, social interaction, thinking freely and 
moving freely (since tracking location undermines free movement). In 
essence, via measures as applied under the IP Act, the general spirit of human 
rights, its everyday importance, or in other words the entrenchment of the 
concept as a major pillar of British life is undermined. 
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 CCTV and Recognition Systems 
The surveillance of online activity via measures such as data retention or mass 
surveillance by intelligence agencies is supplemented by other forms of 
surveillance, e.g. surveillance in public institutions via the Channel program. 
I will, in the following, elucidate one more relevant example of surveillance 
in the UK, which is surveillance via CCTV, in combination with facial 
recognition technology (FRT).267 However, before I will discuss CCTV in 
combination with facial recognition, I will shortly introduce the usage of 
CCTV in the UK in order to contextualize the roots and basis of the current 
recognition system. 
Today, Britain is home to the most extensive CCTV system 
worldwide and London is one of the most complete surveyed cities in the 
world.268 The rapid growth of CCTV systems in the UK reaches, in fact, 
further back than 9/11. Already in the 1990s, CCTV was expanded in order to 
prevent crime. However, after 9/11 CCTV surveillance was expanded again, 
this time using the argument of terror threats.  Thus, already in 2003, a British 
citizen was on average filmed three hundred times a day.269 The number of 
public cameras in the UK was estimated at around 4.2 million in 2009, one for 
every fourteen people.270 Until 2013, the number had grown to almost six 
million.271 In 2007, media reports found that thirty surveillance cameras were 
to be found within two hundred yards of the apartment in which George 
Orwell wrote 1984.272  
Whereas systems of CCTV were implemented in order to prevent 
serious crime and terrorism (or to enlighten the backgrounds of already 
committed terror attacks), CCTV cameras are non-surprisingly not primarily 
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used for these purposes. Mostly they serve purposes of regular criminal 
prosecution, as e.g., following car thieves or traffic offenders, or in general 
zooming in on unconventional public behavior or enforcing conformity in 
public.273 Jeffrey Rosen evaluated after conducting fieldwork into CCTV 
monitoring rooms in the UK that CCTV is not used to prevent terrorism but 
“to keep punks out of shopping malls.” Accordingly, CCTV constitutes an 
example of a side-effect anti-terrorism measure. In addition, Rosen could not 
find an operative who had prevented an act of terrorism by using CCTV.274  
Moreover, CCTV systems do tend to amplify discriminative 
tendencies in societies, although the systems are technically passive systems 
(not directly interfering). The reason is the prioritization of CCTV monitoring 
staff in relation to the individuals in the pictures. As Rosen documented, 
(mostly male) monitoring staff concentrates their surveillance actively on 
(young) women and male members of ethnic minorities. Thus, CCTV does 
entail both gender and racial bias.275 From a spirit of rights perspective, CCTV 
collides with a general idea of free public space, in the original sense of 
freedom. Moving, assembling, associating and expressing opinions in public 
space become surveyed activities, reducing the amount of anonymity and 
privacy of every affected individual. In effect, awareness of surveillance 
potentially triggers a change of behavior. Thus, (some) people will change to 
more adaptive behavior, based on their ideas about social conformity. Such 
trends potentially undermine the level of public political engagement that is 
critical for all democracies, as well as collide with norms and values that are 
essential for all open societies, e.g. the importance of privacy as integral part 
of human life, the general spirit of freedom in society, and the general notion 
of human dignity. The latter can be evaluated as being damaged when certain 
shares of a population are scrutinized disproportionately, when almost all 
individuals in metropolitan areas are under constant surveillance when 
moving in public space, and when such technologies are in general used in 
order to increase a sense of control over the population. Reflecting upon 
CCTV systems, one might draw parallels between the construction of a dense 
net of surveillance in the name of anti-terrorism, and Jeremy Bentham’s 
concept of the Panopticon prison. Michel Foucault’s description of the 
Panopticon as a state method to assert less visible forms of control which 
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trigger a constant awareness of state power appears to be a fitting metaphor in 
the face of ever-expanding surveillance of public space.276 
  In latest years, the potential of CCTV has been merged with the idea 
to establish facial recognition systems. The idea of recognizing individuals in 
public by the help of biometric characteristics and CCTV has been prevalent 
in the UK since the first years after 9/11. However, in the early 2000s, systems, 
which tried to recognize faces via live pictures, were very unreliable. 
Therefore, the UK authorities opted to install a system that is able to recognize 
number plates instead.277 Still today, the British police are running a system 
of cameras that can automatically recognize number plates of vehicles. The 
system automatically compares numbers plates scanned on British streets 
against a databank of (suspect) number plates. The declared aim of the 
measure is – non-surprisingly – the prevention of crime and terrorism.278 
However, due to an improvement of facial recognition technology in recent 
years, British security services and politicians have rediscovered the idea of 
live facial recognition systems based on biometric data and CCTV and 
embraced them as a part of future security strategies, including the fight 
against terrorism.279 Such systems conduct an automatic scan of the physical 
characteristics of faces of passers-by and compare these biometric data to data 
on suspects or persons of interest stored in a database. If a match occurs, the 
system will produce a notification and security personnel (e.g. police units) 
will take action.280 UK plans for establishing facial recognition via CCTV are 
following a global trend. Similar systems are e.g. developed in Germany, the 
US, and Australia. China is already using such systems on a widespread 
scale.281 Thus, it has become a likely scenario, that in the near future such 
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281 Cynthia Wong, "We underestimate the threat of facial recognition technology at our peril," 
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systems will see widespread usage in the UK, especially at points of public 
interest in metropolitan areas. The likelihood of this scenario is amplified by 
the positive evaluation of such systems by police authorities, who believe in 
great benefits of the system. This likelihood is additionally amplified by the 
fact that earlier ‘test systems’ on other measures have eventually been 
implemented as the new normal.282 Accordingly, public space will see a 
transformation. Surveillance and the potential to monitor each individual will 
become an inevitable component of such space.283 However, some test runs of 
facial recognition systems have not gone according to the expectations by law 
enforcement institutions. For instance, the NGO Big Brother Watch held that 
facial recognition systems used at the 2017 Notting Hill carnival produced 
false results in more than ninety percent of cases, and the results were equally 
bad at the 2017 Remembrance Sunday event in London.284 Thus, rights might 
be interfered with for a system that appears not very effective in terms of anti-
terrorism benefits. Furthermore, recognition systems own a racial and gender 
bias, since the failure rate is higher for people of color, as well as women (not 
only in British systems, as US and Australian systems showed the same 
effect).285 Still, security and police authorities continue preparations for usage 
of such systems on a wider scale. 
                                                          
The Guardian, August 17, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/17/we-underestimate-the-threat-of-
facial-recognition-technology-at-our-peril. The technology can be expected to be used in the 
nearest future for a variety of purposes, e.g. in order to speed up security procedures at 
airports, or, more significantly, for commercial reasons, for instance, allegedly more secure 
methods of payment. Again, China is a frontrunner for such usages of this technology. Eden 
Gillespie, “Are you being scanned? How facial recognition technology follows you, even as 
you shop,” The Guardian, February 24, 2019. 
282 Dodd, “UK police use of facial recognition technology a failure, says report.” Martha 
Spurrier, “Facial recognition Facial recognition is not just useless. In police hands, it is 
dangerous,” The Guardian, May 16, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/16/facial-recognition-useless-police-
dangerous-met-inaccurate. 
283 Paul Karp, "Facial matching system risks racial bias, Human Rights Law Centre warns,” 
The Guardian, May 29, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/30/facial-
matching-system-is-racist-human-rights-law-centre-warns. David Paris, Director of Digital 
Rights Watch accordingly warned that states, who implement facial recognition, might 
eliminate “any place where people aren’t surveilled.” Gillespie, “Are you being scanned?” 
284 Dodd, “UK police use of facial recognition technology a failure, says report.” Spurrier, 
“Facial recognition is not just useless. In police hands, it is dangerous.” 
285 Dodd, “UK police use of facial recognition technology a failure, says report.” Spurrier, 
“Facial recognition is not just useless. In police hands, it is dangerous.” Wong, "We 
underestimate the threat of facial recognition technology at our peril." Karp, "Facial matching 
system risks racial bias, Human Rights Law Centre warns.” Amazon’s system, currently one 
of the front-runners, commits the same kind of mistakes as a study by the MIT revealed in 
early 2019. James Vincent, “Gender and racial bias found in Amazon’s facial recognition 
technology (again),” The Verge, January 25, 2019. 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/25/18197137/amazon-rekognition-facial-recognition-bias-
249 
 
Although no relevant court has delivered a ruling on the matter, the 
establishment of a system of facial recognition via CCTV does appear at least 
questionable from a legal perspective. Facial recognition systems in public 
places operated via live CCTV pictures collide with the right to privacy, 
assembly, association and freedom of expression. Individuals’ privacy is 
limited when one cannot move freely in public (or at least in big parts of major 
cities) without being surveyed by having one’s face or movement scanned and 
analyzed. Freedom of assembly, association, and freedom of expression are 
arguably reduced via recognition systems as well, e.g. in a scenario of such 
technology being used at venues of assemblies, demonstrations or other forms 
of political protest. In effect, some people might refrain from using their right 
to assembly and to express their political views at such events.286 Limitations 
and derogations of human rights can only be justified when certain conditions 
are upheld. However, the widespread use of facial recognition systems via 
CCTV in public areas all over the UK appears not to be in accordance with 
these conditions. First, limitations must be in accordance with the law. 
However, until further there is no clear legal basis for the usage of facial 
recognition via CCTV in the UK, the test runs of the measure have been 
carried out in a legal grey zone.287 Accordingly, until further, this demand for 
limitation is not fulfilled. Second, the demand for proportionality appears not 
to be upheld either.288 If facial recognition systems were used by thousands of 
CCTV cameras over the whole country hundreds of thousands, if not millions 
of passers-by would have their faces scanned every day. This appears non-
proportionate in order to detect a comparatively tiny group of suspects.289 The 
ECJ decided in 2016 that indiscriminate scanning of online data is illegal 
based on its indiscriminate style of surveillance. As the same indiscriminate 
style is used by facial recognition, one can assume that a relevant court (at 
least the ECJ) would with a certain likelihood come to the same conclusion in 
terms of recognition systems.290 Based on these points legal eligibility of facial 
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widespread indiscriminate facial recognition via CCTV appears to lie at least 
in a grey area. 
From a spirit of rights perspective, widespread facial recognition 
technology is highly problematic. The possibility of constantly being 
recognized by state authorities in public (whereas being uncertain about if one 
is really surveyed at the moment) greatly extents state power over its 
individuals. Martha Spurrier, therefore, denominated facial recognition 
measures as “policing without constraint.”291 This power relation is 
additionally reflected in the fact that facial recognition systems are erected in 
a way, which makes it impossible to collect the consent of affected 
individuals. Sometimes, not even a notification is if systems are in use.292 
Under such circumstances, options for legal remedy are sparse. Collecting 
more power in the hands of state authorities, while actively interfering with 
individuals’ rights, equals a decline of the democratic quality of the political 
system since democracies are supposed to empower the individual versus the 
state, not vice-versa. Thereby, such systems have the potential to become tools 
of “injustice or suppression,” as e.g. Joy Buolamwini of the MIT points out.293 
Again, rapidly increasing state power is a threat to all democratic societies.294 
Via such processes of extending state power, instead of protecting individuals’ 
freedom, autonomy, and social space, facial recognition also undermines the 
wider human rights idea of freedom. Such circumstances of continuous 
potential state control are additionally in conflict with the idea of human 
dignity since the pursuit of dignity for every member of society is arguably 
threatened by constructing public panoptic facial recognition systems. Human 
beings are no longer perceived as potential possessors of dignity and rights (or 
‘ends in themselves’ as Kant formulated), but rather as subjects that might 
pose threats and therefore need to be under control. Therein, the wider aim of 
equal justice in societies is inflicted as well, as recognition systems still 
produce a significant amount of false positives (false alarms). This leads to 
innocent individuals coming under heightened scrutiny and having to prove 
their innocence, effectively returning the burden of proof, and undermining 
the presumption of innocence, a central element of rule of law.295 Furthermore, 
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the number of mistakes in the systems is even higher for certain minority 
groups (black people, and especially women of ethnic minorities). Thus, such 
systems interfere with the rights of members of such groups to an even greater 
extent. Again, Waldron’s hypothesis that certain groups will experience a 
bigger loss of rights in scenarios of increased security measures appears to 
hold true. As explained, the perception of injustice and of a lack of equal worth 
and equal recognition of personhood triggered by discriminatory practices can 
heighten social tensions and produce a security backlash, by creating more 
violence-prone individuals. Moreover, surveillance via facial recognition 
might lead to a so-called chilling effect. In other words, part of the population 
might adapt their public behavior - e.g. refrain from participating in a protest 
or refrain from visiting critical locations (e.g. abortion clinics or a drug 
treatment center).296 Such adaptive behavior cannot come as a surprise when 
reflecting that individuals would be under the perception of being under 
constant control. In such a situation, individuals will not perceive themselves 
to be fully free and to be able to exercise one’s rights and enjoy one’s 
capabilities to the fullest any longer. Thus, systems of facial recognition own 
the potential to collide with the enjoyment of the capability for political 
engagement as defined by Nussbaum (besides the capabilities to move freely, 
to socially interact freely, and to lead a life without discrimination). In other 
words, by refraining from e.g. public protest, the level of the democratic 
quality of society as a whole can be expected to decrease. Without the 
guarantee and full enjoyment of the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, 
assembly, and association, no functioning debate or exchange of ideas, 
understandings, and knowledge is possible. By undermining these rights, the 
independent role of the citizen in an ideally free and democratic society is 
endangered, undermining the cornerstones of democracy that anti-terrorism 
measures claim to protect. 
In general, facial recognition systems provide another exemption 
from the framework of guaranteed and universal human rights. However, 
undermining this framework bit by bit is, as mentioned, threatening the 
general relevance of the idea of universal human rights. Since such 
apprehensions were lately voiced by high-stake members of the tech industry 
itself, e.g. Microsoft President Brad Smith warned against negative effects of 
facial recognition such as discrimination, a loss of privacy and encroachment 
on democratic freedoms, it seems that the problem has at least come to the 
awareness of powerful actors. If such awareness will be enough to overcome 
such problems is to be seen.297 
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 Summarizing Observations 
The first major point emanating from this analysis section is that several 
human rights have indeed been curtailed by British anti-terrorism measures 
and legislation of the last seventeen years, from a legal perspective but 
especially from the perspective of a wider understanding of human rights (in 
the sense of the spirit of rights). Examples could be produced for policies such 
as stop-and-search practices, indefinite detention, control orders, legislation 
on the glorification of terrorism, the Channel program of the Prevent stream, 
data rendition legislation, online mass surveillance and surveillance in the 
public space. Such policies were evaluated as either breaches of legal human 
rights obligations by relevant judicial institutions (or were placed in the legal 
grey area) and/or curtailed the spirit of rights. The mentioned measures are (or 
were) curtailing rights such as the right to privacy, the right to freedom of 
expression, the right to a fair trial, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
association, freedom of movement, the right to liberty and the right to be free 
from discrimination. The number of rights problems in British anti-terrorism 
has increased significantly since the attacks of 9/11 and the country has seen 
the trend of an ever-growing amount of policies and measures that endanger 
rights standards. Similar to the German case did British anti-terrorism see a 
shift of focus in the years after 9/11, away from a focus on potential members 
of international terror networks, towards terror suspects (or individuals who 
are evaluated as possibly becoming terrorists somewhere in the future) among 
the own population. A first major legislative reaction to 9/11 was the adoption 
of the ATCSA, including the possibility to indefinitely detain foreign terror 
suspects, clearly reflecting a focus on potential foreign perpetrators (as was 
the case with the 9/11 attacks). However, after the attacks in London in 2005, 
committed by members of British society, the focus shifted towards detecting 
radicalized individuals amongst the British population. This shift triggered a 
policy line that has broad surveillance of the population as a whole, but 
especially of the Muslim community (as the new ‘suspect community’) as a 
shaping trend of British anti-terrorism.298 A range of measures that are 
criticizable from a human rights perspective is the outcome of this changed 
focus, examples that were discussed above are the ban of ‘glorification’ of 
terrorism, referral practices in the public sector, data retention legislation or 
mass surveillance by British intelligence services. Many of these measures 
are, as explained, supposed to detect radicalized individuals in society.299 This 
trend towards more surveillance in particular, but also towards a generally 
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more rights-infringing anti-terrorism has been (similar to the German case) 
largely independent of which party constituted the government. At times 
certain parties (especially the Liberal Democrats) tried to slow down the speed 
of rights evasive policies, but the overall trend prevailed nonetheless. 
Furthermore, another similarity to the German case, measures of anti-
terrorism have not been rolled back in the UK, even when the threat of 
terrorism decreased for a number of years (roughly from 2006 to 2013, when 
the UK did not see any major attacks and the IS wave had not started yet).300 
The only exception from this would be the decrease of the length of potential 
pre-charge detention of terror suspects, which was set back to fourteen instead 
of twenty-eight days. This trend of a growing net of anti-terrorism legislation 
seems to receive the support of large parts of the British population.301  
Second, it appears to be a general trend of British anti-terrorism that 
many policies own a discriminatory tendency. Clearly, as demonstrated 
above, certain groups, foremost the British Muslim community, have been 
targeted more by certain measures than other parts of the population. 
Especially the whole Prevent stream of the British CONTEST strategy aims 
foremost at preventing Islamist terrorism (this was e.g., acknowledged in an 
impact assessment report issued by the House of Commons in 2011) and 
contributes in constituting the Muslim population as a ‘suspect community’.302 
In other words, what came to attention with many of the described policies is 
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that they entail a discriminatory core. Although most anti-terrorism policies 
appear to potentially affect all members of society, they are often aimed at 
people who are ‘different’, e.g., Muslim and non-Western minorities.303 
Discriminatory tendencies become most clear in measures such as stop-and-
search practices, indefinite detention for foreign suspects, control orders, the 
ban on the glorification of terrorism, or referral practices under the Channel 
program (the latter added a real-life, institutionalized surveillance measure on 
the top of electronic bulk surveillance practices).304 To that extent, Waldron 
was right with his hypotheses that in case of a limitation or derogation of rights 
not all groups in society are hit equally. Some groups have seen their rights 
more undermined by anti-terrorism legislation than the majority of society.305 
Indeed, despite the discriminatory tendencies laid bare in this analysis, British 
authorities have also taken steps against Islamophobia in society, for instance, 
via the Prevent stream under the presented CONTEST strategy.306 This does, 
however, not negate the discriminatory effects of a range of processes and 
policies of British anti-terrorism. It does, additionally, not negate the 
perception of discrimination via anti-terrorism policies in the British Muslim 
community. A 2004 poll conducted by ICM found that only eighteen percent 
of British Muslims felt that British anti-terrorism laws were used in a fair 
manner in regard to the Muslim community, whereas sixty-four percent 
thought that anti-terrorism laws were used unfairly.307 Two years later, another 
survey revealed that the vast majority (seventy-four percent) of British 
Muslims felt that fellow citizens treated them with suspicion. In the same poll, 
seventy-nine percent voiced the opinion that abuse and hostility towards 
Muslims had increased since the July 2005 bombings in London.308 The 
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widespread perception of unfair treatment or discrimination in the course of 
anti-terrorism policies among the Muslim community in Britain, opposed to a 
majority of society that supports harsh anti-terrorism measures, including such 
that might bear a discriminatory tendency, shows how split the British society 
is in regard to anti-terrorism. A split between the Muslim community and the 
rest of society and the creation of binary worldviews, is, however, a declared 
aim of Islamist groups such as IS.309 By delivering the context to make such a 
split more likely, the British authorities thus contribute to preconditions of IS 
fulfilling one of its strategic goals. Furthermore, the widespread impression of 
discrimination increases the potential of radicalization of individuals inside of 
the Muslim community.310 Increased radicalization in this community can, in 
turn, be expected to lead to an increased threat perception amongst the British 
majority society. An increased threat perception can – as explained above - 
arguably lead to the adoption of even harsher anti-terrorism policies by the 
political elite, potentially including policies that infringe human rights in 
general and those of the Muslim community in particular. The last would then 
again lead to an even stronger perception of discrimination. Thus, a vicious 
circle of perceptions of discrimination and threat, accompanied by harsh 
policies might be set in motion.311 An antidote could here be a generally 
improved integration policy. Reflecting on this issue Laura Donohue rightly 
points to the “integration of the minority community” as the “most important 
issue facing the United Kingdom.”312 
Third, British anti-terrorism legislation has at times been exploited by 
British authorities for other purposes than attempting to increase security 
against terrorism or has been misused in attempts to cover up for questionable 
policy measures. This echoes certain elements of the German case. Some of 
these actions are in themselves critical in terms of human rights obligations. 
One example of how British security authorities exploited terrorism 
legislation was - as mentioned – section 44 of the TA 2000, which provided 
the possibility to search people in public places, officially in order to prevent 
terrorism. However, very often this section was used in order to search all 
                                                          
much bolder. 
309 Adam Deen, “PREVENT: Understanding the Jihadi/Terrorist Mindset,” Talk at World 
Counter Terror Congress, London, April 19, 2016. Yassin Musharbash, “Angriff auf Europa“, 
Zeit Online, March 22, 2016. 
310 The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee has acknowledged this risk of 
increased alienation of communities due to discrimination. Gearty, Liberty and Security, 105. 
311 Fittingly Brian Jenkins noted already in 1977, “perhaps the biggest danger posed by terrorists 
lies not in the physical damage they do, but in the atmosphere of alarm they create, which 
corrodes democracy and breeds repression.” Brian Jenkins, "Upgrading the Fight Against 
Terrorism," The Washington Post, March 27, 1977. 
312 She adds, “the ability to obtain intelligence, information about potential attacks and 
understanding the issues faced by the state depends upon a good relationship with this 
community. Donohue, quoted in Andrew Staniforth, The Routledge Companion to UK Counter-
Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2013), 342. 
256 
 
different kinds of groups (e.g. war protestors). Thus, the stop-and-search 
measure rather constitutes a side-effect anti-terrorism measure than a genuine 
anti-terrorism policy. The Channel program, explained above, arguably 
constitutes another case of side-effect anti-terrorism, in face of the low 
numbers of affected individuals that see an anti-radicalization ‘intervention’, 
compared to the larger amount of people who receive other policy offers (such 
as social housing programs). Martin Scheinin argues that sometimes a 
‘function creep’ develops so that some powers that were meant to be used for 
anti-terrorism purposes are used for other purposes.313 
Examples of ‘false’ anti-terrorism can be found by looking at some 
recent examples of interference with journalists’ work. The reporting on 
surveillance measures was, after Snowden’s revelations, often undermined 
and suppressed, including by British authorities. Freedom of expression was 
thus further undermined, this time the freedom of journalists instead of the 
broad public. I will give a few short examples of such criminalization of 
reporting on surveillance. For instance, the British intelligence service GCHQ 
demanded The Guardian to hand over all copies of the archive on Snowden 
and his files. In order to not have the government learn what exactly Snowden 
had passed on, the journalists declined this demand but agreed on destroying 
all relevant hard-drives with GCHQ officials overseeing the process.314 
Another attempt at undermining the reporting on the practices of the GCHQ 
was delivered with the arrest of David Miranda, the partner of Glenn 
Greenwald, the journalist working with Edward Snowden. Miranda, carrying 
encrypted information that Greenwald had received by Snowden, was 
detained at Heathrow airport in 2013, for the then maximum nine hours, under 
schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act of 2000, enabling the stop and search of 
persons under the suspicion of preparing an act of terrorism. The British 
authorities (here the MI5) utilized the broadness of the UK’s definition of 
terrorism. They claimed that Miranda was carrying information that, if 
released, might endanger lives. Since they additionally claimed that such a 
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trumfede pressefriheden,” Politiken, October 31, 2015. 
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release would aim at influencing the government, under the pursuit of 
advancing a political or ideological goal, they saw the definition of a potential 
act of terrorism fulfilled and thus issued the arrest under the Terrorism Act of 
2000.315 This case illustrates how broad terrorism definitions can be arbitrarily 
used for real or alleged anti-terrorism measures. Both, in case of the arrest of 
Miranda and in case of forcing The Guardian to destroy their hard-drives, the 
British government undermined the right to freedom of expression as 
guaranteed in various central human rights documents (see Chapter 1). 
Arguably, the arrest of Miranda additionally violated his right to freedom from 
arbitrary detention, as defined in art. 9 of the UDHR, art. 9 of the ICCPR and 
art. 5 ECHR. Since the British Court of Appeal declared the arrest of Miranda 
as justifiable, this case provides a good example for the importance of 
extending the human rights evaluation of terrorism policy, away from 
exclusively legal standards, to the wider category of the spirit of rights. It 
might be that the authorities can defend the arrest on a legal basis, given the 
broad definition of terrorism and the connected schedule 7 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000. However, one might argue that the British authorities used the broad 
definition of terrorism and the connected possibility of a stop and search 
procedure as a pretense. It is not plausible that Miranda would have released 
the documents with the purpose to cause any harm to anybody, thus a 
connection of his case to the crime of terrorism is far-fetched, to say the least. 
Indeed, several high stake legal and political figures criticized the arrest, e.g. 
Lord Dyson (a former Justice of the UK Supreme Court) argued that a 
publication of material should not be interpreted as potentially falling under 
terrorism, if not a motive of intent or recklessness for endangering others 
could be proven.316 It appears that the UK authorities, in this case, launched a 
case of a ‘false’ anti-terrorism measure in order to achieve other purposes, 
namely to collect information about Snowden and the journalists working with 
him and possibly to discourage others from similar actions. Again, the case 
shows how extensively broad definitions of terrorism can be utilized. 
Fourth, British anti-terrorism maintained an international dimension 
as well. The UK oriented itself towards the European level of anti-terrorism, 
but also followed wider, mostly American, trends. For instance, the UK played 
an active role at the EU level in terms of anti-terrorism and tried to shape the 
overall strategy of the EU on the issue. The British CONTEST strategy, as 
mentioned, clearly shaped the EU’s overall anti-terrorism strategy. British 
policies such as the extension of CCTV or indefinite detention of suspects 
later surfaced in other European countries as well (e.g. Germany). The UK 
furthermore upholds cooperation in smaller fora (the Prüm Convention) or at 
                                                          
315 Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 458. Greenwald, No Place to Hide, 186. 
316 Costigan and Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 458-459. The arrest was further 
criticized by former Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer and David Anderson (the Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in the UK between 2011 and 2017). 
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the bilateral level (e.g. with France).317 However, the UK did not align itself 
as closely with EU anti-terrorism as for example Germany, e.g. since the UK 
did maintain its own definition of the concept of terrorism, independent of the 
EU’s definition and since the UK put emphasis on its anti-terrorism 
cooperation with the US. For instance, the UK became part of the US-led Five 
Eyes surveillance network.318   
Fifth, in the UK, similar to the German case, one can see a rights-
protective function of the judiciary.319 For instance, in 2007 the Law Lords 
challenged the measure of the control orders. In 2015, the British High Court 
declared the British data retention legislation under the DRIPA for unlawful, 
the ECJ ruled the same way in 2016 and the UK Court of Appeal confirmed 
the High Court ruling in 2018. In 2018, the High Court decided that the data 
retention part of the newly established IP Act was ineligible. Furthermore, in 
2019 the British Court of Appeal ruled that the Prevent Duty Guidance did not 
put enough weight on the importance of the preservation of rights standards, 
such as freedom of expression, thereby placing the whole referral duty in a 
legal grey zone. Tim Dunne pointed out that the actions of the involved courts 
signify that “a necessity claim cannot override norms that are legally 
binding”.320 Tony Blair agreed to this evaluation of the government’s course, 
at times, being counteracted by courts when he declared: “We, of course, 
wanted far tougher laws against terrorism. We were prevented by opposition 
and then by the courts in ensuring that was done.”321 However, judicial defeats 
have not changed the overall trend of British anti-terrorism. Rather, whenever 
a certain policy was declared ineligible by either a British or European court, 
British policymakers have tried to search for an option to uphold the maximum 
degree of such measures using a new legislative base, see e.g. the history of 
indefinite detention transforming to control orders and then TPIMs or the ever 
returning practice of data retention. Thus, the judiciary has a hard time to stop 
the trend of rights evasive anti-terrorism. The process rather resembles a 
continuous race between infringing legislation and corrective rulings. It 
remains doubtful if a democratic system can be regarded as ‘working 
correctly’ in a situation in which evasive legislation is consciously renewed in 
new fashions, knowing that a rights infringing measure will be valid for at 
least some years until a court might (again) demand changes or an abolition 
(see my points on that in Chapter 3). So - in Tim Dunne’s words - necessity 
                                                          
317 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, 322-323. 
318 Greenwald, No Place to Hide. In addition, the UK’s GCHQ cooperated closely with 
American agencies and the UK additionally cooperated with the US in terms of the American 
‘extraordinary rendition’ program. On a global note, UK anti-terrorism policies have been 
emulated in various countries, e.g., Australia, Canada, South Africa or Singapore. Roach, The 
9/11 Effect, 238. 
319 Roach, The 9/11 Effect, 239. 
320 Dunne, “The Rules of the Game are Changing,” 283. 
321 Tony Blair, October 1, 2006, quoted in Landman, “The United Kingdom: The Continuity of 
Terror and Counterterror,” 75. 
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claims did actually (continue to) override rights norms on numerous 
occasions.322 
To summarize, the UK has seen a growing amount of rights infringing 
anti-terrorism measures and policies since 2001. A range of examples could 
be found by using both a legal and spirit of rights framework. Some pieces of 
British anti-terrorism legislation were later declared ineligible based on 
legally binding rights norms, and a range of anti-terrorism measures and 
policies could be evaluated to be in conflict with essential parts of the wider 
ideals of human rights (the spirit of rights), such as human dignity, equality, 
justice and senses of individual freedom. This is not supposed to imply that 
all UK anti-terrorism is curtailing human rights. Some measures that were 
taken after 9/11 are defendable, also from a human rights perspective. 
However, just as in the German case, a trend towards a growing amount of 
rights infringing policies is showing. This trend threatens to undermine the 
very civilizational values and pillars of a free society that policymakers often 
claim they are protecting. 
                                                          
322 The House of Lords has at times scrutinized rights invasive policies as well. For instance, 
the Lords scrutinized the ATCSA measure of indefinite detention and were critical of the 
follow-up measure of control orders as well. However, it could neither stop nor decisively limit 
the overall trend of a more rights evasive anti-terrorism course. 
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Chapter V 
The EU as an Anti-Terrorism Actor  
Similar to the two previous chapters, I will, in this chapter provide a 
contextualization of terrorism and anti-terrorism for the case in focus (the 
EU), and will, in a second section scrutinize relevant anti-terrorism policies 
by utilizing the established human rights framework. I will, in the course of 
the latter, elucidate the issues of data retention, the EU’s Passenger-Name-
Record Directive, the implementation of biometric passports and ID cards, 
the push for the construction of biometric databases and the implementation 
of facial recognition, and newest policies on the prevention of radicalization. 
 
The EU’s Anti-Terrorism Context 
Other than the states that were in focus in the previous chapters, the EU does 
not possess a distinct history of terrorism (other than the terrorism history of 
its member states). No terror organization in the last decades did per se aim 
at hitting EU institutions (arguably with the exception of the IS attack on 
Brussels in 2016). Therein, the section will not deliver details allowing for 
an evaluation of the emergency level at EU level. Such an evaluation would 
be unfeasible anyway, as the EU is here understood as the EU institutions 
themselves (the Council, Commission, EP, and ECJ), it simply does not 
possess a territory that could be evaluated to be at a state of emergency (other 
than that of its member states). Therefore, this section will not contain an 
enumeration of specific terror attacks, but will rather point to the overall 
development of anti-terrorism at the EU level. The section will thus rather 
emphasize the development of the EU to become an important focal point 
and actor in European policymaking on terrorism. It will emphasize the 
increased institutionalization of anti-terrorism at the EU level, give some 
insights on the Europeanization of anti-terrorism, provide some remarks on 
the general perception of terrorism at EU level and shed light on the EU’s 
overall strategy paper for facing terrorism. This will, however, not exclude 
remarks on those terror attacks that foremost functioned as a catalyst for the 
EU’s development in anti-terrorism. Overall, the section will underline the 
importance of the EU as a player in European anti-terrorism, by pointing to 
the rapidly increased policymaking activity at EU level after 2001 and the 
entanglement of EU and member states in anti-terrorism efforts. Therein, the 
section will additionally underline my argumentation for why the EU 
constitutes a relevant case of analysis for this thesis. 
A first major point is that it took the attacks of 9/11 to give real 
impetus to terrorism policies at EU level.1 Before ‘9/11’, the EU was rather 
                                                          
1 Mirjam Dittrich, "Facing the global terrorist threat: a European response," EPC Working 
Paper No. 14, January 2015, 12. Daniel Keohane “Implementing the EU’s Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy: Intelligence, Emergencies and Foreign Policy,” In International Terrorism: A 
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inactive in the field of anti-terrorism. By then, only a handful of the then 
fifteen EU member states had dedicated terrorism legislation. Many EU 
member states did at that point not even own a specific definition of 
terrorism.2 Many states rather focused on certain international conventions 
on terrorism, dealing with specific terrorist actions and the suppression of 
terrorist financing. As Claudia Hillebrand: “It was only in the beginning of 
this century that there emerged an EU CT policy [meant is anti-terrorism 
policy] worthy of the name.”3 That this policy activity after 9/11 signified a 
real change of EU policymaking on the issue becomes most clear by having 
a look at the activity or rather lacking activity of the EU on the issue before 
9/11, that is during the 1970s to 1990s. 
During the 1970s, the EC showed in general not a high level of 
activity in terms of anti-terrorism. The most important – and maybe only 
important - cooperation on anti-terrorism at the time was established by the 
formation of the TREVI (Terrorisme, Radicalisme et Violence) group. The 
TREVI group was set up by the European Council Summit in Rome in 1975. 
TREVI was established against the backdrop of several terror incidents, e.g., 
the attack on the 1972 Olympics. It was a forum for international security 
cooperation, operating from 1975 to 1993. TREVI was, however, rather a 
loose network than a fixed institution. Via TREVI authorities were intended 
to increase cooperation on anti-terrorism, e.g. by information exchange, the 
exchange of anti-terror tactics of police forces or cooperation around air 
traffic and the protection of nuclear facilities. Practical improvements, such 
as the standardization of ID cards and passports in the EC were at focus at 
TREVI as well. This reflected a practical track of anti-terrorism cooperation 
at the time, away from solely legal cooperation.4 However, since meetings 
often concluded in non-binding consultations, results were – from an overall 
perspective - relatively meager over the decades. The TREVI cooperation 
                                                          
European Response to a Global Threat, ed. by Jörg Monar and Dieter Mahncke (Brussels: 
Peter Lang, 2006), 63. 
2 Keohane, “Implementing the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 68. 
3 Claudia Hillebrand, Counter-Terrorism Networks in the European Union: Maintaining 
Democratic Legitimacy after 9/11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 186. 
4 Oldrich Bures and Stephanie Ahern, “The European Model of Building Regional 
Cooperation Against Terrorism,” In Uniting against terror: cooperative nonmilitary 
responses to the global terrorist threat, ed. by David Cortright and George A. Lopez 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007). Bernhard Blumenau, “International 
Cooperation & Intelligence Sharing” (presentation, The Future of Terrorism: Georgetown & 
St. Andrews University Conference, Washington, April 28-29, 2016). Monica den Boer, “The 
EU Counter-Terrorism Wave: Window of Opportunity or Profound Policy Transformation,” 
in Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, ed. by 
Marianne van Leeuwen (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 187. Raphael 
Bossong, The Evolution of EU Counter-Terrorism: European security policy after 9/11 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 27-29. 
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was in 1993 included under the third pillar (the Justice and Home Affairs 
Pillar) of the newly restructured EU.5  
In terms of legal cooperation, results at EC level were even sparser. 
In 1979, an EC convention to suppress terrorism was drafted, however, it 
never entered into force. This was related to the Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism previously adopted at the Council of Europe (CoE) 
in 1977. After the CoE convention had been adopted, there was not much 
interest in another convention amongst EC member states (with the 
exception of France).6 
Overall, the cooperation of EC member states on the issue of 
terrorism remained at a quite low level, despite the mentioned startling terror 
attacks of the 1970s. A lack of institutionalized cooperation on the issue of 
internationalizing terrorism is a major characteristic of the period. At the 
time, “norms and obligations regarding the cooperation of states against 
terrorism hardly existed”, Bernhard Blumenau evaluates.7 For instance, the 
EC member states did not produce any common position at UN negotiations 
on terrorism conventions. It additionally took a number of years to fix 
problems of extradition of terror suspects between Western European 
countries. For most of the 1970s, terror suspects hiding away in another 
Western European country would not be extradited from their ‘host’ country 
to the country in which they had committed their deeds. Extradition did not 
even work between Germany and France. This problem was one of the focal 
points of the 1977 CoE Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (so 
some results were achieved on this point, albeit in the framework of the CoE, 
not the EC). Additional steps in anti-terrorism cooperation were often 
blocked by dominating national interests. These interests often trumped the 
willingness for cooperation. Therefore, no comprehensive instrument of anti-
terrorism cooperation was implemented at EC level in the 1970s and 80s, the 
policy area continued to deliver results “in a piecemeal fashion.”8 So even 
for like-minded countries, anti-terrorism cooperation was not a matter of 
course, no “united Western front” existed on the matter during the Cold War 
period.9 Of course, the EC had a different form than today’s EU, and 
accordingly, the EC did not perceive anti-terrorism to be one of its main 
tasks. 
                                                          
5 Emek Ucarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,” In European Union Politics, 
ed. by Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016). 
6 Blumenau, “International Cooperation & Intelligence Sharing.” 
7 Bernhard Blumenau, “The United Nations and West Germany’s efforts against international 
terrorism in the 1970s,” in An International History of Terrorism: Western and non-Western 
experiences, ed. by Jussi Hanhimäki and Bernhard Blumenau (London, New York: Routledge, 
2013), 70. 
8 Blumenau, “International Cooperation & Intelligence Sharing.” 
9 Ibid. 
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Although anti-terrorism cooperation at EC level during the 1970s - 
and at the international level in general for that matter – was thin compared 
to current levels, it is important to note, that it was in this very decade that 
the foundation for international cooperation on terrorism was created, both 
at European (at the EC and the CoE) and the global (UN) level. Later, 
policymaking could draw on this groundwork, however thin it was. 
Incremental development of pre-9/11 anti-terrorism cooperation 
followed in the 1990s. For instance via the 1998 Vienna Action Plan or the 
1999 Tampere Council Conclusions, or the Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters from 2000; the last e.g., obligated member 
states to provide information on bank accounts and banking transfers. 
Eurojust – an institution set up in 2001 in order to improve cooperation on 
investigations and extradition requests – is to be considered a signifying pre-
9/11 measure. Although these efforts were useful and sent a signal for 
enhanced anti-terrorism cooperation, cooperation was during those years still 
rather limited.10 A self-confident articulation of an active role in anti-
terrorism efforts and a common strategy towards terrorism at the EU level 
was first initiated after 9/11.11 
Indeed, the events of 9/11 delivered the necessary push for policy 
cooperation on terrorism at the EU level and can be considered the turning 
point of EU policymaking on the issue.12 Already in the immediate aftermath 
to 9/11, the European Council stated, “the fight against terrorism will […] be 
a priority objective of the EU”.13 This statement was followed up by an 
indeed strongly increasing policy cooperation. Only weeks after the attacks 
on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the EU member states agreed 
on a first Action Plan to address the issue of terrorism, including new policy 
efforts on police and judicial cooperation, air transport, economic and 
financial measures, emergency preparedness, diplomatic efforts, and 
                                                          
10 Paul Wilkinson, “International terrorism: the changing threat and the EU’s response,” 
Chaillot Paper Vol. 84 (2005): 30. Dittrich, “Facing the global terrorist threat: a European 
response,” 12. Bures and Ahern, “The European Model of Building Regional Cooperation 
Against Terrorism,” 190-191. David Brown, European Union, counter-terrorism and police 
co-operation, 1992-2007: Unsteady foundations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2010), 121-126. 
11 Bures and Ahern, “The European Model of Building Regional Cooperation Against 
Terrorism,” 191. 
12 Tessa Szyszkowitz, ”The European Union,” In Europe Confronts Terrorism, ed. by Karin 
von Hippel (Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) 171. Javier Argomaniz, Oldrich Bures 
and Christian Kaunert, “A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical 
Assessment,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 30 No. 2-3 (2015). 
13 Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 
September 21, 2001. 
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humanitarian aid.14 The European Arrest Warrant – easing the transfer of 
terror suspects between member states – is another example of an early EU 
anti-terror measure after 9/11 (introduced in 2002). A common definition of 
terrorism and a common list of terror groups were swiftly implemented as 
well. Especially the implementation of a common definition was an 
important development since it set the cornerstone for a common 
understanding of the phenomenon and, thereby, common policy action 
(however broad the definition ended to be). Without the attacks of 9/11, it is 
unlikely that the EU would have agreed on such a definition.15 
Until after 9/11, no detailed definition of terrorism existed at the EU 
level. Until then the established terrorism definition by the European 
Ministers of the Interior was that terrorism is “the use, or threatened use, by 
a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of warfare) to effect political 
aims”.16 This definition (based on the UK’s definition from 1974) had 
actually already been used by the TREVI group, thus no evolution in terms 
of defining terrorism had taken place at European level since the days of 
TREVI.17 Only in the context of 9/11, the EU Council decided on a more 
detailed common definition. In other words, the terrorism definition of the 
EU (as well as its anti-terrorism policies) is constructed in the context of 
terrorism committed against its member states and the states the EU 
identifies with (especially the US).  
The EU’s new post 9/11 definition was delivered by a Council 
Framework Decision on terrorism in 2002. The result was a very long and 
detailed list of offenses that could qualify for terrorism under certain 
conditions. These offenses are:  
“(a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death;  
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;  
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;  
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a 
transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, 
a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private 
property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;  
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;  
                                                          
14 David Whittaker, Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat (London: Longman 
Pearson, 2002), 195. Oldrich Bures, EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2011), 64. 
15 Brown, European Union, counter-terrorism and police co-operation, 1992-2007, 130-138. 
16 Cited in Philip Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a 
Democratic Society (Cambridge: First MIT Press, 2000), 3. 
17 Alex Schmid, “The response problem as a definition problem,” In Terrorism – A Reader, 
ed. by John Horgan and Kurt Braddock (New York: Routledge, 2012), 92. The TREVI 
definition is based on a definition of terrorism from the UK’s Prevention of Terrorism Act 
1974. This shows again the interlinkage of anti-terrorism policies, understandings, and 
definitions across European countries and institutions. 
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(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, 
explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research 
into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons; 
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the 
effect of which is to endanger human life; 
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other 
fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life; 
(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).”18 
The conditions under which such actions are considered terrorist, 
provided that they have been carried out deliberately, are: 
(1) the attempt to serious intimidation of a population, or  
(2) the attempt to unduly compel “a Government or international 
organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously 
destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organization,” 
or  
(3) the attempt to seriously destabilize or destroy “the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international 
organization.”19 
As mentioned, the definition is very detailed on the specific acts of 
violence; however, it refrains from including several typical ingredients of 
terrorism definitions. The definition does not reflect three of the five typical 
ingredients mentioned earlier (see Chapter 2).20 First, it is noteworthy that 
the EU’s definition does not connect the mentioned actions to their potential 
motivations. The EU’s definition does not include terms such as ‘political’, 
‘religious’ or ‘ideological’ as reasons for the violence committed, terms 
present e.g., in the British definition and most other state or scholarly 
definitions (as presented earlier). The EU’s definition only speaks of a 
possible terrorist aim to destabilize the political system of a country. 
However, this is not the same as identifying a specific motivation for 
terrorism itself. Furthermore, the definition does not mention potential 
perpetrators or victims of terrorism. Whereas the formerly used TREVI 
definition contained a short (albeit vague) note on potential perpetrators (“a 
                                                          
18 EU Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, June 13, 2002, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32002F0475&from=EN. 
19 Ibid. 
Just as the UK, the EU’s definition does not only include populations and state governments 
as audiences of terrorism, but also international organizations. 
20 These are, again, acts of violence falling under terrorism, claims on the motivation of 
terrorism, remarks on possible perpetrators of terrorism, information on possible victims and 
claims on the aims of terrorism. 
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cohesive group of persons”), such formulations were omitted from the 2002 
EU definition.21 
In essence, the EU definition constitutes a very broad and vague 
definition.22 For example, research into nuclear weapons with the intent to 
intimidate a population would qualify as terrorism according to this 
definition; to that extent, the EU could be able to call nuclear scientists of 
antagonistic regimes for terrorists (e.g. those in North Korea, and one could 
easily fabricate other questionable examples).23 One can only speculate why 
the EU adopted such a broad definition. It might be a consequence of the 
need to find a compromise between the then fifteen EU members, in 
combination with leaving a lot of leeway for attaching the label terrorism to 
various groups or individuals (and potentially state actors). It might simply 
reflect the fact that most state definitions are rather broad.24  
Additional impetus for anti-terrorism policymaking at the EU level 
was delivered by two big Al-Qaeda attacks in Europe in the following years, 
the March 2004 Madrid bombings and the bombings in London in 2005.25 
                                                          
21 Whereas the TREVI definition was short on the concrete acts of terrorism, the EU definition 
went into great detail with such acts.  
22 Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2006), 163. 
23 Saul points out that riots as taken place in suburbs in Paris and London could very well be 
stretched to fit under this definition. Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law, 165. 
Actions by armed forces, which are governed by international humanitarian law, are, however, 
excluded from being defined as terrorism (according to the preamble of the relevant 
Framework Decision). Bures and Ahern, “The European Model of Building Regional 
Cooperation Against Terrorism,” 205. 
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scholars, states cannot agree on a common definition of terrorism either (or if they do, like in 
the framework of the EU, the definition becomes very vague). 
25 Hillebrand, Counter-Terrorism Networks in the European Union, 186. Wilkinson, 
“International terrorism,” 31. Keohane, “Implementing the EU’s Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy,” 63. Peter Katzenstein, “Same War—Different Views: Germany, Japan, and 
Counterterrorism,” International Organization, Vol. 57 No. 4 (2003): 739. Jeanne Pia Mifsud 
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or ‘Combating Terrorism’” Information & Communication Technology Law Vol, Vol. 16 No. 
2 (2007): 161. Gustav Lindstrom, “The EU’s approach to Homeland Security: Balancing 
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Raphael Bossong labeled the attack in Madrid “the second formative 
moment” of EU anti-terrorism.26 Furthermore, Javier Argomaniz held that 
Madrid provided anti-terrorism as a policy field at the EU level with 
additional importance.27 After the attacks in Madrid, EU internal reports 
stated that the EU’s anti-terrorism measures had until then been “slow, poor 
and inadequate.”28 Thus, policy-activity was increased and a new Plan of 
Action to Combat Terrorism was agreed on, including measures as e.g., 
maximizing capabilities within EU bodies and member states to detect 
terrorists, to prevent attacks and to deal with the consequences of possible 
attacks, to address factors leading to support and recruitment for terrorism, 
to protect international transport and to make border controls more effective 
(e.g. via mandatory fingerprints in passports).29 It was also after the attack in 
Madrid that the position of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator was 
created.30 The bombing attacks in London in July 2005 delivered another 
push for EU anti-terrorism policies (albeit to a somewhat lesser degree), 
especially in the dimensions of surveillance and prevention. The Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) Council agreed on a directive on data retention, 
intensified information exchange between law enforcement authorities, as 
well as further efforts to prevent radicalization.31 Thus, it can be evaluated 
that the EU’s anti-terrorism course has largely been incident driven, policy 
reactions were often triggered due to the impetus provided by recent 
attacks.32 
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  A full-fledged Counter-Terrorism Strategy was developed after the 
London attacks in 2005 as well, in an attempt to streamline European anti-
terrorism.33 The strategy is based on the four strands of prevention, 
protection, pursuing and responding. Although the EU’s strategy facing 
terrorism is labeled ‘counter-terrorism’, it contains foremost anti-terrorism 
tools according to my definition of the term. This is a logical consequence of 
the EU’s capabilities since the EU is most able to provide input, support, 
coordination and policymaking on anti-terrorism, rather than counter-
terrorism (due to lacking EU special forces or troops). That the British 
approach of facing terrorism left its mark on EU strategies on the matter 
becomes clear by comparing the labels and structure of the UK’s and the 
EU’s strategies. The EU’s strategy operates with four categories of ‘counter-
terror’ measures, just as the UK’s anti-terrorism strategy CONTEST. Three 
of these categories are identical with categories used in the UK strategy 
(Prevent, Pursue and Protect). Only the UK’s Prepare category is exchanged 
to a Response category.34 Clearly, the British CONTEST strategy served as 
orientation and basis for the EU strategy. This circumstance is another 
indication of the interrelation of national and EU anti-terrorism approaches.  
The EU aims under Prevention mainly at preventing individuals 
from becoming terrorists by tackling the root causes of terrorism (examples 
for such root causes are in the EU’s perspective propaganda, poverty, and a 
lack of education or good governance). Besides promoting economic and 
political development, the EU counts spotting and tackling problem behavior 
(e.g., on the Internet or of people traveling into conflict zones) as prevention 
measures. In terms of Protection, the EU Strategy aims for “protecting 
citizens and infrastructure […] through improved security.” The EU includes 
a range of very heterogeneous measures in this category, e.g. the 
establishment of biometrics in passports, security of transport (e.g., aviation), 
a Visa Information System and strengthened control of the EU’s external 
borders. It becomes clear from some of these points that some of the 
measures can be (and are) used for other policy objectives than anti-
terrorism, e.g., to prevent illegal migration (I will come back to this point). 
Pursuing is then the category that mixes anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism 
measures in the understanding of this thesis, albeit overwhelmingly staying 
in the realm of anti-terrorism. Under Pursuing the EU understands “to pursue 
and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally”, including the 
disruption of support networks and of funding and to “bring terrorists to 
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justice”. This reflects an understanding of terrorism as a global phenomenon 
that needs a global answer. Accordingly, the UN is mentioned as a forum for 
anti-terrorism as well. Although the claim of “bringing terrorists to justice” 
sounds quite belligerent, it is followed up by the demand that this is to be 
carried out while “continuing to respect human rights and international law”. 
Tools which the Pursue category introduces are e.g., the European Arrest 
Warrant, intelligence cooperation, an attempt to prevent terrorists from 
attaining explosives, to strengthen cooperation via Europol and to strengthen 
national capabilities to “combat terrorism”. The fourth strand of the EU’s 
strategy on terrorism, Respond does not include measures that shall prevent 
terrorism or pursue terrorists but deals largely with crisis coordination in case 
of and in the aftermath of an attack.35 The four strands of the strategy provide 
the EU with a multifaceted anti-terrorism approach spanning over a wide 
array of policy fields.36 In relations to the four strands (and their sub-points) 
in the EU Strategy, it is important to emphasize that the EU Strategy of 2005 
does not contain any prioritization.37 Therefore, the strategy has at times been 
described as a long list of potential options of policymaking, rather than an 
actual specific and coherent strategy. It has often been critically pointed out, 
that almost all EU policymaking that somehow touches on internal security 
can be justified via the EU’s 2005 strategy, simply since the strategy is that 
broad.38 Although the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy claims that human 
rights shall be protected while tackling the issue of terrorism, it lacks a 
detailed explanation on how exactly human rights are supposed to be 
protected in the course of terrorism policies. Ideas for how to tackle both 
challenges, diminishing the threat of terrorism and preserving high rights 
standards, remain a blind spot of the overall strategy.39 
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Whereas the attacks of 9/11, Madrid, and London provided the 
impetus for increased anti-terrorism action at EU level in the early 2000s, the 
wave of IS-inspired terrorism in Europe since 2015 renewed this impetus. 
Since then, developments of EU anti-terrorism efforts include the 
implementation of new tools for pursuing and preventing terrorism on a pan-
European level. For instance, the EU now maintains a European Counter-
Terrorism Center (ECTC), an Internet Referral Unit (IRU) and a 
Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). The ECTC was established in 
January 2016 as a reaction to shortcomings of intelligence cooperation 
concerning Islamist attacks in Paris 2015 and is affiliated with Europol. It is 
supposed to provide operational support to member states’ security 
organizations and to strengthen cooperation between international counter-
terrorism authorities, for instance in regard to information exchange on 
terrorism financing and arms trade. The IRU, operated by Europol as well, 
owns the task of referring violent extremist content on internet platforms to 
providers in order to have this content banned. The IRU is thus clearly a 
prevention tool. The RAN is a network of police and prison staff 
practitioners, as well as researchers, social workers, and members of other 
professions dealing with or doing research on radicalized individuals.40 The 
network is supposed to strengthen capabilities by sharing expertise and 
experiences. The ECTC is the most important of these three new anti-
terrorism tools, the last two programs are rather limited in scope. 
Besides a new impetus for anti-terrorism policymaking, recent years 
have seen the trend of anti-terrorism being dealt with through an even 
broader scope at the EU level. Formerly the issue was dealt with mainly by 
Home Affairs officials at the EU level and Interior or Foreign Ministers of 
member states at the EU Council level. Now, ministers of justice, youth or 
education are included in the process of cooperation and policymaking on 
the issue. In other words, the issue of anti-terrorism at EU level has gained 
“broader ownership,” as Jorge Bento Silva from the EU Commission 
explained.41 
In general, anti-terrorism moved rapidly to the forefront of the EU’s 
policy agenda after 9/11, with the result that the twenty-eight members of the 
EU are now obliged to implement a vast body of legislation and policy. More 
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than a hundred anti-terrorism measures have been produced at the EU level.42 
This includes a common legal definition of terrorism and terrorist offenses, 
and a host of substantive criminal and procedural laws and mechanisms for 
cross-border police cooperation, as well as ‘security’ and ‘preventative’ 
measures (some of these measures will be under scrutiny in the next section). 
In terms of perceptions of terrorism, the EU has followed similar 
trends as seen in the two country cases in this thesis. One of those trends is 
that terrorism is at the EU level foremost understood as a problem of Islamist 
terrorism. The same was detected for the UK and Germany (see above) and 
is potentially the case in the entire West. That it is Islamist terrorism that the 
EU is most conscious about can be deduced from a range of indications. First, 
as seen above, anti-terrorism action at the EU level received its biggest 
impetus after moments of a perceived terrorism crisis, mostly constituted by 
Islamist terrorism (9/11, Madrid, London and the IS wave of 2015-2017).43 
Severe incidents of right-wing terrorism, e.g. the attacks of Anders Breivik 
in Norway, did not cause any considerable push for anti-terrorism at the EU 
level. Second, for many years the focus of the EU was on international 
terrorism, a strand of terrorism that was very much identified with the 
Islamist Al-Qaeda network. Third, Europol, in its regular trend reports on 
terrorism in the EU underlines the perception of terrorism as mostly Islamist 
terrorism. In its 2017 trend report, Europol spent eighteen pages describing 
the threat by Islamist terrorism, but only three pages each on right-wing, left-
wing and separatist terrorism (right-wing violence against asylum seekers 
was deliberately left out in the report). Furthermore, twelve out of fourteen 
observations of Europol on current terrorism trends covered information on 
Islamist terrorism.44 Fourth, the focal points of the EU’s terrorism strategy 
and action plans, as well as many of the EU’s anti-terrorism measures (data 
retention, the PNR agreement or de-radicalization) in their essence aim at 
tackling Islamist terrorism. 
The perception of terrorism at European level parallels the 
perception at the member state level additionally on the point that it sees the 
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aim of terrorism, and, here, as mentioned, primarily Islamist terrorism as 
attacking common European “values.” When significant terrorist attacks 
were committed in Europe in the last eighteen years (e.g., in Paris, Brussels 
or Berlin), and especially when they were motivated by Islamist ideology, 
interpretations were that ‘European civilization’, ‘European values’ or 
democracy would be threatened by such attacks. The President of the EU 
Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and the EU’s Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator Gijs de Vries, among others, offered such claims.45 Juncker and 
de Vries were thus in line with several European heads of state or 
government such as Angel Merkel, German President Joachim Gauck, or 
Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann, who all declared their readiness to 
defend the common European values.46 It is, additionally, often portrayed in 
utterances of top politicians that terrorism seeks to undermine ‘our way of 
living’ or ‘our openness’. Thus, the EU leadership very much seems to be in 
line with European state leaders in terms of a lacking self-reflection and self-
criticism in terms of potential different root causes of terrorism. The EU 
leadership rather follows the state leaders in spinning a discourse of easy 
answers, instead of challenging these assumptions. 
Besides these trends, two further points about European perceptions 
of terrorism might be underlined. First, the latest years have seen the 
constitution of a Europeanization of terrorism perceptions.47 This has 
boosted a common willingness for anti-terrorism action in Europe and thus 
distributed anti-terrorism from the European center stages of anti-terrorism 
to its peripheries. Attacks such as the ones in Paris in 2015 or Brussels in 
2016 created an echo which saw the atrocities as an attack on all of Europe, 
although in most cases the attacks were confined to only one country and 
often the perpetrators were coming from the inside, being either citizens or 
residents. In this sense, some of the described attacks are in their effects and 
perceptions increasingly not confined to national boundaries anymore but 
trigger a Europe wide audience, as well as a European policy reaction. 
Zygmunt Bauman, e.g., underlined this interpretation when he held in a 2016 
publication that the mentioned terror attacks managed “to make sure that 
wherever their outrage is committed its effects will reverberate all over the 
European Union.”48 And indeed, leaders of the EU, as well as the member 
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states, often engaged in a discourse which emphasized ‘the whole of Europe’ 
being the aim of the attack. Fittingly, Jean-Claude Juncker claimed after the 
attacks in Brussels: “Today Brussels was hit, yesterday Paris – but Europe 
as a whole is the target.”49 In this sense, we have seen an increasing 
development of a genuine European awareness in regard to terrorism. This 
European awareness has effects on policymaking at the EU level as well. For 
instance, this process affects the policymaking of states that are not at the 
core of the EU or at the core of terrorist threats, as Bauman explains. He 
holds that efforts to enhance security following a terror attack in Europe 
affect not only the directly assaulted places but far away spots in the 
countries of  “second speed” Europe, “which the terrorists […] have no 
intention of attacking.”50 Europe might thus be at the beginning of a 
genuinely European history of terrorism and anti-terrorism. 
Second, the attack in Brussels (the de facto EU capital) in 2016 had 
a particular character for the EU, as one of the bombs blown off exploded in 
a metro station in the very EU quarter of the city, only a few hundred meters 
from the main buildings of the EU Commission and the Council of the EU. 
A place that thousands of EU employees pass every day. Therefore, this part 
of the Brussels attack comes closest to what could be evaluated as a direct 
attack on the EU bodies. Consequently, many EU leaders and staff perceived 
the Brussels attack as an attack on the institutions of the EU. Pictures of a 
Federica Mogherini (High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and Vice-President of the EU Commission) shedding tears 
during her official statement on the attack went around the world.51 
Coming back to the EU’s overall role in European anti-terrorism, the 
EU is trying to establish grand scale cooperation.52 The EU is working to 
improve cooperation between its member states, but also between its member 
states and third states, just as between itself and third states, or itself and 
other organizations, such as the UN. Although the terrorism policies of the 
individual EU-member states are, still, looking different, and the states are 
remaining to be the major source of anti-terrorism activities, the EU is 
relevant as an initiator of an overarching anti-terrorism framework and of 
specific terrorism policies.53 The role of the EU in European terrorism 
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policies has increased significantly since 2001, and it is now an important 
focal point for cooperation and decision-making.54 Correspondingly, Jorge 
Bento Silva from the EU Commission evaluated in 2016 that “enormous 
progress has been made” in terms of cooperation on anti-terrorism at the EU 
level. More than twenty countries would e.g. contribute with intelligence to 
strengthen pan-European efforts. The challenge would be to develop this 
process further and to bring the existing tools and efforts together to one 
coherent framework.55 
It is, however, important to keep in mind that the execution of the 
EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy in particular and the EU’s anti-terrorism 
policies, in general, differs from that of states themselves. The EU is not a 
state and does not have the traditional competences of a state activated in 
counter-terror measures. The EU does not have its own police force, military 
capabilities, legal prosecutors, or intelligence services.56 It is, still, the 
member states who provide the majority of European anti-terrorism 
activity.57 The EU, therefore, aims mostly at carrying out measures for which 
it's supranational and intergovernmental institutions are suited. This 
concerns providing cooperation at the EU level but also pushing for initiating 
new EU-wide legislation (often with the aim to ease cooperation).58 EU 
organs – and here mostly the Commission and the Council – push for the 
creation of EU-wide anti-terrorism measures which the member states are 
supposed to implement. Of course, such measures are agreed upon with the 
participation of national decision-makers. A push for a Europeanization of 
anti-terrorism is thus delivered from both the EU and member state level.59 
The member states and the EU continuously increase entanglement in terms 
of anti-terrorism. Anti-terrorism policies thus become ‘distributed’ from the 
core EU states to the EU periphery, as well as from countries that are at the 
center of terrorist threats to those that see very little terrorist activity 
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(including potential rights problems). National politicians, however, at times 
blame the EU for unpopular laws and regulations, although they might 
themselves have been part of bringing them in place.60 This method of 
indirectly implementing desired measures is also called ‘policy laundering’ 
and can be found in the policy field of anti-terrorism as well.61 Still, EU-wide 
cooperation on terrorism policies is not preventing smaller groups of member 
states from cooperating more closely. An example of such smaller groups of 
European anti-terrorism policymaking is e.g., the Prüm Convention from 
2005 which then had seven member states as its parties. In 2015, the Prüm 
Convention, reflecting a sort of ‘laboratory’ for future EU cooperation, had 
already fourteen member states as parties. The convention, however, 
respected EU law and was thus compatible with EU regulations and laws on 
the issue.62 
Although the EU has clearly boosted its activity in terms of terrorism 
policies and has strengthened cooperation between member states, the EU is 
still criticized for being underdeveloped and ineffective in anti-terrorism 
policies with regard to several points. First, the EU faces the criticism that 
its anti-terrorism efforts are not sufficiently implemented in its member 
states. The national governments would “often lack the political will to align 
laws or make their police forces work together.”63 Even when this political 
will is given, the concrete implementation of agreements is often a slow 
process. As an example, Keohane mentions the slow implementation of joint 
teams of investigators, taking several years after this measure was agreed on 
in 2002.64 Implementation was, however, going quicker in case of the 
European Arrest Warrant (only a couple of years). Therein, cooperation in 
terms of terrorism policies is a declared will of the member states and the 
EU, but implementation is not always going as quick and effective as wished 
for by the EU Commission. The underlying reason is often the unwillingness 
of member state authorities to give away sovereignty in a policy field 
perceived to be at the core of every state, security.65 
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Second, shortcomings of EU anti-terrorism policies do not only lie 
in its implementation, sometimes the very creation of effective and relevant 
legislation is a slow process as well. An example of this is the process of 
common legislation on blank firing guns. Such guns (deactivated guns and 
rifles) were used during the two series of IS attacks in Paris in 2015 (sixteen 
out of forty-five weapons). Due to different procedures in the twenty-eight 
member states, the terrorists were able to purchase deactivated guns in 
Eastern European member states, reactivate them and use them for their 
attacks. The EU Commission was aware of the problem of different 
procedures for the deactivation of guns (e.g., guns deactivated in Denmark 
or Germany cannot be reactivated again), but did not move fast enough. In 
fact, the Commission was working on a new common directive on the issue 
since 2008 but never finished it.66 This example shows the lack of speed in 
finding common solutions to security problems that, at times, persists at the 
EU level.67 
Third, the EU member states are criticized for their security service 
cooperation not being sufficient. European intelligence agencies at times 
refrain from sharing vital information with each other, and rather share 
‘sanitized’ information.68 This criticism indirectly concerns the EU as well, 
since it is a declared aim of the EU to facilitate such cooperation.69 Especially 
in the aftermath of the IS attacks in Brussels in 2016, the lacking cooperation 
between European security services came to the attention of the European 
public. In regard to these attacks, warnings by other services were not 
processed effectively by the Belgian services.70 In order to strengthen such 
cooperation, Europol created the ECTC (European Counter Terrorism 
Center) in 2015. Police staff at this center is supposed to collect information 
from the different connected secret services, especially on the issue of 
returning Jihadis, financing of terrorism, weapons trade and terrorist internet 
propaganda. However, the crucial point is that also this center is reliant on 
the information the national services provide. Many analysts still interpret 
this supply as non-sufficient.71 These three points of relative ineffectiveness 
                                                          
66 Jakob Sheikh and John Hansen, “Spor fra terrorangreb peger mod kælder i Slovakiet,” 
Politiken, March 20, 2016. 
67 The EU is, however, not that slow with all its anti-terrorism policymaking. For instance, a 
common definition terrorism was adopted rather fast after 9/11, and the same is valid for the 
adoption of a European Arrest Warrant. 
68 In part due to fears of enclosing sources. Wilkinson, "International Terrorism." Wilkinson, 
Terrorism Versus Democracy, 179. 
69 Szyszkowitz, ”The European Union,” 176. 
70 Tim King, "Why Belgian politicians haven’t lost their jobs," Politico, March 30, 2016. 
https://www.politico.eu/article/why-belgium-politicians-havent-lost-their-jobs-resignation-
political-failures-security-brussels-terror-attacks/ 
71 Deutsche Welle, "Insufficient data sharing hinders defense against terrorism," March 24, 
2016. http://www.dw.com/en/insufficient-data-sharing-hinders-defense-against-terrorism/a-
19141514. 
278 
 
are bemoaned after every bigger terror attack in Europe, and after every 
attack, politicians demand improvement on these points. Still, a certain 
ineffectiveness persists.72 
To summarize, this section pointed to the fast development of anti-
terrorism policymaking after 9/11, especially when compared to the meager 
results of cooperation between the 1970s and 1990s. After 9/11 and the 
Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005, the EU bodies adopted a 
range of policies directed towards terrorism. Due to this increased activity 
and the established common strategy and terrorism definition, the anti-
terrorism policies of the EU and its member states have become connected 
(or Europeanized). The EU now owns a real coordination role in terms of 
anti-terrorism (still, member states often try to steer the EU’s general 
approach on the issue). The section additionally pointed out that the 
perception of terrorism at the EU level, similar to the perception in most 
member states, is a perception of Islamist terrorism. Other strands of 
terrorism, e.g. right-wing terrorism, enjoy less attention. Although the 
coordination role of the EU does not always deliver, the EU has produced 
results. Some of these results, however, include policies that threaten rights 
standards. I will in the next section scrutinize these policies. 
 
The EU’s Post-9/11 Anti-Terrorism: A Human Rights Perspective  
After shedding light on the development of anti-terrorism, as well as the 
perception of terrorism at the EU level, this section will scrutinize specific 
EU policies implemented in the EU’s efforts to fight terrorism. This analysis 
will be carried out by having the high human rights standards that the EU has 
set for itself in mind. As mentioned, the EU perceives itself as a human rights 
frontrunner and builds a large part of its raison d’ être on stabilizing, 
improving and spreading individual rights. An emphasis on human rights is 
existent in the EU’s rhetoric on anti-terrorism as well. The EU has, e.g. 
pointed out that it wants to tackle terrorism “while protecting human rights 
and upholding the rule of law,” as well as international law.73 The 
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compatibility of human rights and anti-terrorism is a declared aim in the EU’s 
official Counter-Terrorism-Strategy from 2005, and was underlined in a 
2012 publication by the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de 
Kerchove, which read that “promoting human rights is one of our most 
effective ways to counter terrorism.”74 Jörg Monar, therefore, denoted the 
EU’s anti-terrorism efforts a “war on two fronts”, as the focus would be on 
tackling the issue of terrorism, while at the same time trying to avoid the 
“undermining of civil liberties and human rights standards as a result of 
counter-terrorism measures.”75 Measures and legislation that interfere with 
human rights ideals in an ineligible fashion thus undermine one of the 
cornerstones of the EU itself. I will, in the following, scrutinize EU policies 
concerning such interferences. 
 
 Data Retention at the EU Level 
The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council agreed in 2005 on bringing 
forward a directive on data retention measures, making it mandatory for 
member states to adopt legislation that obliges telecommunication service 
providers to store metadata for six to twenty-four months. State authorities 
would then have the opportunity to access the retained data at any time. As 
mentioned earlier, metadata saved by data retention consists of information 
on communication without saving the content of communication, thus 
saving, e.g., who is in contact with whom, at what time, for how long and the 
location of the cell phones involved. These data can be automatically 
analyzed and provide for a detailed insight into an individual’s life. The 
storage of such data comes close to a “logbook of a person’s behavior and 
life.”76 The data retention directive was a response to the terror attack in 
Madrid in 2004, where perpetrators of the attack could be traced by phone 
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records.77 The idea for the directive was thus to gain insights into the 
communication and networks of terror suspects.78 However, data retention 
did not only aim at EU citizens, but the communication of all individuals 
passing through the EU’s infrastructure (equaling a considerable share of the 
world’s population).79 Therein, the data retention directive constitutes the 
EU’s most comprehensive policy in terms of surveillance until further.80  
The directive was, however, not only developed at the EU level but 
at the member state level as well. Germany was one of the member states 
pushing the directive at EU level; especially Otto Schily, Interior Minister at 
the time, was a proponent of the directive. The German government not only 
aimed at the implementation of data retention legislation at the EU level out 
of convictions concerning European cooperation and coherence but also 
since a directive coming top-down from the EU might spare the German 
government of becoming the target of critics. The EU thus functioned as an 
important vehicle for distributing the measure of data retention to all member 
states.81 This process of utilizing the EU as a means to establish a piece of 
legislation that was anyway considered on the national level can be identified 
as a case of policy laundering. Still, a pro-active role of the EU in terms of 
data retention can be traced in the fact that the relevant EU Commissioner at 
the time, Cecilia Malmstroem, repeatedly bemoaned a slow and too diverse 
implementation of the directive in several member states.82 
However, after national data retention legislation had already come 
under pressure in some member states (e.g., Germany), the EU’s own data 
retention directive was declared non-valid as well. In 2014, the ECJ ruled 
that it was violating the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection 
(art. 7 and 8 CFREU) of EU citizens in an unjustifiable fashion and therein 
incompatible with the EU’s CFREU. The court held that the directive 
interfered with citizens’ rights in a non-proportional manner since it 
demanded the collection of data on virtually all EU citizens and residents. 
The data retention directive did thus not live up to the demands for a 
justifiable derogation from rights as defined in the CFREU (upholding the 
principles of proportionality and necessity of derogation). Additionally, the 
court held that the data retention directive failed to define limits on data 
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access of security organs and failed to provide satisfactory safeguards in 
terms of data security and data storage.83 All national law based on the 
directive was thus no longer compliant with EU law already by 2014.84  
In December 2016, as mentioned earlier, the ECJ expanded its stand 
on data retention in a ruling on data retention regimes in the UK and Sweden. 
The court explained that data retention provides for severe interference with 
the right to privacy and the right to data protection, as it would allow for 
precise conclusions on private lives. Freedom of expression as defined in 
article 11 of the CFREU was evaluated to be interfered with as well by the 
court. The court held that indiscriminate data retention would possibly 
construct the impression of constant surveillance. Based on this evaluation 
the court ruled that indiscriminate and non-transparent retention of electronic 
communication is ineligible. Such indiscriminate retention (covering 
virtually all individuals in European societies) would exceed the limits of 
necessity (and proportionality) and would not be justifiable in a democratic 
society. The condition for a derogation of privacy rights was thus not met. 
The court pointed out that only such data retention that served the purpose 
of combatting serious crime, including terrorism, is eligible, however, only 
if retention is aimed at specific suspects.85 Furthermore, each act of data 
retention would demand a specific authorization by a court or an independent 
body. In order to uphold a sufficient level of transparency, a notification of 
the application of a data retention measure would have to be supplied to 
affected individuals as soon as the measure was not in use anymore. The 
court demanded member states to reform and renew their data retention laws 
along the lines of its judgment (abolishing indiscriminate collection and 
implementing the mentioned safeguards).86 It can thus be concluded that the 
EU’s data retention directive breached human rights on a legal basis. 
Furthermore, based on the court's verdict it becomes hard to imagine how 
any form of indiscriminate mass surveillance in the EU would be in 
accordance with ECJ jurisdiction.87 
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Additionally, the EU’s data retention directive violates the wider 
aims of human rights or the spirit of rights. The data retention directive 
negatively interferes with the right to privacy, and in consequence with the 
right to freedom of expression, freedom of movement and freedom of 
association.88 Again, privacy is an integral part of what it means to be human. 
If humans do not feel free from unnecessary control their abilities of self-
definition, of creating relationships and to personal, moral, intellectual, and 
political development are restrained. The same is valid for individuals’ 
abilities to make autonomous decisions and to freely express opinions and 
gain political influence.89 By triggering a situation in which all individuals 
potentially feel surveyed at almost all times, one cannot speak of a sound 
atmosphere of rights anymore. In such a situation, perceptions of human 
dignity and notions of freedom are undermined. The same is valid for the 
human capabilities of thinking and moving freely, and engaging in political 
decision-making. However, all of these points are central parts of what 
human rights, in general, try to support.  
Since the data retained from mobile phones very often include 
location data, it is, by the help of these data, possible to construct movement 
profiles of individuals. The possibility of indiscriminately tracking 
movement effectively decreases the general amount of freedom of movement 
in society, as well as undermines the crucial idea of freedom of movement, 
to freely move in public space (without being tracked).90  
If the feeling of being under surveillance or control persists in a 
society or a fraction of society, individuals can be expected to start behaving 
differently. They might start to avoid expressing opinions in political debates 
and engaging in political campaigns. In other words, a process of self-
censoring in fear of potential false incrimination might be launched. Humans 
very often start to act differently when they become aware of external 
surveillance and control, by conforming their behavior to mainstream 
expectations (this was, as mentioned before, acknowledged in the ECJ ruling 
from 2016 and documented in a recent French study).91 Such a development 
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would severely damage every democratic society since the free engagement 
of citizens and individuals is crucial for every functioning democracy.92  
Furthermore, via surveillance processes, the state increases its 
amount of power over its individuals, to the extent that the democratic 
cornerstones of society might become fragile.93 Lilian Mitrou argues that 
indiscriminate data retention reflects a shift of the state from a constitutional 
state providing protection in concrete scenarios of a threat to a primarily 
security-oriented, preventive state.94 With indiscriminate data retention, 
collecting information on all individuals, not only suspects of crime, states 
enter the realm of pre-emptive action. Surveillance as a practice is 
transformed from the exception to the norm, enabling a much easier sorting 
and categorizing of individuals. Every individual communicating 
electronically becomes a target for surveillance and thereby a potential 
suspect.95 The data retention directive shows that the EU is not only 
contributing to policies that undermine rights by providing a forum for the 
cooperation of member states but also pushes itself for the implementation 
of policies that are ineligible from a human rights standpoint (by demanding 
states to implement such policies).96 
Although indiscriminate data retention both violates the spirit of 
human rights and the CFREU and although member states have an obligation 
to make sure their data retention laws are in accordance with ECJ 
jurisprudence, member states have been very reluctant to reform their data 
retention laws according to the demands of the ECJ. Many member states 
have not changed their data retention laws after the 2014 and 2016 verdicts, 
although these laws are by now in breach of EU jurisdiction. Many member 
states seem to be willing to disdain the ECJ’s judgment and let their legally 
non-eligible data retention laws run as long as possible. A proposed solution 
has been the adoption of a ‘rights compliant data retention directive’ at the 
EU level. Currently, the Council is in an official “reflection process” on data 
retention and how to make data retention practices compatible with the 
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demands by the ECJ.97 However, such an EU wide solution would have to 
be adopted by the member states in the European Council. Moreover, data 
retention would have to change dramatically in character in order to end up 
‘human rights compliant’. 
Tellingly, despite the fact that data retention has been declared in 
breach of essential human rights more than once by relevant European courts, 
the EU still develops new policy ideas based on the mass retention of internet 
data. For instance, in 2018 the EU published plans to give investigators of 
one member state the right to access data retained by internet service 
providers in another country, including emails, chat protocols, videos, and 
photographs. Data access would have to be granted in the course of ten days 
and in emergency cases after the latest six hours.98 These plans show that a 
learning effect on the side of the EU Commission based on the court verdicts 
does not seem to have materialized. Mass data retention still constitutes the 
basis for the extension of investigation powers, this time even including 
concrete content and not ‘only’ metadata (since photographs and videos are 
included). Furthermore, the fact that the policy proposal includes a process 
that is not based on actual emergency situations indicates that the idea of 
preventive policing along the lines of e.g. the German concept of ‘looming 
danger’ seems to have entered the policymaking processes at the EU level as 
well. Thus, although mass data retention has been scrutinized extensively by 
European courts in the recent past, the idea to utilize this measure of mass 
surveillance has survived, not only at the member state level but at the EU 
level as well. 
 
 The Passenger-Name-Record Directive  
Another example of an EU anti-terrorism policy that exercises pressure on 
human rights norms is the Passenger-Name-Record directive (PNR) adopted 
in 2016.99 The directive makes it mandatory for airlines to save a range of 
                                                          
97 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Data Retention Across the EU.” 
https://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/information-society-privacy-and-data-protection/data-
retention. Privacy International, "National Data Retention Laws since the CJEU’s Tele-
2/Watson Judgment." 
Statewatch, “Council wants a "comprehensive study" on data retention that considers "a future 
legislative initiative"," April 10, 2019. www.statewatch.org/news/2019/apr/eu-council-data-
ret-con.htm. 
98 Spiegel Online, “EU-Plan: Fingerabdrücke im Ausweis sollen bald Pflicht sein,” April 17, 
2018. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/eu-fingerabdruecke-im-personalausweis-
sollen-bald-pflicht-sein-a-1203405.html 
99 It took the directive a long time to reach the stage of adoption. It was discussed since 2002. 
Before the adoption of the directive, the EU had made agreements with the US about transfer 
of PNR data. See e.g., Hillebrand, Counter-Terrorism Networks in the European Union, 169-
170. Vassilios Grammatikas, "EU Counter‐terrorist Policies: Security vs. Human Rights?" 
Conference Paper, First Annual Conference on Human Security, Terrorism and Organized 
Crime in the Western Balkan Region, Ljubljana, Slovenia, November 2006. 
285 
 
data on passengers and transfer them to member state institutions, e.g. name, 
address, travel date, itinerary, other ticket information, contact details, travel 
agent, all forms of payment information, seat number or baggage 
information. The data are to be saved for all flights from third countries 
entering the EU. However, the member states agreed to save data on EU-
internal flights as well. These data can additionally be delivered to authorities 
in the US, Canada or Australia. The PNR data are to be stored in a 
personalized fashion (connected to real names) for six months and are to be 
completely deleted after five years.100 The data are not to be saved in specific 
situations of threat but at all times. Accordingly, data collected under the 
PNR directive are based on a general presumption of threat, not a specific 
one. In effect, the PNR directive operates as the facilitator of another measure 
of indiscriminate data collection and storage. Therein, the directive 
constitutes another instance of indiscriminate surveillance.101  
The official purpose of the directive is to “prevent, detect and 
investigate terrorism and other forms of serious crime.”102 Thomas De 
Maiziere, German Interior Minister at the time, argued that the directive 
would provide insight into so-called ‘endangerers’ entering Europe.103 
However, the EU includes a wide range of issues in its definition of serious 
crime in connection with the PNR directive, e.g. corruption, fraud, forgery 
of documents, drug offenses or industrial espionage (in total twenty-six 
different crimes are listed). Thus, the directive covers a lot more than only 
terrorism, and it covers more than violent crime as well. Therefore, the PNR 
directive appears to constitute another example of a side-effect anti-terrorism 
policy, which is a policy that does have an anti-terrorism purpose, or that is 
sold to the public mainly as an anti-terrorism measure, but that does try to 
suffice other purposes as well and foremost shows effects in regard to these 
other purposes.  
The directive had been in the pipeline of EU policymaking for 
around five years already, without reaching consent in the European 
Parliament. The US issued external pressure on the EU for a number of years 
to get the EU to approve the directive and to include an agreement about the 
potential transfer of the data to US authorities. The attacks on the editorial 
board of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in January 2015 then provided a push 
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for the policy proposal at the EU level. Still, the policy saw another delay 
since France initially demanded a longer data saving period. Finally, the 
directive was adopted in April 2016.104 However, in 2018 fourteen EU 
member states still missed implementing the directive into national 
legislation.105 This process exemplifies, again, three different points that I 
have tried to make. First, anti-terrorism policymaking at the EU level can 
take a long time, since different demands by the many member states have 
to be brought in line. Second, concrete attacks can provide a push for policy-
proposals that potentially had been discussed for years, without successfully 
finding a compromise. Third, anti-terrorism policymaking at the EU level 
and the member state level are intertwined. France provided both a push and 
a delay in the process, and the directive forces the member states to adopt 
national laws implementing the goals of the EU directive. Furthermore, the 
example of the PNR directive shows that the EU is at times an object of 
external pressure in terms of anti-terrorism policy, here to pressure by the 
United States.  
Now, using my human rights analysis framework, I would like to 
argue that the EU’s PNR directive undermines both the right to privacy and 
the CFREU’s right to data protection (art. 8 CFREU). So far, no verdict has 
been delivered on the matter of the PNR directive by the ECJ. Still, the 
directive, due to its indiscriminate collection and storage of data, appears to 
provide a potentially ineligible interference with the right to privacy and the 
right to data protection from a legal perspective. One might argue that states 
might limit or derogate from these rights in order to prevent severe threats, 
however, if the conditions of necessity and proportionality are upheld in case 
of the PNR deems at least questionable. To save extensive data on all air 
travel, in order to potentially catch a few suspects, or gain insights into the 
movement and network of a considerably small amount of individuals, 
appears just as non-proportional as the saving of communication data of all 
citizens; especially since no proof has been provided how the PNR directive 
might prevent a terror attack. Again, the indiscriminate saving of PNR data 
is just another mass surveillance measure; and such indiscriminate 
surveillance has been declared ineligible by the ECJ in the past based on the 
legal norm of privacy rights (see above).106 Therefore, the same 
                                                          
104 Becker, “Fluggastdaten: EU-Innenminister beschliessen PNR-Richtlinie.” Javier 
Argomaniz, “When the EU is the ’Norm-taker’: The Passenger Name Records Agreement and 
the EU’s Internalization of US Border Security Norms,” European Integration, Vol. 31 No.1 
(2009): 119. Kurz, Die Datenfresser, 189. 
105 Statewatch, "Travel surveillance: Commission demands PNR Directive implementation by 
14 Member States as 'Informal Working Group' settles in," July 23, 2018. 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jul/eu-pnr-infringements.htm. 
106 Justine Chauvin, “EU-PNR directive: Overlooking EU fundamental rights will not make 
Europe safer.” Politheor, January 9, 2016. http://politheor.net/eu-pnr-directive-overlooking-
eu-fundamental-rights-will-not-make-europe-safer/ 
287 
 
interpretation of articles 7 and 8 of the CFREU (covering privacy and data 
protection) as delivered by the ECJ in case of data retention might be 
delivered for the PNR directive; the similarities of the character of data 
collection are obvious.107 Admittedly, the share of people traveling by plane 
is smaller than the share of people using electronic communication, but still, 
the data collection and storage is likewise conducted in an indiscriminate 
fashion, not targeting specific individuals, as demanded by the ECJ in its 
2016 verdict on data retention. Moreover, in terms of the transfer of PNR 
data to third states, the ECJ has already issued a negative opinion in 2017, 
forcing the EU to at least adopt additional safeguards. The ECJ declared at 
the same time that the EU has so far not successfully proven that the directive 
is necessary (a condition for derogating from the mentioned rights under the 
CFREU).108 Furthermore, it is not unlikely that PNR databases might be used 
in a dragnet fashion, implementing discriminatory profiling practices, thus 
violating the right to be free from discrimination (see Chapter 3 on the legally 
discriminatory nature of dragnet searches). Based on these points, the EU 
might head for a future legal setback concerning the PNR directive. And 
indeed, the German legislation implementing the EU’s PNR directive has 
recently been charged in Germany, e.g., by Emilio Capitani, former head of 
the Secretariat of the EP’s LIBE Committee, based on some of the points laid 
out above, e.g., the indiscriminate nature of data collection.109 
Since the directive constitutes another indiscriminate surveillance 
measure, it is at odds with the spirit of rights and wider aims of human rights 
as well. The argumentation is similar to the one presented above in 
connection with data retention. The PNR directive negatively interferes with 
privacy rights and therein undermines one of the central conditions for 
humans to thrive in democratic societies. It interferes with the protection of 
individuals’ social space and diminishes individual autonomy. It constitutes 
another control regime, interfering with the wider human rights aim of 
freedom and a general notion of human dignity. By creating another 
surveillance instrument the perception of being surveyed at all times might 
increase amongst the population. By that, the directive rather damages than 
supports an atmosphere of enjoyment of rights. The human capability of 
moving freely, without tracking, is undermined as well. In such a situation, 
one must expect negative consequences for the notion of being treated in a 
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dignified way and of having one’s personhood protected. The perception that 
the state (or the EU) supports the maximization of the freedom of its citizens 
(and non-citizens) and is ready to concede limits on its own power is 
undermined as well. Since the directive enhances the amount of power 
authorities hold over the populations, it feeds into Mitrou’s argument that 
indiscriminate data collection and storage reflects a shift towards a security-
oriented and pre-emptive state.110 Surveillance increasingly becomes the 
norm, rather than the exception, by the introduction of instruments such as 
the PNR directive; and by targeting all travelers indiscriminately, all become 
potential suspects (instead of being recognized as ‘ends in themselves’). 
Again, the cornerstone of the modern human rights idea, human dignity is 
damaged by ever-extended indiscriminate data collection.  
In spite of potential future challenges facing the PNR directive and 
the problems it constitutes for the spirit of human rights, the Romanian 
presidency of the EU Council, in the spring of 2019 suggested an extension 
of the PNR regime to other means of transportation.111 Thus, one might see 
more surveillance of individuals’ transportation in the future, not less. And, 
more such surveillance would be triggered by processes playing out at the 
EU level. 
 
 The Implementation of Biometric Passports and ID Cards 
Another example of a questionable anti-terrorism measure that was pushed 
at the EU level is the implementation of biometric data on passports and ID 
cards. This implementation has been conducted in two steps. First, a 
regulation on the implementation of biometric passports was adopted in 
2004. Second, a new regulation from 2018 makes the implementation of 
biometric data in ID cards mandatory.  
First, in 2004, the EU adopted a regulation that demanded all its 
member states (with the exception of the UK, Ireland, and Denmark), to 
implement biometric data (two fingerprints and a biometric picture) in 
passports.112 Such biometric data allow for secure verification of the identity 
of individuals.113 One of the major justifications for the implementation of 
the regulation was its alleged contribution to a heightened level of security, 
(especially in the context of the ‘War on Terror’). As mentioned before, the 
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EU’s directive was a result of political pressure from the US, who threatened 
the EU to abolish visa-free travel for citizens of EU member states to the US 
if biometric data would not be included in European passports. Still, also the 
German government supplied pressure at the EU level in order to push the 
biometric passport issue on the EU’s political agenda.114 
The fact that it was the EU, who pushed the measure of 
implementing biometric passports on the European political agenda, 
resulting in the implementation of biometric passports in almost all member 
states, provides an example of the relevance and power of the EU in 
European anti-terrorism. The specific issue of the regulation on biometric 
passports, however, illustrates as well that the EU is vulnerable to external 
pressures in terms of terrorism policies, especially from the side of the US.  
This vulnerability to US pressure surfaced in other cases as well, as e.g., seen 
with the PNR agreement. 
This first regulation from 2004 is from a legal perspective eligible. 
In 2013, the ECJ ruled that the inclusion of fingerprints in electronic 
passports is admissible. The court acknowledged that the storing of 
fingerprints constitutes an interference with the right to privacy and the right 
to the protection of one’s data. However, it argued that this interference was 
justifiable since the measure would contribute to enhanced security, since the 
storage of two fingerprints would not constitute a very sensitive issue and 
since the regulation would help to meet an objective of the general interest 
of the EU (preventing illegal entry into the EU). Still, the court emphasized 
that its verdict is only applicable to the process of storing the biometric 
fingerprint data directly in the passport, which is then handed over to the 
individual, not for extended processing of the biometric data, e.g. by creating 
centralized biometric databases.115  
Although the direct storage of biometric data on passports has 
received legal consent, the measure is still somewhat questionable from a 
spirit of rights perspective. One might claim that the act of handing over 
one’s fingerprints to state authorities interferes with perceptions of one’s 
overall human dignity, even if the data are directly stored on the passport 
only. This concern was even expressed in a report by the EU’s own 
fundamental rights agency FRA.116 The act of providing fingerprints is 
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culturally connected to suspects of crime, having all individuals provide 
fingerprints arguably means regarding all individuals as potential future 
suspects. This is especially valid since the legitimizing context for the 
implementation of the regulation was to filter out potential terror suspects. 
This additionally constitutes an infringement of the general presumption of 
innocence, a central part of due process (and the basis for the wider rights 
aim of equal justice).  
In the latest years, the EU has renewed its focus on biometric data 
and tries to push for their extended use (via legislation and budgeting). This 
has for instance been manifested with the development of a new regulation 
on mandatory biometric data in ID cards. In the spring of 2018, the EU 
developed a new regulation, making it mandatory for all ID cards in the EU 
to include two electronic fingerprints, as well as a biometric photograph 
(extending the earlier demands to now encompass ID cards as well). The new 
regulation, adopted in April 2019, subjects around 175 million EU citizens 
to exchange old ID cards with new biometric ones. The EU Commission 
emphasized that the new regulation supports European anti-terrorism efforts 
since terrorists could use forged ID cards in order to enter the EU. At the 
same time, the Commission justified the regulation with general efforts 
against transnational crime.117 Thus, one can arguably regard the new 
regulation as a side-effect anti-terrorism measure as well, since its use is at 
the outset not confined to potential anti-terrorism benefits, but encompasses 
efforts against regular crime as well and will with a high probability see its 
main effects in preventing regular crime (see my definition of side-effect 
anti-terrorism). The timing of the push for the new regulation supports my 
earlier argument that anti-terrorism measures are, at times, extended, even if 
the peak of a specific terror threat has passed. The new regulation would have 
appeared to be more in line with current terrorism contexts if it had been 
proposed at the recent high time of IS terrorism in Europe (roughly from 
January 2015 to the summer of 2017). Of course, one might ascribe the late 
initiation of the regulation to the slow nature of EU policymaking, however, 
if the peak of a threat has passed, the new measure could just as well have 
been dropped, if not it is to serve other purposes as well (such as tackling 
transnational crime).118  
Questionable circumstances of the new regulation pertain its scope 
and its purpose or necessity. First, the new regulation adds many million 
individuals in the EU to the owners of biometric identification documents, 
thus the scope of biometric identification is considerably expanded and the 
amount of people that are forced to provide sensitive, digitally transferable 
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data when issuing an identification document is growing. This expanded 
scope of the biometric identification documents, especially ID cards, deems 
questionable. It does not meet the official purpose of protection from 
terrorism. Most owners of ID cards do not use them for traveling in or out of 
the Schengen zone (here often a passport is needed or used), and most checks 
on ID cards do rather aim at other irregularities or offenses than terrorism. 
Furthermore, the two main categories of people entering Europe (who do not 
own a European ID card in the first place) and posing a threat are refugees 
who become radicalized after entering Europe and returning nationals of 
member states who fought for IS. The latter might, however, potentially 
return on their own identity papers or via secret routes without passport 
control. Thus, a preventive effect in terms of biometric ID cards in 
connection with these two groups cannot necessarily be expected. Cases of 
IS members traveling to Europe by using forged ID and committing terror 
attacks have at least not been in the headlines in terms of latest Islamist terror 
attacks in Europe. In light of this, the regulation appears ever more futile in 
its anti-terrorism purpose. 
Second, the issuing of new ID cards via biometric data entails the 
risks of misuse of that form of data collection from the side of state 
authorities. Suddenly the data might not only be stored on the card any longer 
but in national databases as well. Such developments are already underway. 
For instance, Germany has in a recent law given its intelligence agencies full 
access to data on passports and ID cards. The access might result in the 
construction of biometric databases based on biometric information in ID 
documents. 119 The granting of access to such data by intelligence services 
constitutes a violation of the original purpose of the EU regulation that stood 
at the start of the process. Such a misuse of the purpose might in the future 
have legal repercussion for both the German legislation and the EU 
regulation as a whole (although the ECJ has thus far abstained from entering 
the discussion about extended usage of biometric data gained via issuing 
passports). This point gains in its validity by keeping in mind, that the new 
General Data Protection Regulation by the EU (adopted in 2016 and 
implemented in 2018) classifies biometric data as sensitive data, such data 
enjoy therefore an extra degree of protection in the perspective of the EU 
itself.120 
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Third, concerning this new regulation, it is important to point out, 
that the EU Commission did not produce any specific argumentation on the 
necessity or proportionality of the new regulation in relation to affected civil 
rights.121 However, since the regulation covers the collection and storage of 
sensitive data (the EU itself evaluates fingerprints and biometric pictures as 
sensitive data), the categories of proportionality and necessity should have 
been considered for a justification of the regulation. Non-proportional data 
collection and data storage of sensitive data on many million individuals 
constitute a potential interference with privacy rights and the right to data 
protection. That the EU did not legitimize the proportionality and necessity 
of the regulation, clearly disregards demands for a derogation of these rights 
under the CFREU. This disregard might bear the potential for legal 
challenges. 
In terms of the spirit of rights, the following points of criticism can 
be provided. Since the purpose of the extension of the scope of biometric 
data in identification documents was the prevention of terrorism, every 
individual is regarded as a potential suspect. This undermines the notion of 
every human being constituting an end in itself and therein interferes with 
the general notion of human dignity and personhood on which human rights 
concepts are based. Furthermore, the expansion of the scope of people 
covered by demands for issuing biometric documents marks a trend of ever 
more far-reaching electronic control mechanisms in Western democratic 
societies; a trend that undermines notions of privacy rights and data 
protection (see my points on the risks concerning the security of biometric 
data above). The trend towards enhanced data collection and data control on 
the side of European authorities additionally feeds into the development 
towards a pre-emptive state. This, again, exemplifies that the rights aim of 
enabling maximal individual freedom and setting the necessary limits for 
state power are not provided in current European anti-terrorism. The 
disregard of the categories of necessity and proportionality by the EU in its 
justification for the new regulation disregards the rules set in a democratic 
and liberal system for how to deal with the collection of sensitive data, and 
more broadly, for how to deal with questions about individual rights in 
general. As with a range of other anti-terrorism measures presented in this 
thesis, the new regulation on ID cards contributes to additional accumulation 
of knowledge about individuals for state authorities. Thereby, the power 
balance between state and individual tips further in the advantage of the 
state.122 And last, if intelligence agencies are allowed access to biometric 
data, an increase of secret surveillance measures becomes a very probable 
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scenario, based on the revelations about secret surveillance in the recent past 
(see Germany and UK chapter). Such surveillance has, as explained before, 
severe repercussions on the general notion of human dignity, and the wider 
aims of the human rights idea. 
Summing up, biometric data integrated into passports and ID cards 
do in themselves not constitute a legal breach of human rights norms (at least 
as long as they are only stored on passport or chip itself). However, some 
criticism can be applied from a rights perspective, as mentioned above. This 
goes for both a legal perspective and a spirit of rights perspective. 
Furthermore, the collection and storage of biometric data via issuing 
passports open the door for the initiation of other measures which endanger 
rights norms and ideas, for instance giving intelligence agencies access to 
biometric data (as seen in the German example explained above) or the 
general trend towards the establishment of biometric databases. The latter 
will be the focal point below.  
 
 The Push for Biometric Databases 
As mentioned, the EU and its member states increasingly push for extended 
use of biometric data, e.g. in biometric databases and, as a future scenario, in 
connection with facial recognition technology. In recent years both the EU 
and the member states have pushed for the construction of additional 
databases on a range of issues, supplementing already existing databases. For 
example, the EES (Entry-Exit System) database will from 2020 onwards 
replace the current system of manually stamping passports. It will 
electronically record all crossings of an EU external border of nationals of 
third countries and will store biometric pictures and four fingerprints of the 
travelers for up to four years. The data will be available to law enforcement 
units and Europol and serves (at least partly) the official purpose to prevent 
or detect terrorist acts. Another addition is a database on passenger records 
of flights to, from and inside of the EU (under the PNR directive). These 
databases will supplement already existing ones. For instance, the 
EURODAC (European Dactyloscopy) database, established in 2003 and 
storing data on five million individuals, stores all ten fingerprints of asylum 
seekers and stateless persons (according to a new Commission proposal a 
biometric picture will be stored as well). The SIS II (Schengen Information 
System II) database stores data (including biometric data) on criminal 
suspects or missing persons and is accessible by law enforcement units in the 
EU. The VIS (Visa Information System) database collects data on all 
individuals applying for visa entry into the Schengen Area, including the 
storage of all ten fingerprints. Currently the database stores data on seventeen 
million visa applications. Under the Prüm Convention, the fourteen members 
294 
 
(all EU member states) exchange DNA and fingerprint data on crime 
suspects via a connected database.123 
EU databases, such as VIS, SIS II, and EURODAC, are subject to 
continuous growth, managing ever-increasing loads of data. In order to 
tackle this challenge, and by the help of improving technology, EU bodies, 
and member states undertake efforts to make these databases interoperable. 
In other words, all these databases are now to become an interrelated entity, 
creating a conjunction between the databases. Thus, both at the member state 
level and the EU level one can observe a trend for enabling investigators to 
check all of these databases by using only one search interface (‘checking all 
databases with one click’).124 In such an interoperable database system, law 
enforcement officers could then search for individuals using biometric data, 
including the usage of facial recognition software (facial recognition 
software, which is already utilized in order to search for suspects in 
individual databases).125 
 The political pushes for the key feature of interoperability came 
from both the EU Commission and the governments of certain member 
states, e.g. the German government. The then German Minister of the 
Interior, Thomas de Maiziere presented in March 2016, just after the attacks 
in Brussels, a policy-paper demanding the creation of conjunction between 
all these databases. De Maiziere argued for this step with the evaluation that 
“in times of crises data protection is nice, but security enjoys priority.” The 
Commission followed in April 2016 by demanding the interoperability of the 
mentioned databases (the Commission had already called for interoperability 
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of Europol databases in 2005). At that point (2016), preparatory cooperation 
on databases was already taking place. For instance, authorities from six 
different member states, including the German BKA, cooperated with 
Europol in order to develop a single search interface for conjuncted databases 
in the nearest future.126 Several member states consider the construction of 
biometric databases as well, e.g. the Netherlands.127 It is likely that national 
databases will be linked to the European ones as well, providing for an even 
more powerful overall database.128 
The creation of an interrelated database combining SIS II, VIS, 
EURODAC, EEAS, and a travel database was adopted by the EP in April 
2019 under the name of the Common Identity Repository (CIR) initiative. A 
conjunction of these databases will mean the construction of a biometric 
‘super-database’ covering the data of many million individuals with EU 
citizenship or residing in the EU, as well as individuals from third countries 
(at least 350 million). The conjuncted database is supposed to be in place by 
2023. The adoption of this initiative feeds into trends of already started 
cooperation towards unifying member state databases. The EU Commission 
has gathered an expert commission in order to clear out the legal details of 
creating interoperability between these databases since each database is 
maintained for a specific purpose and could thus far not be arbitrarily 
interrelated.129 
From a legal perspective, the erection of databases is not declared 
eligible, but also not banned. In a recent verdict on biometric data on ID 
cards, the ECJ surprisingly avoided taking a position on the possible 
construction of biometric databases. It has thus neither allowed nor banned 
such databases (likewise, the new EU regulation itself, neither prescribes nor 
bans the construction of databases).130 This move by the ECJ surprised many 
legal experts since it would appear logical that the court would point out if 
the further use of data collected for issuing passports (e.g. storage in a 
database) constitutes an eligible measure.131 In the case of data retention 
laws, the ECJ took a different standpoint and declared the data retention 
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directive for invalid, also based on the argument that the directive failed to 
regulate the further usage of the data on the national level. Additionally, in 
an earlier verdict, the court had pointed out that EU legislators must ensure 
that biometric data are “effectively protected from misuse and abuse.”132 In 
any case, the construction of an interoperable ‘super-database’ is clearly not 
covered by the ECJ’s positive 2013 ruling on biometric data in passports 
since the court only declared the direct storage of biometric data on the 
document itself as eligible. 
Still, the construction of big databases involving sensitive data such 
as fingerprints, face pictures, and DNA affects several human rights. The 
right to privacy and the right to data protection are both affected. In terms of 
legal standards, the erection of databases is, as mentioned, not declared 
eligible, but also not prohibited. Still, there are reasons to assume that the 
construction of a European super-databank on biometric data might run into 
legal trouble. First, already the construction of some of the individual 
databases is questionable. A legal study on the eligibility of the new EES 
database concluded that the indiscriminate nature of the collection of traveler 
data violates fundamental rights (again, the right to privacy and data 
protection). Furthermore, the circumstance that the data would be stored for 
a full four years would be a problem as well. Fittingly, the ECJ has ruled in 
July 2017 that Canada cannot be allowed to store data of European travelers 
indefinitely or for a long time; data would have to be deleted as soon as the 
stay was over.133 Thus, if the indiscriminate nature of individual databases 
implies legal problems, the conjunction of such databases to a super-database 
appears questionable from a legal perspective as well. Second, all currently 
existing databases have been initiated for a specific purpose, the storage of 
certain data is thus legally connected to a specific purpose as well (e.g. in 
terms of EURODAC to avoid asylum seekers to register several times in 
different states).134 Furthermore, article 8 of the CFREU, demands that 
personal data of individuals must be processed “for a specified purpose.”135 
However, it appears at least questionable what the specific purpose of a 
super-database should be and how authorities would be able to justify and 
defend it. Third, according to the GDPR adopted by the EU in 2016, 
biometric data are sensitive data and deserve special protection. However, 
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the storage of many million sets of biometric data in a super-database would 
make it hard to trace that special protection.136 Fourth, since the necessity 
and proportionality of some of the sub-databases can already be questioned 
(e.g., why save all flight data when the amount used for security purposes is 
tiny), it seems far-fetched to argue for the necessity and proportionality of a 
super-database. Since European courts have decided that the storage of all 
Internet metadata in an indiscriminate fashion is not proportionate, how can 
the storage of all flight data or all travel data of non-EU citizens be 
proportionate, let alone the storage of biometric data on millions of 
individuals in a single databank? The answer is that it appears at very 
questionable if relevant international courts (e.g., the ECJ) would see the 
demand of proportionality to be fulfilled. Fifth, a new potential biometric 
super-database would additionally provide the opportunity for dragnet 
investigations.137 In fact, the EU had already in the early years after 9/11 
recommended the usage of profiling systems in order to combat recruitment 
and radicalization.138 Dragnet investigations, involving indiscriminate 
scanning of data in big databases, have in the past been declared to be in 
breach of legally manifested human rights norms (see Chapter 3). Based on 
these arguments, it can at least be pointed out that the construction of a super-
database interferes with the right to privacy and data protection, not unlikely 
in an ineligible fashion. The EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 
likewise evaluated the construction of such databases as interfering with 
these rights and held that necessity and proportionality of such databases 
could not be demonstrated. The Agency additionally pointed out that the EU 
legislators should make clear that storage of biometric data in databases is 
not eligible.139   
From a spirit of rights perspective, the increasing construction and 
conjunction of databases clearly constitute a problem. Conjuncted databases 
make it even more difficult (or almost impossible) for individuals to keep 
track of the information saved on them in the various databases and evaluate 
the accuracy of such information, therein, undermining individuals’ 
ownership of their own information.140 Additionally, as mentioned before, 
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such a process defines a huge amount of individuals, if not whole populations 
as potential suspects. It undermines the presumption of innocence, as well as 
the general notion of individuals’ dignity. Furthermore, such a ‘super-
database’ interferes with the right to privacy and data protection and opens 
up for risks of misuse concerning the large amounts of stored data. Moreover, 
the construction of a ‘super-database’ contributes to additional accumulation 
of power by the state versus all affected individuals.141 However, as pointed 
out earlier, it is a core aim of the human rights idea to empower individuals, 
not state authorities. Thus, the empowering of the individual, as well as the 
democratic quality of political systems, would be undermined. The ‘super-
database’ would thus feed into the development towards a continuously 
growing scope of surveillance and digital control, as well as the trend 
towards pre-emptive state action, disregarding the rights aim of establishing 
boundaries to state power. 
As a next potential step, the described conjunct databases, or ‘super-
database’ might be connected with searches via facial recognition over 
CCTV and social media. Such a potential next step is according to current 
technological and political developments not a far-fetched, but rather a 
realistic scenario for the near future.142 For instance, FRA the EU’s 
fundamental rights agency has pointed out that the use of facial recognition 
systems operating with a link to biometric databases is a potential future 
development.143 The Romanian Council presidency proposed in the spring of 
2019, that the use of biometric data and databases, as well as facial 
recognition systems, should be extended.144 Thus, a push for the 
implementation and usage of facial recognition by the help of biometric 
databases is provided at the EU level. Furthermore, Germany, one of the 
EU’s most influential member states has, as mentioned, run test projects 
linking databases and facial recognition (just as the UK) and has announced 
to implement such systems in regular use at points of public interest (railway 
stations or airports). Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organization, 
with which the EU’s police agency Europol maintains close cooperation, has 
already documented its interest in linking biometric databases, with facial 
recognition technology and CCTV systems or social media. Already today, 
Interpol is operating searches in biometric databases with facial recognition 
software.145 Europol is cooperating with Interpol on such biometric searches. 
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Europol is itself maintaining its own facial recognition system (FACE), 
recognizing individuals via picture or video material in databases on suspects 
and contacts of suspects.146 Based on these examples, one must evaluate that 
solid indications for the usage of facial recognition systems in European 
countries in the near future are provided. The trend to digitalize anti-
terrorism, and to combine the collection of digital data on one’s citizens with 
live surveillance technology is on the agenda of relevant EU bodies, making 
the widespread future use of such systems quite likely. 
From a legal standpoint, the connection of a ‘super-database’ with 
systems of facial recognition is questionable, especially in terms of facial 
recognition via CCTV and social media. The linking of biometric data, 
biometric databases, and facial recognition systems would constitute 
another, more intense, level of surveillance. The rights to privacy, assembly, 
association and freedom of expression would all be constrained. Quite 
obviously, privacy is constrained if one is potentially tracked in public space 
with one’s own biometric data, but in the event of assemblies in public space, 
the right to assembly, association, and freedom of expression are constrained 
as well. Now, such restrictions of rights could only be legally justified if the 
conditions for rights limitation or derogation are upheld. However, this does 
not seem to be the case with facial recognition technology as already argued 
in Chapter 3. If thousands or hundreds of thousands of individuals would be 
scanned every day in an indiscriminate fashion, in order to track a few 
subjects, the demand of proportionality is not met. Since relevant courts have 
decided in the past that indiscriminate data collection, storage, and 
procession via other measures (e.g. data retention) is ineligible, even when a 
general terror threat is given, this evaluation must be valid in case of searches 
via facial recognition and biometric databases as well. Furthermore, the use 
of biometric data in facial recognition systems would in many cases not 
uphold the specific purpose with which these data were collected in first 
place (as biometric data collection is, as mentioned above, connected to a 
specific purpose defined in legal documents, e.g. to prevent double 
registrations of asylum seekers or the identification of visa applicants). 
Therefore, usage of these data in a super-database in connection with facial 
recognition systems would constitute a misuse of the basis of data collection 
and might be expected to be legally challengeable. 
At times individual anti-terrorism measures first reveal their full 
rights invasive impact when combined with each other. The combination of 
the directive on biometric passports by the EU combined with video 
surveillance ordered by member states and the upcoming technology of 
automated face recognition (pushed by the EU and member states) provides 
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a vivid example. Therein, from a spirit of rights perspective, the possible 
connection of a super-database to systems of facial recognition (via CCTV 
or social media) reflects a severe problem. The construction of a ‘super-
database’ that can be used in connection with digital recognition systems 
would severely interfere with the right to privacy, freedom of movement, 
association, assembly, and expression, as well on general notions of dignity. 
Self-perceptions of being free and of exercising one’s rights might be eroded. 
A connection between biometric databases and facial recognition systems 
would mean that virtually no citizen or resident of an EU member state would 
be able to move freely in the (urban) public without running the risk of being 
automatically recognized.147 Individuals would be recognized during daily 
transport (e.g. at railway stations), but also during political activism in public 
space, e.g. during demonstrations, being captured by a panoptic surveillance 
system. Therein, the awareness of recognition can arguably lead to a change 
of behavior or the cancellation of behavior, for instance, not to participate in 
a demonstration.148 Again, the last would equal a decline in the level of public 
scrutiny and a decline in democratic quality. Furthermore, facial recognition 
systems might still give a false alarm (false positives) even when using 
biometric data, thus many individuals would come under closer scrutiny by 
state authorities without justification, arguably undermining the wider 
human rights aim of justice.149 Consequently, individuals, or at least a certain 
share of the population, which might perceive itself to belong to a group that 
is under special scrutiny, might start to not make use of their civil and 
political rights to the fullest degree possible; or in the terminology of Martha 
Nussbaum, not enjoy their capabilities to the fullest (e.g., the capabilities to 
political engagement, free movement and non-discrimination).150 This might 
contribute to perceptions of a lacking full recognition of personhood from 
the side of the state and trigger perceptions of injustice and discrimination 
(including the potential consequences described earlier). In conclusion, and 
as argued earlier in regard to facial recognition in Germany and the UK, 
linking biometric databases and facial recognition systems would from a 
spirit of rights perspective constitute an erosion of the wider human rights 
aims of individual dignity, freedom, and equal justice. It would equal the 
erection of a panoptic system in European societies, which no longer regards 
all individuals as potential owners of dignity, but as potential threats that 
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necessitate surveillance and control. State organs would gain an even larger 
amount of insight into individuals’ life and therefore power over the 
individual. 
 
 Prevention of Radicalization at the EU Level 
After 9/11, the EU (just as many member states) started to develop efforts to 
prevent radicalization.151 Although violent radicalization was not a new 
phenomenon on the European continent, such efforts were a new policy area 
for the EU.152 In the first years after 9/11, the EU foremost focused on 
international terror networks and foreign perpetrators in their anti-terrorism 
efforts (just as many of its member states). Root causes of such terrorism and 
of radicalization of individuals were understood to be connected with 
poverty, autocratic regimes and lacking education in third states.153 However, 
from 2004 onwards, the EU further increased its emphasis on anti-
radicalization and started to focus increasingly on preventing the 
radicalization and recruitment of individuals inside the EU. Triggers for this 
development were the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), which 
were committed by so-called home-grown terrorists. Many of the insights 
into the radicalization history of the perpetrators from Madrid and London 
functioned as an inspiration for subsequent anti-radicalization approaches.154 
After Madrid, the EU saw a multitude of strategies, action plans and other 
official announcements on the prevention of radicalization. For instance, in 
2004 the EU member states agreed to fight factors contributing to “the 
involvement of individuals in terrorist activities.”155 An emphasis on efforts 
to prevent radicalization was set in the EU’s Action Plan on terrorism in 2004 
as well. In 2005, the EU Council adopted a European Strategy to Combat 
Radicalization and Recruitment (updated in 2009 and 2014), aiming at 
disrupting the networks of ‘radicalizers’ and the prevalence of ‘mainstream 
voices.’156 The strategy did, however, not include a precise definition of what 
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constitutes radicalization, but rather pointed out that radicalization 
encompasses the “practical steps an individual must take to become involved 
in terrorism.”157 In 2005, the Council suggested preventing radicalization via 
education (in schools and on the Internet), through integration policies, 
efforts for greater inter-cultural understanding and interfaith dialogue 
(including pleas to the ‘moderate Muslim communities’ to intervene in 
radicalization processes, in other words winning the ‘hearts and minds’).158 
In 2007 EU Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini suggested efforts to shape 
a ‘European Islam,’ e.g. by a specific European religious education (of 
Islamic clerics); all in the name of preventing radicalization.159 The measure 
of data retention, discussed above, can be understood as an EU measure 
reflecting the aim of disrupting networks of radicalizers as well.160 
Altogether, these approaches reflect a great diversity and variation of ideas. 
Still, the focus of EU anti-radicalization was always Islamist radicalization 
and the major understanding behind this radicalization was always 
‘vulnerable’ Muslims falling prey to external radicalization efforts.161 
Despite the mentioned diversity, five key goals and guidelines remained 
relatively unchanged: first, a focus on communication in order to counter 
‘extremist’ propaganda, to improve explanations on EU policies and to avoid 
inaccurate perceptions of Muslims. Second, a focus on directly disrupting 
radicalization and recruitment in key environments such as prisons, Mosques 
or the Internet. Third, the provision of equal opportunities for all. Fourth, 
establishing cooperation between an array of different actors such as law 
enforcement and civil society, and fifth, providing opportunities for the 
exchange of information, intelligence, research, and experience.162  
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Efforts to prevent radicalization have been intensified again in latest 
years, as a consequence of a range of terror attacks committed by member-
state nationals, who had declared allegiance to the so-called Islamic State 
(see e.g. the attacks in Paris 2015 and Brussels 2016). Consequences of this 
were in terms of institutional efforts, the establishment of a Radicalization 
Awareness Network (RAN) and an Internet Referral Unit (IRU). The RAN 
is a network of relevant practitioners (e.g. police and prison staff,), experts, 
and academics who are dealing with radicalized individuals or providing 
research on the topic. The network aims at strengthening anti-radicalization 
capabilities by sharing insights, expertise, and experiences. The IRU, 
operated by Europol, is supposed to refer violent extremist content on 
internet platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) to internet providers 
in order to remove this content. The idea is to prevent radicalization and 
recruitment by preventing the spread of terrorist material.163 Focus thus 
shifted from identifying illegal content to triggering its removal.164 In terms 
of policy content, the recent terror wave resulted in an update of the EU’s 
anti-radicalization strategy in 2014 (albeit still lacking a precise definition of 
radicalization), putting emphasis on threats by ‘lone-wolf-terrorism’, 
terrorist use of social media and foreign fighters. The five key points 
explained above, however, remained intact.165 Still, an important novelty of 
the 2014 strategy is its establishment of a ‘whole of society’ approach, 
including everyday institutions such as schools, universities, sports clubs and 
health-care institutions into efforts of anti-radicalization.166 This approach 
mirrors very much recent British Prevent efforts and it thus constitutes 
another indication of active uploading processes of national anti-terrorism to 
the EU level (or Europeanization processes). The establishment of a ‘whole 
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society’ approach at the EU level mirrors the same potential problems that 
are present in the UK’s efforts in that regard in connection with the country’s 
Channel program (see Chapter 4). 
Some of the EU’s efforts in terms of anti-radicalization and 
recruitment constitute a problem from a human rights perspective. I will 
provide one very telling example in the following. I would like to draw 
attention to the EU’s fight against terrorist content on the Internet and, more 
specifically, the EU’s most recent draft regulation aiming at preventing the 
spread of such content. This draft regulation on preventing the dissemination 
of terrorist content on the internet from September 2018 constitutes an anti-
radicalization measure that is quite questionable in the face of the EU’s 
official human rights commitment. It reflects one of the EU’s top priorities 
in countering radicalization, namely the spread of terrorist content by already 
radicalized individuals. The regulation is in effect an extension of practices 
that are already in place at Europol’s IRU unit.167 Terrorist content is in the 
draft regulation understood as content that instructs, incites or ‘glorifies’ 
terror acts, often by video or pictures.168 Indeed, several European countries 
have in the latest years witnessed terror attacks committed by individuals 
who were (at least in part) incited to terrorist violence by material available 
on the internet. This is especially valid for terrorists who simply claimed 
allegiance to a cause without being a fixed member of a terror group. 
Examples can be found for both Islamist and right-wing attacks, see e.g. 
Chapter 3.169  
The regulation demands two major measures. First, it demands 
internet service providers (all of them, not only tech giants such as Google 
or Facebook) to delete terrorist content within one hour of the upload. 
Content will be referred to by national authorities or by Europol and is then 
supposed to be deleted by the providers (without the involvement of judicial 
institutions). Second, it prescribes service providers to take proactive 
measures in order to prevent the re-upload of content that has previously been 
deleted and to prevent the upload of terrorist content in the first place. These 
demands would with a high probability lead to the installment of so-called 
automated ‘upload filters’. In other words, algorithms would automatically 
search for such content and propose its deletion or block its upload. However, 
automated systems do have a hard time understanding the exact context and 
purpose under which material has been uploaded. Many tech experts, as well 
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as the legislators themselves, do not themselves properly understand how 
exactly such a filter would work. The EU Commission’s own impact 
assessment expects ‘false positives’, in other words, the deletion or block of 
legal content. An example of the potential faulty nature of such automatic 
upload filters was delivered in April 2019, when the Mueller Report on the 
Trump administration was blocked by an automatic filter used by the online 
platform Scribd (checking not for terrorist content, but copyright issues). The 
regulation owns thus an experimental nature. Furthermore, due to the 
relatively small size of illegal content compared to legal content, it can be 
expected that more legal than illegal content will be blocked.170 Additionally, 
the definition of what constitutes terrorist content is kept rather vague in the 
draft regulation. Crucially, the regulation omits intention as a component of 
its definition, thus deviating from the EU’s own definition of terrorism (see 
above). Thereby, the regulation constructs the scenario that an extensive 
amount of terrorism-related content might come under scrutiny, including 
NGO content or academic work, simply since an intent for incitement or 
instructing to terrorism is missing in the demands for when content can be 
blocked or deleted.171 
The draft regulation has received support by many European top-
politicians, especially Interior Ministers. For instance, Austria’s Interior 
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Minister, Herbert Kickl, argues that there would be an urgent need for action 
in terms of terrorist content on the internet, which would catalyze 
radicalization, ultimately leading to terror attacks in Europe. The regulation 
would be part of protecting Europe’s citizens.172 Julian King, the EU’s 
‘Commissioner for the Security Union’, one of the driving forces behind the 
regulations, likewise argued that blocking terrorist content would constitute 
an important anti-terrorism contribution by preventing self-radicalization.173 
These measures are not adopted yet; the regulation is still a draft 
regulation. However, it has already received approval of the EU Council in 
December 2018, which means that it will be approved if/when the European 
Parliament gives its consent.174 Although the EP has in the past (at times) 
taken the role of a counter-force to Council and Commission efforts in 
potentially rights infringing anti-terrorism policies, in the end, the policies 
were almost always adopted nonetheless (at times after some amendments). 
An example is here the mentioned recent adoption of an interrelated database 
of biometric data (see above). Based on that, and since the EP just recently 
adopted an upload filter in the name of copyright issues, it can very well be 
expected that the EP will approve the regulation on terrorist content as 
well.175 
The upload filter, which would be necessary in order to uphold the 
demands of the regulation would intensify surveillance of populations since 
all potential uploads would have to be scanned by automated systems. The 
filter would feed into the current trend of intensifying surveillance, it would 
feed into a “digital information ecosystem in which everything we say, even 
everything we try to say, is monitored.”176 The effects of surveillance on 
privacy rights have been explained in detail above. The regulation would 
intensify the web of surveillance that European politics has constructed in 
the course of anti-terrorism in the last years.  
The draft regulation, in its current form, would furthermore interfere 
with the right to freedom of expression. The automated scanning and 
evaluation of uploaded content, in connection with the very short timeframe 
for deletion and the vague definition of terrorist content, will with a not 
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insignificant likelihood lead to an overly excessive deletion practice by 
internet providers. The regulation gives providers all incentive to always 
delete material when in doubt in order to not bring the providers anyway near 
a liability, thus a referral of Europol or a national unit will with a high 
likelihood always lead to a block or deletion of content.177 In effect, a high 
amount of content that is both legal and justifiable, uploaded by 
organizations and regular citizens, will not be uploaded anyway, 
undermining the freedom of expression of those affected. A danger for 
freedom of expression is indeed perceived by a range of NGOs in the field 
and the relevant UN special rapporteurs.178 Moreover, members of parts of 
society that perceive themselves to be more in focus of state authorities in 
the first place might refrain from trying to upload content in fear of becoming 
the object of additionally intensified scrutiny. In other words, the practice of 
scanning all uploads could lead to self-censoring processes (as already 
discussed for other surveillance practices). Freedom of expression would 
thus be undermined to a higher degree for some specific groups. In general, 
the filter would support conformist behavior rather than a diversity of 
viewpoints. However, the inclusion of a multitude of opinions in the public 
sphere is a necessary component of every free society (as e.g., Rawls argued). 
Automated processes of referral, leading to extensive deletion undermine 
democratic processes since they undermine options to freely share 
information, express and discuss opinions. In addition, the human capability 
of using one’s mind and of interacting with others would be hampered as 
well. Such processes might therein mute legitimate dissent, as well as 
undermine the conditions for a sound public sphere, a vital part of every 
democratic society, and a crucial component for realizing the core of the 
human rights idea (dignity, freedom, and justice). These core ideas would 
themselves be negatively affected based on the interference with the rights 
to privacy and freedom of expression (I explained the connection between 
these basic aims of the human rights framework and privacy and freedom of 
expression in detail earlier). 
Moreover, since content would be deleted or blocked after the 
referral of national authorities, a law enforcement agency of a single member 
state could trigger the deletion or block of content for the whole of Europe. 
This might open up for questionable scenarios of such actions being 
exploited by certain governments (e.g. the Hungarian government, which is 
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taking an increasingly extreme standpoint on many issues itself).179 In a 
worst-case scenario, state authorities might use internet filters in order to 
censor the spread information from specific groups in society. Another 
detrimental feature of the regulation would be its effect on the capability of 
NGOs, news-organizations and research organizations to document human 
rights violations and war crimes. Since the removal of content and the upload 
filter would be carried out by automated systems, a high error rate in terms 
of evaluating the source and context of the upload can be expected. Thus, 
organizations who document violent terror acts might have their content 
deleted as well. Some organizations have already experienced such a process 
by over-excessive deletion practices of internet providers. For instance, 
YouTube deleted thousands of videos documenting war crimes and human 
rights violations since 2017, e.g. by the Orient News Channel operating in 
Syria.180 Likewise, Google deleted over a thousand videos taken during the 
Syrian civil war, including material by the Syrian Archive an organization 
aiming at preserving footage of the conflict.181 Just recently, the French 
branch of the IRU demanded the deletion of hundreds of webpages on the 
internet archive (archive.org), based on allegations of the webpages 
containing terrorist propaganda; a claim that seems far-fetched taking the 
nature of the affected webpages into account, e.g. the American Libraries 
collection or TV broadcast by the US House of Representatives).182 Thus, 
since the risk of over-extensive deletion already exists there is a good reason 
to assume that widening the scope of systems, which are not able to test for 
the context of a media item will aggravate the problem considerably. An 
erasure of documenting material would in effect undermine the ability of 
civil society actors to hold certain governments and political actors 
accountable, it would thereby undermine one of the cornerstones of 
democratic societies.183  
Furthermore, necessity and proportionality of the measure, two 
decisive criteria for making the interference with the rights to privacy and 
free expression legally eligible can be questioned. The necessity of the 
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regulation can be questioned since a great amount of illegal extremist content 
has already been removed from mainstream social media and networks in the 
last years.184 The EU Commission’s own impact assessment points out that 
only two of the assessed nineteen member states reported an increase of 
terrorist online content, whereas twelve reported a decrease. Furthermore, 
only six percent of all internet users reported about ever coming across such 
content in a Eurobarometer survey.185 The regulation does additionally not 
seem proportionate, as only a very small amount of service providers has 
ever had to deal with the upload of illegal extremist content in the first place, 
estimates range from one to five percent of providers.186 Moreover, the draft 
regulation would not allow for a sufficient amount of transparency of the 
process for the affected individuals, and would not provide options for legal 
remedy, thus undermining core ideas of rule of law.187 
Thus, based on the interference with freedom of expression and 
privacy rights, while not upholding the criteria for such rights limitations, it 
must be concluded that the EU’s regulation on preventing the dissemination 
of terrorist content online bears the potential to eventually run into legal 
troubles. If adopted in its current form it will with a high likelihood end in 
front of the ECJ who would then face the task to determine the legal 
boundaries of the regulation.188 In any case, the proposed upload filter is, 
based on its detrimental effect on privacy and especially freedom of 
expression in conflict with the spirit of rights framework introduced in this 
thesis. 
 
 Summarizing Observations 
First, although the EU claims to aim at upholding human rights standards 
while fighting terrorism, this promise does not seem to hold true. At several 
instances, the EU has undermined and still is undermining the same human 
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rights norms, which it has itself declared to function as cornerstones of its 
own identity (as well as for all democratic European societies). However, in 
terms of data retention, the PNR directive, biometric passports, the wider use 
of biometrics and the latest efforts for preventing dissemination of terrorist 
content the EU has actively implemented measures that reflect interferences 
with rights norms. At times, courts have declared EU measures ineligible 
(data retention), for most other examples, such court verdicts have not (yet) 
been delivered; still, many measures stand on shaky legal grounds. In any 
case, they undermine the spirit of rights. The EU is, therefore, having its 
share in tendencies threatening to erode human rights ideas in a European 
context. Thus, one might speak of a growing inconsistency between the EU’s 
self-declared core value of human rights, and the EU’s role in anti-terrorism 
policymaking. This might in the long-run have a detrimental effect on the 
EU’s self-proclaimed human-rights-based identity. 
Furthermore, although EU member states carry out the bulk of rights 
invasive anti-terrorism policies and not the EU bodies, the impetus for rights 
invasive policies on the member state level, at times, comes from the EU. 
Examples for this are, as mentioned, the directives on data retention and 
biometric passports. Moreover, the EU at times constitutes a hub for big 
member states to distribute such rights invasive measures to other or all other 
member states. For instance, Germany attempted to export its measure of 
dragnet investigation to other member states by implementing it in EU 
legislation. Additionally, the coordination role of the EU in terms of 
European anti-terrorism, does occasionally, get the EU involved in 
questionable practices from a rights perspective, e.g., in regard to 
coordination of intelligence at EU level (opening the door for a circular swap 
of data). Thus, although the EU is not involved in as many rights infringing 
policies and measures as the member states analyzed above, it still does 
actively contribute to measures that are highly questionable from a human 
rights perspective.  
Second, despite its active involvement and establishment of rights-
infringing anti-terrorism measures, the EU owns a double-edged role in 
terms of anti-terrorism and human rights. On the one hand, it is responsible 
for the adoption of rights infringing policies, while it, on the other hand, 
provides legal and political institutions which often attempt to protect rights 
against excessive terrorism policies. Thus, EU bodies constitute a certain 
paradox in terms of questionable anti-terrorism policies. Three entities of the 
EU have been most active in efforts of counter-balancing rights invasive 
terrorism policies, the CFREU, the ECJ, and the European Parliament 
(EP).189 The proclamation of the CFREU and its establishment as a legally 
                                                          
189 This is not to say that human rights action at the EU level only exists at these specific sub-
institutions. For instance, in July 2006, the European Council demanded the US administration 
to close Guantanamo prison based on a human rights argumentation. Gershon Shafir, Alison 
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binding rights document in the course of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
increased the level of scrutiny the ECJ is able to apply on EU legislation, 
including anti-terrorism. For instance, the ECJ produced a landmark verdict 
in connection with the data retention regulation, emphasizing the importance 
of the protection of privacy rights even under terror threats. Furthermore, the 
DRIPA legislation was declared unlawful by the ECJ based on the law being 
at odds with the CFREU (see above). Clearly, the corrective function of 
courts, including the ECJ, is one of the strongest forces of counter-acting 
rights invasive anti-terrorism measures. However, in the course of Brexit, the 
ECJ will lose its function as a ‘corrective’ of British anti-terrorism 
legislation. Thus, with the Brexit in effect, the ECJ will not have this option 
of acting as a safeguard for rights in the UK anymore. However, the UK 
would still be bound to other legal international human rights standards, e.g. 
the ECHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR (although the conservative 
government has played with the thought of leaving the ECHR as well).190 
The EP has at several occasions acted as a protector of rights in the face of 
terrorism policies as well.191 For instance, the PNR directive was first 
proposed by the European Commission in 2011 but was shot down by the 
EP, based on concerns for the freedom of movement in 2013.192 Moreover, 
also in the case of the EU directive on data retention, the EP acted as a rights-
interested counter-balance to the Council.193 This circumstance emphasizes 
that the different EU bodies often have different standpoints and priorities 
when reflecting on rights and security. The EP seems to be most concerned 
about rights, whereas the member state representatives at the Council often 
prioritize additional alleged security measures. Recently the EU’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) directive came into force (the EP played 
an important role in the drafting and adoption of the directive). The directive 
set stricter standards for the protection of data of individuals in the EU, e.g., 
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vis-à-vis companies and organizations.194 Therein, the EU implemented a 
significantly increased standard of data protection, which aims at giving 
citizens as much control over their data as possible. 
Third, side-effect anti-terrorism measures exist at the EU level as 
well. The EU has connected its anti-terrorism policies with a range of other 
policy fields. Some policies, sold in the name of anti-terrorism, end up rather 
affecting policy fields than the struggle against terrorism.195 Such policies 
constitute side-effect anti-terrorism policies (see Chapter 2). An example of 
such a measure that was ‘sold’ in the course of anti-terrorism, but that is used 
mostly for other purposes is the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The EAW 
is a legal instrument to make the extradition of suspects between EU member 
states easier and faster (extradition is supposed to take a maximum of ninety 
days). Suspects here include terror suspects, however, the EAW is not 
confined to terrorism but established the option to extradite suspects of a 
range of other offenses as well, as long as offenses are punishable by a 
sentence of at least twelve months. The EAW entered into force in January 
2004. And indeed, the aim of the was EAW achieved, the extradition time 
decreased from an average of nine months to only forty-three days in the 
course of two years. This was achieved by constituting mutual judicial 
recognition of extradition demands, connecting procedures to fixed standards 
and barring the influence of national executives on the process.196 Since its 
implementation in 2004, this measure was used more than 130.000 thousand 
times.197 It becomes clear by this huge number that not all of these warrants 
can have been connected to terror suspects. The official statistics from 
Europol only counted six hundred arrested terror suspect for all EU member 
states in 2009 and a thousand for 2016 (and this is all suspects arrested, not 
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those facing extradition, a much rarer occasion).198 Most warrants were 
actually issued in the course of an investigation covering ‘traditional’ inter-
state crime. The EAW might be an improvement in the course of such 
investigations as well, but it was originally implemented as an anti-terror 
measure and not a measure pertaining to regular crime.199 It contributes to 
the Pursue chapter of the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. However, this 
function is not its major effect. The EAW thereby reflects a case of a side-
effect anti-terrorism policy. 
A further example of an EU measure implemented (at least partly) 
by using the argument of preventing terrorism, that, however, mainly covers 
other purposes than anti-terrorism is the extended control of the EU’s 
external borders. Intensified border controls were implemented by using the 
argument that current terrorism often involves interstate travel and that 
terrorism, therefore, can only be effectively fought by tightening border 
controls. However, most of the big recent terror attacks in European member 
states were carried out by citizens or residents of these same member states 
(e.g., London 2005, Paris 2015). Allowedly, a few perpetrators of terror 
attacks in Europe and some arrested suspects used the refugee stream as a 
camouflage entering Europe, and controls of some borders could arguably 
contribute to the Protect stream of the EU’s terrorism policy strategy.200 
However, the amount of these individuals was rather small, whereas the 
border controls had as its biggest effect (and main intention) a drastic 
reduction of the influx of refugees, as well as stopping criminals and illegal 
migrants, and not terrorists. The border controls, both EU-internal and 
external reflect therefore not a ‘real’ anti-terrorism measure, but an instance 
of side-effect anti-terrorism. 
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Fourth, a continuous problem in EU anti-terrorism efforts is the 
reluctance to provide precise and tangible definitions on crucial terms related 
to the matter. As pointed out earlier, the EU owns a rather vague definition 
of the term terrorism. Additionally, concerning its anti-radicalization efforts, 
the EU maintains a vague definition of ‘terrorist content’ (which the EU at 
the same time heavily targets with current measures). ‘Radicalization’, is 
strikingly not officially defined by the EU at all. This reluctance of defining 
crucial terms can potentially be explained by the general tendency of states, 
state federations, and IOs to provide as much leeway for the own policies 
and measures in anti-terrorism as possible. Narrow definitions would 
potentially prevent new policy ideas early on. However, vague definitions 
undermine the public accountability of anti-terrorism policies and potentially 
contribute to the legal precariousness of some pieces of anti-terrorism 
legislation. 
Fifth, in the aftermath of 9/11, the EU has not only increased its anti-
terrorism activity on its own initiative or via impetus delivered from its 
member states but also due to external pressure, e.g. exercised by the US.201 
Already shortly after 9/11, the US sought to increase its police and judicial 
cooperation with the EU, and it pressed for further influence on the EU’s 
internal security agenda. For instance, the implementation of biometric 
passports was not only initiated due to policy ideas by the EU Commission 
or pressure from certain member states (e.g. Germany) but due to external 
pressure by the US as well. The adoption of the directive on the collection 
and storage of passenger data (the PNR directive) was, in part, a consequence 
of external US pressure as well, resulting in the “internalization of US-
produced border security norms” in the EU.202 Thus, the ‘partnership’ 
between the EU and the US on anti-terrorism is not an emancipated one. The 
US is able to exert higher and more effective pressure in regard to the 
implementation of certain measures.203 Still, this is not to deny the EU its 
responsibility for its own anti-terrorism policies, including rights-infringing 
policies. The general direction and content of EU anti-terrorism 
policymaking are clearly determined by European political players.204 These 
players have actively steered the EU towards borrowing into the anti-
terrorism trends of anti-radicalization and preventive surveillance, providing 
detrimental effects on rights ideas and frameworks.
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Chapter VI 
Comparing European Human Rights Problems in the Course 
of Anti-Terrorism 
In this chapter, I will compare the anti-terrorism policies of the three cases 
analyzed above. The major focus will be on the differences and similarities 
of the three entities, especially concerning human rights infringements in the 
course of anti-terrorism. 
First, comparing the cases of my two states, it becomes clear that 
Germany and the UK follow rather similar overall trends of anti-terrorism. 
Both countries have adopted a range of similar in the last seventeen years. 
Both have e.g., implemented data retention, widened intelligence 
surveillance, or extended CCTV surveillance (including the implementation 
of facial recognition). Therein, both countries followed the wider trend of 
extending surveillance and concentrating on preventing radicalization, as 
well as detecting alleged radicalized individuals among the own population, 
in order to prevent so-called homegrown terrorism, instead of tracking down 
members of international terror networks (at least since roughly 2005-2006). 
Furthermore, both countries adopted a range of policies that pressure the civil 
rights level of a vast amount of the population, if not virtually all individuals 
of German or British society. However, anti-terrorism in both countries owns 
a clear focus towards Islamist terrorism and therein the Muslim minority in 
regard to a range of policies (basically all policies and measures that are 
supposed to detect radicalized individuals). Thus, members of this minority 
have seen an even larger interference with their civil rights than the ‘average’ 
member of society. Moreover, both countries implemented policies that were 
sold as anti-terrorism policies, but which are rather used for other objectives 
(I called such policies ‘side-effect’ anti-terrorism). In neither of the two 
countries, have the extent of anti-terrorism legislation and scope and degree 
of anti-terrorism measures been cut back in phases of a reduced threat level.1 
Thus, a move away from a situation that should be regarded as exceptional, 
that is the limitation of and derogation from universal rights norms has not 
taken place, even in the context of a decreased threat. This shows that 
policymakers and security organs quickly start to perceive additional security 
measures that might have been implemented as preliminary measures, as the 
new normal. Such a trend is triggering a likely race to the bottom in terms of 
human rights standards. The tendency towards implementing sharper anti-
terrorism policies in a continuous fashion has been independent, in both 
countries, of the composition of the government. The trend towards rights 
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infringing anti-terrorism policies continued regardless of which of the big 
parties held governmental power.2 
Still, and this is the second overall point of this comparison, 
differences between German and British anti-terrorism are observable as 
well. The UK has adopted a larger amount and range of anti-terrorism and 
the UK has often adopted policies that are going further in terms of putting 
a sound human rights framework at risk. Additionally, the UK has often been 
faster in adopting such rights infringing policies, as well as policies that 
reflect a new trend. In other words, the UK has been more of a frontrunner 
and trendsetter in anti-terrorism policymaking than Germany (and most other 
EU member states), whereas often at the cost of undermining human rights. 
In terms of differences in the extent or degree of anti-terrorism, one 
might point to a range of examples. For instance, early after 9/11, the UK 
adopted a policy enabling the indefinite detention of (foreign) terror suspects. 
Germany has not yet seen the adoption of such a policy on indefinite 
detention at the federal level, however, very recently at the state level 
(Bavaria). In course of adopting indefinite detention, the UK became the only 
European country to declare an emergency after 9/11 (until France declared 
a state of emergency in 2015).3 In reaction to a court ruling declaring 
indefinite detention of terror suspects for ineligible the UK implemented so-
called control orders - effectively measures to control terror suspects without 
regular detention. This measure triggered problems with rights norms as 
well. Germany did not implement any similar measures for a long time, 
whereas recently Germany has seen the implementation of demands for so-
called ‘endangerers’ to wear electronic tags. In general, the UK has been a 
frontrunner among Western countries in terms of the spread of CCTV 
systems, and plans for the implementation of facial recognition systems have 
existed in the UK very early on as well. Germany has been slower, and 
potentially more careful for many years in terms of extending its net of 
CCTV, however, the country is now following the trend of extensive public 
CCTV surveillance as well, including the usage of facial recognition 
software.4 Furthermore, the UK implemented a system for number plate 
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recognition, a system indiscriminately scanning number plates of all vehicles 
already in the early 2000s. Such a system has not been implemented for the 
whole of Germany (several federal states did though). However, the German 
Constitutional Court has recently ruled the continuous practice of automatic 
control of number plates as unconstitutional (February 2019).5 For another 
example of German-British anti-terrorism differences, one can point to the 
UK’s establishment of a prevention system that targets mere political 
viewpoints rather than political violence or intentions to apply violence (e.g., 
via the Channel program). Such a far-reaching system, pervading the whole 
public sector, has not been established in Germany.6 Furthermore, in the 
aftermath of the revelations by Edward Snowden, the UK government 
legalized a broad range of mass surveillance measures with the IP Act of 
2016, a piece of legislation that has been described as very invasive for a 
democratic state. In fact, Snowden himself described the IP Act as “the most 
extreme surveillance in the history of western democracy.”7 The IP Act made 
the UK the first liberal democracy to establish a statuary footing for 
widespread hacking practices of its security organs. Additionally, data access 
was granted to dozens of public institutions and was not restricted to security 
organs (e.g., tax institutions were included as well). The German government 
has increased surveillance measures in the country as well in the last years 
(e.g. by bringing back data retention measures or by adopting the BKA law), 
however, these efforts fall short of the UK’s IP Act legislation in terms of 
scope and effect, e.g. the German BKA legislation does not go as far as the 
British IP Act. Surveillance measures under the BKA Act are more closely 
connected to demands for an existing danger of terrorism, and data access is 
not handled as loosely as in the British case. Furthermore, the UK has closer 
ties to some questionable components of the US anti-terrorism framework 
than Germany. Surely, both German and British intelligence services 
cooperated with the American NSA. However, the British GCHQ engaged 
in closer cooperation with the NSA than the German BND (based on the 
GCHQ being a member of the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence cooperation).8 The 
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GCHQ additionally appears to carry out more far-reaching mass surveillance 
measures in comparison to the BND.  
Moreover, both countries, especially in the first years after 9/11, 
showed tendencies to go back to some historical legacies of their respective 
anti-terrorism. For instance, the UK implemented a system of indefinite 
detention, utilizing official derogation options in the process, and restricted 
certain acts of speech (e.g., banning terror ‘glorification’). Similar practices 
were used by the UK during the Troubles.9 Germany fell back to the measure 
of dragnet investigation, which was used already in the 1970s. Such 
historical anti-terrorism has, at least at times, contributed to shaping 
reactions to current terror threats. These historical legacies in effect 
contributed to differences between German and British reactions to anti-
terrorism.10 Still, due to convergence effects of European anti-terrorism 
policies in the last years, such historical legacies do currently not play such 
a big role. In other words, the point of historical legacies does not negate the 
development of common trends of European terrorism policies. 
Emphasizing another difference, it appears that the public in 
Germany is slightly more critical towards rights infringing anti-terrorism 
measures and policies than the British public. Whereas in the UK one can 
detect strong support for sharpened anti-terrorism measures and a general 
increase of anti-terrorism throughout the post 9/11 timeframe, the picture is 
more mixed in Germany. In the UK, public surveys found majorities for the 
implementation of indefinite detention (sixty-two percent supported this in a 
2004 ISM survey and sixty-seven percent in a 2006 ISSP survey, making this 
the highest value of agreement in thirty-three countries covered by the latter 
survey), increased use of CCTV systems (eighty percent in a 2004 ICM 
survey), for tapping into peoples’ phones in the scenario of an imminent 
attack (seventy-eight percent agreed to this in the same ISSP survey), 
extended stop-and-search powers for the police (sixty-nine percent supported 
this in a 2004 ICM survey and seventy percent in a 2005 Populus survey), 
and data retention measures (fifty-three percent agreed with that in a 2015 
YouGov survey).11 In a survey from 2007, seventy-three percent of British 
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respondents agreed with the argument that the government should put 
combating terrorism ahead of civil liberties concerns.12 In general, the 
surveys clearly demonstrate the widespread willingness of large parts of the 
British population to curtail basic rights in order to increase the perceived 
likelihood of preventing terror attacks. In Germany, certain measures of anti-
terrorism receive high public support as well, while other measures receive 
less support. For instance, an increase of CCTV has seen support by the 
German public (polls found an agreement by between sixty and eighty-three 
percent).13 Another survey produced a majority for extended surveillance 
(seventy percent supported a general increase of surveillance in a 2016 
infratest dimap survey). However, for the measure of indefinite detention, 
even in the scenario of an imminent threat, a majority could not be found (in 
an ISSP survey from 2006).14 In addition, when surveillance practices of 
NSA and GCHQ were revealed in 2013, many Germans showed concern 
over the issue. A survey from August 2013 showed that many Germans were 
critical of the revealed mass surveillance, fifty-one percent stated that they 
did not want ‘somebody to be able to check what I am doing on the 
internet’.15 Moreover, in a number of surveys, the majority of respondents 
declared to feel generally well protected against terrorism (between fifty-one 
and fifty-eight percent).16 Even in the summer of 2016, just after the attack 
of Nice and in between two attacks in Germany, fifty-nine percent of 
Germans declared that protection measures are sufficient, only thirty-one 
percent did not agree with that.17 Thus, the picture of public support for or 
opposition to rights infringing anti-terrorism is much more mixed in 
Germany. Other than in the UK, almost automatic support cannot be 
detected. 
Furthermore, and this is an important point, the climate and 
discourse towards human rights have been somewhat more positive in 
                                                          
from 2006 detected that half of the population was unhappy with having their data stored in 
national databases (including DNA data). However, the poll did not mention the terms 
terrorism or anti-terrorism, which could be an explanation for the somewhat higher reluctance 
towards state surveillance in this survey. Still, the survey did not produce a counter-argument 
against the point that the British public in general is in agreement with sharpened anti-
terrorism measures, since most proposed measures still found a majority in the same survey. 
YouGov/Daily Telegraph Survey Results, November 28-30, 2006 
http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/TEL060101024_4.pdf. 
12 Richards, “Countering the psychological impact of terrorism,” 194. 
13 Moritz Wichmann, “Mehrheit der Bürger spricht sich nach Anschlag von Berlin für mehr 
Polizei und Videoüberwachung aus,” YouGov.de, December 28, 2016. Infratest dimap, 
“ARD-Deutschlandtrend,“ January 2017. 
14 Infratest dimap, “ARD-Deutschlandtrend,“ January 2016. Guasti and Mansfeldova, 
“Perception of Terrorism and Security and the Role of Media,” 13-14. 
15 Allensbach. “Wirkungslose Aufregung,“ 2013.  
16 tagesschau.de, ”ARD-DeutschlandTrend: Keine Angst vor Terroristen,” January 5, 2017.  
17 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, “Politbarometer Juli II 2016.” 
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Germany than in the UK, especially in the last years. In the first years after 
9/11, the governments of both countries were still pointing to the importance 
of human rights in anti-terrorism. For instance, Gordon Brown spoke in 
October 2007 of a British interpretation of liberty, which would assert “the 
importance of freedom from prejudice, of rights to privacy and of limits to 
the scope of arbitrary state power.”18 However, in the latest years, the UK 
government has made headlines with ideas to take the country out of legally 
binding human rights frameworks. First, in 2015, the Conservative 
government forwarded plans to exchange the UK’s Human Rights Act from 
1998 with a so-called ‘British Bill of Rights’, and in the course of the Brexit 
process, Theresa May (Interior Minister at the time) revealed plans to 
withdraw the UK from the ECHR, arguing that the ECHR made the UK a 
less safe place and would not improve human rights situations in third 
countries.19 Although the UK Human Rights Act of 1998 is a piece of 
national legislation it is highly relevant concerning the international human 
rights obligations of the UK and the general attitude of the UK towards 
international human rights. The Human Rights Act is clearly intended to 
further the goals of the ECHR (it actually manifested the ECHR in domestic 
British law, e.g., all articles of the Human Rights Act refer back to the 
ECHR).20 The ECHR itself is supposed to promote the goals of the UDHR. 
Thus, abolishing the Human Rights Act, just as taking the UK out of the 
ECHR, equals a grave backlash on the promotion of international human 
rights aims and norms in the UK (and for the global framework of universal 
rights as well). Furthermore, by leaving the legal boundaries of the EU in the 
course of Brexit the UK would (most likely) leave the legal obligations of 
the CFREU behind as well.21 In Germany, despite the country’s worrying 
trend of growing right-infringing anti-terrorism, the government at least 
upholds rhetoric that marks freedom and civil rights as important 
components of policymaking. For instance, Angela Merkel in her New 
Year’s Address at the end of 2016 emphasized the importance of freedom 
and a general balance between security and freedom in anti-terrorism (said 
after an eventful German year in terms of terrorism, when Germany saw 
several Islamist terror attacks).22 In 2015, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German 
                                                          
18 Gordon Brown, October 2007, quoted in Conor Gearty, Liberty and Security (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2013), 86. 
19 Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason, "UK must leave European convention on human 
rights, says Theresa May," The Guardian, April 25, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leave-european-convention-on-
human-rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum. 
20 Todd Landman, "Imminence and Proportionality: The U.S. and U.K. Responses to Global 
Terrorism,” California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2007): 93. 
21 Lorna Woods, “Data retention and national law: the ECJ ruling in Joined Cases C-203/15 
and C-698/15 Tele2 and Watson (Grand Chamber),” EU Law Analysis, December 21 (2016). 
22 Zacharias Zacharakis, "Angela Merkel: Keine Angst,” Zeit Online, July 28, 2016. 
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Foreign Minister at the time, held that both the support of rights principles 
and efforts of tackling terrorism would be at the core of the German 
presidency of the OSCE.23 In sum, while similarities exist between German 
and British anti-terrorism in the last seventeen years (see above), the British 
authorities have often gone one or two steps further than their German 
counterparts in terms of sacrificing human rights for alleged security 
benefits. 
Third, the EU anti-terrorism framework entails severe problems as 
well, as explained earlier. However, the number of policies that infringe 
human rights and the degree of such infringements is not as high as for the 
two analyzed EU member states. Surely, the circumstance that the EU does 
not possess any independent military units, or only limited police capacities 
(Europol) and very limited intelligence capacities (at the ECTC and the IRU) 
contribute to this fact. Since the EU does not have the capacity to indefinitely 
arrest suspects, to extensively search individuals in the street, to extensively 
survey its citizens via intelligence services or to shoot down a civilian 
airplane, the EU is hard to compare to the two states. The fact that the EU 
does not violate civil rights on the same range, does, however, not mean that 
the EU does not follow similar trends as its member states (at least in some 
regards). In fact, the EU feeds into the same big trend of continuously 
growing surveillance and prevention measures and of moving towards pre-
emptive security policies. The EU has, for instance, adopted data retention 
surveillance, making it mandatory for member states to collect data on 
internet traffic, has established initiatives to prevent radicalization and track 
down radicalizers, has adopted a directive making the indiscriminate 
collection of data of all individuals travelling by plane mandatory, has 
pushed for the usage of biometrics in different regards (in passports but also 
for facial recognition purposes), is supporting the construction of a biometric 
super-database, and is now supporting a ‘whole of society’ approach in order 
to counteract radicalization (an approach reflecting the British measure of 
tackling radicalization in all areas of public service via the Channel 
program). Especially in face of the last examples, one might argue that the 
EU has become looser on its rights norms in the latest years, compared to the 
first years after 9/11, when one did not see many (clearly) rights infringing 
anti-terrorism measures at the EU level. Moreover, a politically steered 
rollback of rights infringing policies in times of a reduced threat has not taken 
place at the EU level either (e.g. the directive on data retention could have 
been rolled back or reduced in scope during the somewhat more calm years 
between 2006 and 2013). Furthermore, just as Germany and the UK, the EU 
has implemented what I defined as side-effect anti-terrorism policies, thus 
                                                          
23 OSCE, “Dialogue, trust and security are watchwords for 2016 Germany’s OSCE 
Chairmanship, Foreign Minister Steinmeier tells OSCE Permanent Council,” July 2, 2015. 
http://www.osce.org/pc/168131. 
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policies that were sold to the public at the moment of adoption as policies 
with a clear anti-terrorism focus, but which to a great extent suffice other 
purposes (mostly regular criminal prosecution). Examples in case of the EU 
are the regulation on the implementation of biometric passports, the PNR 
directive, and the European Arrest Warrant. 
At the same time, however, the EU constitutes the entity of the three 
analyzed cases that tries the most to push human rights on the European and 
global agenda. For instance, the EU has adopted the CFREU (containing a 
large part of international human rights norms) and elevated it to the status 
of an EU treaty, the EU denotes human rights and human dignity as major 
aims to be achieved in the TEU (the treaty which constitutes the basis of EU 
law), the ECJ regularly takes the role of a human rights watchdog in 
European policymaking, the EU points to human rights conditionality as 
important component of its enlargement and development policy, and the EU 
regularly mentions the preservation of civil rights as an aim in anti-terrorism, 
both in  documents and via statements of EU officials.24 For instance, the EU 
mentions compatibility of human rights and anti-terrorism as a central aim 
in its 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and the EU’s Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, underlined that promoting human rights 
could in itself be a means of tackling the problem of terrorism.25 Thus, one 
can conclude that although the EU does contribute to a very worrisome trend 
of an ever-growing amount of rights infringing anti-terrorism, its (official) 
general attitude towards the idea of human rights is still positive. The EU is, 
in this sense, positioning itself, at least discursively on the human rights side. 
In that point, the EU rather reflects the human rights position of the German 
government than the attitude of the UK government. This attitude of the EU 
might be of significance for the general European perception of human rights 
since the EU’s discourse can have a legitimizing or de-legitimizing effect on 
the infringement of human rights in the course of anti-terrorism. Still, as 
mentioned, the EU has, especially in the latest years, been feeding into the 
trend of an ever more expansive anti-terrorism framework. Especially in 
terms of surveying whole populations and trying to detect allegedly 
radicalized individuals, the EU has followed the trend of member states such 
as the UK and Germany. 
                                                          
24 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, October 26, 2012. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012M002. Alison Brysk, “Human Rights 
and National Insecurity,” In National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate 
Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2007), 7. Council of the European Union, “Human Rights and Democracy 
in the World,” 2014, 38. 
25 Villy Søvndal, Gilles de Kerchove and Ben Emerson, “Counter-terrorism and human 
rights,” European Voice, March 19, 2012. Akiva Lorenz, “The European Union's Response 
to Terrorism,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, May 1, 2006. 
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Fourth, the mentioned differences in all three analyzed entities are 
clearly inter-related in regard to European anti-terrorism, and all three are 
driving powers of a common European anti-terrorism. As mentioned before, 
both Germany and the UK have pushed some of their anti-terrorism 
preferences at the EU level. For instance, the UK’s CONTEST strategy has 
been used as an orientation for the EU’s Counter-Terrorism strategy, the 
UK’s policy of facing radicalization inside of public institutions like schools 
and universities has been taken up at the EU level as well in recent years, 
Germany tried to implement the measure of dragnet investigations at the EU 
level, and Germany was one of the members states most strongly pushing for 
the implementation of a directive on data retention at the EU level.26 The 
EU’s force in terms of European anti-terrorism has been shown by its efforts 
in terms of coordinating European measures facing terrorism (e.g. via its 
Action Plans and Counter-Terrorism Strategy), its development towards 
becoming an important focal point for anti-terrorism decision making, its 
construction of relevant anti-terrorism institutions at a European level (e.g. 
the ECTC or the IRU under Europol), and by a range of binding directives 
on anti-terrorism that member states are demanded to adopt and implement, 
e.g. on data retention, PNR records or biometric passports. The EU has 
additionally been pushing the construction of wide-scale biometric databases 
in the name of anti-terrorism. Accordingly, the EU has had a converging 
effect on the states’ terrorism policies, similarities have been growing 
between member states’ anti-terrorism and the EU is one influential factor in 
the explanation of that circumstance.27 Thus, all three entities are interrelated 
and resemble driving forces of European anti-terrorism. Another good 
example of this inter-relation is the EU’s definition of terrorism, which has 
been implemented as the only valid definition in several member states (e.g. 
Germany).28 Moreover, due to their influence on European anti-terrorism 
policies, the three players do not only mutually influence each other, but also 
push anti-terrorism trends and developments to the periphery of the EU, as 
well as to countries that see only little terrorist activity. In effect, both the 
member states and the EU have been pushing for a Europeanization of anti-
terrorism policymaking in the last decades, continuously increasing inter-
relations in the policy field. Thus, due to the increasing entanglement 
between the three players, each of them owns an increasing amount of 
responsibility for anti-terrorism practices and policies that threaten a sound 
human rights framework. 
                                                          
26 Gearty holds that British anti-terrorism policies have been emulated elsewhere. Conor 
Gearty, “No Golden Age: The Deep Origins and Current Utility of Western Counter-
Terrorism Policy,” In Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 82. 
27 den Boer and Wiegand, “From Convergence to Deep Integration,” 208. 
28 In this regard, the UK is arguably less closely aligned with EU anti-terrorism than Germany, 
since the UK still maintains a definition of terrorism independent from the EU’s definition. 
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Fifth, all three analyzed cases have embraced a precautionary logic 
in their anti-terrorism efforts. The notion of a precautionary logic goes back 
on considerations by Cass Sunstein. When having implemented a 
precautionary logic, policymakers aim at taking all steps possible to protect 
against potential harms for society at large. Protective efforts are obviously 
not negative, however, in a precautionary logic, such efforts are carried out, 
even if causal chains leading to potential harms are unclear and even if it is 
not certain that such harms would occur without pre-emptive measures. The 
logic follows, in plain terms, the catchphrase “better safe than sorry,” or Dick 
Cheney’s doctrine of “doing something is better than doing nothing.” The 
idea is to avoid risks as much as possible and to implement a margin of safety 
in all areas. Harms are supposed to be tackled as soon as one perceives risk 
and not first when harms have occurred.29 This principle is applied in security 
politics and anti-terrorism as well.30 Applied on the relation between human 
rights and anti-terrorism, this means that risks of terrorism are supposed to 
be tackled, even when it is not sure that actions will diminish the risks and 
even when rights interferences might be highly disproportionate to existing 
risks. The risk for the implementation of unjustifiable actions via the 
application of a precautionary principle in anti-terrorism increases if a 
minority of society overwhelmingly carries the costs.31 Now, the purpose and 
current nature of much of the anti-terrorism of the analyzed cases is feeding 
into this precautionary logic, e.g. by focusing on pre-empting or preventing 
radicalization and recruitment via bulk surveillance, or by extensive use of 
stop-and-search practices.32 One can observe, at the member state level and 
at the EU level, a dissociation of the concept of risk from concrete acts, and 
a move towards the attempt to prevent certain risks in a general fashion.33 
Examples are initiatives on radicalization, as well as measures enabling 
investigators to identify radicalized individuals via data retention. The 
possible construction of a Panopticon via linking biometric data, CCTV and 
facial recognition systems is another example.34 Recently, the EU has started 
                                                          
29 Cass Sunstein, Laws of Fear – Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). Richard Jackson, “The epistemological crisis of counterterrorism,” 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 8 No. 1 (2015). 
30 A salient example from this realm mentioned by Sunstein is the internment of the Japanese-
Americans in the US during WWII.  
31 Sunstein, Laws of Fear. 
32 Genevieve Lennon, “Stop and search powers in UK terrorism investigations: a limited 
judicial oversight?” The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 20 No. 5 (2016). 
33 Lilian Mitrou, “The impact of communications data retention on fundamental rights and 
democracy – the case of the EU Data Retention Directive,” In Surveillance and Democracy, 
ed.by Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas (London: Routledge, 2010), 139. 
34 The European Parliament itself acknowledged this trend towards mass surveillance 
becoming a key feature of anti-terrorism in 2011. Javier Argomaniz, Oldrich Bures and 
Christian Kaunert, “A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical 
Assessment,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 30 No. 2-3 (2015). 
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in its overall policy framework, to encourage the member states to reinforce 
this precautionary logic, thus the EU is not standing better in terms of an 
application of the precautionary principle than the member states.35 
Sixth, it can be emphasized that all three entities maintain 
institutions, both judicial and legislative that take an active role in trying to 
confine extensive anti-terrorism policies. All entities maintain courts as 
counter-balance to rights invasive policies (the German Constitutional Court, 
the British High Court, and the ECJ), and all three maintain a second 
legislative chamber that (at times) plays the role of an anti-terrorism 
watchdog as well (the Bundesrat in the German case, the House of Lords in 
the UK and the European Parliament in case of the EU).36 Tony Blair agreed 
to this evaluation of the government’s course, at times, being curtailed by 
courts and opposing political forces: “We, of course, wanted far tougher laws 
against terrorism. We were prevented by opposition and then by the courts 
in ensuring that was done.”37 Clearly, the mentioned courts have had a much 
greater impact in terms of confining and abolishing rights invasive policies, 
as could be seen in my three case studies.38  
Seventh, this leaves this section to summarize the question of which 
of the three players is infringing human rights to the highest degree. One 
might argue that this question is hard to answer given some of the players 
have adopted policies that are not to be found in other cases. For instance, 
the UK has adopted a full-fledged surveillance program in its public sector 
with the Channel program and Germany had adopted legislation enabling the 
downing of a civil airplane (including its passengers). Regarding the question 
as to which of the two is the most grave human rights curtailment, the 
surveillance of potentially millions of citizens in institutions of public trust 
                                                          
35 Monica den Boer, ”Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance 
Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis,” Intelligence & National Security, Vol. 
30 No. 2-3 (2015): 225. den Boer and Wiegand, “From Convergence to Deep Integration.” 
36 However, the motives for counter-acting rights invasive anti-terrorism policies on the side 
of the second legislative chambers are far from always placed in a genuine interest for 
providing high rights standards. For instance, the German Bundesrat has often delayed anti-
terrorism legislation in order to gain concessions for (some of) Germany’s sixteen federal 
states in other policy areas. Hellmuth, Counterterrorism and the State. Arguably, the 
Bundesrat is the one of the three described chambers with the least supportive action in terms 
of human rights prevention. 
37 Tony Blair, October 1, 2006, quoted in Todd Landman, “The United Kingdom: The 
Continuity of Terror and Counterterror,” In National Insecurity and Human Rights: 
Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007), 75. 
38 Fiona de Londras argues in the same direction, when she holds that it no other organs than 
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case of the UK and the policy of indefinite detention. Fiona de Londras, Detention in the ‘War 
on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
280-283. 
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(schools, hospitals, universities, etc.) or setting the groundwork for the 
theoretical case of a country killing a couple of hundred of its own citizens 
(or more), appears tricky to provide with an ultimate answer. However, as 
mentioned before, some general differentiating trends can be detected in my 
analysis. The UK has adopted a larger amount of rights infringing measures 
and policies as the two other analyzed cases, the UK has adopted policies 
that have gone further in terms of undermining a sound human rights 
framework, and the UK has in its general rhetoric and attitude moved further 
away from the ideal of maximizing human rights than Germany and the EU. 
Thus, one can conclude that the UK is responsible for the most critical human 
rights record of the three analyzed cases concerning anti-terrorism post 
9/11.39 Germany then follows after the UK, since the country has adopted 
more critical anti-terrorism policies than the EU, both in quantity and quality. 
Although the EU is here categorized as the ‘least bad’ case, I would like to 
emphasize that this does not mean that the EU has an overall positive record 
in terms of human rights in the course of anti-terrorism; the opposite is the 
case (see above). Furthermore, all three entities have moved away from the 
objective of full realization of human rights as a major aim of their general 
policymaking (the full realization and full enjoyment of rights is the 
teleology of rights). Limitation of and derogation from rights norms (legal 
and spirit norms) has become the rule rather than the exception in European 
anti-terrorism. Thus, none of the three entities reflects a maximalist attitude 
towards human rights.40 
Reflecting the question of European anti-terrorism in a wider 
context, it must be emphasized that the implementation of tough anti-
terrorism laws in the UK, Germany (and at the EU level) after 9/11 does not 
constitute a unique development in a European context, but rather reflects a 
common European trend. Many European countries have implemented new 
laws on anti-terrorism in this timeframe, and the three cases at the center of 
my analysis are not the only countries that have come close to or crossed the 
line of rights invasive measures in this policy field. France is another 
prominent example of a traditionally rights-oriented country, which has 
opened up for a process of continuously curtailing rights for alleged security 
benefits. France, for instance, first proclaimed a state of emergency after IS 
attacks in 2015, which was renewed for two years before transformed into 
                                                          
39 De Boer and Wiegand share this evaluation – at least for the first years after 9/11 - when 
they claimed that the UK (together with France) showed a stronger reaction to terrorism after 
9/11 than Germany (as well as Italy, Spain and the Netherlands). den Boer and Wiegand, 
“From Convergence to Deep Integration,” 207. 
40 Again, a maximalist understanding of human rights reflects the aim to realize as much of 
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Lang, 2019), 12-16. 
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permanent legislation. This legislation contained a range of measures that are 
at least questionable from a human rights perspective, such as expansive 
powers to raid houses and detain terror suspects, house arrest schemes, stop-
and-search practices of the police in specific areas, the closing of places of 
worship, as well as extensive surveillance programs, all entailing the 
discriminatory tendencies towards Muslims that were described in detail for 
the cases in focus in this thesis.41 Accordingly, a 2019 study conducted in 
France revealed that many Muslims feel stigmatized in anti-terrorism 
practices, e.g., via being deliberately chosen for checks by the police.42 
Besides the right to non-discrimination, the right to liberty, freedom of 
assembly and freedom of religion have come under pressure as well in 
France. Just as many other countries, France is setting the conditions for 
implementing measures that were supposed to deliver additional security for 
a specific period of time as the new norm. And, similar to other countries, 
France is operating its anti-terrorism course based on a rather vague 
definition of terrorism.43 Moreover, the perception of discrimination in the 
course of anti-terrorism is widespread among Muslim minorities in Europe, 
as Eijkman and Schuurman report.44 The cases that I focused on in this thesis 
are thus not to be understood as odd cases but rather as reflecting the general 
picture of European anti-terrorism policy development of the last seventeen 
years. 
Reflecting on the mentioned developments, one might wonder why 
a majority of citizens in the countries in question does not stop such anti-
terrorism policies.45 A larger and influential movement among the population 
taking up invasive anti-terrorism policies and potentially setting an end to 
                                                          
41 Nicholas Vinocur, ”New French anti-terror law to replace 2-year state of emergency,” 
Politico, October 31, 2017. Angelique Chrisafis, ”Macron’s counter-terror bill risks France’s 
human rights record, say UN expert,” The Guardian, September 28, 2017. 
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Discrimination in the European Union: A Call for Systematic Evaluation (The Hague: ICCT, 
2011), 19. 
45 As mentioned, when rights infringing policies were stopped in the analyzed cases, then 
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them via political pressure, cannot be detected. Certain hypotheses can be 
constructed in order to explain the lack of resistance in Western societies. In 
earlier research, I tried to find out why people are not showing more 
resistance to mass surveillance. The abstractness of the issue, the lack of 
concrete victims of surveillance that one might identify with, the missing 
hope for an abolishment of surveillance, the fact that the perception of 
privacy rights as important has declined, and the consequential lack of 
intense anger in face of mass surveillance were some of the reasons for a lack 
of resistance in Germany.46 It can be expected that some of these variables 
are also relevant to the case of the UK. Jeanne Bonnici argued in a similar 
way when she claimed, “public apathy to privacy and data protection needs 
have characterized developments of recent years, while the regulations that 
fashion European society continue to be fuelled by concerns about terrorism, 
security and safety.”47 Not even the revelations about surveillance, provided 
by Edward Snowden have triggered a determined movement forcing an 
abolishment of rights infringing surveillance activities. After these 
revelations, an awareness concerning privacy problems was initially growing 
but did not stay a ‘mainstream’ concern.48 In the last years, engagement with 
the problem, as well as the general interest in it, has somewhat faded. Gearty 
proposes another promising variable for explaining the lack of resistance to 
rights infringing anti-terrorism measures. He argues that the majority of the 
British society is not concerned about the government's rights infringing anti-
terrorism measures, as they would have gained the understanding that these 
measures are in reality not aimed against them, but against minorities, 
foremost Muslims and non-Westerners. Thus, many members of the majority 
society would be indifferent with harsh anti-terrorism policies since they 
would not feel that they would ever be hit (other than maybe in an abstract 
fashion).49 The majority would be “quite prepared to truncate” the liberty of 
minorities, “while contriving to continue to believe not only in our own 
freedom but in liberty as a universal value.”50 Minority groups do however 
understand rights infringing measures as a threat to their personal lives 
including the development of discriminatory tendencies. 
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Lastly, I would like to note that the fact that I have detected a range 
of rights problems in anti-terrorism policies since 2001, does not mean that 
all anti-terrorism is illegitimate. Examples of legitimate measures can be 
found and some have been mentioned already. For purposes of clarity I 
would like to point to a few examples constituting non-rights-invasive anti-
terrorism, e.g., the ban of membership in terror organizations (if that is 
defined properly), the ban of financing of terrorism (again, terrorism must be 
defined properly and third persons cannot be stripped of economic rights), 
the ban of joining foreign wars, the ban of incitement to violence (again, 
under a narrow definition and judicial oversight), individual instances of 
surveillance of suspects in cases of concrete indication of a connection with 
terror plans, international cooperation on anti-terrorism (given that 
cooperation does not include cooperation with rights infringing services), a 
ban of online weapon trading, anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism exercises 
of police forces, or the increase of police staff and budgets. 
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Discussion 
After I detected a range of human rights problems in the course of German, 
British and EU anti-terrorism policies, and after comparing these policies, it 
shows that the current relationship between anti-terrorism and human rights 
has developed in a negative direction on the European front in recent years. 
We have seen a move away from rights ideals and the initiation of a status 
quo that sees rights restriction to be the new norm rather than the exception.1 
This leaves the question of how a more sound relationship between rights 
and anti-terrorism would look. I will thus now delve into how the relation of 
human rights and anti-terrorism is understood in theory, opening up for 
different perspectives on this relation. Then I will reflect upon the question 
to what extent human rights should be curtailed in terms of anti-terrorism, or 
if at all. I will, in the course of this, relate to the question of whether anti-
terrorism and human rights are necessarily contradictory concepts. 
Essentially, the struggle between rights and anti-terrorism represents a 
struggle between different perceptions regarding the quantity and character 
of security measures necessary in a society facing the threat of terrorism.  
A first position that one can identify regarding the relationship 
between human rights and terrorism policies is often referred to as a ‘realist’ 
understanding. In this view, human rights would at best be subordinate to 
security interests and policies, or not relevant at all in terms of security 
policies.2 Alison Brysk refers for instance to Frank Biggio as a typical 
proponent of a realist stance on the relationship between human rights and 
terrorism policies. Biggio argues that a state has the justified right to exercise 
preemptive and unilateral action against terrorism. This argument is based 
on the idea that terrorism poses “a total threat to the existence of democratic 
societies”.3 Due to this unprecedented and existential threat, far-reaching 
measures would be justified in order to secure stability (of the state, a state’s 
hegemony, and the world order). Measures such as military strikes against 
terrorist camps, kidnappings or assassinations of terrorist leaders may 
become morally justified when faced with such a threat, Biggio holds. 
Terrorists would have become “enemies of mankind”, in his opinion 
(resembling a ‘crimes against humanity’ vocabulary), forfeiting national as 
well as humanitarian protection.4 Another proponent of such a perspective is 
John Ashcroft former Attorney General in the administration of George W. 
Bush. He tried to devalue the importance of rights in facing the threat of 
                                                          
1 Richard Jackson pointed to such a trend as well. See Richard Jackson et al., Terrorism: A 
Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 235. 
2 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization 
Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 12. 
3 Frank Biggio in Alison Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” In National 
Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison Brysk 
and Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 10. 
4 Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” 10. 
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terrorism with claims such as the following: “[T]o those who scare 
peaceloving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: your 
tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our 
resolve. They give ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to 
America’s friends.”5 Such positions were popular in the direct aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks, especially among American policymakers.6 Essentially, this 
argumentation, the idea that rights do not have to be regarded in constructing 
security, takes away the legitimization of having rights; it undermines one’s 
right to have rights.7 Such positions come close to what Laura Donohue 
labeled “the perversion of the liberal dialogue.” Argumentations such as the 
ones presented above try to legitimize the abolishment of liberal institutions 
of societies (such as rights) in an attempt to ensure security. However, this is 
what these institutions were supposed to protect.8 Since the mentioned 
positions refrain from even considering rights as an important focal point of 
anti-terrorism policymaking, such a stance must, obviously, be refused from 
a human rights perspective.9 
A second, more commonly displayed, position regarding the 
relationship between human rights and terrorism policies is the so-called 
‘trade-off position’, pointing at finding the right balance between liberty and 
security. In other words, the balance analogy is resting on the idea of a 
conflict between (the right to) security and (other) civil rights.10 Many 
proponents of this position underline the potential importance of human 
rights. However, most writers in this camp end up with the viewpoint that in 
the face of a terrorist threat, security would have to have priority over human 
rights. Human rights would have to be diminished to the advantage of more 
effective terrorism policies. The relation between human rights and security 
is here understood as a zero-sum game; if the one is increased, the other is 
necessarily in decline.  
                                                          
5 CNN, "Ashcroft: Critics of new terror measures undermine effort," December 7, 2001. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/12/06/inv.ashcroft.hearing/. 
6 Ishay, The History of Human Rights, 12. 
7 Hannah Arendt defined human rights in that way. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken, 2004), 297. 
8 Laura Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” In Terrorism and Human Rights, 
ed. by Magnus Ranstorp and Paul Wilkinson (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 71. 
9 The stance does reflect a traditional realist position, declaring the primacy of states and their 
pursue of security and survival as the major promoter of international relations processes. 
Ideas such as human rights, belonging to the realm of political ethics, would not have a place 
in such a realist understanding of international relations, since states would be meant to pursue 
their survival, not ethics. Marie-Benedicte Dembour, “Critiques,” In International Human 
Rights Law, 2nd ed., ed. by Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 57. 
10 Mifsud Bonnici, “Recent European Union developments on data protection … in the name 
of Islam or ‘Combating Terrorism’” Information & Communication Technology Law Vol, 
Vol. 16 No. 2 (2007): 164. 
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Jeremy Waldron explains that it is assumed that “there is always a 
balance to be struck” between liberty and security. It would always be a 
necessity “to strike a balance between the individual’s liberty […] and 
society’s need for protection.” A common suggestion after a terror attack is 
thus to demand an increase of security and a derogation of liberty in order to 
restore the balance that the attack destroyed.11 Many would in such a 
situation develop the perception that “it might be unreasonable to insist on 
the same restrictions on state action” as was insisted on before an attack 
(Waldron uses 9/11 as an example). Many would start to think that the risks 
of providing a certain amount of liberty or rights are higher than they 
assumed before the attack. In other words, a change of threat perception will 
often deliver a justification for changing the balance between rights and 
security.12 
American journalist Nicholas Kristoff explained the position in a 
2002 publication this way: “9/11 lifted the toll into the thousands, and 
terrorists are now nosing around weapons of mass destruction that could kill 
hundreds of thousands. As risks change, we who care about civil liberties 
need to realign balances between security and freedom. It is a wrenching, 
odious task, but we liberals need to learn from 9/11 just as much as the F.B.I. 
does.”13 Judge Richard Posner (judge at the US Circuit Court of Appeals) 
argued in a similar fashion when he held that “in times of danger, the weight 
of concerns for public safety increases relative to that of liberty concerns, 
and civil liberties are narrowed. In safer times, the balance shifts the other 
way and civil liberties are broadened.”14 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
argue that lawmakers could not evaluate the right amount of rights 
derogation and that the judiciary should allow the executive branch to trade-
                                                          
11 Jeremy Waldron, “Security and Liberty: The image of balance” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol. 11 No. 2 (2003): 191. Waldron, however, points out that the calculation 
between liberty and security could be conducted the other way around as well. Instead of 
limiting freedom via defining a certain amount of necessary security, one could also imagine 
a minimum demand of freedom. If it were not possible to deliver this minimum demand of 
freedom without increasing the risks, then greater risks would be taken into regard. Waldron 
as quoted in Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 62. 
12 Waldron, “Security and Liberty,” 191. 
13 Nicholas Kristoff, “Liberal Reality Check: we must look anew at freedom vs. security,” 
New York Times, May 31, 2002. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/31/opinion/31KRIS.html. 
However, as statistics show, the high number of terrorism-victims in 2001 was rather an 
unusual outlier, rather than the consequence of a general trend. This is valid for both the US 
and Western countries as a whole. The years after 2001 did in any case see much fewer victims 
of terrorism (again), until an IS campaign let death tolls increase again in the US and Europe. 
See, e.g., statistics by the START research institution and the Global Terrorism Database. 
14 Richard Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 9. However, as we have seen in the empirical cases 
analyzed earlier, security policies are not really rolled back again when a terror threat 
decreases. 
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off rights for security if necessary.15 Other contemporary authors holding that 
a restriction of rights in the face of terrorism is necessary are e.g., Alan 
Dershowitz, Michael Ignatieff, James Nickel, Philip Heymann, or John Yoo 
(I will come back to some of their positions below).16 Alison Brysk regards 
the phenomenon of a constitution of a “cluster of historically liberal analysts” 
accepting rights derogation as a post-9/11 novelty.17 And Jack Donnelly 
evaluated that since 9/11 “security and human rights are again increasingly 
coming to be seen as competing rather than reinforcing concerns.”18  
However, the idea that individuals should sacrifice some freedom in order to 
gain security is everything else but new; it goes back to e.g., ideas by Thomas 
Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli.19 
A scenario that is often used in order to legitimize a balancing to the 
disadvantage of rights and liberty is the so-called ‘ticking-time-bomb’ 
scenario. Alan Dershowitz is an example of an author utilizing this scenario. 
He holds in a post-9/11 publication that the isolated and supervised usage of 
torture could be permissible in case of an imminent threat to public security.20 
The scenario is mostly based on the hypothetical situation that authorities 
have captured a suspect who is believed to have information on a devastating 
imminent terror attack. Authorities should - according to Dershowitz - be 
allowed to derogate from some basic rights of the suspect, e.g., his right not 
to be tortured in order to make him hand over information that will prevent 
the attack (Dershowitz endorses non-lethal torture with judicial oversight). 
The rights derogation would be permissible because many lives could be 
saved.21 Although I do not look at cases of torture in my anti-terrorism 
                                                          
15 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
16 Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004). James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007) Philip Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense 
Strategy for a Democratic Society (Cambridge: First MIT Press, 2000). John Yoo,“ The 
United States needs to reasonably limit civil liberties and bolster executive powers,“ In 
Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, 
and Responses, ed. by Stuart Gottlieb (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2010). 
17 Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” 11. 
18 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 241. 
19 Hobbes held in his Leviathan that individuals would sacrifice some freedoms in the process 
of entering into society and thereby gain security. Machiavelli assumed that individuals are 
willing to give away freedom in order to achieve personal security as well. Donohue, “Security 
and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 59. Mahmood Monshipouri, Terrorism, Security, and Human 
Rights (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 188. 
20 Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works. 
21 Ibid., 88-89. The scenario of a ticking time bomb is confronted with a range of criticism. 
First, it is argued (e.g., by Jeremy Waldron and Jack Donnelly) that only few such cases 
(maybe even none at all) can be detected in real life in connection with terrorism. Waldron, 
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analysis, this scenario does bear some relevance, since it reflects the same 
type of thinking that tries to justify the implementation of rights curtailing or 
rights derogating anti-terrorism policies and measures analyzed earlier. 
Other writers have indeed used similar modes of argumentation to 
justify rights infringing anti-terrorism measures. For instance, Michael 
Ignatieff constructed one of the most widely known arguments, for why 
human rights derogations are permissible in the face of a serious threat by 
terrorism. Ignatieff claimed in his book The Lesser Evil, that “If the threat is 
sufficiently great, preemptive detention of suspects […] may be necessary. 
It is unrealistic to think that commitments to dignity, coupled with a 
conservative bias against departing from tried legal standards, will be 
sufficient to cope with any eventuality in the future.”22 Besides preemptive 
detention, Ignatieff deems interrogation “to the limits of their psychological 
endurance” as another potentially necessary evil.23 Ignatieff holds that 
“respect for one right [security] might lead us to betray another.” James 
Nickel outlines a similar argumentation: “if a terrorist emergency is severe 
enough it may be justifiable to enact a system of detention without trial of 
                                                          
“Security and Liberty,” 207. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 245. 
Second, it is argued – e.g., by Henry Shue or Alison Brysk – that such a position opens up for 
a slippery slope of rights derogations, which ultimately leads to the widespread use of 
preventive detention and torture. Governments would “not be able to […] uphold a clear 
distinction between coercive interrogation and torture.” Brysk, “Human Rights and National 
Insecurity,” 13. Henry Shue spoke already in 1978 of “considerable evidence of all torture’s 
metastatic tendency.” Henry Shue “Torture,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 7 No. 2 
(1978): 143. Third, several studies have shown that information gained by torture (or measures 
very short of torture), are everything but reliable. Individuals subjected to such procedures 
will often fabricate information or even incriminate themselves, just in order to have the 
procedure stopped. Sumner B. Twiss, “Torture, Justification, and Human Rights: Toward an 
Absolute Proscription,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29 No. 2 (2007). A prominent example 
is former Al-Qaeda member Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, who fabricated connections between Al-
Qaeda and Iraq’s former leader Saddam Hussein after being subjected to several months of 
torture. Al-Libi’s ‘testimony’ was later used by the American administration as justification 
for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Jeremy Scahill, Schmutzige Kriege (München, dtv, 2013), 51. 
This point was already made in the 18th century by the Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria 
when he claimed that a “sensitive but guiltless man will tend to admit guilt if he believes that, 
in that way, he can make the pain stop.” Beccaria as quoted in Ishay, The History of Human 
Rights, 87. Michael Sandel adds a fourth point to the discussion by emphasizing that (most 
of) those arguing for overriding rights, and torturing the suspect would not only act on basis 
of a cost and benefits calculation but also based on the (non-utilitarian) moral standpoint that 
terrorists are bad people who deserve to be punished. He argues that this becomes clear when 
one alters the scenario to an innocent being tortured in order to prevent a terror attack; e.g., 
via the scenario that a suspect’s innocent child be tortured in order to make the suspect talk. 
Most of those formerly ruling for overriding the right not to be tortured, Sandel argues, would 
“flinch at the notion” of this scenario. Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 40. 
22 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 10. 
23 Ibid., 9. 
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suspected terrorists arrested in the national territory.”24 Philip Heymann (a 
former US Deputy Attorney General) concluded in a 2002 publication that 
“preventative detention may be justified albeit unpopular.”25 That the 
relation of human rights and security is understood as a trade-off or zero-sum 
game by Heymann becomes clear when he writes that “electronic 
surveillance, coercive interrogation, and limitations on association, 
detention, and speech […], controlled or forbidden by the United States 
Constitution, are likely to be promising ways of […] preventing terrorist 
initiatives.”26 The position taken by these writers reflects arguably a 
utilitarian position.27 A utilitarian position would argue along with the 
‘ticking-time-bomb’ argument, pointing out that it would at times be 
necessary to restrict or even violate rights (even basic human rights as the 
prohibition of torture) in order to prevent ‘greater harm’. This argumentation 
goes back to Jeremy Bentham’s (1748-1832) dictum of establishing the 
“greatest good for the greatest number” (which in case of a terror attack 
would be to minimize suffering for the greatest amount of people). This 
utilitarian reasoning should according to Bentham be the basis for public 
policy and law.28 
Support for a balancing of rights and security is, however, not only 
detectable in the academic literature, but at the level of political leadership 
as well. For instance, Barack Obama held in a 2013 speech that there was a 
“need for a balance to be struck between […] security and citizens’ rights to 
privacy.”29 Angela Merkel argued that the German government works “to 
bring freedom and security into a balance, and thereby secure our way of 
living.”30 John Reid, British Home Secretary from 2006 to 2007 argued (in 
2006) that some freedoms would have to be “modified” in the short run in 
order to save civil liberties in the long run.31 And, Andy Burnham of the 
British Labour party employed this balance analogy in the public debate 
regarding the IP Act.32 The EU likewise emphasizes that it wants to strike a 
balance between liberty and security (e.g., in the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Action Plan 2005).  
                                                          
24 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 122. 
25 Heymann as cited in Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” 11. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity.” 
28 Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?, 31. 
29 Adrian Guelke, “Secrets and Lies: Misinformation and Counter-Terrorism,” In Illusions of 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 107. 
30 Zacharias Zacharakis, "Angela Merkel: Keine Angst,” Zeit Online, July 28, 2016. 
31 John Reid, August 9, 2006, quoted in Todd Landman, “The United Kingdom: The 
Continuity of Terror and Counterterror,” In National Insecurity and Human Rights: 
Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007), 75. 
32 BBC, ”Investigatory Powers Bill: May defends surveillance powers”, March 15, 2016. 
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In the end, many policymakers still seem to evaluate human rights 
and anti-terrorism as contradictory concepts, resulting in attempts at 
restricting rights and liberties in order to enhance security and an effective 
anti-terrorism regime (this was demonstrated by many examples in my 
analysis). Fearful publics often support such a prioritization.33 Thus, 
policymakers’ and the public’s theoretical understanding of the relation of 
human rights and anti-terrorism has repercussions on real-life anti-terrorism 
policymaking. Administrations, which deem rights less important as security 
and which are willing to trade-off rights in the name of security will 
implement measures that curtail human rights more than administrations 
holding approaches which try to achieve both. Again, the administrations 
analyzed earlier (at least at most times since 9/11) have taken a stance that 
favors restrictions of rights.  
Such standpoints by politicians and the above-mentioned scholars 
reflect a so-called ‘hierarchy of rights’ perspective. This line of argument 
claims that the state would in certain situations necessarily be forced to 
concentrate its efforts on the protection of the most important right, mostly 
perceived as the right to life, or right to security. Therefore, other rights 
constituting an obstacle to the effective protection of these most important 
rights would have to be restricted.34 The argument of a hierarchy of rights 
appeared in the German discourse on the issue in July 2013 when the then 
German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich declared the right to security 
to a ‘Supergrundrecht’ (super basic right) in order to defend limitations of 
other rights in the course of Edward Snowden’s revelations.35 Tony Blair had 
already pointed in this direction from the British perspective in 2001 when 
he claimed that: “Civil liberties are a vital part of our country, and of our 
world. But the most basic liberty of all is the right of the ordinary citizen to 
go about their business free from fear or terror.”36 The idea of balancing 
rights and security in times of terror threats to the disadvantage of rights rests 
often on the implementation of a precautionary principle (see Chapter 6). 
Furthermore, this ‘hierarchy of rights’ perspective sometimes divides 
between individual and collective rights, emphasizing that (at times) 
individual rights to liberty would be trumped by collective rights to 
                                                          
33 Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” 6. 
34 Benedetta Berti, “Escaping the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Securing a Role for Human Rights in 
Counter-Terrorism,” in Effectively Countering Terrorism, ed. by Cornelia Beyer and Michael 
Bauer (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009) 79-117. Monshipouri, Terrorism, Security, 
and Human Rights, 192-193. 
35 This crude categorization not only earned him a lot of criticism from rights activists, but 
also made him the object of mockery among German media. Veit Medick and Philipp Wittock, 
“Minister Friedrich und die NSA-Affäre: Der USA-Verteidigungsminister,” Spiegel Online, 
July 16, 2013. 
36 The Guardian, “Full text of Blair's speech to the Commons,” September 14, 2001. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/sep/14/houseofcommons.uk1. 
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security.37 In other words, individuals would have to sacrifice a certain 
amount of personal freedom in order to secure the freedom of society as a 
whole.38 Again, this perspective clearly reflects a utilitarian argumentation 
line of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’.39 
However, some differentiation is necessary when going through 
positions on the balance issue. Whereas those authors that have so far been 
presented take a rather harsh stance and advocate a balance to the 
disadvantage of rights (e.g., Dershowitz, Ignatieff, Nickel, Heymann), other 
voices can be found as well. An author using the analogy of a balance while 
trying to argue against a widespread restriction of rights is e.g., Paul 
Hoffman, who demands a restoration of “the balance between liberty and 
security by reasserting the human rights framework, which provides for 
legitimate and effective efforts to respond to terrorist attacks.”40  
Furthermore, one should keep in mind that the restriction of rights 
rests on a legal basis (although restrictions are according to a maximalist 
perspective necessarily in conflict with the spirit of rights regardless of a 
legal basis). As I pointed out before, the idea of rights derogation in times of 
emergency is not unknown to human-rights-law itself. In fact, “international 
human rights standards and humanitarian law have always been sensitive to 
the balance between liberty and security,” as Paul Hoffman notes.41 Again, 
according to the principle of jus cogens, all of the legally binding human 
rights documents used in this thesis contain provisions for the derogation of 
rights (see Chapter 1).42 Relevant courts have used the analogy of balancing 
as well. For instance, the ECtHR held in 1989 that “a fair balance between 
the demands of the general interest of the community [e.g. national security] 
and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental 
                                                          
37 Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” 6. 
38 Lilian Mitrou, “The impact of communications data retention on fundamental rights and 
democracy – the case of the EU Data Retention Directive,” In Surveillance and Democracy, 
ed.by Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas (London: Routledge, 2010), 140. 
39 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 62. 
40 Paul Hoffman, “Human Rights and Terrorism,” Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 26 (2004): 
932. The analogy of balancing liberty and security is used as well by David Whittaker and 
Jörg Monar, however, in a more neutral fashion. For instance, Whittaker declares the search 
for the “balance between operating strategies and programmes and the importance of 
conserving human rights” for one of the main issues of terrorism policy. Whittaker, Counter-
Terrorism and Human Rights, 2. Monar in his elaboration on the EU’s anti-terrorism 
framework used the analogy as well, emphasizing that the EU and all its international partners 
would face the challenge “of maintaining a balance between the need to protect its citizens 
[…] and the need to protect those citizens’ civil liberties.” This challenge would constitute “a 
fight on two fronts.” Jörg Monar, ”Conclusions,” In International Terrorism: A European 
Response to a Global Threat, ed. by Monar and Mahncke (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2006), 156. 
41 Hoffman, “Human Rights and Terrorism,” 950. 
42 Still, a certain core of rights is defined that is not to be derogated under any circumstances. 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrc29.html#_edn3. 
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rights,” is inherent in the whole convention [the ECHR].43 Thereby, authors 
with so different positions as Dershowitz and Ignatieff on the one side and 
Hoffman on the other side, as well as the ECtHR, are still relating to the same 
idea – a direct relation between security and rights, in which a fitting balance 
of rights and security can be detected. 
However, the idea of a balancing process between rights and security 
is flawed. Several authors point to some of those flaws. For instance, Jeremy 
Waldron is very skeptical about giving up any rights or liberties at all. He 
remarks that when negative liberties (or negative rights, as described in 
Chapter 1) are reduced, the powers of the state necessarily increase. This 
might be risky since state power would “always and endemically [be] liable 
to abuse.44 Martin Scheinin calls for caution in regard to using the balance 
analogy. He argues that whenever this picture of balance between security 
and liberty is applied, security will appear as the dominant factor.45 Conor 
Gearty argues that a viewpoint, which sees “security and human rights in an 
inevitable collision,” is potentially undermining the general 
acknowledgment of the idea of human rights.46 Indeed, perceptions of terror 
threats have started to undermine the acceptance of human rights as a 
normative cornerstone. Gearty accords with this evaluation when he claims 
that questions have arisen asking why killing and torturing terrorists cannot 
be justified.47 Peter Katzenstein is another scholar criticizing the argument 
that a trade-off between rights and security is necessary when facing a 
terrorist threat. He underlines that “one should be wary of putting too much 
trust in government promises that tilting the balance decisively against civil 
liberty will be rewarded with special gains in security”.48 Laura Donohue, 
Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, as well as Richard Jackson, support this 
claim that restricting freedoms might not necessarily result in greater 
security.49  
                                                          
43 Council of Europe Guideline, 31. 
44 Waldron, “Security and Liberty,” 205. Monshipouri argues in a similar fashion. 
Monshipouri, Terrorism, Security, and Human Rights, 195. The term ‘negative liberty’ was 
defined by Isaiah Berlin as the absence of interference with an agent’s actions by exterior 
social bodies. Isaiah Berlin, Liberty, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002). 
45 EUI Interviews, “Martin Scheinin on the legality of mass surveillance.” 
https://surveille.eui.eu/ 
46 Gearty, Liberty and Security, 342. 
47 Ibid., 360. 
48 Peter Katzenstein, “Same War—Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism,” 
International Organization, Vol. 57 No. 4 (2003): 757. Jack Donnelly is skeptic towards the 
idea of restricting rights in order to enhance security as well. For him, a connection between 
curtailing civil liberties and protecting people against terrorism “is unclear at best.” Donnelly, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 247. Monshipouri takes the same position. 
Monshipouri, Terrorism, Security, and Human Rights, 171-172. 
49 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum.” Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, Civil 
Liberties & Human Rights, 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 454-455. 
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In general, the balancing analogy is (at least at times) built on a 
conception of a possible rational calculation around the benefits and losses 
in regard to the increase of either anti-terrorism or human rights.50 However, 
human rights are essential preconditions for a life in dignity. Rights ideals 
are supposed to constitute the core of our societies and of our conception of 
how to provide a life build on dignity. Such notions of dignity and potential 
full enjoyment of rights and capabilities can hardly be quantified in a way 
that is fathomable in a rational-choice account. Furthermore, besides the 
question of practicability of such calculations, I would argue that utilizing a 
rational choice approach on human rights and human dignity misses the 
bigger picture due to the described essential nature of rights for individuals 
and societies. Rational choice calculations do not grasp the true nature of 
what rights are all about, their wider aims and their spirit are neglected (the 
latter are the ‘bigger picture’). Based on this point and the points delivered 
in the previous paragraph, I would like to argue that the idea of a necessary 
balance between security and liberty, and especially anti-terrorism and 
human rights, contains various loose ends and misleading points. 
Consequently, it does not serve the purpose of finding a sound course of 
action in the face of terrorist threats (such a sound course reflects an approach 
that does not erode the spirit of rights, while still being beneficial).51  
And indeed, the balance analogy (and its proponents) seems to miss 
the larger picture in regard to the long-term negative effects of many rights 
infringing anti-terrorism measures.52 Such effects are not easy to calculate 
via a rational choice framework (e.g. potential processes of self-censoring or 
increased perceptions of being constantly surveyed). Disregarding potential 
long-term consequences of anti-terrorism can equal counter-productive 
effects of the same. One such mechanism pertains to the counter-productive 
long-term effect of discriminatory tendencies. Waldron convincingly 
describes the groundwork of this process. He holds that “the real diminution 
in liberty may effect some people more than others.” One should not make 
“the claim that civil liberties are diminished equally for everyone.” Waldron 
therein suggests the existence of a specific distribution of the changes to the 
alleged balance in the name of security. Certain measures might “trade off 
the liberties of a few against the security of the majority”. He claims that 
ethnic minorities identified with terrorism (currently often Muslim 
communities), will potentially lose a higher amount of liberty than other 
                                                          
Richard Jackson et al., Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), 235.  
50 Gustav Lindstrom, “The EU’s approach to Homeland Security: Balancing Safety and 
European Ideals,” In Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches, ed. 
by Esther Brimmer (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006), 126. 
51 In the Conclusion, I will point to some measures that try to reflect such a ‘sound approach’. 
52 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 60. 
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groups.53 What Waldron has in mind here is that certain measures might have 
a discriminatory character. As an example, Waldron points to the American 
Patriot Act, which allowed for more extensive surveillance of foreigners than 
US citizens. Scheinin supports Waldron’s claim when he holds that “certain 
groups of individuals are affected more than the average citizen by counter-
terrorism measures” and […] “ethnic or religious minorities are often 
targeted by counter-terrorism measures affecting a broad range of human 
rights.”54  
The results of the analysis in this study support these claims. 
Examples of such processes could be found in the UK’s detention of foreign 
terror suspects, discriminatory tendencies in stop-and-search practices, or 
discriminatory tendencies in the German dragnet investigation (to name only 
a few examples). Thus, Waldron’s claim indeed holds true, some groups lose 
more rights in anti-terrorism than others.  
Now, via such an unequal loss of rights, processes of radicalization 
amongst groups who perceive to be treated unfairly can be triggered, with 
the result that an unequal trade-off of rights can lead to more terrorism and 
not less.55 Personal grievances and experiences of personal injustice and 
lacking opportunities of individual expression (e.g. via cracking down on 
freedom of expression) are important factors for the engagement of 
individuals in terror groups.56 Grievances, experiences of injustice and 
limited opportunities, however, are with a high likelihood perceived by a 
larger number of people in a context of an ever more severe and rights-
ignorant anti-terrorism framework.57 Scheinin provides the example of 
discriminative stop-and-search measures in the UK as potentially facilitating 
terrorist recruitment.58 And indeed, a study conducted in Germany in 2007 
showed a link between discrimination experiences and radicalization.59 
                                                          
53 Waldron, “Security and Liberty: The image of balance,” 204. Ronald Dworkin agrees to 
this claim in his essay The Threat to Patriotism from 2002. Alan Dershowitz points to this 
unequal loss of rights and liberties as well. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, 194. The same 
is valid for Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 71. 
54 Martin Scheinin, “Terrorism,” In International Human Rights Law, ed. by Daniel Moeckli, 
Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 557. Cass 
Sunstein is another eminent scholar supporting this argumentation. Cass Sunstein, Laws of 
Fear – Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
207-223. 
55 Scheinin, “Terrorism,” 561. 
56 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 63-69. Jackson, Terrorism: A Critical 
Introduction, 235. Another author who implies that perceptions of injustice give rise to 
terrorism is Martha Crenshaw. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 13 No. 4 (1981): 383. 
57 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum.” 
58 Scheinin, “Terrorism,” 561. 
59 Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, “Stereotypical representations of Muslims and Islam following the 
7/7 London terror attacks: Implications for intercultural communication and terrorism 
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Therein, my point is that a discriminatory or in general harsh anti-
terrorism course can lead to counter-productive effects. The likelihood of 
breeding a larger number of individuals in society that will be ready to use 
violence in order to express their frustrations and political viewpoints 
increases via implementing policies that curtail rights. Therefore, harsh 
efforts against terrorism might backfire by a growing amount of future 
violence.60 This process is amplified if rights-curtailing measures have a 
clear disproportionate effect on certain minorities. The validity of this claim 
is e.g. indicated by the mentioned study conducted in Germany (see above), 
the fact that the majority of suicide bombers are drawn from vulnerable 
communities, or historical examples. For instance, the case of Northern 
Ireland has shown that an increasingly severe anti-terrorism course, 
including the restriction of civil rights, amplifies grievances and the 
readiness for violent action among affected individuals and groups.61 
Instead of a defeat of terrorism, as postulated by some of the above-
mentioned scholars, one will, via restricting rights, rather see the breeding of 
new terrorists, undermining the security situation of countries and 
populations even more. Thus, the analogy of a balance between security and 
                                                          
prevention," International Communication Gazette, Vol. 74 No. 6 (2012). Donohue supports 
this point that perceptions of injustice via restrictions of rights will potentially lead to more 
violent prone individuals as well. Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 72. 
60 A range of researchers point to such potential processes, e.g.: Donohue, “Security and 
Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 63. Scott Atran argues that retaliation increases peoples’ readiness 
to act according to radical doctrines and policies. He points to a 2002 poll conducted amongst 
Palestinians in which sixty-six percent were stating that operations of the Israeli army 
increased their backing of suicide terrorism. Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” 
Science, Vol. 299 No. 5612 (2003): 1538. The UN in its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
points to violations of human rights as conducive for the spread of terrorism as well. Scheinin, 
“Terrorism,” 562. English underlines that via illegal policies terrorism policies would be “at 
odds with our ultimate purpose in countering terror in the first place,” and would be ineffective 
and create new terrorists. Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). Andrew Silke argues that harsh counter-measures by states “can have 
a negative impact far greater than many of the issues which are traditionally seen as root 
causes of terror.” Andrew Silke, “Fire of Iolaus: The role of state countermeasures in causing 
terrorism and what needs to be done,” In Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways 
Forward, ed. by Tore Bjørgo (London and New York, Routledge, 2005), 241. Mikkel Thorup 
and Morten Brænder argue that parts of states’ fight of terrorism will create further 
radicalization and violence. Mikkel Thorup and Morten Brænder, “Undtagelse og terror,” In 
Antiterrorismens idehistorie – stater og vold i 500 år, ed. by Thorup and Brænder (Aarhus: 
Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2007), 50. 
Often terror groups aim at triggering an overreaction by state organs just in order to reap 
recruitment benefits. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: 
Lessons from the Past (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 97. 
61 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 63-69. Costigan and Stone, Civil 
Liberties & Human Rights, 455. Similar trends could be observed for the cases of Algeria, 
Palestine, Cyprus and Kenia. See also my references on historical British anti- and counter-
terrorism efforts in Chapter 4.  
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liberty, and anti-terrorism and human rights, that can easily be adjusted and 
that will provide security gains in both short and long term scenarios, does 
not hold true. The relationship between human rights and security (or anti-
terrorism) is not an inevitable zero-sum game.62 
Now, instead of seeing anti-terrorism and human rights as mutually 
exclusive, one should regard the support of human rights as a promising way 
of decreasing the risk of terrorism. This position is the third perspective 
presented here and at the same time the position that this thesis tries to 
support. I would, thus, like to argue, that the very upholding of human rights 
standards is a necessary basis for effective anti-terrorism policies. In fact, the 
support of human rights norms and an increase in the level of enjoyment of 
human rights in society is an important part of anti-terrorism. 63 Just as certain 
levels of security can be the basis for the enjoyment of rights, so can rights 
be the basis for the enjoyment of security.64 Support of human rights might 
make a country not less, but more safe, e.g., by pointing, again, to the issue 
of violent radicalization. Supporting the idea of human rights and putting 
effort into a high level of rights enjoyment in society is a viable way to 
decrease the threat of terrorism in the long run. If one understands terrorism 
(at least partly) as an effect of underlying variables (root causes), then the 
best strategy appears to be to tackle these variables instead of aggravating 
the effects of said variables.65 Or, as Donohue put it: “If part of the reason 
for the violence in the first place is related to constricted liberty, will further 
restricting freedoms […] have the desired effect?”66 In turn, the support of 
                                                          
62 Lindstrom, “The EU’s approach to Homeland Security,” 130. 
63 Shafir, Brysk and Wehrenfennig argue in a similar direction. Gershon Shafir, Alison Brysk 
and Daniel Wehrenfennig, “Conclusion,” In National Insecurity and Human Rights: 
Democracies Debate Counterterrorism, ed. by Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007), 177. The same is valid for Monshipouri. Monshipouri, 
Terrorism, Security, and Human Rights, 171. 
64 For instance, Berthold Meyer argues that security efforts have given important stimulation 
to the whole ‘process of civilization’.” Berthold Meyer, “Fighting Terrorism by Tightening 
Laws: A Tightrope Walk between Protecting Security and Losing Liberty,” In Fighting 
Terrorism in the Liberal State, ed. by Samuel Peleg and Wilhelm Kempf (Amsterdam: IOS 
Press, 2006), 88. 
65 Michael Bauer and Cornelia Beyer claim that terrorism policies of states should address the 
root causes at the social level to deny radicalization. Cornelia Beyer and Michael Bauer, 
“Introduction,” In Effectively Countering Terrorism, ed. by Cornelia Beyer and Michael 
Bauer (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 2. Richard English too claims that states 
should, when possible, address underlying root causes. English, Terrorism: How to Respond. 
Again, Dershowitz shows a very different opinion. Dershowitz claimed that states should not 
try to solve the root causes of terrorism. He even claimed that doing so would mean offering 
encouragement to terrorism, as this would indicate to terrorists that their tactic is effective. 
“We must commit ourselves never to try to understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, 
but rather to place it beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation,” Dershowitz held. 
Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, 24. 
66 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 63. 
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human rights to a degree that avoids grievances, experiences of injustice and 
lacking opportunities (as much as possible) opens up for a higher degree of 
security as well.67 The provision of high human rights standards is in this 
sense understood as terrorism prevention. Via refraining from violating 
human rights in the course of anti-terrorism, as well as actively working for 
individuals to enjoy the maximum of rights in the first place (e.g., via social 
programs, fighting discrimination, supporting education and supporting the 
full enjoyment of human capabilities at large), terrorist movements will find 
it much harder to recruit new members, as well as convince individuals of 
social groups they seek to represent to take up violent means in order to 
represent the interests of these social groups.68 In other words, actively 
supporting human rights is a component of increasing security levels.69 
Fittingly, Scott Atran holds that “ethnic profiling, isolation and preemptive 
attack on potential (but not yet actual) supporters of terrorism probably will 
not help […], reducing perceived humiliation may help.”70 Since experiences 
of discrimination undermine trust in state organs, as a recent study has 
shown, avoiding the causation of more injustices and grievances would also 
help in upholding or re-establishing cooperation of minority groups with 
state organs.71 That way, it would become more likely that information about 
                                                          
67 Andreas Bock argues in a similar direction when he claims that states should try to contain 
the psychological roots of terrorism. States should counter-act the perceptions of 
discrimination and humiliation among big parts of the Muslim population in Western and non-
Western countries. States should try to ‘win the hearts’ of people instead of creating 
belligerent strategies. Andreas Bock, Terrorismus (Paderborn: UTB, 2009). Wilkinson argued 
in a similar way, when he claimed that governments should engage more in a “battle of ideas”, 
in order to prevent frustrated citizens from turning to terrorism. Paul Wilkinson, “International 
terrorism: the changing threat and the EU’s response,” Chaillot Paper, Vol. 84 (2005): 84. 
68 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 74. Monshipouri, Terrorism, Security, 
and Human Rights, 173. 
Admittedly, empirical studies have struggled to show a clear correlation between increased 
education levels and a preventive effect in terms of terrorism. See e.g., Alan B. Krueger and 
Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17 No. 4 (2003). Still, improving education levels is not the 
only necessary approach here, but only one of a wider range of approaches. 
69 Donohue argues for an active support of rights as well in order to increase security of 
societies. Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 68. 
70 Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” 1538. Communications scholar Richard Leeman 
had already constructed a normative approach to terrorism policies in the 1990s, in which he 
clearly emphasized prevention measures. His starting point was to prevent conflict altogether. 
The prevention of explicit acts of terror is only a second step in his conception. Leeman 
underlines that terrorism policy objectives will have to be in line with “democratic value 
system[s]”, and should prevent to abandon democratic principles in the course of such 
policies. Richard Leeman, The Rhetoric of Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 12. 
71 Centre d’étude sur les Conflicts, "The Effects of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-
Radicalisation Policies on Muslim Populations in France: A quantitative Study," June 28, 
2019. 
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imminent attacks will reach relevant organs and security would actually be 
increased, instead of diminished.72 
Several researchers in the field support the position I take here. For 
instance, Gearty holds that security cannot be delivered without an “effective 
system of human rights protection.”73 Paul Hoffman argued that “a war on 
terror waged without respect for the rule of law undermines the very values 
that it presumes to protect” and that “the fulfillment of universal human 
rights is essential to building a world in which terrorism will not undermine 
our freedom and security.”74 Zygmunt Bauman called on leaders to focus on 
solving the root causes of terrorism and thereby deprive “the terror-lovers 
and promoters of the luxury of ample and still swelling recruiting ground.”75 
Brysk held in a 2007 publication that “if we can rethink national security so 
it is […] an evolving mode of protection for citizens from both external and 
institutional violence, human rights become neither a trade-off nor a luxury. 
Rather, they constitute an integral part of a sustainable defense of the 
citizenry and the democratic political community.”76 She furthermore points 
out that national security builds on human security, which in turn rests on 
human rights.77 
A position claiming that supporting rights and constructing politics 
aiming at the maximal enjoyment of rights can lead to security benefits is, 
however, not only taken by academics, but also by representatives of 
international organizations, e.g., the UN.78 For instance, Sergio Vieira de 
                                                          
72 As Donohue pointed out, a loss of trust is counter-productive in terms of anti-terrorism 
since alienated communities will provide less information about potential imminent threats to 
state organs. Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 64.  Todd Landman and Nick 
Brooke emphasize such points as well. Todd Landman, “Imminence and Proportionality: The 
U.S. and U.K. Responses to Global Terrorism,” California Western International Law 
Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2007): 89. Nick Brooke, “Learning the Lessons of Terrorist Failure: 
The Dogs that Didn’t Bark in Scotland and Wales,” ICCT Policy Brief, (2019): 11. 
73 Gearty, Liberty and Security, 113. 
74 Hoffman, “Human Rights and Terrorism,” 932-934. 
75 Bauman furthermore claims that one should rather be afraid of Europe “stooping to the 
terrorists’ mindset and code of behavior”, as well as giving up on its defining ideas, e.g., 
morality, liberty, and equality. Zygmunt Bauman, “A Few Comments on the Mis-Imagined 
War on Terrorism,” socialeurope.eu, March 29, 2016. 
76 Brysk, “Human Rights and National Insecurity,” 2. 
77 Ibid., 13. In a slightly more neutral tone, Alex Schmid deemed that upholding the moral 
high ground, when faced with a terrorist threat, would be more important than intelligence in 
the long run. Alex Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 32. 
78 The same is valid for NGOs working in the human rights field. For instance, Amnesty 
International argues that human rights protection and protection against terrorism are two 
mutually reinforcing concepts, instead of contradictory ideas. They argue that necessary anti-
terrorism measures could be carried out inside the boundaries of human rights law and that 
upholding the own moral high ground (by living up to the own standards) lets the number of 
people motivated to carry out terror attacks decline. Amnesty International, Security and 
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Mello, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights shared this view 
when he declared in 2002 that “the best — the only — strategy to isolate and 
defeat terrorism is by respecting human rights, fostering social justice, 
enhancing democracy and upholding the primacy of the rule of law.”79 
Furthermore, Kofi Annan - then UN Secretary-General – declared, “there is 
no trade-off between effective action against terrorism and the protection of 
human rights. On the contrary, I believe that in the long run, we shall find 
that human rights, along with democracy and social justice, are one of the 
best prophylactics against terrorism.”80 Later, he added that “respect for 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are essential tools 
in the effort to combat terrorism — not privileges to be sacrificed at a time 
of tension.” Otherwise, Annan underlined, “we deliver victory to terrorists 
no act of theirs could achieve.”81  
National governments have, in opposition to UN representatives, 
been more careful in terms of declaring the support of human rights for a 
strategy that can increase security (if they have not taken a trade-off stance 
as exemplified above). For instance, the German government on the occasion 
of Germany taking over the chair of the OSCE in January 2016, argued for 
the general compatibility of human rights and anti-terrorism. The then 
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier declared that both the 
support of human rights principles and the fight against terrorism would be 
at the core of the German chair presidency of the OSCE.82 Thus, the 
                                                          
Human Rights: Counter-Terrorism and the United Nations (London, Amnesty International 
Publications, 2008), 15. 
79 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Terrorism.” 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/. 
80 Kofi Annan as cited in Alex P. Schmid, ”Terrorism and Human Rights: A Perspective from 
the United Nations,” In Terrorism and Human Rights, ed. by Magnus Ranstorp and Paul 
Wilkinson (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
81 Annan as cited in David Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights (Harlow: 
Longman, 2009), 33. The new Secretary General of the UN, Antonio Guterres argues in a 
similar fashion. In a speech at the SOAS University in London, he held that: “Terrorism is 
fundamentally the denial and destruction of human rights. The fight against terrorism will 
never succeed by perpetuating the same denial and destruction. […] Terrorism thrives when 
disenfranchised people meet nothing but indifference and nihilism. It is deeply rooted in 
hopelessness and despair […] societies based on respect for human rights and with economic 
opportunities for all represent the most tangible and meaningful alternative to the recruitment 
strategies of terrorist groups.” United Nations Association, “Terrorism is fundamentally the 
denial & destruction of human rights: UN chief's robust, principled approach to countering 
terrorism,” November 16, 2017. Not all UN representatives have, however, directly pointed 
to a supportive role of human rights. Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, formulated more neutrally that it is possible to fight terrorism “while fully 
upholding human rights.” Robinson as cited in Whittaker, Counter-Terrorism and Human 
Rights, 33. 
82 OSCE, “Dialogue, trust and security are watchwords for 2016 Germany’s OSCE 
Chairmanship, Foreign Minister Steinmeier tells OSCE Permanent Council,” July 2, 2015. 
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awareness for human rights as a potentially effective tool in terms of 
decreasing terror threats still needs to be better developed at the level of 
European governments (especially when reflecting the statements by Tony 
Blair and Theresa May provided earlier). Still, a policy line that supports 
human rights instead of undermining them not only lives up to binding legal 
obligations as well as the spirit of rights, it additionally constitutes a policy 
line that bears a larger potential for reducing terror threats. 
 
                                                          
The EU has in a similar fashion pledged to fight terrorism while respecting human rights. See 
e.g., the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2005. Of course, concerning such government 
statements, it is always the question to what extent speeches, publications, and policy papers 
are consistent with the actual anti-terrorism policies carried out by such authorities. 
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Conclusion 
I have tried to show that human rights have been undermined by anti-
terrorism policies in the cases of Germany, the UK, and the EU. Several 
courts ruled that despite existing terror threats some anti-terrorism policies 
have not been upholding demands for rights limitation and derogation (often 
proportionality).1 Based on such court rulings and readings of important 
rights documents from the ECHR to the ICCPR, my sense is that many 
policies involved in current European anti-terrorism stand on very shaky 
legal ground. However, as a larger point, wider human rights aims emanating 
from the UDHR and the spirit of rights have been violated in numerous 
cases.2 Therein, a range of rights for citizens and residents of the mentioned 
countries have come under pressure. These rights include the right to privacy, 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of 
movement and the right to life, liberty and security. A range of policies or 
measures additionally entailed a discriminatory character, violating the right 
to be free from discrimination. The UK has implemented the greatest number 
of rights invasive policies and arguably the policies with the most severe 
impact on human rights. Examples of such policies are the former practice 
of indefinite detention of foreign terror suspects, the UK’s data retention 
scheme, British mass surveillance or the IP Act. Germany has curtailed rights 
in the course of anti-terrorism policy as well, e.g. via policies on data 
retention, its Air Security Law, or dragnet investigations. The EU is e.g., 
responsible for criticizable policies in relation to data retention, the collection 
of flight data, or the construction of biometric databases. Therein, all three 
cases arguably contribute to the deterioration of rights standards in European 
anti-terrorism. 
The policy line by the players addressed here has become ever 
stricter and gradually more rights invasive; alleviations have been only rarely 
detectable (if so, then only for isolated policies), a softening of the general 
policy line (or a rolling back of infringing anti-terrorism measures) has not 
taken place in any of the analyzed cases, even in years when the frequency 
of terror attacks dropped.3 Accordingly, sunset clauses were only attached to 
                                                          
1 In other words, anti-terrorism policies did often not survive the legal evaluation of weighing 
different rights principles (e.g. the rights to bodily integrity or security against the mentioned 
undermined rights) against each other (Rechtsgüterabwägung in German).   
2 The political motivation for implementing such policies often seems to stem from a 
widespread perception of being too vulnerable to terrorist threats in case such policies are not 
implemented. The trigger for implementation is often a concrete attack, sometimes in 
combination with public cries for more security. Thus, many anti-terrorism policies are 
implemented in order to give the majority of society a feeling of reassurance by sacrificing 
freedoms and rights in the course of installing a perception of stability and security. 
3 Gearty evaluates that current anti-terrorism legislation tends to be permanent, instead of 
constituting a time-limited response. Conor Gearty, “No Golden Age: The Deep Origins and 
Current Utility of Western Counter-Terrorism Policy,” In Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 91. Jeanne 
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anti-terrorism legislation in the minority of cases.4 In general, the restriction 
of and derogation from rights norms has rather become the norm than the 
exception in European anti-terrorism. This trend is not surprising if one 
reflects on how the threat by terrorism is often understood. Since anti-
terrorism measures are implemented to tackle or solve the problem of 
terrorism, the amount of anti-terrorism must logically increase, as terrorism 
can never be defeated or eradicated in its entirety.5 Therefore, one can 
witness a continuous addition of new layers of anti-terrorism. When a 
specific anti-terrorism policy or practice was stopped in the latest years, then 
it was predominantly against the background of a ruling in a relevant 
international or national court. In essence, European anti-terrorism policy 
follows a trend of “increased reliance on the precautionary logic”.6 Such a 
precautionary logic aims at preventing risks at almost all costs, even when 
causalities are unclear and the interferences with human rights might be 
highly disproportionate to existing risks.7 The party affiliation of high-stake 
policymakers (the governments) does not seem to play a decisive role in 
terms of such processes (in all three cases). 
In general, two major approaches to dealing with terrorism could be 
detected among the three analyzed cases. First, to construct a system that is 
supposed to scan all of society for potential threats, and second, to 
                                                          
Bonnici speculated in 2007 that potentially a major case of breach of privacy rights becoming 
public could restore “the balance between security and rights” in the sense of decreasing rights 
infringing measures against the populations’ privacy. Jeanne Bonnici, “Recent European 
Union developments on data protection … in the name of Islam or ‘Combating Terrorism’” 
Information & Communication Technology Law, Vol. 16 No. 2 (2007), 173. However, 
although such a big case did indeed occur with the Snowden revelations, not much changed 
in terms of rights infringing surveillance and its detriment effects on privacy rights. 
4 Monica den Boer, ”Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance 
Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis,” Intelligence & National Security, Vol. 
30 No. 2-3 (2015): 220. 
5 English holds that one key aspect of responding to terrorism would be the acknowledgment 
that “terrorism is not going to go away”. He evaluates that the War on Terror can never end, 
as “war against terrorism as such is not winnable, we cannot utterly eliminate terrorism”. We 
would have to learn to live with this fact, and rather concentrate on minimizing destruction 
and casualties. Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 122. 
6 den Boer, ”Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU,” 219. Such a trend is, 
however, not only detectable for Europe but the Western world as such, or even on a global 
level. For instance, John Ashcroft, Attorney General under George W. Bush, spoke openly of 
the US following such a ‘paradigm of prevention.’ Ashcroft as cited in David Cole, 
“Respecting civil liberties and preventing overreach are critical to preserving America’s 
security and ideals,” In Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives 
on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, ed. by Stuart Gottlieb (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 
2010). 
7 Cass Sunstein, Laws of Fear – Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
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concentrate on the social group that is perceived to constitute the most severe 
threat. Both approaches are implemented simultaneously.  
The first approach is reflected by a trend towards an increasingly dense net 
of broad surveillance in efforts of detecting alleged radicals among the own 
population.8 The use of surveillance has become a permanent institution, and 
surveillance of individuals is no longer connected to genuine suspicion.9 
However, this approach of moving towards all-encompassing surveillance is 
both ineffective and rights-invasive. As pointed out earlier, surveillance 
interferes with the right to privacy, freedoms of expression, assembly, 
association, and movement. By undermining these rights, the independent 
role of the citizen in society is endangered. Therein, wide-scale surveillance 
measures change the relationship between the individual and the state, to the 
advantage of the state. Democratic societies rest on the idea that its citizens 
hold the state accountable; however, in a surveillance society, the state is 
holding its citizens accountable.10 If privacy is “a matter of individual control 
and choice,” surveillance eradicates this possibility of self-determination.11 
Via digital storage of information, authorities can potentially save decades 
of communication of every individual. The movement of individuals can be 
surveyed as well in a detailed fashion. Surveillance, therein, becomes a tool 
for social control.12 Awareness of such developments might lead to self-
censorship, a damaged public sphere, and a more conformist society. 
Thereby, everyone’s potential to speak truth to power - indispensable for 
every functioning democracy - is damaged.13 This trend of growing 
surveillance warrants comparison to Bentham’s Panopticon. Just as the 
Panopticon, the increasingly dense net of surveillance that individuals are 
faced with triggers the preconditions for some parts of society to eradicate 
unwished behavior and become more conforming. Online surveillance, as 
well as surveillance of public areas, might thus make the Panopticon’s 
promise of a less visible but effective state control a reality. Reflecting on 
                                                          
8 Torin Monhan spoke of a trend towards a growing pervasiveness of surveillance as well. 
Torin Monahan, ”Surveillance as governance: Social inequality and the pursuit of democratic 
surveillance,” In Surveillance and Democracy, ed. by Kevin D. Haggerty and Minas Samatas 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 105. 
Indeed, the UK has played an active and important role in the construction of this extensive 
surveillance system, with Germany and the EU supporting the major players of Western 
surveillance, the Five Eyes (US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). 
9 Konrad Lachmayer and Normann Witzleb, “The Challenge to Privacy from Ever Increasing 
State Surveillance: A Comparative Perspective,” University of New South Wales Law Journal, 
Vol. 37, No. 2 (2014): 774. 
10 The current surveillance system is non-transparent; accordingly, it is not possible to hold 
authorities accountable. 
11 Timothy Garton Ash, Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2016), 288. 
12 Monahan, ”Surveillance as governance,” 105. 
13 Garton Ash, Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World, 292. 
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Foucault’s take on the Panopticon, surveillance is indeed increasing a 
permanent consciousness of state power and opening up for an automatic 
functioning of this power.14 Truly, terrorism policies have had their part in 
constructing a system that knows the potential for all-encompassing 
surveillance to be a reality.15 In the context of such ever-intensified 
surveillance, enabling an ever-growing reach of anti-terrorism, members of 
traditionally free societies “are increasingly becoming glass people,” and 
“tagged pigeons.”16 The effectiveness of such far-reaching measures must be 
questioned. Despite growing amounts of data available to security agencies, 
the latest wave of IS-related terrorism could not be stopped. The biggest 
challenge seems to be to process data in the right way, not to gain more and 
more data. For instance, German authorities had all necessary information 
on Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the 2016 attack on the Berlin Christmas 
market (from traditional sources, not mass surveillance). However, they were 
not processed in an effective way.17 Therein, the potential for a better anti-
terrorism lies also in the improvement of data processing, not the rights 
infringing collection of as many data as possible. 
The second approach, to execute special scrutiny on the perceived 
‘suspect community’ is illegitimate and ineffective as well. The 
discriminatory tendencies against Muslims that can be found in a range of 
anti-terrorism policies, not only violate rights norms, but also contribute to a 
split in society, which is counter-productive.18 Discriminatory tendencies in 
the anti-terrorism policy sector feed into other instances of discrimination or 
‘special treatment’ of Muslim minorities. This amplifies the effect of the 
discriminative anti-terrorism policies. In the latest years, several Western 
societies have adopted laws that ban Burkas and Niqabs, prevent all public 
service employees from wearing headscarves of any variety or halted the 
construction of minarets or mosques.19 When such measures are combined 
                                                          
14 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1977). 
15 Lachmayer and Witzleb, “The Challenge to Privacy from Ever Increasing State 
Surveillance,” 774. 
16 Garton Ash, Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World, 283, 324. 
17 As mentioned earlier, the 9/11 Commission pointed out similar problems in connection with 
the 9/11 attacks. 
18 Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science, Vol. 299 No. 5612 (2003): 1538. 
Discrimination on basis of ethnicity or religion is further listed as one of fourteen 
preconditions of terrorism in Tore Bjørgo, The Root Causes of Terrorism. Adrian Hyde-Price, 
”Germany: Redefining its security role,“ In Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan 
and Beyond, ed. by Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
19 Radhika Sanghani, "Burka bans: The countries where Muslim women can't wear veils," The 
Telegraph, August 17, 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/burka-bans-the-
countries-where-muslim-women-cant-wear-veils/. Nick Cumming-Bruce and Steven 
Erlanger, "Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques," The New York Times, November 
29, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/world/europe/30swiss.html. 
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with anti-terrorism policies that mainly target Muslim minorities, e.g. in 
terms of de-radicalization, and coupled with at times aggressive foreign 
policy towards the Middle East, as well as a social context that sees Muslim 
minorities to hold a lower average income and education levels, higher 
unemployment and poverty rates, the perception of discrimination is 
amplified. The perception of being discriminated and standing outside of 
mainstream society increases the risk of additional radicalization and 
recruitment for terrorist actions, it creates more angry and disillusioned 
members inside of Europe’s Muslim communities.20 Such perceptions will 
distill a tiny minority of individuals that are willing to use violent measures 
in order to overcome grievances of personal or perceived religious nature 
(e.g. by helping to construct a Caliphate).21 In this sense, rights-infringing 
anti-terrorism equals throwing logs on the fire of international and 
intercultural conflict, instead of quenching it. Furthermore, as a consequence 
of a one-sided approach, authorities are not sufficiently prepared against 
other sorts of terrorism, which does not reflect an efficient approach towards 
terrorism as a whole.  
Rights norms came under pressure in Germany, the UK and at the 
EU level, while all three entities were connected to legally binding rights 
norms and while (some) leaders of these entities continue to emphasize the 
importance of rights. Thus, one can point to a clear misfit between human 
rights protection in theory and in practice, constituting what Gearty called an 
“ambiguity towards the practice of human rights” of those very countries that 
are commonly identified with promoting human rights.22 By moving away 
from rights norms and assigning considerably less importance to the overall 
framework of human rights (including plans to step away from of binding 
international rights treaties, e.g., the UK in case of the ECHR and the 
CFREU) such states move away from the “right side of history”.23 However, 
moving away from rights obligations damages European democracies. As 
                                                          
20 Laura Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” In Terrorism and Human Rights, 
ed. by Magnus Ranstorp and Paul Wilkinson (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
Furthermore, police cooperation of minorities is diminished in contexts of discriminatory 
tendencies. Gershon Shafir, Alison Brysk and Daniel Wehrenfennig, “Conclusion,” 180. 
21 The reasons for engagement of individuals in terror groups often rest on personal grievances 
(personal experiences of injustice) or lacking modes of expression (or change), as terrorist 
literature on the psychological aspects tell us. Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the 
Fulcrum,” 63. 
22 Conor Gearty, “Terrorism and Human Rights,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 42 No. 3 
(2007): 346. 
23 After the end of the Cold War, several Western states self-righteously applauded themselves 
“for having been on the right side of history,” as Gearty remarks. This would already at the 
time have reflected double standards, since many Western states were themselves struggling 
with the growing gap between rich and poor, as well as upholding basic social and economic 
human rights, such as healthcare and ensuring social security. Gearty, “Terrorism and Human 
Rights,” 345-346. 
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democracies are dependent on a sound level of individual rights, a trend that 
diminishes individual freedom in a continuous fashion is a severe threat to 
liberal democracy. When governments of liberal states stop to act on liberal 
norms and to protect individual rights democratic systems might become 
fundamentally altered, to the degree that the democratic core of such systems 
vanishes.24  
Moving away from rights obligations, however, undermines not only 
the idea of democracy, but also the mentioned spirit of rights. Therefore, the 
primary issue produced in my analysis may really be the negative effects of 
anti-terrorism measures on the rights’ philosophical framework (the spirit of 
rights). Simply, we are looking at a range of policies eroding the grounds for 
liberty’s universality, the space for the individual’s self-realization, the 
ability to freely formulate opinions and communicate them, and for equal, 
just and dignified treatment of all members of European societies. One can 
make arguments about the need for security. Clearly, that is a human right 
too. Security is, however, not the only human right, or a more important right. 
Therein, one can wonder what attempts to increase security are worth if it 
does not allow for broad senses of dignity, democratic practice, inclusion, 
and the ability of individuals to pursue their capabilities. The gold standard 
for human rights is whether or not one is able to engage in the “full” 
realization and development of the self. If one needs to fear retribution by 
the state if one holds an unusual opinion, is a member of an ethnic minority, 
or may not have citizenship in the nation in which one resides, then the 
conditions for such a full realization and development are not provided. For 
sure, one has a right not to be harmed in one’s physical integrity by a terrorist 
attack. One also has a right, however, to enjoy the protection of all other 
rights emanating from the human rights framework; only when all rights are 
regarded, the promise of universal, indivisible and inalienable rights is 
fulfilled. In any case, individuals in European societies - and in Western 
societies in general - need to ask themselves the crucial question if they are 
willing to continue legitimizing political leaders in curtailing, or at least 
making de facto overtures to curtailing essential human rights.  
                                                          
24 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 67. Furthermore, rights infringing anti-
terrorism measures have potential repercussions on rights practices in authoritarian or 
dictatorial regimes. Such regimes will gain the option to hide behind European malpractices 
or justifications concerning their own rights violations. Conor Gearty, Liberty and Security 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 103. By not living up to their own standards, the entities in 
focus in this study make it easier for other players to excuse policies, which violate human 
rights. In this context, Tim Dunne warns against “copy-cat breaches of fundamental rights” in 
China, Russia, Israel or Egypt. This point follows the fact that governments import and export 
anti- and counter-terrorism measures and policies. Tim Dunne, “The Rules of the Game are 
Changing: Fundamental Human Rights in Crisis After 9/11,” International Politics, Vol. 44 
(2007): 281. Shafir, Brysk and Wehrenfennig, “Conclusion,” 182. 
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On these grounds, I would like to emphasize anti-terrorism 
approaches that potentially will have a positive impact without endangering 
rights and democracy. These approaches are both short-term and long-term 
and rest on a mix of ‘sticks and carrots’.25 This duality of approaches reflects 
state authorities’ problem to be pressed to react swiftly to concrete acts of 
terrorism while trying to construct a long-term strategy in order to undermine 
the phenomenon.26 Too often after 9/11, governments have given the 
impression to rest too much on short-term approaches. However, a definition 
of long-term goals and approaches is a necessity.27 Admittedly, as no ‘silver 
bullet’ against terrorism exists, also the following approaches will not 
eradicate the threat of terrorism. Still, they might open different allays to 
contain and reduce it.28 Whereas long-term approaches seem more promising 
for preventing terrorism in the first place, legitimate short-term policies are 
necessary in order to tackle the ‘symptoms’ of already existing terrorism. 
Such short-term measures can, for instance, be the surveillance of known 
violence-prone individuals, (so-called ‘endangerers’), legal actions against 
those inciting to concrete violence, banning people from joining a foreign 
war, banning weapons exports and strengthening the resilience of urban 
areas, as well as strengthening police capacities, and European cooperation.29 
                                                          
25 This is broadly following categorizations by Crelinsten and Schmid, as well as Art and 
Richardson. Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmid, “Western responses to terrorism: a twenty-
five-year balance sheet,” In Western Responses to Terrorism, ed. by Crelinsten and Schmid 
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1993). Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and 
Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 
2007), 564. 
26 David Long recognized this problem already in 1995. David Long, The Anatomy of 
Terrorism (New York: Free Press, 1995). 
27 Art and Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism, 97. Admittedly, some state 
strategies behind terrorism policies do include long-term approaches, aiming at tackling the 
roots causes of terrorism, e.g., the UK’s CONTEST strategy. However, these approaches, for 
instance an outreach to the Muslim community or poverty eradication are not prioritized and 
not delivered upon. Qurine Eijkman and Baart Schuurman, Preventive Counter-Terrorism and 
Non-Discrimination in the European Union: A Call for Systematic Evaluation (The Hague: 
ICCT, 2011), 5. 
28 Art and Richardson point out that there is no silver bullet to fight terrorism and that this 
simple fact deserves continuous reiteration. Art and Richardson, Democracy and 
Counterterrorism, 564. 
29 David Omand rightly claims that in order to improve security, cooperation between 
European intelligence powers is necessary. David Omand, “Pursue and Prevent: Keynote 
Panel Discussion, Security – Judicial Oversight – Secure Communications – Cost Civil 
Liberties: Can we strike a balance between these competing priorities?” World Counter Terror 
Congress, London, April 19-20, 2016. English too argues that close coordination in the course 
of terrorism policies would be crucial, both between domestic institutions and on the 
international level (e.g., between local police forces). English, Terrorism: How to Respond? 
Leeman held already at the beginning of the 1990s that “the primary objective of international 
counterterrorism should, therefore, be to ensure international cooperation, especially for the 
purpose of preventing the escalation of conflict.” Richard Leeman, The Rhetoric of Terrorism 
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However, this must be done in accordance with human rights standards. One 
might furthermore try to get into a dialogue with groups responsible for 
terrorist actions, not in order to necessarily start negotiations and make 
concessions, but rather to launch a process of discourse and counter-
discourse in the public sphere, which might in effect reveal the moral, 
empathic and humane emptiness of certain violent groups (e.g. IS).30 
The upholding of rights standards is also a necessity in efforts to de-
radicalize violence-prone extremists or to prevent radicalization in the first 
place. For sure, anti-radicalization programs are acting on a fine line, 
between potentially undermining rights and freedoms and benefitting 
societal security. Instead of operating with confrontational approaches, as the 
British Channel program, anti-radicalization programs should rather 
implement an inclusionary approach as its cornerstone. If anti-radicalization 
efforts and programs do not interfere with human rights, they can form 
legitimate tools of anti-terrorism.31 The prevention of violence-prone 
radicalization of minor age refugees would be an important application area 
for inclusive anti-radicalization efforts. This is especially valid for those 
minor age refugees who entered Europe all alone and are thus particularly 
vulnerable to radicalization (as well as crime).32 Alone eight thousand minor 
age refugees have been reported missing in Germany alone in the last years 
(as of 2017). Many of them find themselves in desperate situations and are 
thus vulnerable to harmful influences, including radical violent Islamism. 
This is valid for minors in prisons as well. A 2018 study amongst thirty-two 
German juvenile prisons showed that three-quarters of them were dealing 
with radicalization issues of inmates (both Islamist and rights wing, 
including incitement to violence). However, only half of the prisons were 
offering support programs for such inmates (e.g., exit support or anti-
                                                          
and Counterterrorism (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991), 12. 
30 Still, Bock evaluates that negotiating with terrorists and terroristic organizations could be a 
promising strategy. By negotiating one could give potential supporters of terrorists the 
perception that only non-violent measures such as making compromises bring progress. This 
would diminish the picture of Western governments as ‘the enemy’, and in consequence, 
diminish the number of potential supporters of terrorism. Andreas Bock, Terrorismus 
(Paderborn: UTB, 2009), 70-86. 
31 One component of a broad scale anti-radicalization effort, which would reflect a 
democratization effort at the same time, could be educational initiatives in terms of digital 
literacy and critical consumption. This might be a promising approach in an age of growing 
post-factualism. Julia Ebner, The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right 
Extremism (London and New York, I.B. Tauris, 2017), 205.  
32 An Israeli study showed that individuals in desperate situations are more receptive for 
radical ‘solutions’ including violent acts. Angelika Finkenwirth, "Terrorismus: Gefährder 
abschieben ist nur ein Teil der Prävention," Zeit Online, July 31, 2017. 
https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-07/terrorismus-gefaehrder-praevention-faq 
357 
 
aggression training).33 Of course, the provision of ‘treatment’ programs in 
prisons does not guarantee success, although some specific approaches such 
as early release options as rewards or exposure to ‘mainstream’ Islam appear 
to have potential. Of course, to expect that such programs will work with 
everyone would be unrealistic, but a lack of such programs will for sure 
produce worse results.34 
Another short-term (or potentially middle-range) strategy pertains to 
European intelligence services. It has been pointed out that powers given 
away to intelligence agencies will always be used, and additionally almost 
always be misused.35 This claim connects with a point by Shoshana Zuboff 
who argued, “every digital application that can be used for surveillance and 
control will be used for surveillance and control, irrespective of its 
originating intention.”36 Global terrorism has often provided a welcome 
justification to intensify the grip of intelligence agencies on individuals’ data 
and to enlarge surveillance programs.37 Therefore, it is not enough to call on 
intelligence services not to misuse powers provided to them, rather, effective 
scrutiny and oversight on the actions of such agencies are necessary, 
combined with a larger amount of transparency.38 
Another short-term approach, when reflecting on the media and 
public, would be to reduce alarmist attitudes. For sure, attacks are tragic 
events; however, does every attack have to lead to new demands for sharper 
anti-terrorism policies? Clearly, ignoring the problem is not going to be 
effective as well, but there is a difference between hysteric alarmism and 
rational observation of developments (this includes the attitude of mass 
media). Therefore, ‘to learn to live with it’, or an attitude towards terrorism 
                                                          
33 Nadine Zeller, “Radikalisierung statt Resozialisierung: In Jugendgefängnissen verbreitet 
sich der Salafismus.” Allgemeine Zeitung, February 25, 2018. 
Such de-radicalization or prevention programs reflect a battle of ideas (sometimes called for 
the ‘battle for the hearts and minds’). For example, Alex Schmid proposes such a battle as one 
of his twelve rules for preventing and combatting terrorism. Alex Schmid, The Routledge 
Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2013), 38. 
34 Andrew Silke, “Terrorists and extremists in prison: Psychological Issues in management 
and reform,” In The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Andrew Silke (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2011), 131-132. 
35 Eric King, “Pursue and Prevent: Keynote Panel Discussion,” World Counter Terror 
Congress, London, April 19-20, 2016. 
36 Shoshana Zuboff, “Be the friction – our response to the New Lords of the Ring,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 25, 2013. 
37 Adrian Guelke, “Secrets and Lies: Misinformation and Counter-Terrorism,” In Illusions of 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 108. 
38 Shafir, Brysk and Wehrenfennig argue in a similar direction when they demand that national 
security policies must be made more transparent and protected from serving the interests of a 
narrow elite. Gershon Shafir, Alison Brysk and Daniel Wehrenfennig, “Conclusion,” 179. 
Martin Scheinin rightly demands more scrutiny for all anti-terrorism legislation (including 
legislation steering intelligence agencies). Scheinin, “Terrorism,” 557. 
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that resembles the British ‘Stiff Upper Lip’39 towards the German Blitz in 
the 1940s would be a more prudent attitude. A change of attitude could, as 
well, diminish the pressure perceived by leading politicians to be forced to 
deliver an ever-enhancing anti-terrorism framework in order to please 
frightened citizens. Arguably, first signs of such a ‘Stiff Upper Lip’ were 
perceivable amongst the German public after the attack on the Christmas 
market in Berlin in December 2016. The public reacted not with hysteria, but 
with considerateness. However, German politicians were instinctively 
willing to tighten the anti-terrorism legislation, even before an analysis of the 
attack was provided. Thus, a change of attitude towards Islamist terrorism 
might be developed on the side of the population, before being adopted by 
policymakers. 
As an addition to these short-term strategies, temporary limitations 
of and derogations from (few) rights, are not inconceivable. However, only 
in exceptional situations and if they are clearly necessary for a reduction of 
the threat and if they are transparent and short-term (sunset clauses could be 
an effective way of increasing the likelihood of the last).40 Furthermore, they 
cannot be of such frequency that they would become the rule instead of the 
exception (as it seems to be the trend in several European countries).  
Generally, (inclusive) long-term approaches seem more promising 
in order to reduce the general level of potential terrorist violence, than trying 
to tackle the symptoms.41 The overall idea is to tackle the root causes of 
terrorism and to respond to grievances that might trigger violent reactions 
such as terror tactics.42 Therein, Western societies need to look at their own 
                                                          
39 English, Terrorism: How to Respond?, 120. Peter Lehr, “PURSUE and PROTECT: 
Looking Ahead – How Can We Expect Terror, and Counter Terror, to Develop over the 
Medium-Term?” World Counter Terror Congress, London, April 19-20, 2016. One might also 
use Herfried Münkler’s term of ‘heroic composure’. Herfried Münkler, “Der Terror und wir,” 
In Terrorismus und Extremismus: der Zukunft auf der Spur, ed. by Uwe Kemmesies 
(München: Luchterhand, 2006). 
40 Costigan and Stone fittingly emphasized that the crucial category in terms rights restrictions 
is necessity (as opposed to e.g. a ‘balance’). Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, Civil Liberties 
& Human Rights, 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 454. Gustav Lindstrom 
supported the idea of an increased usage of sunset clauses. Lindstrom, “The EU’s approach 
to Homeland Security,” 131. 
41 Long-term approaches almost necessarily need to try to bolster rights instead of pressing 
them, since – as explained earlier – a strategy of pressing rights in the name of security is 
likely to be counter-productive in the long run. Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the 
Fulcrum,” 73. In this sense they need to be inclusive approaches, as e.g., proposed by Clive 
Walker. Walker holds that democracies faced by terrorism must remain inclusive and must 
hold their nerve and their “cherished values in the face of the heat and light of the terrorist 
spectacular.” Clive Walker, “Policy Options and Priorities: British Perspectives”, In 
Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, ed. by 
Marianne van Leeuwen (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 35. 
42 Shafir, Brysk and Wehrenfennig share my demand to tackle such grievances in order to 
decrease the threat of terrorism. Shafir, Brysk and Wehrenfennig, “Conclusion,” 180. So do 
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shortcomings. A starting point is here to reconsider foreign policy, e.g. 
abandoning overreactions such as military invasions, which stir resentment 
and additionally might leave a power vacuum for extremist forces or 
reconsidering alliances with extremist regimes, e.g., Saudi Arabia.43 
Additional potentially promising focal points aiming at the ‘external’ are a 
process of successful development support (including humanitarian help) 
and conflict prevention abroad.44 However, the larger scope of policy options 
lies in the domestic arena. Here Western states need to reconsider some 
shortcomings as well. I have already discussed how avoiding reactions from 
the side of authorities that are rights evasive (and especially discriminatory), 
will create fewer angry and frustrated individuals and will be beneficial in 
the long-run. This approach is to be suggested as one domestic focal point. 
Still, a more active policy approach is asked as well. This pertains to facing 
shortcomings in terms of injustices in social policy which higher the risk of 
people turning to terrorist violence.45 For example, to strengthen efforts of 
integrating youths with migrant backgrounds into the labor market, as well 
as society and culture at large, in order to prevent them from turning to other 
alternatives deems highly significant.46 Such efforts point at a full enjoyment 
                                                          
Michael Bauer and Cornelia Beyer, who claim that terrorism policies of states should address 
the root causes at the societal level to deny radicalization. Cornelia Beyer and Michael Bauer, 
“Introduction,” In Effectively Countering Terrorism, ed. by Beyer and Bauer (Brighton: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 2. 
43 English, for instance, points to the creation of IS which was (at least in part) made possible 
by the US military invasion in Iraq in 2003. Richard English, “Introduction: The Enduring 
Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism,” In Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2015), 2. English builds 
his point, that over-militarized responses should be avoided, on historical examples, which 
would show that “military means can be ambiguous and often counterproductive, […] French 
experience in Algeria, British experience in Northern Ireland and Israeli experience with 
Palestinian terrorism all suggested the limitations of military muscle.” English, Terrorism: 
How to Respond, 120-143. TTSR (Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law) 
Research Project. Theoretical Treatise on Counter-Terrorism Approaches, 2008, 25. 
https://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/. Rashmi Singh, “Counter-Terrorism in the Post 9/11 
Era: successes, Failures and Lessons Learned,” In Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism, ed. by Richard English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
44 Mahmood Monshipouri, Terrorism, Security, and Human Rights (Boulder and London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 6. Humanitarian help is evaluated as a promising strategy 
by Bock in order to reduce hostile attitudes. He explains that the share of people in Indonesia 
holding a positive view of the US increased from fifteen to thirty-eight percent in the course 
of the US emergency help to Indonesia after the big Tsunami in 2004 (the approval of Osama 
Bin Laden dropped from fifty-eight to thirty-five percent meanwhile). Bock, Terrorismus, 70-
86. 
45 Kofi Annan’s statement about a connection between questions of social justice and 
terrorism points in this direction as well. Kofi Annan as cited in Alex P. Schmid, ”Terrorism 
and Human Rights: A Perspective from the United Nations,” In Terrorism and Human Rights, 
ed. by Magnus Ranstorp and Paul Wilkinson (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
46 I mention here the integration of youths as main priority since this group has the highest 
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of ESC rights as an element of preventing violent radicalization and terrorism 
and thus certainly concern a wide range of government action.47 Questions 
of social inequality must come to light in the course of such efforts.48 In other 
words, the full spectrum of rights needs to be supported in order to counteract 
the root causes of terrorism. If such efforts are successful, results in terms of 
decreasing terrorist threats are not unrealistic.49 That some of those ideas 
have been (at least partly) ingrained at top security levels was demonstrated 
when Rob Wainwright, head of Europol, proposed community engagement, 
employment efforts and efforts towards social cohesion in a 2016 speech. 
However, implementation and prioritization of such ideas are still 
insufficient.50 
Considering long-term strategies, one might additionally reflect 
upon ideas to ‘update’ legal human rights norms. We can currently see the 
starting phase of the implementation of technology that increases 
possibilities in various areas, including anti-terrorism, e.g. in regard to 
surveillance. Digitalization, machine learning, and big data processes will 
bring ever-increasing changes to the everyday lives of individuals in our 
societies, enabling an even smoother utilization of online surveillance, GPS 
tracking, centralized databases, facial recognition, and automatic behavior 
evaluation.51 The degree of change these technologies bring might not stand 
behind those social changes triggered by the industrial revolution of the 
nineteenth century. Such potential impacts of new technologies could make 
one raise the question if Western societies need an ‘update’ or a renewal of 
human rights in relation to the digitalization of human lives. Demands for 
such updates have been voiced in the literature.52 One could e.g., imagine a 
                                                          
likelihood to turn to violent means such as terrorism. It is, however, a fact that integration of 
the more than twenty-three million Muslims in Europe is a problem in many member states 
regardless of the age group. Akiva Lorenz, “The European Union's Response to Terrorism,” 
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, May 1, 2006. 
47 Martin Scheinin proposes such an approach. Scheinin, “Terrorism,” 562. 
48 Social injustice is also among the fourteen preconditions of terrorism in Tore Bjørgo, The 
Root Causes of Terrorism. Art and Richardson likewise mention social privation as 
contributing factor to terrorism and point out that governments should address social issues in 
their anti-terrorism efforts. Art and Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism, 577. 
49 Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” 74. 
50 Rob Wainwright, “Protect: Cooperation and International Responses to Security and 
Counter-Terror Strategy in Europe,” World Counter Terror Congress, London, April 19-20, 
2016. 
51 Lachmayer and Witzleb, “The Challenge to Privacy from Ever Increasing State 
Surveillance: 775. Consequences of such innovations might, in dark scenarios, be comparable 
to the social point system already established in parts of China, exercising control over the 
population via assigned value to surveilled behavior. 
52 For instance, Eliza Watt demanded a modernization of article 17 of the ICCPR, including a 
more specific definition of the right to privacy of communication in the digital sphere. Eliza 
Watt, “The right to privacy and the future of mass surveillance,” The International Journal of 
Human Rights, Vol. 21 No. 7 (2017): 787-788. 
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human rights charta for the digital age. However, the human rights regimes 
that are currently in place are, in theory, strong enough to check rights-
curtailing usage of data, they simply need to be respected by governments 
and furthermore defended by populations and the judiciary. It is in this regard 
worrying that certain European governments, including the UK government, 
try to soften up the ECHR, Europe’s most important human rights document. 
If the mentioned technological advances are not checked against their 
potential negative influence on the rights and freedoms of individuals, these 
rights and freedoms might be critically diminished. Certainly, facing and 
challenging these threats to rights regimes is crucial.53  
Another important focal point could arguably be to elevate the 
understanding of the misfit between the perception of threat triggered by 
terrorism and the factual threat it, on average, constitutes for individuals in 
Western society. As mentioned earlier, the risk of being killed or harmed by 
a terror attack is (at least in Western countries) significantly smaller than 
being harmed by other social risks (e.g. crime). However, the human 
tendency to focus on spectacular risks instead of unimposing risks lets the 
perceived threat of terrorism grow and delivers the groundwork for ever-
increasing anti-terrorism. Policymakers, at least at times, take advantage of 
this misperception in order to adopt new security measures and to broaden 
the power base of the state versus its individuals. It is in the face of such 
reflections that states must be urged not to overreact to terrorist threats. Yes, 
such threats are real, and terrorism, unfortunately, causes victims, but 
terrorism does not constitute a threat to the existence of Western states per 
se or a situation comparable to war. And, whereas threat perceptions might 
change societies, it is, in essence, the reactions of public and policymakers 
that decide if terrorism threatens a ‘Western way of life’; e.g. via the 
abolishment of those rights and freedoms that are essential for democratic 
                                                          
53 As mentioned earlier, even Microsoft’s President Brad Smith pointed to the abusive 
potential of facial recognition technology (as one example of the various technologic 
innovations I speak about) and called for government regulation. "Facial recognition: It’s time 
for action," December 6, 2018. 
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Western societies.54 Therefore, as English argues, states should maintain 
strong credibility and refrain from overdoing terrorism threats.55 
No doubt, terrorism by Al-Qaeda, IS and their sympathizers has 
intensified not only threat perceptions, but also fear of and stereotypes 
towards Muslims in Western societies. Increased threat perceptions have 
given political and security elites incentives to adopt ever more policies that 
are supposed to prevent future attacks. Unfortunately, these policies are in 
its biggest majority not inclusive, e.g. attempting to bridge the widening split 
in society but rather aim towards one certain minority, the Muslim minority. 
The consequence is the creation of a new suspect community (e.g. replacing 
‘the Irish’ as suspect community in the UK), which in turn amplifies anger 
and fear inside of Muslim communities, increasing the likelihood of home-
grown (glocal) Islamist violence and in turn, the likelihood of right-wing 
violence and even harsher anti-terrorism policies. This is nothing else than 
the initialization of a vicious circle of reaction and counter-reaction, a vicious 
circle of mutual contempt, as well as violence and counter-violence.56 Now, 
instead of solidifying this vicious circle with the adoption of more rights 
infringing policies, states (and civil society actors) need to aim at breaking 
this circle by implementing inclusive policies, by reducing fear towards a 
minority and by deconstructing the perception of an existing conflict 
between ‘the West’ and Islam’. In short, the ambition must be to unite instead 
of dividing. In utilizing this maxim, in terrorism policy, a starting point 
should be to fight all sources of terrorism with equal seriousness, in other 
                                                          
54 Here I follow an argumentation by e.g., Richard English, (Terrorism: How to Respond), or 
Julia Ebner, (The Rage). Laura Donohue argued that the provocative effect that terrorism aims 
to implement, works only if governments and populations play along this rationale. Donohue, 
“Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum.” Charles Townshend argued in a similar direction 
when he claimed that liberalism in Western societies is not really threatened by terrorism 
itself, but by reactions of the state to the same. A reaction without proportionality, build on 
emergency laws and the usage of special units would decompose liberal traditions. Such 
reaction would, furthermore, endanger the trust of (parts of) the population to the government 
and thus the legitimacy of the government. Charles Townshend, Terrorismus: eine kurze 
Einführung (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 2005), 183. Paul Wilkinson had already in 1979 
warned against the danger of state over-reaction to terrorism. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and 
the Liberal State (London: MacMillan, 1979), 296. 
55 English, Terrorism: How to Respond. For instance, by not acting based on false facts spread 
among the public, as in the case of the US and the 2003 Iraq War. 
56 Julia Ebner describes the relation between Islamist and right-wing extremism in her 2017 
book The Rage. She points out that both camps of violence prone extremists, Islamists and 
right-wing groups can enter in a relationship of “reciprocal radicalization”, including effects 
of victimization and mutual demonization. In a similar note, Roger Eatwell coined the term 
‘cumulative extremism’, describing how “one form of extremism can feed off and magnify 
other forms.” Roger Eatwell, “Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in 
Contemporary Britain,” The Political Quaterly, Vol 77 No. 2 (2006). 
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words, eradicating the bias towards Islamist terrorism and Muslim 
minorities.57 
On a broader note, the strengthening of the idea of human rights and 
of universal empathy is a crucial long-term strategy.58 Suffering and conflicts 
can be sources of political violence, including terrorism. If notions of 
universal empathy for human suffering and concern about political conflicts 
are in decline the probability that ‘we’ as a European community will be able 
to solve intercultural conflicts resulting in violence may decline as well. 
Therefore, strengthening the idea of human rights and supporting notions of 
universal empathy, as well as supporting democratic and cosmopolitan 
identities, can be a way of preventing terrorism in the long run.59 In terms of 
facing violent threats such as terrorism, the principles of human rights and 
rule of law are providing better guidance than attitudes, which build on 
increasing security capabilities at all costs, implementing the precautionary 
principle, or disregarding rights altogether and handing all power to the 
state.60 If a stronger sense of empathy and support for human rights could be 
developed the possibility of the emergence of a bigger public resistance to 
rights infringing anti-terrorism would increase as well. 
I have, in this thesis, tried to argue for an approach towards anti-terrorism 
and towards human societies in general that aims at a maximal fulfillment of 
the human rights idea, enabling a dignified life, a maximal enjoyment of 
human capabilities, and the fulfillment of the rights aims of justice and 
freedom. Of course, one might ask the question if such an approach actually 
rather constitutes a utopia in the face of security threats such as terrorism and 
                                                          
57 Some of my proposed strategies are reflected in contributions by other researchers in the 
field, but especially in publication of Critical Terrorism Studies, see e.g., Sondre Lindahl, “A 
CTS model of counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 10 No. 3 (2017) or 
Benoit Gomis, Counterterrorism: reassessing the policy response (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 
2015). 
58 I point to the importance of universal empathy instead of simply ‘empathy’, since the latter 
can be understood and utilized in a non-universal partisan fashion as well. As Ebner points 
out, violent extremist groups, including groups using terror tactics do motivate their members 
by triggering a sense of empathy for the suffering of a certain group. Empathy for this 
suffering is a part for the explanation for why some individuals join terror groups and are 
willing to risk their life for a political cause. However, the empathy of these individuals does 
not reach further than the boundaries of this specific group, empathy for the suffering of 
victims on ‘the other side’ is not given. Ebner, The Rage. 
59 Shafir, Brysk and Wehrenfennig support the promotion of such identities in their case for a 
“human rights education in the broadest sense.” Shafir, Brysk and Wehrenfennig, 
“Conclusion,” 180. Ronald Crelinsten and Iffet Ozkut demanded a promotion of human rights, 
tolerance and mutual understanding in efforts to create a sociopolitical climate preventing 
conflicts already in 2000. Crelinsten and Ozkut, “Counterterrorism Policy in Fortress Europe: 
Implications for Human Rights,” In European democracies against terrorism: governmental 
policies and intergovernmental cooperation, ed. by Fernando Reinares (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate, 2000), 263. 
60 Gearty, Liberty and Security, 114-115. 
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other potential constraints of Realpolitik.61 In a sense, this approach is utopic, 
yes.62 Especially realists would claim that full enjoyment of human rights, 
especially in the context of terrorist threats, is both unrealistic and 
illegitimate. However, this does not, in my opinion, invalidate a maximalist 
rights framework (and its utopian outlook). First, trying to achieve such a 
utopia provides not only a potential fulfillment of the human rights idea but 
also security benefits. Second, is it not the case that most societies do lay out 
goals or principles which they want to achieve? Indeed, the idea of human 
rights often functions as a strategy, guideline or set of ideas for improving 
the world – creating the “better society,” as such.63 That is, at least in part, 
the point of political society. The Vienna Declaration of 1993 in its preamble 
called upon all UN member states to promote human rights in order to secure 
the full enjoyment of rights. This reflects, in a sense, a call for a utopia as 
well. It at least calls on us to strive for a progressive and better society, build 
on the framework of the idea of universal rights. Reflecting on human rights 
as a guideline for the better society one might point to a statement by Marie-
Benedicte Dembour, who fittingly pointed out that human rights “represent 
the language of not-yet-realized – and ever-to-be reidentified – political 
claims […].”64 In this sense, terrorism cannot be fought by not working 
towards realizing such political claims but only by attempting to do just that. 
                                                          
61 This can be understood as answer to a Realist critique of human rights norms in the context 
of terrorism policies. 
62 Consequentially, Moyn denoted human rights “the last utopia.” Samuel Moyn, The Last 
Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard Bellknap, 2010). 
63 Ben Dorfman, Rights under Trial, Rights Reflections: 13 Further Acts of Academic 
Journalism and Historical Commentary on Human Rights (forthcoming, Frankfurt: Peter 
Lang, 2019). 
64 Marie-Benedicte Dembour, “Human Rights Talk and Anthropological Ambivalence: The 
Particular Contexts of Universal Claims,” In Inside and Outside the Law: Anthropological 
Studies of Authority and Ambiguity, ed. by O. Harris (London: Routledge, 1996), 20. 
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This Ph.D. thesis delivers a human rights-based analysis of post 9/11 
anti-terrorism policies in a European context, looking at the cases of the 
UK, Germany, and the EU. Terrorism policies that are under scrutiny in this 
thesis are e.g. indefinite detention, dragnet investigations, data retention, in-
telligence mass surveillance, facial recognition systems, and various preven-
tion measures. Affected rights are e.g. the right to life, liberty and security, 
the right to privacy, the freedoms of expression, association, assembly, and 
movement and the right to be free from discrimination. The major claim of 
this thesis is that the mentioned entities do curtail essential human rights in 
the course of anti-terrorism since 9/11. Such curtailments threaten the free 
and full unfolding and development of human beings, the full enjoyment of 
human capabilities, and additionally change the power-relation between the 
individual and the state.
